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Shakespeare and the Law: State of the Art
Shakespeare shows us repeatedly what it is to fail in justice.
Regina M. Schwartz, Loving Shakespeare, Living Justice, vii
This volume sets itself within a flourishing production on Shakespeare featuring
legal problems, which has characterized the last twenty years and more, in the
wake of the parallel flourishing of studies on law and literature. The seminal in-
terdisciplinary topic of law and literature, born in the United States, has seeped
into Europe giving rise to innovative studies and researches branching out into
many more comparative studies that have connected law to the most varied dis-
ciplines. The Shakespearean texts, in their endless interpretations and over-inter-
pretations, have very often been the focus of these analyses linking law and lit-
erature, surprising the readers and viewers with the many legal perspectives that
had gone unnoticed so far in the Shakespearean texts.
With any attempt to produce yet another book on Shakespeare and the law,
we must necessarily start with an assessment of the state of the art of the latest
critical studies. This brief survey will hopefully provide the background to show
how the present volume can contribute to the never ending fascination with the
legal aspects of Shakespeare’s plays. For this purpose, a number of recent books
have been singled out for their insightful scrutiny into Elizabethan legal prob-
lems in dramatic productions of the time.
I shall begin with Regina Mara Schwartz’s Loving Shakespeare, Living Jus-
tice¹, a very interdisciplinary text that weaves together literature, psychology,
philosophy, and personal experience. The book starts from the observation
that all books on justice written from a political perspective never mention the
question of love because this emotion is considered to be private and not public;
while all books on religion have love as their focal point. The connection be-
tween love and justice has never been taken into consideration so far.
Another consideration that has so far prevented this connection is that duty
and obligation pertain to the realm of reason, while love is emotional. Even for
Kant the moral act follows the dictates of duty and not of emotion.
 Regina M. Schwartz, Loving Shakespeare, Living Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2016).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-001
We understand justice to be a universal value of impartiality, all persons, whatever differ-
ences of race, gender, religion, or abilities, deserve to be treated with impartiality. The Kant-
ian ideals of universality and impartiality have informed theories of justice as fairness.²
How can we define justice? Justice has to do with impartiality, it is a universal
value that goes beyond the distinction into religions and races. It derives from
Kant’s idea of fairness. All this entails a universal ethical theory.
In most of Shakespeare’s plays justice is a central question: they widely de-
bate problems concerning law, ethics and equity, justice, legitimacy and author-
ity. Schwartz observes that most often the tragic result of his tragedies stems
from lack of love, while the happy ending of comedies consists in the recovery
of loving relations and the redress of justice through love.
Why does love not appear in theories of political justice? Justice can be en-
forced, while love asks for no constrictions. Still one of the many rhetorical de-
vices Elizabeth I used in her speeches was the recourse to the love for her sub-
jects. She used love as a rhetorical device to fascinate her people and draw their
consensus. She said that she was married to England and her subjects would
never again have a queen that loved them more. Elizabeth I, who skillfully
used strategies of self-promotion so to create a favourable iconic image of her-
self, focused her power not on force and control, but on loving and communal
sharing.
The power of love was not underestimated by Shakespeare, whose romances depict the
moral order righted when love prevails and whose tragedies often suggest that the dissolu-
tion of order accompanies a loveless world.³
The biblical tradition and the Kantian tradition are at variance: the former con-
templates giving as an act of love,while the latter considers giving as duty. There-
fore love and justice coincide in the former, love is compassion and duty in the
latter.
Our contemporary societies are based on contracts that have been consid-
ered a solution to domination. Even the principles of justice are forged by an im-
agined original agreement: societies come together on principles of cooperation
and on the assignment of rights and duties. Therefore we can speak of contrac-
tual justice as the basic principle of societies. One enters a contract freely; it
marks mutual benefit.
 Schwartz, Loving Shakespeare, Living Justice, 12.
 Schwartz, Loving Shakespeare, Living Justice, 38.
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The contract marks the relational character of legal rights and exemplifies social relation-
ships within the modern world. The form of the contract allows people to overcome any ju-
ridical limitation through the dialectics of single wills.⁴
But Schwartz correctly asserts that contracts cannot create trust between the par-
ties.
Coming to a more general statement concerning retributive justice, Schwartz
asserts that hardly ever does the criminal law system take into consideration the
social disadvantage of the culprit in criminal actions.We tend to equate bad be-
haviour to bad person, as if the moral life could be measurable.What prevails is
an economic perspective. The sort of punishment attributed must be in propor-
tion to the offense: in this case the judge appears to be the equalizer. What
Schwartz calls retribution can after all be compared to the rigorous application
of the law, while we should judge equitably and take into consideration the dis-
advantaged social position that most often brings people to cause crimes.
In the place of measurable retribution Schwartz suggests forgiveness in the
sense of overcoming resentment. All along Shakespeare’s production revenge is
seen as sinful and suspect: it generates more errors and it does not redress jus-
tice. Shakespeare rather purports forgiveness as a harmonizing factor, forgive-
ness connected to the recovery of love.
Schwartz’s book, while speaking of Renaissance society and of how Shake-
speare envisages the possibilities of justice, also speaks for the contemporary
world: it offers a possible solution to the difficulty of harmonizing justice in
our diasporic cultural European situation. Also my own longstanding studies
both on postmodernism and on the Renaissance have brought me to compare
the two periods and to observe that the Renaissance has strong seeds of antici-
pation of what was to reach its climax in the late twentieth century.⁵
Rather than applying a rigorous legal code of behaviour or the economy of
punishment and revenge, Schwartz fosters forgiveness and mutual understand-
ing as ways to solve the strictures of our times. Schwartz’s volume is very much
in trend with contemporary analyses of Shakespeare’s Biblical perspectives⁶ and
stresses the idea that justice to be such must be connected to love.We are back in
 Daniela Carpi, “Contracts in Literature: from Doctor Faustus to Vampires,” in Comparative
Contract Law, ed. Pier Giuseppe Monateri (Celtenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017), 322–360, 322.
 Daniela Carpi, “Renaissance into Postmodernism: Anticipations of Legal Unrest,” in Liminal
Discourses. Sublime Tensions in Law and Literature, eds. Daniela Carpi and Jeanne Gaakeer (Ber-
lin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2013), 177– 189.
 Piero Boitani, The Gospel According to Shakespeare (Paris: University of Notre Dame Press,
2014); Sarah Beckwith, Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness (New York: Cornell Univer-
sity Press, 2011).
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the debate between law and equity, from a more religious perspective. In fact her
reasoning finds its focal point in some passages from the Bible which she takes
as examples for Shakespeare’s view of justice.
Also Gary Watt’s latest volume Shakespeare’s Acts of Will ⁷ analyses Shake-
speare from a legal perspective and offers the opportunity for a reflection on
the word “will.” The term “will” in the volume has many valences: it plays ironi-
cally with Shakespeare’s name itself, it implies testaments and heritages, it
means will-power, performing will, the actor’s and the playwright’s will.
At the very opening of the book Watt presents two very interesting assump-
tions for a scholar of law and literature: that the book is concerned with cultural
practices, and specifically the cultural practices that connect theatre and law to
the wider world, that is law as creative practice. This sounds strange to outsiders
of the juridical field that have always considered law as a hard, dreary practice,
unimaginative and empirical. The law can also be connected to fairy tales, be-
cause it is rooted in “magic words,” formulas, rhetoric. So law “spins a good
yarn.”⁸ If in the theatre language is a sort of magic, transforming a linguistic re-
ality into a material body essence (the actor’s physical presence), in law opera-
tive words such as “I agree,” “I declare,” “I swear” transform a person into some-
body else, they create a parallel and virtual world. In the same way a legal
testament remains in potentia until its testator dies. Its action takes place only
in absentia of the person who wrote it. It is a presence/absence, where word
and action are at variance. Both situations (performance and will) are based
on the power of words to make things happen: words are operative.
These two opening assertions spread out the field of law, and connect Watt’s
book to two very important latest trends in the law-and-literature field: law as
culture, and law as fable. In particular, as far as the latter is concerned, we
must consider Derrida’s argument that:
What is fabulous in the fable does not only depend on its linguistic nature, on the fact that
the fable is made up of words. The fabulous also engages act, gesture, action […] in organ-
izing, disposing discourse in such a way as to recount, to put living beings on stage, to ac-
credit the interpretation of a narrative, to faire savoir, to make knowledge, to make perform-
atively, to operate knowledge.⁹
Marett Leiboff, in her turn, stresses the causative and operative capacity of law:
 Gary Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will (London: Bloosmbury, 2016).
 Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will, 3.
 Jacques Derrida, The Beast and the Sovereign,Volume I, eds. Michel Lisse, Marie-Louise Mallet
and Ginette Michaud, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009),
35–36.
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Words do not act on their own, nor does law. Law’s actors inevitably are involved in “mak-
ing to know,” but law’s practice is such that it denies the possibility that law, with its tech-
niques grounded in the assumptions that rationality and reason immunize law’s actors
from fabling, might result in “making like knowledge.”¹⁰
What is very innovative, considering the time of the Renaissance, is the fact that
Shakespeare invites the audience to speculate on whether affairs of state might
be better handled by common folk. This idea is very unsettling in a period domi-
nated by the concept of absolute monarchy.
According to Watt, the most testamentary play in all of Shakespeare’s pro-
duction is As You Like It. Here the concept of will is at its widest perspective:
it means both governing will and performance as communal approbation; it is
testamentary fashion and personal will. In The Merchant of Venice, the stubborn
will of a dead father, which requires a certain performance, clashes against the
will of a living daughter; in As You Like It the “letter” of a father’s will appointing
his eldest son Oliver as his hierarchical heir opposes itself to the natural rights of
a son, Orlando, who better embodies the “spirit” of the will.
Moreover, in other plays, such as King Lear and The Merchant of Venice, we
have cases which we can define as living will ante litteram. Lear subverts the in-
heritance laws and custom in the division of his reign among the three daughters
in the same way as Shylock embodies a stubborn will that he tries to impose on
others (the Jewish rites that Jessica should respect and the written word that he
divinizes): he is finally baffled by a more modern play of wills during the trial.
The focal idea of Paul Raffield’s volume The Art of Law in Shakespeare¹¹ is
that during the first Jacobean period law and the theatre mutually influenced
each other, the theatre taking from law the courtroom perspective, but the law
taking from theatre its rhetorical devices. Both forms are linked through rhetoric.
Raffield’s main aim in this volume is to demonstrate a closer interest for the rul-
er’s persona in the Jacobean period than in the Elizabethan one. Both James’ I
Basilicon Doron (1599) and his The Trew Law of Free Monarchies (1598) triggered
a widespread interest for the problem of kingship and for the relation between
the crown and common law. The crown was presented to the public as a form
of theatre (see Elizabeth’s speech and James I’s speech to both Houses of Parlia-
ment in March 1610). Raffield speaks of a “correlation between the Jacobean
 Marett Leiboff, Introductory chapter to Fables of the Law, eds. Daniela Carpi and Marett Leib-
off (Berlin and Boston: DeGruyter, 2016), 33–46, 38.
 Paul Raffield, The Art of Law in Shakespeare (Oxford and Portland: Bloomsbury, Hart, 2017).
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masque and the juridical processes of English law”¹² through the shared theme
of divine justice.
Raffield explores how classical rhetorical techniques are influential to the
development of juridical procedure. He mentions the recourse to juridical fables
to teach young lawyers ethics and the use of narrative. Law and narration were
therefore strictly connected as far back as the Renaissance. Legal education in
the early Inns of Court was provided by the study of the art of rhetoric and ethics,
which helped lawyers develop their craft. However in the course of the Renais-
sance lawyers passed from the awareness of having a sacerdotal role (they
thought they were Ministerial Officers) to the fall into the sin of pride and avar-
ice. This is why lawyers in the plays of the period were very often made fun of.
They were presented as torn between moral law and individual desire. They were
also accused of lack of learning.We have many instances of such accusations in
the Jacobean plays: for instance from The White Devil by John Webster we derive
a sense of the law as a mischievous tool in the hands of clever manipulators. The
English Lawyer by Edward Ravenscroft presents an unethical use of forensic elo-
quence and lawyers are frequently accused of using a nonsensical law-Latin jar-
gon. Also in Shakespeare’s Love’s Labour’s Lost we have an example of parody of
forensic obscure language.
In 1534 with the Act of Supremacy English jurisprudence got independent
from Rome and the Justinian code, thus setting the foundations of a secularized
English jurisprudence. In this way the lawyer from being a sacerdos is trans-
formed into a lawless being. The sacred aspect of the law was demonstrated
also by what was customary in the Halls of the Inns of Court: the common con-
sumption of food as a sacred act of communion, as a metaphor for the eating of
the holy wafer. But rapidly the law fell under the harsh criticism of satire: Tho-
mas Nashe in The Isle of Dogs in fact connects the practice of law with the pow-
ers of evil. The lawyer is dehumanized by Nashe and reduced to a malevolent
monster.
Raffield also speaks of treason and regicide. If for Aristotle, whose influence
is all pervading in the period, the ideal state was rooted in amicitia and concord,
the act of treason was a betrayal of the state and of love: it is an act of infidelity
against the spiritual body of the monarch.
Many plays by Shakespeare present trial scenes, which has a metatheatrical
meaning, in that plays and trials share a common spectacular element and a dra-
matic engagement. Moreover the act of transcribing the law and the legal prece-
dent correspond to the assimilation of food for the body’s nourishment (the
 Raffield, The Art of Law in Shakespeare, 12.
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king’s body, in this case). We have horticultural metaphors: if through grafting
nature is transformed into art, so the political succession of James I to queen
Elizabeth is often described in paintings as a climbing rose stemming out of
two conjoined hands: a thistle is grafted onto a rose rootstock. There is a subtle
correlation between law and horticulture: gardening and the law have a common
matrix.
Kevin Curran’s volume Shakespeare and Judgment¹³ adds another “and” to
the many works comparing Shakespeare to other fields of study. It can be con-
sidered to be the first thorough analysis of how judgment gives form to Shake-
speare’s plays and how Shakespeare’s representation of judgment in its turn
helps the common people of the time understand how judgment works. The
first aspect of judgment that is taken into consideration pertains to reason: it
is a rhetorical skill that has to do with invention. Invention triggers ideas and
judgment orders them. The volume also considers judgment as pertaining to
law courts, hence its connection to classical rules of oratory and the capacity
to follow certain rules of expression. This last perspective on judgment is con-
trasted to the religious one: only the Church can judge according to moral dicta.
Curran mentions the many characteristics a good judge should be endowed
with, above all modesty and respect for legal doctrine. But judgment to be sound
must be based also on a communal sharing with others, as Hannah Arendt af-
firms: she connects judgment with collective perception, therefore the term
has also a political connotation.
“There can be no account of judgment that does not make reference both to
subjectivity and to the milieu of ideality in which it operates.”¹⁴ The various
chapters in the volume illustrate the possible perspectives on judgment that
Shakespeare’s texts purport. Virginia Lee Strain¹⁵, for instance, considers Meas-
ure for Measure through the lens of the judge’s judgment of Barnardine: what the
judge strives to obtain is an ideal justice and not the mere rigorous application of
punitive law. In particular Strain speaks of preventive justice, which is a new
context in which to evaluate Shakespeare’s magistrates.
 Kevin Curran ed., Shakespeare and Judgment (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2017).
 Vivasvan Soni, “Believing in Ghosts, in Part: Judgment and Indecision in Hamlet,” in Shake-
speare and Judgment, ed. Curran, 45–70, 56.
 Virginia Lee Strain, “Preventive Justice in Measure for Measure,” in Shakespeare and Judg-
ment, ed. Curran, 21–45.
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On the same play we have the interpretation of Carolyn Sale¹⁶,who, on the con-
trary, stresses the fact that this play may be set in a civil law jurisdiction that ques-
tions to whom judgment pertains: to the judge or to the commons? Sale analyses
the concerns with the jurisprudence of the period that the play demonstrates
side by side with its effects on the present time. Paul Yachnin¹⁷ in his turn takes
into consideration Measure for Measure. At the opening of the play Shakespeare
opposes law to justice: Isabella considers that the death penalty is too severe for
the sin of having begotten one’s betrothed lover with child. When Isabella places
justice with God and the law with human beings she opens a chasm between
law and justice. However towards the end of the play she mixes once more law
with justice: law must necessarily produce a just treatment. Finally, mercy is show-
ered on everyone creating a big feast where everybody is pardoned. Even in this
case, as other critics have observed, Shakespeare appears not to believe in the
well-functioning of the juridical system. However the play develops a critical rep-
resentation of three kinds of law: the law of sovereign will, the law of kind, and
the law of judgment. The first one is at the basis of public and private life and
rests in the monarch. The law of kind has to do with our humanness and with nat-
ural feelings. The third one, the law of judgment, is connected to active public life
and is subjected to change and to precedent. Shakespeare in his plays tries to cul-
tivate popular judgment thus to educate people to law.
In order to discuss his own new view of what sort of judgment is called into
question, Curran has recourse to Hannah Arendt and her view of judgment as
linked to responsibility and freedom. “This has the effect of lifting Prospero’s
epilogue out of the historically specific world of Renaissance drama and rhetor-
ical theory and reframing it in terms of the ethical dynamics of participatory pol-
itics.”¹⁸ The audience is expected to judge, in a real and active participation with
the action. Once more the modernity of Shakespeare’s perspective extends the
message of his play to the contemporary world, where we as citizens are con-
stantly called to judge and evaluate.
 Carolyn Sale, “ ‘Practis[ing] judgment with the disposition of natures’: Measure for Measure,
the ‘Discoursive’ Common Law, and the ‘Open Court’ of the Theater,” in Shakespeare and Judg-
ment, ed. Curran, 115–138, 115.
 Paul Yachnin, “The Laws ofMeasure for Measure,” in Shakespeare and Judgment, ed. Curran,
139– 156, 139.
 Kevin Curran, “Prospero’s Plea: Judgment, Invention, and Political Form in The Tempest,” in
Shakespeare and Judgment, ed. Curran, 168. See Hannah Arendt, “Personal Responsibility Under
Dictatorship,” in Responsibility and Judgment, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Random House,
2003), 17–48, 18.
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Quentin Skinner’s volume Forensic Shakespeare¹⁹ takes into consideration a
series of Shakespeare’s plays produced between 1594 and 1605 where his in-
volvement with the technicalities of forensic language is particularly evident.
He stresses the frequent use in certain plays of the terms “foul” and “honest,”
which were frequent rhetorical devices in forensic language. Considering the
five principles that Cicero enlists in his Ars Rhetorica, “inventio,” “dispositio,”
“elocutio,” “pronuntiatio,” “memoria,” Skinner stresses the place of “inventio”
and “dispositio” in the construction of judicial arguments which Shakespeare
re-echoes in his plays. Many of his plots are based on judicial controversiae.
Skinner objects to most of the critical production on the legal aspects of Shake-
speare that, in his opinion, tend to exaggerate Shakespeare’s legal competence.
On the contrary Skinner asserts that if we wish to explain Shakespeare’s partic-
ular vocabulary we should rather turn to the rhetorical sources of the scenes. As
we have seen, also Raffield revises this concept of Shakespeare’s rhetorical skill.
Another interesting perspective that was highlighted by a very recent volume
is the performing body: in the Renaissance “the body becomes the focus of the
social, legal and cultural imagination and the privileged metaphor for specific
cultural discourses and political practices.”²⁰ The body has the function of defin-
ing one’s identity as distinct from the Other. It also marks the juridical constitu-
tion of authority. This legal perspective is necessarily intertwined with visuality,
because authority very much leans on its spectacularization. These discourses
are strictly connected to the latest studies on law and the image, so deeply influ-
enced by Richard Sherwin’s recent production²¹, but are also in the trend of per-
formance studies. The “volume demonstrates how the body is positioned centre-
stage in the Elizabethan and Jacobean period as the ideological focus of the ar-
ticulation of power and, at the same time, as a repertoire of infinite (cultural and
historical) possibilities.” ²²
At the basis of Zurcher’s volume Shakespeare and the Law²³ is the by-now
obvious assessment that the two fields of law and literature are connected
through interpretation. The law offered Shakespeare not only a tool for interpre-
 Quentin Skinner, Forensic Shakespeare (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
 Sidia Fiorato, “Performances, Regulations and Negotiations of the Renaissance Body. Legal
and Social Perspectives,” in Performing the Renaissance Body, eds. Sidia Fiorato and John Dra-
kakis (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter,2016), 1–26, 11.
 Richard Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago
Press, 2000); Richard Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques
and Entanglements (New York: Routledge, 2012).
 Fiorato, “Performances, Regulations and Negotiations of the Renaissance Body,” 36.
 Andrew Zurcher, Shakespeare and the Law (London: Methuen, 2010).
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tation, but also an apt language through which to give voice to his insights. This
volume stems from the question of what was it that so attracted Shakespeare to
legal ideas. “The law offered Shakespeare not just an analogy for the interpreta-
tive opportunities and perils facing his own literary art, but a rich and apt lan-
guage in which to posit and test these insights.”²⁴ Very often in his plays he
stresses the interactions between personal interests and legal processes.
François Ost’s Shakespeare. La comédie de la loi²⁵ aims at assessing the legal
innuendos of Shakespeare’s plays. Shakespeare can be considered a major
source for our contemporary juridical conscience. As a matter of fact, Ost uses
the term “comedy” in his title not to suggest a limitation to his analysis of Shake-
speare’s comedies, but in the Latin sense of comoedia as the whole of human
actions. From the very start, Ost stresses the fact that there is a deep interchange
between theatre and society in the Renaissance, in that trials have very strong
theatrical connotations, being based on ritual and performance. If Greenblatt
theorizes about the exchange or negotiation between society and theatre, this
definition can also be applied to the interplay between law and Shakespearean
theatre.
The Renaissance is characterized by great economic changes, with a mer-
chant class rapidly emerging against a land-owing class, a lurking dissent
against absolute monarchy, and the antagonistic force of Puritan individualism
resisting Parliament. All this brings about a debate on sovereignty and its legiti-
macy and on the contraposition between law and equity.²⁶
Daniela Carpi has extensively written on some legal perspectives in the
Shakespearean texts: from the problems concerning equity and law in The Mer-
chant of Venice and Measure for Measure²⁷ to accusations of defeating of defec-
tive mind in Othello²⁸; from Shakespeare and the Law²⁹ to power and legitimacy
in King Lear, King John, Julius Caesar³⁰; from the importance of a name in Romeo
 Zurcher, Shakespeare and the Law, 3.
 François Ost, Shakespeare. La comédie de la loi (Paris: Michalon, 2012).
 Daniela Carpi, “Review of François Ost, Shakespeare. La comédie de la loi,” Pólemos 7.1
(2013): 143– 148.
 Daniela Carpi, “Law, Discretion, Equity in The Merchant of Venice andMeasure for Measure,”
Cardozo Law Review 26.6 (2005): 2317–2329.
 Daniela Carpi, “Law and Aesthetics in Othello,” in Le Cabinet du Curieux. Culture, Savoirs,
Religion de l’Antiquité à l’Ancien Régime, Mélanges en l’honneur de Jean-Paul Pittion, eds.Witold
Konstanty Pietrzak and Magdalena Koźluk (Paris: Classiques Garnier, 2013), 79–90.
 Daniela Carpi ed. Shakespeare and the Law (Ravenna: Longo, 2003).
 Daniela Carpi, “Power and Legitimacy in King Lear, King John, Julius Caesar,” Pólemos 10.2
(2010): 85–98
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and Juliet³¹ to the sacralization/de-sacralization of Caesar’s body in Julius Cae-
sar.³²
The rich spectrum of ideas presented by all these volumes demonstrates how
fertile the comparative studies on Shakespeare and the law still are and how the
Shakespearean texts can still speak to the contemporary legal mind, highlighting
fruitful connections between the Renaissance period and the contemporary one.
These connections are drawn together by the innovative perspectives that in-
terdisciplinary and multidisciplinary studies offer in this volume, which broad-
ens the fertile fields of investigation of both the Shakespeare &s and of the
Law &s, by interfacing with original aspects of culture. The intersections with
meta-criticism, diaspora studies, the body, and the concept of authority, create
a multifaceted critical prism whose refractions extend to several areas of knowl-
edge, highlighting how, despite the abundance of literature on the matter, much
more can be looked at when it comes to Shakespeare and the Law. If Literature is
emotion, Law is in-motion, and it is in virtue of the ever-changing essence of the
Law itself that the grandeur of Shakespearean works is to be inquired, for their
contemporary value, made clear by diachronic analysis, is not only crucial for a
deeper understanding of Early-Modern culture, but becomes essential for an ap-
preciation of the contemporary Self.
 Daniela Carpi, “Romeo and Juliet: The Importance of a Name,” Pólemos 9.1 (2015): 37–50.
 Daniela Carpi, “Sacralization/De-sacralization of Caesar’s Body in Shakespeare’s Julius Cae-
sar,” Pólemos 9.2 (2015): 281–294.
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François Ost
As You Law It…: Of Certain Objects and
Functions of Ambiguity in Shakespearean
Theatre
As you law it… the wordplay inspired by the play As You Like It gives a clear ac-
cess key to Shakespearean law, yet it is digging an abyss beneath its certainties at
the same time. As Leiboff notes in her contribution to this volume, a series of
previously unseen questions are immediately heard: can law be liked, what is
law like, wat [sic] is like law? And furthermore: a law for all seasons? A law
for each one? Justice on this side of the Pyrenees, injustice on the other? The
present collection delivers a rich harvest of the ambiguities which characterise
the Shakespearean theatre of the law.
The modern critic, fascinated by this multifaceted kaleidoscope, agrees at
least on one point: Shakespeare is elusive. A.D. Nuttall does not hesitate to main-
tain that on all the essential questions he presents we will never know his defin-
itive point of view.¹ It is as if his mind is never at peace: he scarcely develops one
point of view to then contradict it in the next scene. Therefore, we can easily find
quotations for and against any given thesis on legal or political problems of
some importance. This is disconcerting, without a doubt; yet at least, as J. B
White points out, the world is embraced in all its aspects, and the first advantage
of this is that we will suspend our hasty judgments and take time to consider the
whole scene, beyond the soliloquy and then also beyond the whole play and
even the work in its entirety.² It is the world and its humanity which Shakespeare
makes a spectacle of, and taking only one character or one quote would be like
taking the wrong end of a telescope. This ambiguity requires an active and inter-
pretative engagement from the reader – and that is a second benefit. Everyone,
in their own time, is led to choose who to support, and soon encounters cruel
contradictions in the Shakespearean Hall of Mirrors: if he believed, for example,
in the superiority of Christian mercy over formal justice, the story which follows
soon instils doubt on the soundness of his interpretation. The perplexity reig-
nites our curiosity, reopens the interpretation game and refines our judgement.
translated by Daniela Carpi, Raffaele Cutolo, Kirstie Gifford
 Anthony Nuttall, Shakespeare the Thinker (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
2007), 1.
 James Boyd White, Living Speech (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2006).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-002
And, when the game is interrupted, and the reader finally decides in favour of
this or that conclusion, Shakespeare will be, once again, the lucid revelator
and the acid test, to the clashing ideologies of his time.
It remains to be seen whether one can ask one’s self where this genius of
doublespeak, this consummate art of ambiguity comes from. There are three rea-
sons for this, ranked here in order of importance. In certain instances, at least,
doublespeak acts simply as a prudent political reflex at a time when censorship
was not a theoretical threat, and when taking a position, notably a religious one,
could easily send authors to the Tower of London.We remember, in this regard,
the persecution which some of Shakespeare’s friends and close relations suf-
fered from being suspected of keeping to Catholic practices. In the Catholic
world, secrets were a second nature and, from this point of view, it was very
shrewd to convince the poet of this or that allegiance. However, this first reason
is put forward here only hypothetically.
A second, clearly more solid, reason is found in the critical spirit of the poet.
As a witness to the violent ideological, social, political, dynastic controversies of
his time, with their cortege of violence, betrayal and cowardice, Shakespeare
took a critical distance, and not only for prudent strategic motives. He learned
to discern the reality behind the deceptive game of appearances, he knew how
to decode the most edifying or flattering remarks and, in doing so, he educates
his audience, playing the role of “teacher” of the people, that who teaches men
the game of “passions at the foundation cities”.
Finally, and this third motive is really decisive, ambiguity is a theatre re-
source par excellence, and Shakespeare is a master in this art. As he is fascinated
by themes of duality, of twinship (how many twins are in this work!), of broth-
erhood (real and false brothers, real and false friends), he also becomes a virtu-
oso of the false bottoms of all the theses defended by his characters. And if the
double fails, it is the hero who doubles himself, and carries these flaws and con-
tradictions within himself: Hamlet is the model for this, but the theme of divided
heroes spans across his works. It is no coincidence that the image of “two bodies
of the law” haunts his work: the truth of the monarch lies in the gap between the
two, as it probably does in each of us, complex enough, human enough, to rec-
ognise “oneself as another” (soi-même comme un autre”).
Shakespeare does not expose these double-sided truths; he performs them
in theatrical performance, he implements them, demonstrating by action and
thus bringing them to life in its complexity, but also its incessant metamorpho-
sis. Moreover, it is this ambiguity, which Shakespeare does not ignore for an in-
stant, that equally characterises his audience. He rejoices in allowing two truths
to be heard at the same time: “we can say each time that he puts pen to paper, he
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writes two plays in one” comments René Girard.³ In the stalls, he serves the au-
dience an intrigue which seems to consolidate all his prejudices; but for those
who develop a finer ear, he distills a music which, like the charms of A Mid-
summer Night’s Dream, will soon dissolve these heavy certainties. Hamlet says
as much to the comedians that come to play at Elsinore: “though it make the un-
skilful / laugh, cannot but make the judicious grieve; the / censure of the which
one must in your allowance / o’erweigh a whole theatre of others” (3.2.26–29).⁴
It will be these ambiguities, double dealings, deceptions, transformations,
metamorphoses and shifting of all kinds which I propose to follow in the remain-
der of this brief introduction. To make an exhaustive list, or claiming to say the
definitive meaning would be an exercise in vanity, like drying the sea – Shake-
speare, the ocean man, Hugo said; at least, I can attempt to raise several themes
from the contributions which follow, at the same time proposing several hypoth-
eses as to the functions they fulfil. King John, one of Shakespeare’s first plays,
here analysed by D. Carpi, brings us to the Hall of Mirrors: we are shown all
the aspects of an authority led astray, at the same time as speech invalidates it-
self in the labyrinths of lies and falsehoods. A throne contested between rival
powers, alliances which are made and unmade in the will of interests, a people
assisting in the play of this comedy of power and determining themselves by the
will of success of one or another, of bastards defying the legitimate order of the
world… all these ingredients of political theatre are already there, based on the
shift in meaning and the disqualification of words, which denounces a chasm
between the said and the unsaid. Constance – well named – denounces this cor-
ruption of words which expresses the duplicity of souls and the denaturation of
authority: “Faith itself to hollow falsehood change” (3.1.21); all is counterfeit, all
is nothing but false money, from the moment the Prince who issues money in his
own image makes a trade of his speech and his high office.When there is noth-
ing any longer to make it possible to distinguish right from wrong, rhetorical
tricks quickly take away convictions and values in a significant shift that is as
frightening as it is corrupting. As D. Carpi notes, from that point on, a gulf
grows wider between signifying and signified royal authority; the two bodies
of the king are broken, as will often be the case thereafter – the sacred and time-
 René Girard, Shakespeare. Les feux de l’envie, trans. B. Vincent (Paris: Grasset, 1990), 13. In
Girard’s opinion, all first readings are sacrificial, while critical readings are mimetic (each of
them able to decode the logics of the scapegoat.)
 And a little lower down: “And let those that play your clowns speak no more than is set down
for them; for there be of them that will themselves laugh, to set on some quantity of barren spec-
tators to laugh too; though, in the mean time, some necessary question of the play be then to be
considered” (3.2.39–44).
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less (the signified) is no longer found rooted in living kings (the signifying),
which destroys power, and, above all, sells off its transcendence in a business
of influence which will soon carry them away.
The body – the human body (embryo, child, adult, corpse), the political
body, the double body of the king – is a subject par excellence of the double deal-
ing of ambiguity. Richard III, the monstrous King who illustrates all of the polit-
ical malfunctions of his time, is the subject of two penetrating studies here, one
by C. Battisti and one by S. Fiorato.We know that disability is a social construc-
tion, and that each culture develops a different interpretation of it, depending on
the place that it intends to reserve for these physical variations within itself. The
Elizabethan Renaissance thought of this difference in terms of deformation and
monstrosity, which it gladly made shows of on temporary fairground stages. Ri-
chard, misshapen and hunchbacked, does not make a mystery of his monstros-
ity. But in exhibiting it as a challenge to the world, he understands how to twist
the astonishment that he arouses to his own profit. He hams up his claimed
monstrosity, distorts it, and makes a trophy of it, which will be embellished by
ten or twenty tailors and which will be reflected in mirrors that he calls for
throughout the play. This deformed natural body which he plays upon, then op-
erates as the instrument of his approbation of the political body that he covets,
explains C. Battisti. He, the circus freak, the exception that we fear and are fas-
cinated by,will be the in-action symbol of a Great Britain destined to be in a state
of exception. The permanent malfunction of the institutions – the usurping of
the throne, assassination carried out as a ruling behaviour, rape passed on as
a genealogical law, can openly be read as a spectacularisation of royal monstros-
ity. In this way, Richard will automatically self-fashion himself through his rhet-
oric ability and his total lack of scruples, as if he had to take vengeance on the
whole world. S. Fiorato has fascinating words to say on the role which the un-
happy Queen Anne plays in this story. Seduced right in the middle of the funeral
procession for her husband, killed on the orders of Richard himself, she be-
comes, in defending her body, the instrument of this monstrous design. Through
her, Richard fashions himself the royal genealogy which was denied to him. In
spite of herself, she will uncover a second Ricardian body, monstrous counterfeit
of regular genealogy and legitimate authority. Anticipating the manner of nation-
al rape which she will soon be subject to, she curses Richard’s offspring in ad-
vance: “If ever he have a child, abortive be it” (1.2.21).
The figure of the other, l’autre, whose most common expression is the strang-
er, represents an ambiguous favoured theme in Shakespeare’s works. And with
it, the thorny question of treatment that us, les mêmes, that is to say the domi-
nants, will reserve to him. One may well think of Othello, of course, but above all
of The Merchant of Venice which is the subject of two sharp studies here. H.
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Antor rightly points out that, far from reducing the play to an antisemitic man-
ifesto, as one often does, we are in the presence of a problem play: comedy for
the Venetian clan, tragedy for the Shylock the Jew. While it is true that the
play does not lack in antisemitic clichés (the Jew as cannibal, the Jew as rabid
dog, the Jew as the figure of the Devil), we also remember the magnificent solil-
oquy in which the ostracised money lender reminds the arrogant Venetians (who
invented the term ghetto) of the shared humanity of Christians and Jew. All of
them have a nose, eyes and ears and all of them are tempted to avenge the of-
fence that was made to them. But this, as we well know, will not render justice
to the money lender – Venice will know how to turn this gamble to its advantage
and will oppose this creditor who claims to hold on to the letter of his bond, and
the absurdity of the logic of his literalism: the pound of flesh, yes, but not a drop
of blood. The victors will even return the weight of the debt against the unhappy
money lender, robbing him of his goods and forcing him into a conversion which
annihilates his racial difference. Moreover, he has the luxury of a lesson in equi-
ty taught by Portia under false identity who, cloaked with the generosity of Chris-
tian mercy, is faced by the legal threat of the avaricious Jew.We can see what a
corrupting role ambiguity plays here, as everything sounds false in this lesson of
equity: from the disguising of Portia (who passes herself off as the spokesperson
for a wise juris consult) to the legal vengeance of Antonio, the glorious ship-
owner who, with the blessing of the doge, destroys the very identity of his adver-
sary by using the pseudo-literality of the interpretation given to the famous
clause in the bond. Equity becomes corrupted in this sham trial, against a play-
ful and triumphant Venice which sometimes allows itself to enjoy the thrill of
loss, before the party resumes at Belmont and Shylock returns to his ghetto.
But the lesson is not forgotten, and it is J. Gaakeer’s merit to follows its dis-
tant but still virulent echoes in German legal doctrine of the end of the nine-
teenth century. All starts with a footnote in R. Ihering’s major work The Struggle
for Law (1872): the great legal theoretician, who purports a law free of formal
constraints and open to social interests, evokes the character of Shylock (along-
side that of M. Kohlhaas, Von Kleist’s rebel in the eponymous story) as a subject
whose rights have been violated and who, in claiming his own law, fights for the
integrity of the Law. Ihering makes it very clear that in his eyes the penal clause
was null and void, as it contravenes good moral standards; but, he adds, as its
validity is recognised by all, it was unjust to deprive Shylock of his profit. “Chi-
canery” he adds “remains chicanery, even while it uses the name of humanity”.
The controversy was widespread and a number of authors were against the tol-
erant and courageous reading given by Ihering. According to them, a certain
Josef Kohler congratulates Portia, a creative judge (?) [sic], who, with good rea-
son, does not hesitate to redress a bad law when necessary. By claiming to be-
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long to the “free law” movement, Kohler thus aims at enhancing the judge’s ini-
tiatives in a text (1883) whose anti-Semitic hints proclaim the drift to come. But
the debate between justice and equity, its ambiguity and double dealing, will un-
doubtedly never cease, and neither will the tensions between the Self and the
Other. Even at the end of the twentieth century, the controversy reappeared in
the production of two major current American “law and literature” authors: Ri-
chard Weisberg and Richard Posner.
Measure for Measure, here studied by F. Ost and alluded to by F. Sgubbi, is
another problem play applied this time to penal law and therefore to the treat-
ment of crime. Games of law and justice take the dramatic form of the sanction
(sometimes capital), itself confronted by two alternatives, as radical as they are
opposing: private vengeance or forgiveness. At the same time, the figure of the
other becomes here one of evil and a criminal – a delinquent who, Shakespeare
suggests to the advantage of a new ambiguity, could well be a part of the subject
itself; if “I, at least sometimes, am an other,” is one not also sometimes a little
criminal? It is the masterful lesson that the Duke of an imaginary Vienna will in-
flict; for a time, he steps away from power to the benefit of the (too) virtuous An-
gelo (who plays the angel…) – who will not rest until he has restored capital pun-
ishment for the crime of fornication. But while he, abusing his own power,
proposes “the abhorrent market” to the sister of the first victim of this edict
(her virtue for the salvation of her brother), the duplicity of the character,
soon confused by the Duke, appears in front of everyone’s eyes. But the lesson
is general; in the meantime we shall have understood that desire subverts the
law, and, above all, that the law is made for the most rigorous (Isabella, the
cold novice who, when courted, does not depart from this truth). Also, wisdom
recommends applying the law in moderation – and, above all, penal law. The
measure of the law, subject of the play, is regulated more by forgiveness than
by vengeance – the affair is not solely inspired by comedy, but more by a life
logic which ends up dragging everything right into the cold bitterness of
death. An enormous burst of laughter and a domino of marriages is the moral
of this story, which reminds us that in order to throw the first stone, one must
have never sinned. Here, we see the game of ambiguity, omnipresent in the
play, whose multiple disguises, substitutions and double-dealings exerts an es-
sential heuristic function: it invites the spectator to take the place of the
other, which, all considered, is the basis of an ethical position and, according
to H. Arendt, the first condition in the operation of judgement.
The study, as referenced as it is profound, that P. Raffield gives to The Com-
edy of Errors confirms this lesson, with a radicalness that borders on metaphy-
sics. It is impossible to summarise this play based on confusion, and whose
first performance, during a memorable evening of revelry at Gray’s Inn on the
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28th December 1594, turned the telling of this story about several pairs of twins
who are lost and found into a general mayhem. And yet: migrants whose boat
sinks in the Mediterranean, who finally are found in Ephesus, a town dedicated
to business and profit which does not hesitate in throwing them back into the
sea – is that not immediately reminiscent of something else? A father of an ex-
iled migrant family, powerless in this hostile environment, who only has a few
hours to gather the total ransom which would allow him to escape the death
penalty – does that say nothing to us? History repeating itself: Cain and Abel,
the enemy brothers dedicated by fate to two different destinies are here Antipho-
lus of Ephesus and his twin brother Antipholus of Syracuse. Will history repeat
itself, with its share of exclusions and murders? Here ambiguity is pushed to the
extreme – “gém ellité oblige”: we can discuss reversibility and transitivity at the
same time. And yet what is exchanged between these two twins whom life has
separated to the point of setting one against the other? Shakespeare again
poses the question “if” – and if it were you? If you were the immigrant seeking
asylum, where would you wish to rest your head? Once again the talisman oper-
ates: the benevolent duke will pay the father’s ransom, and Syracuse’s son will
fall into the arms of Ephesus’s brother. Metaphysics, should I say? Without a
doubt, as soon as we know – didn’t we notice? – these brothers are called Anti-
pholus, literally the opposite of a friend. One, the lost brother, looking for his
identity, lost in a foreign land. The other brother full of hatred, carrier of discord
and withdrawn into himself. Like the two divided pieces of the sun-bolon. Divid-
ed, then eventually reunited. As the chain of gold that Antipholus is looking for
for his wife, so the social link is renewed. Brotherhood restored the invisible link
that assures agreement between cities, and which Plato said was more essential
than the law, which is only the result of it. Once again, life and the symbolic en-
ergy that supports it are revealed to be the strongest.
The fact remains that ambiguity does not always have a positive connota-
tion. Sometimes, quite simply, it conveys the inevitable uncertainty of real histor-
ical changes: certain forms are therefore consigned to the pages of history, while
others bear new uncertain beginnings. The passage from the Republic to the Em-
pire in Rome is an example of this; Shakespearean times, marked by the collapse
of the codes of honour from the Middle Ages (the degree), the rise of absolute
monarchy, simultaneous with the progress of bourgeois individualism and puri-
tan “rigourism,” are another. The play, Julius Caesar, commented on here by C.
Pelloso, illustrates this painful transition effectively. Pelloso asks the following
question: ultimately, do Brutus and the conspirators operate as vulgar murderers
(“butchers”, as Shakespeare would say) or virtuous sacrificers? The questions
must be dealt with according to the Roman concept of ius sacrum – and the au-
thor notes that in view of this ancient right, whoever was guilty of sacrilege be-
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came proprietas deorum, there was nothing more that anyone could do for them,
and those who lay a hand on that homo became sacer (literally separated from
the community, property of the Gods), benefitting from total impunity. Hence the
question: did Caesar fall under the blame of accusation sacer esto? Could he
have, in flouting the institutions of the Republic, offended the Gods (adfectatio
regni crime). Doubtless, he refused the crown that was offered to him but, by
gathering all the powers to his person, in crossing the invisible border, as
Lord Protector of the city (the pomerium – here the Rubicon) did he not attempt
a serious attack on the institutions? The conspirators sincerely believed so, and
considered themselves necessary sacrificers. The Roman Senate put an end to the
matter differently, in granting an official funeral to Caesar and treating the con-
spirators as murderers – while according them impunity, however. This clumsy
compromise reflects the limits of ambiguity: far from being meaningful, it ex-
presses the limits of the dialectic and the pure and simple wreckage of a certain
form of social bond.
Many other aspects of ambiguity receive an original perspective in this pres-
ent volume. G. Ben-Nun, specialist in diplomatic history, takes advantage of the
play Henry V, which, as we know, relates the sombre negotiations between the
French and English courts regarding English lands in France (a recurring
theme in Shakespeare’s historical plays) to underline how the rights of the peo-
ple (law of nations), so close to brute force, lend themselves to clever manipula-
tion, while the affairs of State only prosper under the shadow of secrecy. These
are the famous arcana imperii – the state secrets, the perfume of suffering, which
surround the abject works of power veiled in smoke. Shakespeare could not fail
to be sensitive to it, surely he knew about the proliferation of spies under Eliz-
abeth and the mystical incantations of royalty on the Divine Right Kings under
James I. When at the service of absolute power, ambiguity ceases to function
and no longer reveals anything.
On the other hand, G.Watt endeavours to do justice, with an attentive ear, to
the thousand effects of meaning suggested by the vocalisation of Shakespearean
poetry. Before it was a read text, this poetry was recited and heard – the finest
ears perceiving there several strategies, including that of fractional inference,
both concealing and revealing a central word which illuminates a whole scene
with its meaning. A practitioner of law would be wrong to neglect these tricks
of the trade – is not the law first and foremost an attentive listening to voices
who try to make themselves heard in court? In the French language, is the sitting
of the court not referred to as the “audience” [hearing]? And is the most funda-
mental principle of law in action not that of the right to a fair hearing: audi et
alteram partem?
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We shall conclude this very brief evocation of the rich contents of this vol-
ume, by mentioning the contribution that M. Leiboff gives to A Midsummer
Night’s Dream, the most ambiguous of all the plays in the corpus. The author re-
turns to our starting point: as you like/law it, and engages in a vigorous plea in
favour of ambiguity, here envisaged under its imaginative and socially emanci-
patory side. In her line of fire: all the conservative dogmatisms and withdrawals,
like those which finally shatter in the Dream. Going back to Chancellor Bacon,
contemporary of Shakespeare, the author proceeds to an attentive rereading of
Novum Organon (1620) and there discovers a new critique in the regulation of
theatrical idols. In a very Platonian vein, Bacon shreds the distortions of reality
and dressing-ups of reality produced by theatrical tricks – those, he writes, lead
to sciences as one would. But, as he wrote this in Latin, others translate it as sci-
ences as you like it. This, then, is the nature of the offence: imagination leads to
departure from truth. We know where this doctrine led the Chancellor in his
function as a lawyer: to the punctilious attachment to the letter of the law, firmly
assured in his analytic formalism. Didn’t Bacon write, seventeen years earlier “it
is not good to stay too long in the theatre,” inviting his readers to go “to the ju-
dicial place or palace of the mind”? M. Leiboff explains that Bacon’s lesson was
only too well understood by Australian officials and government lawyers of the
regime, with things starting to move in the 1980s. Imagination is liberated pro-
gressively, political discourse is emancipated from the motherland, while the is-
landers rediscovered the aborigines who had preceded them on the land, as well
as the historical injustices that they were victim to. Therefore, in liberating all the
virtues created by an imaginative thought, indexed by the as you like/law it, Aus-
tralian judges were authorised to rewrite history in view of liberating the future –
these are the famous Mabo High Court decisions (1988 and 1992), known world-
wide, which finally gave identity and justice to the natives. In this “Australian
Night’s Dream,” the law renews itself with the force of theatrical imagination.
Yes, another world is possible, said Shakespeare, and it is up to you – as you
like it.
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Part One The Body Politic and Power Politics

Daniela Carpi
King John or the Proliferation of the Word
of Authority
If up to a few years ago the Elizabethan period was nostalgically studied accord-
ing to founding orthodox ideologies, such as “the great chain of being” and the
“Elizabethan world picture,” such a myth of the Arcadian and pastoral past has
been dismantled, bringing to the surface symptoms of unrest and anticipations
of the many contemporary crises in society.
One of the many tragic dimensions arises “in the displacement of meaning,
in the disturbance within the present of ‘another’ time […] that, in consequence,
is always in some way historical, pivoted upon a crisis of times and so of mod-
els.”¹
The word acquires a cultural mobility of necessary signification for the integration of liter-
ature within history and within cultural politics. Such an integration is realized both as a
dynamic interaction and as a potentiality of pragmatic intervention of language upon the
extra-textual reality.²
According to such statements, King John becomes the emblem of the search for
“the infinite potentialities of dissent inscribed in Shakespearean language,
which can be re-inscribed into our daily praxis of social and political conflicts.”³
The tragic element in King John is constituted by the recession of the concepts of
obedience and loyalty, undermined by the inadequacy of power; and it is repre-
sented by the gap between a divine and mythic concept of authority and its ap-
plication to the historical context, to the quarrel between the two sovereigns.
The starting position of King John resembles that of Richard III: no legitimate supremacy
can be established in a politically volatile period. The cause of the difficulty in this case
is a loophole in the regulation defining royal succession.⁴
 Alessandro Serpieri, “Shakespeare: la storia, le storie,” in L’altro Shakespeare. Critica, Storia,
Ideologia, ed. Alessandra Marzola (Milano, Guerini, 1992), 15–28. [My translation]
 Alessandra Marzola, “Introduzione,” in L’altro Shakespeare [My translation.] See also Kiernan
Ryan, Shakespeare (Brighton: Harvester, 1989).
 Marzola, “Introduzione” [My translation].
 Björn Quiring, Shakespeare’s Curse. The Aporias of Ritual Exclusion in Early Modern Royal
Drama (London and New York: Routledge, 2014), 142.
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From the opening lines the theme of the desecration of the term “majesty” is in-
troduced:
Chatillon: […] the borrowed majesty, of England here.
Elinor: A strange beginning: borrowed majesty!⁵ (1.1.4–5)
However, the focal point for our analysis is constituted by the dialogue between
Constance and Salisbury in Act III, scene I: this is the moment in which Con-
stance is informed of the previous alliance between the two kings, an alliance
that makes the promises of help of her brother, king Philip, useless. The “divine”
social order represented by the monarchy is unveiled as human/too human, as
an artificial and fictional construction (from “majesty” to “counterfeit,” from
“faith” to “falsehood change”), disclosing an anxiety that becomes a linguistic
anxiety, making evident its partial and purely signifying nature. An extremely
modern way to place us in front of and within language is thus demonstrated
in order to unveil the play’s ambiguous and multi-layered structure.
The play upon contrasting words (“form/formless,” “order/orderless”), used
as a counterpoint to the rapid changing of alliances within the text, is a frequent
rhetorical device employed by Shakespeare (bear in mind also the famous “fair
is foul and foul is fair” in Macbeth), and it underlines the semantic multi-valen-
ces of words and of actions in a context of political corruption. The linguistic
confusion, which is also a theological interrogation, indicates a previously exist-
ing moral confusion.
Constance represents the “resistance to theory” or the resistance to topical
concepts of “policy,” majesty and honour. The juxtaposition between “seeming”
and “being” expressed by Hamlet occupies a considerable part here too. Con-
stance’s duty is to unveil the other side of the public message, diametrically op-
posing meaning to meaning.
All the discourse directed to Salisbury is in fact played upon the contrast be-
tween “word” and “sign:” the word is “misspoke” and “misheard,” it is a “vain
breath” which causes a lack of faith. “Believe me, I do not believe thee:” the es-
sence of the word (the idea of “truth”) becomes “false,” transforming the con-
cepts of “truth” into “seeming” and of “falsehood” into “being.” The epistemo-
logical stability of medieval knowledge is made redundant by the use of a
rhetoric where the trope of irony and the trope of the unutterability of meaning
prevail. After all, the “nostalgia for the lost unity, the univocal correspondence
between words and things is the aspiration for the imaginary, a desire to return
 William Shakespeare, King John, in Complete Works, eds. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen
(Houndmills: Macmillan 2007), 772–828. Further references in the text.
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to simplicity and certainty in a world that comes before symbolic difference, a
world that is without visible power, since power itself is a relation of differ-
ence.”⁶
If “humanism can be defined in the first instance as a rhetorical practice
that resists theory conceived of as an epistemological project,”⁷ Constance’s ver-
bal confutation is used precisely to underline the concept of linguistic impreci-
sion. Such a subversion of “policy” through the dilation of verbal sense corre-
sponds to the general humanistic attitude of the Scholastic critics as a
formulation of universal principles, and it corresponds to the emergence of rhet-
oric in its aspect of attention to the linguistic dimension of communication.
The word thus becomes epistemologically unstable. Constance is the figure
of the humanist who undermines the stability of language and, at the same time,
attempts to resist such an instability. The word is divorced from its practical ap-
plication, creating a semantic gap: “signs” (gestures, actions) vs. “words”.
It is not so, thou hast misspoke, misheard,
Be well advised, tell o’er thy tale again.
It cannot be, thou dost but say ‘tis so.
I trust I may not trust thee, for thy word
Is but the vain breath of a common man:
Believe me, I do not believe thee, man,
I have a king’s oath to the contrary.
[…]
Be these sad signs confirmers of thy words?
Then speak again, not all thy former tale,
But this one word, whether thy tale be true. (3.1.4–26)
This juxtaposition occurs also between the “tale,” that is, an account, narration,
or linguistic articulation, and the “word.” Within this structural binary opposi-
tion an even more hidden subversion is situated, since it is realized within the
meaning itself of “word” that from time to time represents the meaning of
true or false.
Constance repeatedly exhorts Salisbury to make his “word” and “truth” co-
incide, but the truth, the real essence of the term, cannot be attained since it
slides once again to the level of “false,” making any attempt to attain a stable
and founding meaning redundant.
 Catherine Belsey, “Creare storie ora ed allora: da Riccardo II a Enrico V” in L’altro Shake-
speare, ed. Marzola, 129–155, 130 [My translation].
 Victoria Khan, “Humanism and the Resistance to Theory” in Literary Theory. Renaissance
Texts, eds. David Quint and Patricia Parker (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Univer-
sity Press, 1986), 373–396, 382.
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Another element, emerging from this incessant alternation between the lev-
els of linguistic truth and falsehood, is the narrative, or the “tale.” The tale is a
necessarily artificial organization of the “word” and consequently it puts an em-
phasis on fictionality: the tale implies a narrator’s awareness of both the resist-
ance of language to signify and of the resistance of the listener to the “suspen-
sion of disbelief.” In such a way the principle of counterfeit, and consequently
Constance’s exhortation to make the “tale” “true,” is transformed into a contra-
diction in terms and an exhortation to an impossible mimesis. Following Aristo-
tle’s dialectic, it can be maintained that the téchné, or productive knowledge,
aware of the application of rhetorical artifice, clashes against the theoria, or
speculation, the mise en abîme of meaning through rhetoric itself. The movement
is from social consensus (adherence to the “policy” dictates and to the sover-
eign’s decisions) to epistemological menace (the redundancy of the sovereign’s
orders through dialectic/rhetorical subversion). The use of irony becomes an ex-
emplary practice to unveil the epistemological/ethical multi-valence of meaning.
Just as Constance questions the official meaning of the message, controvert-
ing term with term, in the same way the two opposing struggles for royalty lead
to a vacancy in power and to a suspension of loyalty and adherence. Constance
does nothing but give voice to this ambiguity of power that is affirmed and de-
nied at the same time. We are witnesses to a reaction of discomfort towards au-
thority, which is in primis expressed as linguistic anxiety. In an “out of joint”
world,where the univocal power of authority is broken, causing loyalty problems
in the subjects (which king to believe in?), “strength and signification” are sep-
arated so that the separation itself (between sign and meaning) becomes the lin-
guistic condition par excellence: the new strength of language lies precisely in its
non-signification. The form (the dilation of meaning and carnivalesque, dese-
crating play) is opposed to the (theological and signifying) strength of linguistic
articulation.
We witness the melancholic pathos of speech that turns on its own axis
searching for a missing referent, attaining in this way a neutralization of mean-
ing through form. The message (energeia) of power is in fact neutralized by a lin-
guistic invasion, by a deconstructing play, which undermines the very basis of its
own significance, becoming a historical-metaphysical menace to its own founda-
tions. As soon as the sacred concept of royalty is annihilated by the conflict be-
tween the two opposing kinds of legality, a subverting element, here mainly ex-
pressed as linguistic subversion, insinuates itself into the gap in power. A “Holy
day” is transformed into a “wicked day, day of shame,” “war” is mutated into
“peace” and vice versa, and “little valiant” into “great villainy:” everything is
“painted” and “counterfeit” so that at the end we have a total coalescence of op-
posites: “odoriferous stench” and “sound rottenness.” In such diametrical oppo-
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sitions signification lingers in a linguistic void of the absence of the referent, of a
methodical menace that is a denunciation of the frailty of meaning and of the
relation between signifier and signified. The linguistic confusion points to a pre-
vious moral confusion and is a theological interrogation. It is a bombastic use of
the word based upon the rhetoric that is a symptom of the ad infinitum openness
of significance, a symptom of the anarchy of the message once it is freed from
the imprimatur of power.
Constance’s linguistic anxiety mirrors the perplexity of the citizens: “the
split between legitimacy and actual power was always a potential malfunction
in the developing Absolutist State.”⁸ In other words, the struggle between the
two legitimacies questions the concept of legitimacy itself, overtly opposing it
to the rights of those who can take and maintain power. In practice we are deal-
ing with a crisis of authority that becomes absence and obsession with the divine
sign of royalty, mutating into a problematic sign, a desperate symbol of the end
of theological optimism that does not express the universe any longer but rather
shows it as separate and insecure. In this way the subjects fill the gap in power
and claim the right to argue about the principle of loyalty, and to discuss and to
theorize on the formation of regal power. “In King John and Richard II Shake-
speare invites us to question the capacity of individual will to determine the des-
tination of the crown and of other landed estates,” asserts Watt in his Shake-
speare’s Acts of Will.⁹
Citizen: He that proves the king,
To him will we prove loyal. Till that time
Have we rammed up our gates against the world. (2.1.270–273).
“The conflict before the walls of Angiers is between traditional lineal succession
and individual will, but the subject matter of the issue between King Philip and
King John concerns nothing less than the proper descent of the English crown.”¹⁰
The citizens take active part in this contest, and are not mere bystanders. The re-
sult is the passage of authority from monarch to commoners.
The loyalty of the citizens is put up for auction and offered to the best bid-
der: “One must prove greatest: while they weigh so even, / We hold our town for
 Alan Sinfield, “Macbeth: History, Ideology and Intellectuals,” in New Historicism and Renais-
sance Drama, eds. Richard Wilson and Richard Dutton (London and New York: Longman, 1992),
63–77, 68.
 Gary Watt, Shakespeares’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Property (London and New York:
Bloomsbury, 2016), 63.
 Watt, Shakespeares’s Acts of Will, 65.
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neither; yet for both” (2.1.332–333). This is a declaration of the decline of a uni-
verse based on the oral (or implied) transmission of principles and the emer-
gence of the written code: bear in mind how the generational betrayal of the con-
cept of monarchy by divine right changes into the necessity of written pacts, even
to sell one’s own soul as in Doctor Faustus. The word, becoming mad, affirming
and negating itself, mirrors the collapse of the medieval principles of loyalty and
honour, causing a new bourgeois and mercantile mentality to emerge, where ev-
erything is traded, even loyalty. The evolution from tradition to a new mercantile
perspective is made evident for instance in Richard II, where the action of Ri-
chard’s giving and Bolingbroke’s taking the crown looks as if they were shaking
hands upon a bargain.
Therefore the point where the citizens themselves decree the canon of the
behaviour of kings is reached, and the citizens offer the two kings the possibility
of a “friendly treaty”: the youths of both families should be united in marriage,
thus returning to a unitary regal concept. The principles of loyalty and of the sa-
credness of royalty are submerged by the flow of words of the Citizen, who with
his logorrhea decrees the finiteness of a theological meaning, relegated to mere
historicity:
Here’s a large mouth indeed,
That spits forth death and mountains, rocks and seas[…]
What cannoneer begot this lusty blood?
He speaks plain cannot fire, and smoke and bounce,
He gives the bastinado with his tongue.
Our ears are cudgelled – not a word of his
But buffets better that a fist of France:
Zounds I was never so bethumped with words (2.1.458–468).
This accusation of logorrhea sounds even more paradoxical by being pro-
nounced precisely by the Bastard who is not characterized by linguistic economy
either. In fact, the Bastard, like Constance, is also a real “corruptor of words”
who, thanks to his “abundance of superfluous breath”, causes the “break[ing]
off of your conference” (2.1.147–150), that is, the dialogue between Austria,
King Philip and King John; in this case, once again, the flow of words makes
the dignity of authority redundant.
A hierarchical universe in defection receives the coup de grâce of rhetoric
which, using the ironic juxtaposition between “grandam” and “mother,” causes
a parallel universe made of words to emerge, words that are independent from
the socio-political referent. What was a dynastic struggle is transformed into a
war of paradoxical “wit,” underlining a purely logocentric dimension. We are
thrown into an upside-down world, in a “plagued bedlam” of inflated words.
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Similarly, Constance mainly recurs to the reiteration of terms such as “pla-
gue,” “will” and “grandam” to create a thick verbal fog (“Words folded up in
smoke,” “ill-tuned repetitions” – 2.1.229,198), which envelops, as in a torpor, pre-
cisely this meaning of royalty. The monarchy, or authority, is thus degraded to a
theory to be demonstrated: “K. John: Acknowledge then the king […] /Citizen:
That we cannot: but he that proves the king/ To him will we prove loyal”
(2.1.268–270). Royalty is transformed into “performance,” “scenes” and “acts,”
and the citizens become spectators to this performance: it is up to the king to
convince his subjects regarding his legitimacy and in this way the stress is
moved from a concept of unconditioned loyalty to a concept of loyalty to be won.
By heaven, these scroyles of Angiers flout
You kings and stand securely on their battlements,
As in a theatre, whence they gape and point
At your industrious scenes and acts of death. (2.1.373–377)
The meta-theatrical opening, which characterizes almost all of Shakespeare’s
works, here underlines the critical and detached, scornful and derisory, attitude
through which authority is observed, and this marks the decline of total adher-
ence and the emergence of mutiny. Authority is degraded to a mere term that has
to fight for its own referent and becomes an alternative.
Such a fragmentation is brought to light precisely by the choice between the
two different monarchies and it is offered to citizens, freeing them from the ne-
cessity of loyalty: the imbalance of the preference ends up subverting a system of
objective relations, a relational configuration that thus becomes a methodologi-
cal decision, giving rise to a critical and disenchanted reading of the ontological
aims of royalty itself and to a reflection on the concept of authority as a theoret-
ical norm. The citizens are transformed into readers of a text, of a “play” or
“script” of war action that is written “with purple hands/ Dyed in the dying
slaughter of their foes” (2.1.322–323).
Therefore, the acts of the kings are converted into narration, fictionalisation,
theatrical action, reductio ad absurdum and phono-logocentrism devoid of mor-
phological correlation. This intrinsic harmony, founded upon the social hierarch-
ical structure of Tillyardean memory, paradoxically turns out to be an artificial
construction that by then lacked consensus; as in any form of narration, if the
listener, or the consenting spectator is missing, the word falls into a void and
it cannot fulfil its duty as the creator of the message. Bear in mind the necessity
of the listener in the accomplishment of the cathartic aims in The Rhyme of the
Ancient Mariner, and in Prospero’s exhortations in The Tempest to Miranda to lis-
ten to his tale. Therefore in King John the concept of royalty is put into question
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precisely because of the continuous verbal dilation that is used and because of
the fact that the subjects do not passively listen to the tale of authority any lon-
ger, but rather they wake up from such an almost hypnotic form of adherence to
power in order to question its auraticity.
“Monarchy” is degraded into an assumption to be demonstrated, it causes
the founding skeleton of its own structure to emerge, and this becomes an object
of investigation and interrogation. The split between the signified (the sacred
meaning of the term) and the signifier (the personae of the two kings) leaves a
power vacuum into which the common man insinuates himself: so it is the Bas-
tard that governs the kings, who clearly demonstrate a decision making inability.
Your royal presences be ruled by me. (2.1.378)
O prudent discipline! From north to south!
Austria and France shoot each other’s mouth.
I’ll stir them to it. (2.1.413–417)
The gap in power is manifested in a linguistic subversion that is the cause of a
free fall into the abyss of non-significance, but also an effect.What emerges from
this is an inversion of political and verbal strength: now the subjects apply the
“policy” and express authority. Now the subjects, in a total subversion of roles,
administer demiurgic linguistic power. The authority principle has become a
metaphorical play, a deferral between sender and receiver in a confusion of mod-
els that relativizes meaning. The “word” is still powerful but it is a “tale,” the
social and organic structure that came to a crisis.
The power of the word is set against the power of authority and the Bastard’s
statements (“Here’s a large mouth indeed”) mentioned above describe precisely
the image of authority/legitimacy besieged and attacked by the word. Language
here represents a physical element and a means of aggression: subversion has its
origin in the “cannonade” of the word. The power of the word is also epitomized
by the various curses that run through the play. Basically the term “curse” indi-
cates a reaction to a transgression. Dating back to the Bible, the curse indicated
either an act of punishment by God or an appeal to God’s justice. The curse im-
plies a juridical order which has in some way been violated and which must be
restored through the curse. In this perspective, the curse has a transcendental
value: it is established as strictly connected to law, which it presupposes and de-
termines at the same time. Basically the term indicates a reaction to a transgres-
sion.
Like the avenger, the curser appears to act in God’s name: he acts as God’s
mouthpiece to reaffirm the law but, at the same time, he becomes blemished by
the utterance. The curser shows his power in the utterance but is endangered by
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it: power and impotence are mixed in the act of cursing, because the curse fol-
lows a ritual but it also marks a state of exception. Therefore the curse is an am-
biguous act that is an exception on one hand, but is ritualized on the other hand,
thus becoming a political act. Correctly, Quiring asserts that the curse can be set
as a borderline: it is an individual act that operates onto a body politic.
The double register, legal and linguistic, clashes against the dramatic agon
in a process of affirmation/negation of legitimacy/authority, in a disrupting dis-
quisition on the right to power. An already unstable universe of royalty (as it re-
sults from the first part of the text where the decision making ability is seen as
falling to the subjects) is checked due to “perjury.” The king’s betrayal of the
word is transformed into “original sin” which infringes the edenic world of legal-
ity and transforms it into “counterfeit,” “painted peace,” “forsworn:” “All things
begun come to ill end” (3.1.94).
Actually the tear in the fabric of authority is transformed into the collapse of
a whole linguistic universe that becomes its own opposite: from reality to “false-
hood,” from “majesty” to “counterfeit,” from “peace” to “war.” In this way the
linguistic subversion mirrors the hierarchical chaos into which society fell be-
cause of the sin of “perjury” committed by the king. The missing word makes
the canon explode, and it becomes an abyss of non-significance in which respect
for authority collapses and makes the pact stipulated between the monarch and
the subjects redundant, opening a chasm that becomes a linguistic chasm. Here
Constance’s verbal violence gives voice precisely to this dissent within legitimacy
and seems particularly subversive exactly because it is the woman, the “other”
par excellence, who expresses it. Such is the case that her irreverent jest to the
king, “And hang a calf ’s skin on those recreant limbs” (3.1.129), is recalled by
the Bastard more than once, and by the “fool”, the other discordant element,
who is always speaking from the margins of society. If the woman and the
“fool” normally share a peripheral and marginal position within Elizabethan
texts and what would otherwise constitute high treason is here permitted to
them, in this text they are the spokesmen of an uneasiness that is recalled
and amplified also by the subjects and which consequently constitutes an
overt element of subversion recurring in the text.
Such a critical and reflexive awareness offers an insight into the operations
of power and it also becomes an insight into the changeable aspects of history.
The sacredness of royal power is connected to the time of immortality: it is a per-
petuation in time by legitimate heredity until the achievement of mythical time.
Bear in mind the attempt to make the day of the alliance between the two kings
sacred:
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[…] this blessed day
Ever in France shall be kept festival:
To solemnize this day, the glorious sun
Stays in his course and plays the alchemist,
Turning with splendour of his precious eye
The meagre cloddy earth to glittering gold. (3.1.75–81)
The allusion is to the stopping of the sun on its course and to the fixity of the
solemnity of that moment. But the “day”, here meant as the eternal day of the
present, is transformed into mortality and oppression because of the sin of “per-
jury” committed by the king. The cosmic upheaval caused by the violation of the
word also involves the passage of time, which is mutated into thanatoic time:
A wicked day, and not a holy day!
[…] return this day out of the week,
This day of shame, oppression, perjury.
[…] This day, all things begun come to ill end. (3.1.83–96)
The passage is from a concept of a Golden Age to a biblical hell of damnation
and of loss. The royal perjury rendered the concept of “majesty” a “counterfeit,”
a shadow (“resembling majesty”), also subverting the semantic value of terms
such as “war” and “peace.”
Constance’s words, along with the Bastard’s, are Dionysian leaps in the anti-
form, into desecration and into opposition, and they rebel against the Apolloni-
an structure required by authority: it is a matter of the primordial urge towards
the codification of meaning within the law. But the obedience to the law ceases
precisely when the legal pact is not accomplished by authority itself.We are in a
total travail, in danger of interrogation. The agonistic dimension becomes a rhet-
orical dimension, inside and outside sense itself, in a continuous negation of the
words of authority that are formed into a banished object, into something other
than the self. The language of subversion presupposes, however, a primitive ad-
herence to the principle of authority.
The interweaving of given and withdrawn words creates a tangle of oaths
and perjuries that, in the impossibility itself of the concept of loyalty, are both
loyal to one side and necessarily disloyal to another side. Pandulph’s speech
in Act III, scene I, in fact, plays completely upon the ambivalence of the terms
“swear/forsworn,” semantically tied to “faith” and “oath.” The whole speech
is posited in an absolute dilation ad infinitum of a few key words, which keep
legality and authority together.
36 Daniela Carpi
Such a making and unmaking of meaning brings about cosmic chaos, almost
Armageddon: “The sun overcast with blood” (3.1.327); “This day grows / won-
drous hot,/ Some airy devil hovers in the sky,/ And pours down mischief”
(3.2.1–4). We witness nature’s rebellion against the reiterated violation of a hier-
archical order that reminds us of the unnatural phenomena scattered throughout
Macbeth and the various (metaphorical and non metaphorical) tempests of
Shakespearean works: everything indicates a rupture and a dismemberment of
the social corpus (here represented by Blanch, who first becomes Lewis’s wife,
and is then torn between the husband’s and the uncle’s factions). Such a rupture
in authority, however, has an ominous influence on social harmony: “Whoever
wins, on that side shall I lose” (3.1.335).
The wavering of authority requires continuous confirmations and here King
John’s second coronation demonstrates the uncertainty of the sovereign: the
whole text of King John is permeated precisely by the problem of “guard[ing] a
title” (4.2.10). Authority needs the allegiance of the subjects since the concept
exists only as long as there is a concordance of meaning: the convergence of
meaning between destinateur and destinataire creates a harmonious circle
where the hierarchy is located. The interruption in the convergence provokes a
language without support, an articulation in a syntax of reason opposed to a
syntax of authority: such an interruption provokes the questioning of a meta-
physical principle that is foundational against a metaphorical pathos.
The linguistic juxtaposition reveals an even wider lack of centre in the text.
As John Blanpied correctly observes: “The effect is of dissipated strength[…] It is
a play in which nothing seems to take root […] Split of the power centre […]”¹¹
The loss of a stable centre in the “play” is rendered also through the images
of dismemberment: bear in mind Blanch’s words:”They whirl asunder and dis-
member me“(3.1.326). The clash is between two, paradoxically inverted, models
of history: Constance and the Bastard seem to be connected to a classical view of
authority, conferred with legitimacy by divine and hereditary right founded upon
concepts of honour and respect to the given word, whereas King John symbolizes
the “new rationalistic and sceptical laicism” that is typical of the “new bourgeois
civilization and of the new science,” founded upon the principle of “commodi-
ty.”¹²
In a reading that pivots on the concept of power, “resistance could be seen
as otherness that defines power in that it differentiates from it and that, there-
 John W. Blanpied, “Stalking Strong Possession in King John,” inWilliam Shakespeare: Histor-
ies and Poems, ed. Harold Bloom (New York, Chelsea House, 1986), 98–119, 98.
 James L. Calderwood, “Commodity and Honour in King John,” in Shakespeare: The Histories,
ed. Eugene M. Waith (Englewood Cliff: Prentice Hall, 1965), 341–356.
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fore, guarantees its existence.”¹³ “In order to give justice to the complexity of
both power and the Shakespearean theatre, a theory of textuality, taking into
consideration the meaning of the terms difference and deferral, is necessary,”¹⁴
but in the world of Shakespearean historical plays, as Belsey also correctly ob-
serves, we cannot really talk about “difference,” since such a concept would
imply the existence of metaphysical certainty, of a univocal concept of power
that such historical plays do not really portray, since they narrate the endless al-
ternation of such royal absolutisms so as to question dynastic legitimacy itself.
Thus, using a definition by Derrida, in my opinion we should talk about différ-
ance which reasserts an endless uncertainty. Constance’s rebellion and the sub-
verting-commenting function of the Bastard are precisely the linguistic outcome
of royalty, the linguistic invasion of a universal/theological concept of power
where the sense of absolute is lost in order to make it a centre of a system of dif-
ferences.
“The absence of a transcendental signified extends the domain and the play
of signification infinitely.”¹⁵ We are dealing with a decentering that leads to a re-
thinking of the structurality of power itself. A metaphysics founded upon princi-
ples of interpretation and sign substitutes a previous metaphysics based upon
concepts of Being and Truth. Royalty is reduced to “sign” and leaves the field
of its own privileged signification.
 Belsey, “Creare storie ora ed allora,” 136. [My translation]
 Belsey, “Creare storie ora ed allora,” 145. [My translation]
 Jacques Derrida, Writing and Difference [1967] (London: Routledge, 1997), 280.
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Chiara Battisti
Richard the Freak: The Dis-ability to Show
Power
1 Disability Studies: the theoretical approach¹
In mythology it is a universal characteristic of men born from the Earth that at the moment
they emerge from the depth they either cannot walk or they walk clumsily.²
Claude Levi-Strauss’ words – which evoke the image of fascinating one legged
creatures, of heroes struggling to walk upright, of crippled gods, and of limping
gaits – emphasize how disability and body’s anomalies are not only biological,
social, and cultural conditions, which exist in every historical time. Indeed, with-
in Western culture, they take on a founding and representative function of the
complex relationship of human beings to Earth, thus becoming important arche-
types for the self-representation of the body. The totality of cultural activities es-
tablishing links between disability inscribed in the bodies and their social con-
struction is evident; yet any form of impairment and especially its social
codification as disability has been for a long time excluded from traditional
fields of knowledge. This exclusion has caused a vacuum that is at the same
 Cf. Lennard J. Davis, Bending Over Backwards (New York and London: New York University
Press, 2002); Lennard J. Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness and the Body (London
and New York: Verso, 1995); Lennard J. Davis ed., The Disability Studies Reader (New York: Rout-
ledge, 1997); Roberto Medeghini ed., Norma e normalità nei Disability Studies: Riflessioni e analisi
critica per ripensare la disabilità (Trento: Erickson, 2015); Alice Hall, Literature and Disability
(New York and London: Routledge, 2015); David Mitchell, Sharon L. Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis:
Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000);
David Mitchell, Sharon L. Snyder, Cultural Locations of Disability (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2006); Mike Oliver, The Politics of Disablement (London: Macmillan, 1990); Mike Oliver,
Understanding Disability, from Theory to Practice (London: Macmillan, 1996); Tobin Sieber, Dis-
ability Theory (Michigan; University of Michigan Press, 2008); Matteo Schianchi, Storia della dis-
abilità (Roma: Carocci, 2013); Matteo Schianchi, Disabilità (Milano: Bruno Mondadori, 2013); Ato
Quayson, Aesthetic Nervousness (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); Henri-Jacques
Stiker, A History of Disability. (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999); David M. Turner,
Kevin Stagg, Social Histories of Disability and Deformity: Bodies, Images and Experiences (New
York: Routledge, 2006).
 Claude Lévi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology (New York: Basic Books, 1963), 215.
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time “a mirror of the socio-cultural taboo represented […] by disability and a con-
tribution to the reproduction of marginalization.”³
Therefore, if the persistence of an ancestral prejudice towards disability is
ascribable to the cultural irrelevance willingly given to this matter – indirectly
exposed by this scholarly neglect – an important role in perpetrating the logic
of denial and of stigmatizing silence may also be attributed to the difficult com-
prehension of a term, such as “disability,” “that did not exist in the past,”⁴ a
term whose meaning is muddled and ambiguous also in the present time. In
fact, “[i]t is not immediately clear whether it is an expression identifying a spe-
cific disability or the person affected by that disability or the social position of
the handicapped person. Often the meanings are obscure and confusing.”⁵ Re-
cent researches in the field of disability studies have contributed to a partial sol-
ution of this conceptual incomprehension and to the codification of its problem-
atic features. These studies cast an explicatory light on the phenomenon of
disability. They developed along the line of cultural politics upheld by the initia-
tive of people subjected to various forms of exclusion and marginalization; this
field of research has analysed the complexity – often rejected by simplistically
arbitrary interpretations – which characterizes the concept of disability by relat-
ing such a concept to a biological condition, but also by revealing the social
pressure through which the person differing from the norm is designated as dis-
abled.
Disability studies, grown out of the cultural studies established in Great Bri-
tain in the Seventies of the twentieth century, have progressively consolidated
acquiring the status of an academic discipline thanks to the work of British
scholars such as Mike Oliver and Vic Finkelstein. In the 1980s these analytical
studies began to be recognized as a new, stimulating, and critical approach by
the Anglo-Saxon world, the United States, Australia, Northern Europe, and
France. Although presented under one label, disability studies appear as a diver-
sified research field that can hardly be brought back to a sole unifying theory, as
its definition seems instead to suggest. The diversification of approach can also
be traced back to and determined by the programmatic will of the movement to
modify the cultural paradigm through which the concept of disability is inter-
preted, using a research that involves a variety of disciplinary fields, such as,
for instance, sociology, law, philosophy, and psychology.
 Schianchi, Storia della Disabilità, 14. [My translation.]
 Schianchi, Storia della Disabilità, 17. [My translation.]
 Schianchi, Storia della Disabilità, 4. [My translation.]
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Disability studies analyse the society within which the disabled person lives,
they critically challenge a functionalist medical paradigm that has suggested
conceptualizations regarding disability and deficiency considered as individual
elements based on the causal link between impairment and disability. From
the perception of disability studies, disability can no longer be conceived as a
deviation from normality, nor can the social experience of the disabled person
be considered without taking into account the contextual factors provoking
the exclusion. In such a critical scrutiny, the distinction between impairment
and disability is founding. As stressed by Leonard Davis, an important spokes-
person for this critical movement, a physical deficiency implies a biological, cog-
nitive, sensorial or psychological difference, whereas disability is the result of a
negative social reaction to such a difference.
An impairment involves a loss […] of sight, hearing, mobility, mental ability, and so on. But
an impairment only becomes disability when the ambient society creates an environment
with barriers- affective, sensory, cognitive, or architectural.⁶
Impairment is a real and physical condition, whereas disability is a social and
political construction. The very concept of normality is a cultural construct:
“the problem is not the person with disabilities; the problem is the way normalcy
is constructed to create the “problem” of the disabled body.”⁷ The critical charge
against the medical model of the approach to disability can therefore be attrib-
uted to the assumption, supported and promoted by such an approach, that sick-
ness is a form of deviance, a disturbance to the social order, and that disability is
an “abnormal” or “unnatural’ condition in contrast with the normality of other
people. According to the medical template, the integration of disabled people in
society therefore envisages a process of rehabilitation and normalization.⁸
The social model⁹ constituting the theoretical framework of disability stud-
ies challenges the medical approach¹⁰ in opposing the construction of disability
 Lennard J. Davis, “Constructing Normalcy: the Bell Curve, the Novel, and the Invention of the
Disabled Body in Nineteenth Century,” in The Disability Studies Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis
(New York: Routledge, 2006), 17.
 Lennard J. Davis, “Introduction: Normality, Power, and Culture,” in The Disability Studies
Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 9.
 Cf. Talcott Parsons, The Social System (New York and London: Routledge, 1951).
 Oliver, The Politics of Disablement.
 Although critically opposing the medical model, the social model acknowledges the contri-
bution that medical science has brought and can still bring to the improvement of the lifestyle of
disabled persons.What is criticized in this model is, rather, the gaze cast on the individual, con-
sidered as an unfortunate subject. Mike Oliver, precisely in order to avoid inaccurate critical al-
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as an individual phenomenon; instead, it chooses to identify those factors that
“disable” the human being (the appropriate term being “disablement”). The ef-
fort not to focus on the biological condition supported by the social model does
not mean, however, forgetting the individual his/her pathological condition, but
rather concentrating on issues to be shared by a subjective collectivity and there-
fore likely to be used in political struggles. The supporters of disability’s social
model actually expose the society’s tendency to isolate the disabled person, un-
derscoring instead the importance of cohesion in sharing ideals and objectives.
It is society which disables physically impaired people. Disability is something imposed on
top of our impairments by the way we are unnecessarily isolated and excluded from par-
ticipation in society. Disabled people are therefore an oppressed group in society.¹¹
The study of disability’s social stigma does not involve only its medical, legal,
and sociological aspect, but also the humanistic one, namely, the representation
of disability in historical, literary, and artistic perspective¹². The analysis of dis-
ability within the context of humanistic research answers to and is in corre-
spondence with the programmatic objectives of the social model because it con-
stitutes in itself “a way of resisting the idea that disability is a personal tragedy
or a pathologised medical issue.”¹³ Far from dealing with the silence and the ab-
sence of disabled beings as found in political and social life, literary texts return
very frequently and with different perspectives to the theme of disability that be-
comes, in turn, an effective metaphor for social anxiety, or the “fulcrum or pivot
out of which various discursive details emerge, gain salience, and ultimately un-
dergo transformation,”¹⁴ taking on “a defamiliarizing effect on the basic catego-
ries of identity and of literary criticism.”¹⁵ As for the latter aspect, Tobin Sieber in
his Disability Theories strongly argues for a link between instability, disability,
and identity; he calls attention to how “the presence of disability creates a differ-
ent picture of identity – one less stable than identities associated with gender,
race, sexuality, nation, and class – and therefore presenting the opportunity
lusions about the work of professionals and to medical contributions, prefers using the concept
of “individual model” of disability and model of social oppression.
 Michael Oliver, Understanding Disability, from Theory to Practice (London: Palgrave Macmil-
lan, 1996), 22.
 Catherine J. Kudlick, “Disability History:Why We Need Another ‘Other’,” American Historical
Review 108 (June 2003): 763–793. http://www.historycooperative.org/journals/ahr/108.3/ku
dlick.html (last access July 20, 2016).
 Hall, Literature and Disability.
 Quayson, Aesthetic Nervousness, 34.
 Hall, Literature and Disability, 39.
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to rethink how human identity works.”¹⁶ Understanding and analysing the cul-
tural and literary representation through the critical lens of disability studies im-
plies bringing into play alternative readings concerning concepts of culture and
power by analysing, first of all, the notion of norm.
Having clarified the critical potential of applying the approach of disability
studies to literary research, it is however necessary to state a methodological
caveat. Actually, such an analysis entails a contemporary conceptual and termi-
nological projection on a time when disability was not a codified concept as it
now is:
From a methodological viewpoint it is […] necessary to keep in mind that the very concept
of disability through time is not unequivocal. It is conceptually wrong to project onto the
past our present perceptions, especially in epochs preceding the previous century, when
the health conditions of the total population were much more precarious.¹⁷
Contemporary criticism acknowledges the necessity of a historical sensibility that
goes along with the application of theories and of contemporary concepts to the
literature of the past. However, it is also appropriate to consider Lois Bragg’s belief
that disability was defined and redefined in the course of years and centuries.¹⁸ In
his Oedipus Borealis: The Aberrant Body in Old Icelandic Myth and Saga, Bragg
highlights that in the course of the centuries different attitudes have emerged
on the theme of disability, as well as different definitions of a concept at any
rate always present in intellectual evaluations, in collective consciousness, and
in every epoch linked to the reflection on deficiency and disability.
Recent critical studies¹⁹ emphasize, however, how the social process of the
definition of “disabled” people has become institutionalized with the progress
of industrialization and through practices and formal debates dating back to
the end of the eighteenth century and nineteenth century. Proponents of English
Historical Materialism,²⁰ (with particular reference to Antonio Gramsci’s catego-
ries, for what concerns the work of Vic Finkelstein, Mike Oliver, and Colin
Barnes) have called attention to the role of industrial capitalism and the result-
ing development of the production sector based on assumptions of skillfulness;
 Sieber, Disability Theory, 5.
 Schianchi, Storia della disabilità, 35.
 Lois Bragg, Oedipus Borealis: The Aberrant Body in Old Icelandic Myth and Saga (Madison,
NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2004), 167.
 Stiker, A History of Disability; Schianchi, Storia della disabilità; Turner, Stagg, Social Histories
of Disability and Deformity: Bodies, Images and Experiences.
 Anne Borsay, Disability and Social Policy in Britain since 1750, (London: Palgrave, 2005);
Brendan Gleeson, Geographies of Disability (London and New York: Routledge, 1999).
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these factors have relegated disabled persons to a position of marginality and de-
pendency that has found its codification in the discourse on “normality.” In sup-
port of such a position, Leonard Davis, for example, reminds us that in English
the term “normal” – whose ambiguous link with the noun “norm” is more than
obvious – with the meaning of “constituting, conforming to, not deviating, or
different from, the common type or standard, regular, usual” entered the com-
mon language around 1840.²¹ Similarly, the term “norm” in its contemporary
meaning was included in dictionaries since 1855.
2 English Renaissance and disability
If it is only in the last part of the eighteenth century and during the nineteenth,
that “the systematized, divided structure of normal and abnormal bodies […is]
institutionalized, treated, and made into a semiology of metonymic meanings,”²²
the obvious question is how debates concerning non-normative identities were
conducted during the Renaissance. This is the historical period when William
Shakespeare wrote Richard III (1591–1592), the last of his four dramatic works
dedicated to English history.
According to Allison Hobgood and David Houston Wood, a “notion of early
modern disability is not anachronistic because human variation, though con-
ceived of and responded to diversely, has always existed.”²³ The text quoted
above takes on and restates Bragg’s conviction, cited earlier, that disability is
an identity category present in every epoch and understood to designate the
“human variation.” Even if the lemma was not yet present in the dictionary,
the concept of disability existed. It evoked different images, taking on different
meanings when applied to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century England because
such a concept was strongly influenced by the scientific and cultural episteme of
the time. From this perspective David Turner and Kevin Stagg in Social Histories
of Disability and Deformity call attention to the fact that “in the early modern pe-
riod the concept of disability was subsumed under other categories, notably de-
formity and monstrosity.”²⁴ Furthermore, many critics highlight that such a topic
can be connected to concepts derived from classic aesthetics, to the Medieval
 Davis, Enforcing Normalcy: Disability, Deafness and the Body, 24, chapter 2, passim.
 Davis, Bending over Backwards: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Difficult Positions, 66.
 Allison Hobgood, David Houston Wood, “Introduction: Disabled Shakespeare,” Disability
Studies Quarterly 29.4 (Fall 2009), available at http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/991/1183 (last ac-
cess June 14, 2017).
 Turner, Stagg, Social Histories of Disability and Deformity, 4.
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concept of the marvellous, and to elements of medical pathology linked to the
theory of humours.
The Renaissance is a period of deep epistemic fractures during which the
conflict between the new science (represented in works by Copernicus, Galileo,
Vesalius, Bacon…) and the authority of ancient texts produces the very notion of
modernity. The corporeal entity of the modern self comes to define itself in a live-
ly arena, a locus of encounter and clash for an ideal body and a monstrous body,
a humoral Hippocratic body, an iconic body, a body rich in symbols to be inter-
preted by studying the manuscripts of the great classic physicians, an astrolog-
ical body and a body placed at the intersection of microcosm and macrocosm, a
cross reference between plants, minerals, animals, stars, and planets. Further-
more, many critics underscore that such a topic can be connected to concepts
derived from classic aesthetics to the Medieval concept of the marvellous, and
to elements of medical pathology linked to the theory of humours. Such a sys-
tem, culturally structured by sometime contradictory cross-references, gives to
the Renaissance body a “strangeness” attributable precisely to the “survival of
older conventions of representation alongside newer fashions.”²⁵
During this time there still is the notion of the classical concept of “ideal
beauty” which, from a visual point of view, presupposes a body formed by the
best anatomical parts of various individuals. No one embodies in himself/herself
ideal beauty because the later is indissolubly connected with the divine. If the
mythopoeic and divine body is unattainable by any human being, in a culture
focalized on the image of the ideal body all the members of a population are
not endowed with an ideal body and “there is no social pressure […] that pop-
ulations have bodies that conform to the ideal.”²⁶ The counterpoint to the dis-
tance from the normality of ideal beauty is the awkward and grotesque distance
from any canon of beauty: the monster.
The concept of monstrosity grows out of a social construct through which a
being is perceived according to a deceptive norm; in Renaissance modernity, the
monster contextualizes the relationship between disability, deformity and phys-
ical defects. However, it is important to point out that the two categories, deform-
ity and monstrosity, are not completely equivalent. The former refers to ugliness
or to physical conditions – such as, for instance, misshapen or crippled limbs
that could cause functional damages. It is a concept bearing a social stigma, al-
though accepted by civil or canonic law.
 Renaissance Bodies: The Human Figure in English culture c. 1540– 1660, eds. Lucy Gent, Nigel
Llewellyn (London: Reaktion Books, 1995).
 Lennard Davis, “Introduction: Normality, Power and Culture,” in The Disability Studies Read-
er, ed. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 2.
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The latter, monstrosity, includes congenital defects, believed to be caused by
either excess or deficiency of the semen ejaculated during conception. In addi-
tion, monsters constitute significant social metaphors allowing for the conceptu-
alization of characteristics that could actually refer to disability, but they could
also address a critique of the political, social, and moral system (in fact, mon-
strous births were considered as bearers of messages addressed to holders of po-
litical, religious or moral power).
The impact of the idea of monstrosity is broadened by its being an absolute
concept that forces the law to question its own rules in the institution of socially
inclusive and exclusive hierarchies:
Within the traits that make a body monstrous – that is, frightening or ugly, abnormal or
disgusting – we may read the difference between an other and a self, a pervert and a nor-
mal person, a foreigner and a native.²⁷
The analysis of the dramatically monstrous body, representing a symptomatic
complexity of fears, brings about a reflection on human variability and on a
modern and pre-modern subjectivity, making Renaissance representation of
the abnormal body an instrument for re-reading and re-interpreting a historically
distant cultural imagination of disability: “Renaissance cultural representations
of non-standard bodies might provide new models for theorizing disability that
are simultaneously more inclusive and specific than those currently available.”²⁸
Within the complex Renaissance episteme, the ideal and the monstrous body are
juxtaposed to the humoral body. The medical paradigm of the four humours is of
great importance also for the Renaissance discourse about disability because the
very notion of pre-modern and Renaissance individuality can be constructed as a
historicized inquiry about the body’s variations and differences. The fundamen-
tal concept of material incarnation, as conceived within the theory of humors (a
mixing of the four main humours: choleric, sanguine, melancholic, and phleg-
matic), is implicitly based on imperfection: excesses or deficiencies of humoral
components create bodily differences of temperament. This consideration intro-
duces the allusion to an initial definition of disability as excess or deficiency
with respect to, in the specific case of the theory of humours, an even means
of equilibrium and proportion. At the same time, however, the representative
transformism of the humoral selves in Renaissance works shows the precarious-
 Judith Halberstam, Skin Shows: Gothic Horror and the Technology of Monsters (Durham: Duke
University Press, 2000), 8.
 Hobgood, Houston Wood, “Introduction: Disabled Shakespeare.”
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ness of the matter of which pre-modern identity is composed, thus making pre-
modern categories of disability much more unstable than the present ones.
In its use of vocabulary related to the ideal, the monstrous, the misshapen,
and the humours, the philosophical and cultural representation of disability re-
veals how in the Renaissance a disabled identity may be considered both as a
complex negotiation of the discourse on deformity and monstrosity, and also
as a perception of identity as fluid matter in continuous negotiation and, as
such, remarkably contemporary.
However, the Renaissance period is also characterized by an important epis-
temological leap²⁹ from the theory of humours, according to which the self is
conceived as a “semi-permeable irrigated container in which humours moved
sluggishly”³⁰, to the successive Cartesian philosophy, where the self is perceived
as “a static, solid container, only barely breached, autonomous in principle from
culture and environment, tampered only with diseases and experts.”³¹ What
happens, therefore, is an epochal transformation of identity categories with a
transfer from a “humoral” self in constant connection and dialogue with its en-
vironment to a self characterized by a marked dualism and essentially isolated
from the environment. It is precisely the liminality of Renaissance writing, the
act of writing at the threshold of this epistemological transformation, that
makes the representation of disability in Renaissance works so challenging
and so far from contemporary perspective and yet sometimes so close to and pre-
cursory of themes present in our own time:
early modern English authors portray stigmatized illness, disease, and deformity- in a
word, disability- by conceiving of it in ways that can simultaneously appear either entirely
alien to current Western (that is, Cartesian) ways of thinking or, on the contrary, as utterly
and even painfully familiar.³²
 Cf. in particular Gail Kern Paster, The Body Embarassed: Drama and the Discipline of Shame
in Early Modern England (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1993); Gail Kern Paster, Humoring
the Body: Emotions and the Shakespearean Stage (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004);
John Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1998).
 Paster, The Body Embarrassed: Drama and the Discipline of Shame in Early Modern England,
8.
 Sutton, Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism, 41.
 Allison P. Hobgood, David Houston Wood “Introduction. Ethical Staring: Disabling the Eng-
lish Renaissance” in Recovering Disability in Early Modern England, eds. Hobgood, Houston
Wood, 13.
Richard the Freak: The Dis-ability to Show Power 47
3 Richard III and disability
Richard III has often been read and interpreted through the analysis of his body,
which has been connected to the stormy fractures that developed within English
history. Thus, Richard is a monstrous political figure who usurps the throne, an
emblematic witness of the Renaissance creed according to which there is con-
tinuity between inner morality and exterior appearance. Richard’s deformity em-
bodies and represents all that is wrong in Richard, in England, and in the cos-
mos, in the attempt to condensate a wider and deeper disorder in the visible
body of a single person.
Michael Torrey³³, for instance, analyses Richard’s deformity through the crit-
ical perspective of physiognomy, attributing the peculiar success of Richard’s
politics to the complex and ambivalent approach to deformity in the Renais-
sance. Mark Thornton Burnett³⁴ too connects Richard’s political ambivalence
to the concept of monstrosity, underscoring how the King’s incompleteness,
his “unfinished state” may be an effective and sinister image of the succession
crisis that might have happened at the end of Elizabeth I’s reign. Linda Charnes
as well emphasizes that “Shakespeare’s audience would immediately have recog-
nized Richard’s physical deformity and moral depravity as a synecdoche for the
state,” since in pre-modern England “the body was one signifier in an elaborate
network of signification in which God’s signature could be read in the physical
world.”³⁵ In the play there are in fact numerous references to the anomaly of po-
litical transactions and to the deep connection of such an anomaly with Ri-
chard’s deformity. An emblematic example can be found in the bitter words of
Anne Neville’s grief for the death of Henry VI:
Foul devil, for God’s sake, hence, and trouble us not;
For thou hast made the happy earth thy hell
Fill’d it with cursing cries and deep exclaims.
If thou delight to view thy heinous deeds,
Behold this pattern of thy butcheries
O, gentlemen, see, see! Dead Henry’s wounds
Open their congeal’d mouths and bleed afresh!
 Michael Torrey, “The Plain Devil and Dissembling Looks: Ambivalent Physiognomy and
Shakespeare’s Richard III”, English Literary Renaissance 30.2 (2000): 123–153.
 Mark Thornton Burnett, “‘Monsters’ and ‘Molas’: Body Politics in Richard III” in Mark Thorn-
ton Burnett Constructing ‘monsters’ in Shakespearean drama and early modern culture (Hound-
mills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave, 2002).
 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity: Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare (Cambridge: Har-
vard University Press, 1993), 30, 22.
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Blush, Blush, thou lump of foul deformity;
For ’tis thy presence that exhales this blood
From cold and empty veins, where no blood dwells;
Thy deed, inhuman and unnatural,
Provokes this deluge most unnatural.(1. 2. 51–62)
In the critical stance mentioned above it is obvious that “the use of deformity as
master metaphor for social ill serves to suppress the personal and social impli-
cation of disability.”³⁶ Considering Richard as a liminal figure, “a Renaissance
version of late medieval attitudes toward deformity”³⁷ helps understanding the
negativity attributed in the play to his body, to a physicality that is a sign indi-
cating, showing, announcing, and predicting. The critical approach of disability
studies allows instead for the analysis of Richard III as a work about the power of
the disabled body. With an anticipatory awareness that bodily experiences and
physical illnesses are constructed and mediated by culture and society, Richard
takes advantage of the language of deformity to describe his physicality, playing
with the plurality of meanings of his deformity, thus morphing it into a technol-
ogy of power.
From this perspective, the famous lines “My conscience hath a thousand sev-
eral tongues/ And every tongue brings in a several tale” (5.3.205–207), beside
describing conscience as a great political force, could pre-announce a prism of
interpretative possibilities. In fact, such words could contribute to trace the
image of Richard himself as a creature with multiple performances of his identity
and physicality, thus becoming also a metaphoric allusion to the interpretative
plurality of the idea of disability in the work itself; such a plurality may refer
to the above mentioned coexistence of different epistemological approaches
about the body.
Richard literally places his body on the stage sometimes to emphasize and
sometimes to minimize his physical difference. His physical impairment is al-
ways present, but Richard consciously plays with the cultural construction of
disability: he transforms his body into a dynamic entity that not only opposes
and refuses the script assigned to him, but also uses such a script to his own ad-
vantage. Let us consider now some examples of these multiple performances
that offer a post-modern possibility “of a mutable self, of a fluidity of subjectiv-
ity.”³⁸
 Turner, Stagg, Social Histories of Disability and Deformity, 9.
 Mitchell, Snyder, Narrative Prosthesis: Disability and the Dependencies of Discourse, 102.
 Annette Kuhn, “Sexual Disguise and Cinema,” in The Power of the Image: Essays on Repre-
sentation and Sexuality (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985), 52.
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We may ponder first on the stunning verbal power of the first monologue
when Richard appears on the stage walking with enraged deformity and looking
at the audience straight in the eye:
Now is the winter of our discontent
Made glorious summer by this son of York,
And all the clouds that loured upon our house
In the deep bosom of the ocean buried.
Now are our brows bound with victorious wreaths,
Our bruisèd arms hung up for monuments,
Our stern alarums changed to merry meetings,
Our dreadful marches to delightful measures.
Grim-visaged war hath smoothed his wrinkled front;
And now, instead of mounting barbèd steeds
To fright the souls of fearful adversaries,
He capers nimbly in a lady’s chamber
To the lascivious pleasing of a lute.
But I, that am not shaped for sportive tricks,
Nor made to court an amorous looking glass;
I, that am rudely stamped and want love’s majesty
To strut before a wanton ambling nymph;
I, that am curtailed of this fair proportion,
Cheated of feature by dissembling nature,
Deformed, unfinished, sent before my time
Into this breathing world, scarce half made up (1.1.1–23)
Richard’s description of his own physical aspect emphasizes the conscious ma-
nipulation of his physicality, underscoring the dramatic qualities of a body capa-
ble of taking on different nuances and appearances in order to answer the aims
and needs of a manipulating “I.”
Let us examine now the words Richard used in his opening monolog: “cur-
tailed of this fair proportion,” “cheated of feature,” “deformed, unfinished, sent
before my time,” “scarce half made up”. These words, left to resound in the spec-
tators’ ears, blend and mingle together, evoking the words with which freak
shows’ presenters invite the public to stop and admire the fun fair phenomenon
on display: “Step up and see the bearded lady, the single skeleton with two
heads, the baby with one eye-socket and no nose!,” and again “Step right
up…see the most astonishing aggregation of human marvels and monstrosities
gathered together in one edifice.”³⁹
 Felix Isman, Weber and Fields. Their Tribulations, Triumphs and Their Associates (New York:
Boni and Liveright, 1924).
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As noted by many critics, the Shakespearean public was familiar with phe-
nomena of representation of diversity – “by the sixteenth century […] represen-
tations of monstrous bodies, rather than the physical bodies themselves, circu-
lated freely within and beyond Europe in the print culture that witnessed an
explosion in the early modern period,”⁴⁰ – as well as with phenomena of repre-
sentation of diversity as a spectacle.
Showing anomalous persons for the sake of spectacle is not a practice lim-
ited to caravans and fair grounds in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, but
was already popular in Shakespeare’s time. The custom of the time to exhibit ab-
normal bodies in taverns or at crossroads became official in the nineteenth cen-
tury with freak shows:
the early itinerant monster-mongers who exhibited human oddities in taverns and the
slightly more respectable performances in rented halls evolved in the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury into institutionalized, permanent exhibitions of freaks in dime museums and later in
circus sideshows, fairs, and amusement park midways.⁴¹
Therefore, the present interpretative hypothesis presumes that the opening
soliloquy should conjure a figure with unusual shape and diversified perspec-
tive: the freak⁴². Such a figure must be understood in the context of a historical
period characterized, as underscored earlier, by the simultaneous presence of
cultural and philosophical beliefs, often diverging for what concerns the defini-
tion of the dis-abled body. If in Shakespeare’s work there is no invitation to stop
 Nadja Durbach, Spectacle of Deformity: Freak Shows and Modern British Culture, (Berkeley
and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2010), 2.
 Rosemarie Garland Thomson, “Introduction: From Wonder to Error. A Genealogy of Freak
Discourse In Modernity,” in Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Extraordinary Body, ed. Rosemar-
ie Garland Thomson (New York and London: New York University Press, 1996), 4–5.
 Cf. Rachel Adams, Sideshow U.S.A: Freaks and the American Cultural Imagination (Chicago:
Chicago University Press; 2001); Robert Bogdan, Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for
Amusement and Profit (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988); Lorraine Daston,
Katharine Parks,Wonders and the Order of Nature, 1150– 1750 (New York: Zone Books, 1998); Ka-
therine Dunn, Geek Love (London: Abacus, 2002); Sarah Hall, The Electric Michelangelo (Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 2003); Armand Marie Leroi, Mutants: On the Form, Varieties and Errors
of the Human Body (London: HarperCollins, 2003); Michael Mitchell, Monsters: Human Freaks
in America’s Gilded Age:The Photographs of Chas Eisenmann (Ontario: ECW Press, 2002); Margrit
Shildrick, Embodying the Monster: Encounters With the Vulnerable Self (London; Thousand Oaks
California Sage, 2002); Rosemary Garland Thomson ed., Freakery: Cultural Spectacles of the Ex-
traordinary Body (New York: NYU Press, 1996); Rosemarie Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bod-
ies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature (New York: Columbia Univer-
sity Press, 1997).
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and look since Richard addresses an already present, real, and imaginary audi-
ence, the voice and the words, in an astute intertwining of images and symbols,
are apt to communicate – in the theater work as well as in the freak shows – a
public identity for the exhibited person that may arouse interest and curiosity
among the audience.
With his being and his words, Richard insinuates himself, by deconstructing
it, into the clear distinction, even in his own time, between the “monster-mon-
ger” evoked in the passage quoted above – the lucid and rational itinerant mon-
ster-monger – and the exhibited “human oddity,” namely, the person morphed
into an object of gazing. First spectator of himself, pleased with but also amazed
by his histrionic interpretations, Richard is the actor and his public, the scene to
be filmed and the camera framing it, it is the thought taking action at the very
moment in which the thought is formulated.
Anticipating the contemporary politics of transgression, Richard manipula-
tes the watchful and idiomatic mechanism of the freak performance, making
himself both uttering “subject” and “object” exhibited in the performance. In
so doing, he destroys the rigidity of certainty and the clear line of distinction be-
tween able and un-able, rational and irrational, man and animal.
The proposed reading perspective, focalized on the figure of the freak and on
the role of the freak show, may be considered problematic from the viewpoint of
disability studies. If the freak show is considered as a spectacle focused on the
disabled person, such a spectacle has the function of structuring and codifying
normality by contrasting it with the abnormality of the exhibited body; in this
case, it is necessary to protect the disabled person from being exploited by a cul-
tural fetishism legitimating a compulsive necessity to define and control physical
differences. However, the dialogue between disability, cultural, and performance
studies, has recently led numerous critics to reconsider the freak show, under-
scoring its value as a “site for contesting some of the cultural logics it enacts.”⁴³
For example, Robert Bogdan calls attention to the fact that scholars and activists
connected with the disability world, in their desire to protect disabled persons
from being exploited, have mistakenly underestimated the degree of independ-
ence and freedom granted by freak shows to such persons.⁴⁴
First of all, it is possible to consider the freak performance staged by Richard
as an early example of independent control of his narrative – or of an attempt to
control it; such an attempt morphs his crippled body into a readable and deci-
 Bree Hadley, “Mobilising the Monster: Modern Disabled Performers’ Manipulation of the
Freakshow” M/C Journal 11.3 (2008), available at http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.
php/mcjournal/article/viewArticle/47 (last access June 20, 2016).
 Bogdan, Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit, 280–281.
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pherable text. Since Richard’s experience of himself is inseparable from his read-
ing of his body’s signs as a signifying text, Richard tries to take control of the
social construction and manipulation of the body as signifier. Instead of negat-
ing his disability or depriving it of its expressive ability, Richard uses it, moulds
it, exacerbates it, makes it “freak,” morphing it into an instrument of power and
validation of disability. In so doing, Richard puts into question the power logics
that, in the course of the centuries, have brought about the conviction that dis-
abled people are incapable of making sense of their experiences, thus depriving
them of voice and communication. “The cultural representation of disability,” as
Thomas Couser argues, “has functioned at the expense of disabled people, in
part because they have rarely controlled their own images.”⁴⁵
The play’s tragic conclusion, as it will be argued later, invalidates Richard’s
power performance. Even if ineffective, Richard’s attempt reminds the reader, es-
pecially the informed contemporary reader, that the body is always “labelled as”
something else in representational economies; […] “labelled as identifies meta-
phorically the space between the materiality of the body and the materializing
of cultural difference.”⁴⁶ In fact, labelling the body as disabled or unnatural
transcends its mere physicality and makes visible the sphere of cultural practices
that historically defines such a physicality. In an intelligent and anticipatory ap-
propriation of the figures, symbols, and stage setting of the freak shows, Ri-
chard’s disability performance begins to deconstruct the mechanism that sup-
ports and legitimizes these cultural practices, thus compelling readers and
spectators to question their own complicity in the construction and definition
of the freak. At any rate, the freak’s performance defines itself as destabilizing
because it complicates and explodes the space between signifier and signified,
showing and demonstrating that the freak is a cultural construction.
From such a perspective, it should be noted that Richard begins his first
monologue with an imperious “Now,” a word repeated twice in the subsequent
lines. Richard’s preoccupation with time and the cyclic emphasis with which the
word “now” is repeated, seem to nod at the “natural” rhythms of life and things,
underscoring how such rhythms define also the social normative paradigms of
actions and body conduct. The subsequent description of himself as different,
as excluded from these natural rhythms, becomes a way to assert and justify
his inadequacy in respecting such norms. But there is more: by offering his
 Thomas Couser, “Disability, Life Narrative and Representation” in The Disability Studies
Reader, ed. Lennard J. Davis (New York: Routledge, 2006), 399.
 Charmaine Eddy “Material difference and the supplementary body in Alice Walker’s The
Color Purple” in Body Matters, eds. Avril Homer and Angela Keane (Manchester: Manchester Uni-
versity Press, 2000), 100.
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own body as a deforming mirror that does not reflect the reality it represents, Ri-
chard challenges the personal “I” and the extended “I” of the audience by bring-
ing back his being a freak, and therefore his exclusion from natural rhythms, to
the mere order and ontological level of the narrative. Thus, identity is just an
endless play of mirrors in a circus-like spectacle. The freak body is not only ex-
hibited, but it is also staged as an unstable and destabilizing product of the dy-
namic relationship between performer, audience, and theatrical space.⁴⁷
The stage setting, the deliberate emphasis on alterity, and the relationship
between freak and audience (elements that, according to David Hevey, are
part of what he defines as “process of enfreakment,”⁴⁸) transform the “freak
of nature,” namely the person born with congenital or genetic malformations,
into “freak of culture” that representational practices and socio-cultural process-
es try to silence, to turn away from the norm.
Ever since Shakespeare’s time, the freak has constituted the re-elaboration
in ludic form of the exclusion and stigmatization of disability, and the freak
body is precisely the locus of metamorphosis and transformation. The cultural
and physical volatility of the freak body – the refusal ingrained in the body to
adhere to a natural order that, in turn, ratifies a social order – makes it socially
and politically disruptive.
These considerations suggest a further interpretation of Richard’s power per-
formance that could be connected to the basic theme of the state of exception, as
argued by Rebecca Lemmon in her “Tyranny and the State of Exception in
Shakespeare’s Richard III.”⁴⁹ So far we have highlighted the extent to which
Renaissance performance practices labelled Richard’s presence as transgression
of natural limits, transgression of classifications, and transgression of the social
system of reference. It has also been emphasized how Richard’s freak perform-
ance has embraced the volatile opportunities offered by his deformity “for rais-
ing important questions about the naturalization of concepts of ’normal’ and
’abnormal’.”⁵⁰ However, it should be noted that Richard’s freak performance lit-
erally stages political and legal effects connected with Richard’s (bodily) state of
exception.
 Elizabeth Stephens, “Cultural Fixations of the Freak Body: Coney Island and the Postmodern
Sideshow,” Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies 20.4 (2006): 485–498, 486.
 David Hevey, The Creatures that Time Forgot: the Photography and Disability Imager, (New
York and London, Routledge, 1992), 53.
 Rebecca Lemmon, “Tyranny and the State of Exception in Shakespeare’s Richard III” in Ri-
chard III a Critical Reader, ed. Annaliese Connolly (London, New York: Bloomsbury Arden, 2013).
 Michael Chemers Staging Stigma (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 5.
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In many lines throughout the work Richard’s body is discussed and stigma-
tized by the other characters: Anne and Elisabeth deride Richard describing him
as “diffused infection of a man,” “hedgehog,” “bottled spider,” and “foul bunch-
backed toad,” all expressions recalling anomalous and inhuman bodies. Howev-
er, Richard’s real monstrosity – a category that at that time, as noted earlier, dif-
fered from infirmity or deformity – is codified by Margaret’s words:
Thou that wast sealed in thy nativity
The Slave of Nature and the son of hell;
Thou slander of thy heavy mother’s womb,
Thou loathed issue of thy father’s loins (1.3.228–231)
Margaret seems to draw her imagery from the vocabulary and the categories in-
troduced by erudite treatises⁵¹ about monsters in Shakespeare’s time. The mon-
ster is such by birth (“wast sealed in thy nativity”) and his different physical
shape is the result of an erroneous mixing of the male and female semen (evoked
in the text by “heavy mother’s womb” and “thy father’s loins”) or by the inade-
quate reproductive strength of the male semen or by the negative influence of the
female menses. If Richard is a monster, he represents not only an infraction to
nature’s order, but also, as Michel Foucault argues, a juridical enigma. For
civil, religious, and canonic law, monstrosity, in difference from infirmity:
is the kind of natural irregularity that calls law into question and disables it. Law must ei-
ther question its own foundations, or its practice, or fall silent, or abdicate, or appeal to
another reference system, or again invent a casuistry. Essentially the monster is casuistry
that is necessarily casuistry introduced into law by the confusion of nature.⁵²
However, the monster, aware of being “a legal labyrinth, a violation of and an
obstacle to the law, both transgression and undecidability at the level of the
law”⁵³ passively awaits to be normalized; the freak’s exemplary quirkiness, pur-
posely staged by Richard, reveals how the normative social system describes as
innate an identity which is, instead, imposed:
 Jakob Rueff, De conceptu et generatione hominis (1554); Conradus Lycosthene, Prodigiorum
ac ostentorum chronicon (1557); Lievin Lemnes, Occulta naturae miracula (1559); Gerolamo Car-
dano, De rerum varietate (1557); Ambroise Parè, Des monstres et prodiges (1573).
 Michel Foucault, Abnormal: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1974‐1975, trans. Graham
Burchell, English series, ed. Arnold I. Davidson (New York: Picador, 2003), 64.
 Foucault, Abnormal, 65.
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Freaks are above all products of perception: they are the consequence of a comparative re-
lationship in which those who control the social discourse and the means of representation
recruit the seeming truth of the body to claim the center for themselves and banish others
to margins.⁵⁴
Richard decides to create a new center that, considering his diversity, is neces-
sarily ex-centric, therefore distant from the normative center. For example,
when the dying king Edward IV tries to secure peace in his kingdom, Richard
turns his misshapen body into sign and exhibition of his exceptional status:
Because I cannot flatter and look fair,
Smile in men’s faces, smooth, deceive and cog,
Duck with French nods and apish courtesy,
I must be held a rancorous enemy. (1.3.47–50)
Richard describes himself as “physically” predestined to break the rules of deco-
rum in order to uphold an “ex-centric” truth; in fact, his very body seems to keep
him away from social normative attire. He stresses the congruence between his
person and his appearance: his body becomes an authentic and reliable text be-
cause his deformity prevents Richard from building himself according to the pa-
rameters of a normality that actually does not belong to him.
In the specific case, his physical difference implies and presupposes a differ-
ent behaviour, marked by an integrity that is not present in the court environ-
ment characterized, instead, by fictitious and illusory “apish courtesy.” Richard’s
objection “I cannot […] look fair” baffle the gazing subject and the object of such
a gaze, wilfully invalidating the spectators’ perspective. In fact, Richard induces
his audience to see what he wants of his body and he has such a power that the
viewers must, partially at least, accept his description of reality.
In the course of the play, this freak and ex-centric Richard interrupts and de-
constructs the ceremonies⁵⁵ connected to rites of passage (from funereal mourn-
ing, to specific funeral rites, to marriage), and “deforms” the juridical institu-
tions linked to succession and inheritance. With Hastings’ execution, he goes
as far as suspending the “form of law” in name of his own security and that
of the state (“The peace of England”).
 Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Litera-
ture, 62.
 William Carroll, “‘The Form of Law’: Ritual and Succession in Richard III” in True Rites and
Maimed Rites: Ritual and Anti- Ritual in Shakespeare and His Age, eds. Linda Woodbridge, Ed-
ward Berry (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992): 203–219.
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Richard: “What? Think you we are Turks or infedels?
Or that we would, against the form of law,
Proceed thus rashly in the villain’s death,
But that the extreme peril of the case,
The peace of England, and our persons’ safety,
Enforced us to this execution? (3.5.41–46).
The simultaneous suspension of the law and its affirmation is a true narrative
representation of the concept of “state of exception.” From a theoretical view-
point, the state of exception is that figure of the order suppressed and constantly
broken in which “the normative aspect of law can thus be obliterated and con-
tradicted with impunity by a governmental violence,” thus producing a perma-
nent state of emergency. And yet, although generating “a juridical vacuum,”
the state of exception “still claims to be applying the law.”⁵⁶. Within this state,
the practice of pure violence unleashed by law enforces the fictio juris according
to which it is always the law that can impose order. Therefore, if the state of ex-
ception appears as “the legal form of what cannot have legal form,”⁵⁷ Richard
represents a strong form of the state of exception “drawing on physical and po-
litical distortion of form.”⁵⁸ The source of Richard’s charisma and political power
derives precisely from his not having legal form, from his exceptional status as a
“monster” that denounces and rescinds normative limits, thus offering him phys-
ical, political and even epistemological freedom.⁵⁹ If the orderly body, the able
body is the normative result of the state of law, the (dis)orderly body, the (dis)
abled body can only be connected to the state of exception where the volatile
force of Richard’s freak performance allows for a process of re-definition of so-
cial identity. In such a process, the tyranny of the normal and the normative is
openly denounced.
In this perspective let us consider Richmond’s ascent to the throne. It is char-
acterized by the same violations of legal precepts that marked Richard’s:
Both seek the hand of Elizabeth; both usurp the crown from a ruling prince; both dream of
their own exceptionalism the night before the battle […]; and both deploy nationalist rhet-
oric based in emotion and instinct, rather than law and reason.⁶⁰
 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception. Homo sacer, II, I, (Chicago and London: The University
of Chicago Press, 2005), 87.
 Agamben, State of Exception, 1.
 Lemmon, “Tyranny and the State of Exception in Shakespeare’s Richard III,” 127.
 Katherine Schaap Williams, “Enabling Richard: The Rhetoric of Disability in Richard III,”
Disability Studies Quarterly, 29.4 (2009), available at http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/997 (last ac-
cess June 30, 2016).
 Lemmon “Tyranny and the State of Exception in Shakespeare’s Richard III,” 127.
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The end of the play, however, justifies and glorifies Richmond’s illegal rebellion
because it aims at re-establishing the normative order in an England that “hath
long been mad” (5.5.23), and, in so doing, it invalidates Richard’s performance as
a disabled person. This performance is defined as “mad” because Richard has
put into question deeply rooted social, cultural, and legal paradigms. From
the freak’s political approach, the conventional ending insists on and shows
how true tyranny is in fact normality.
Beside questioning the limits of legal legitimacy in the definition of the dis-
abled body, out of historical necessity involving the period of the composition of
Richard III, the last act reintroduces the fantasy of an “ideal” body in Rich-
mond’s character. This element invalidates Richard’s power performance, sug-
gesting the impossibility of upholding the strength of disability in a culture
where ability is valued. On the eve of the battle of Bosworth, both Richmond
and Richard appeal to St. George, the patron saint of England iconically connect-
ed with the dragon’s killing. Let us now examine the two invocations: Rich-
mond’s words – “God, and Saint George, Richmond, and victory” (5.3.270) –
with the explicit invocation to God, allude to a battle for a superior cause. Ri-
chard’s words, “This and St. George to boot” become instead the verbal transla-
tion of his physical aspect, taking on twisted and contradictory traits. Richard
evokes St. George, aware of the fact that the “able” normative system around
him expects this conduct from a king and a leader. However, he later ambiguous-
ly urges his troops to be inspired and driven by the fury of the dragon, St. Georg-
e’s antagonist: “Our Ancient word of courage, fair Saint George,/ Inspire us with
the spleen of fiery dragons.” (5.3.349–350).
Like the national patron he invokes, Richmond frees England from a mon-
strous body that, like the dragon symbolizing it, “figurant, lui, la Bête-en-nous,-
qu’il faut tuer, c’est-à-dire rejeter.”⁶¹
In the fight between St. George and the dragon, Richmond is St. George from
whom he draws physical strength kept in check by moral strength (thus coming
close to the concept of the “ideal” body); with his twisted and crippled body, Ri-
chard is the dragon that must be killed, rejected in order to re-establish a clear
line of distinction between able and disabled, normal and abnormal, monstrous
and ideal. The discursive practices of hegemonic power linked to the definition
 Jean Chevalier and Alain Gheerbrant, Dictionnaire des symboles: Mythes, réves, coutume, ges-
tes, formes, figures, couleurs, nombres (Paris: Robert Laffont, 1982), 232.
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of acceptability of bodies implies “the emptying (kenosis) of normalcy […]
through the purging of those beings that confuse, [and] are misrecognizable.”⁶²
Finally, Richard’s performance, analysed from the freak point of view, leads
to a discussion of Lindsay Dawn Row-Heyveld’s interpretative hypothesis accord-
ing to which “Richard, albeit genuinely impaired, enacts a performance of disa-
bility that clearly links him to the charity-hungry thieves of rogue literature and
to the tradition of the counterfeiter on the early modern stage.”⁶³ Row-Heyveld
attributes Richard’s rise to power to the “manipulation of his audiences’ chari-
table impulses;” she reads into Shakespeare’s work a warning to replace charity
with suspicion “when dealing with people with disabilities, fraudulent or other-
wise.”⁶⁴
The category of crippled beggars was well known in Shakespeare’s time and
was considered suspicious because crippled beggars hoped to arouse empathy
and to get alms precisely for their obvious inability to work. Furthermore, fre-
quent simulations of malformation had induced the state to introduce a distinc-
tion, from a legal point of view, between persons unable although willing to
work (“the deserving poor”), who could enjoy the benefits of alms, and persons
unwilling to work (“the undeserving poor”).
An early definition of disability links such a condition to the inability to
work, and therefore to the necessity of benefitting from alms. The fear of simu-
lation, strengthened and validated by legal codification, appeared forcefully in
every aspect of English Renaissance culture and found literary expression in
popular ballads, a literary genre known as “rogue literature”⁶⁵ and in those
shows that could be defined as “fraudulent disability plays,”⁶⁶suitable to edu-
cate spectators to be suspicious and watchful in dispensing alms.
 Fiona Kumari Campbell, “Refusing Able(ness): A Preliminary Conversation about Ableism,”
M/C Journal 11.3 (2008), available at http://journal.media-culture.org.au/index.php/mcjournal/
article/viewArticle/46 (last access July 10, 2016).
 Row-Heyveld, Dissembling Disability: Performances of the Non-Standard Body in Early Mod-
ern England, 163.
 Row-Heyveld, Dissembling Disability: Performances of the Non-Standard Body in Early Mod-
ern England, 164.
 Kathleen Poires, “The Intersection of Poor Laws and Literature in the Sixteenth Century: Fic-
tional and Factual Categories” in Framing Elizabethan Fictions: Contemporary Approaches to
Early Modern Narrative Prose, ed. Constance Caroline Relihan (Kent: Kent State University
Press, 1996).
 Among contemporary works that can be included in the genre of “fraudulent disability
plays” or containing references to the theme of the fraudulent beggar, we should mention (in
alphabetical order): Richard Brome, The City Wit (1629–30); Richard Brome, A Jovial Crew, or
The Merry Beggars (1641); George Chapman, The Blind Beggar of Alexandria (1595–96); Thomas
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The deceitful appeal to public or even government generosity, exposed in
fraudulent disability plays, or the attempt at arousing empathic commiseration
for the crippled beggars, is very different, however, from the logic of freak
shows’ artists who refused compassion as a mode of show, since “pity did not
fit in with the world of amusement.” ⁶⁷
Often freak artists did not consider themselves as disabled persons needing
public pity, rather they tended “to construct themselves as skilled performers
whose bodies allowed them to lead normal, if not extraordinary, lives, a fact
that was clearly central to their public personae.”⁶⁸ These words do not connect
the size of the able body with conformity, expectations, social constructions, but
with the ability to act using one’s own disability or deficiency as “technology
performance.”
Once more the freak perspective allows for the dismantling of the dichotomy
able/disabled with anticipatory reference to the new approaches toward disabil-
ity that find their theoretical codification in Lennard Davis’Bending over Back-
wards: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Difficult Positions. Davis presents
the condition of disability as a fundamental and essential characteristic of the
postmodern that he defines as dismodern, precisely because of this new concep-
tion. The awareness that all human beings in some way or at some moment of
their lives are “wounded” or “maimed” leads Davis to state that “impairment
is the rule, and normalcy is the fantasy.”⁶⁹
By availing himself of his deformity as power technology, Richard fits Davis’
concept of dismodern subject. Considering Richard as a dismodern subject ena-
bles us to observe how, in different ways, all the bodies described in the play –
from the king’s dying body, to the nation as a metaphoric body, from the soldiers’
wounded body to the wasted body of Margaret, Henry VI’s widow – are unstable.
Richard challenges the dichotomy able/disabled bodies showing how everybody
starts with or reaches a condition of disability at a certain moment in life: in this
way he rejects the narration of modernity that insists on the description of a sub-
Dekker, The Honest Whore, Part 1, (1604); Ben Jonson, Every Man in His Humour (1598); Ben Jon-
son, Bartholomew Fair (1614); Ben Jonson, Volpone (1605–06); Thomas Kyd, The Spanish Trag-
edy (1582–92); John Marston, Antonio’s Revenge (1599); Thomas Middleton and William Rowley,
The Changeling (1622); Thomas Middleton, A Mad World, My Masters (1605); Thomas Middleton
and Thomas Dekker, The Roaring Girl (1607– 10); James Shirley The Constant Maid (1640); Wil-
liam Shakespeare, Hamlet, (1599–1601); Henry VI, Part 2 (1591); King Lear (1603–06); Titus An-
dronicus (1590–93); The Winter’s Tale (1610–11); Cyril Tourneur, The Atheist’s Tragedy
(1601–04); Thomas Heywood, The Rape of Lucrece (1608); John Webster, The White Devil (1612).
 Bogdan, Freak Show: Presenting Human Oddities for Amusement and Profit, 277.
 Durbach, Spectacle of Deformity: Freak Shows and Modern British Culture, 20.
 Davis, Bending over Backwards: Disability, Dismodernism, and Other Difficult Positions, 31.
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ject with an able body whose complete independence suggests the possibility of
perfection.
Thus Richard gives a provocative potential to the category of disability by re-
vealing its aspect as that of an unstable category.With his emphasis on the mul-
tiple ways through which his body difference is negotiated within the text, he al-
lows for the observation that these repeated performances, even in the case of a
normatively able identity, “[are] bound to fail, as the ideal able-bodied identity
can never, once and for all, be achieved.”⁷⁰
 Robert McRuer, Crip Theory, Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability (New York: New York
University Press, 2006), 9.
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Sidia Fiorato
Performance, Power, Politics: The Body as
Stage in Richard III
In the Early Modern Period, the body is a “cultural text that is interpreted, inscri-
bed with meaning – indeed made – within social relations.”¹ Central to the pe-
riod is the metaphor of the body politic, which is based on the analogy between
the human body and the political order and which is expressed in the image of a
harmoniously articulated body divided into different parts and functions, that
correspond to the members or organs of the community which cooperate for
the well being and balance of the whole. At a jurisprudential level, “Calvin’s
case” in Plowden’s Reports incorporated the conception of the king’s two bodies
into substantive law as the representation of the ordered state: the body natural
of the king was “subject to all Infirmities that come by Nature or accident […]
and to the like Defects that happen to the natural Bodies of other People.”²
The physical frailty of the body natural is transcended by the ethereality of
the body politic, which cannot be seen nor handled, but is represented through
the image of the lawful authority of the state in a presentification of its ontolog-
ical conception.³
Within this context, the historical and Shakespearean figure of Richard III
acquires a relevant meaning in the embodiment and articulation of such politi-
cal metaphor. As a matter of fact, his disability, reported in the historical records
but belied by recent findings, is invested with a political meaning: “Richard be-
comes the nation’s fate turned flesh; and his contorted body seems to grow di-
rectly out of England’s twisted fate during the Wars of the Roses. The body politic
deformed by decades of civil war materializes in the monstrous body natural of
 Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies (New York: Columbia University Press,
1997), 22.
 Edmund Plowden, Commentaries or Reports (London: Brooke, 1816), 212a.
 See Paul Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and Political
Power 158– 1660 (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2004), 57–58, and Cristina Costantini,
“Representing Law: Narrative Practices, Poetic Devices, Visual Signs and the Aesthetics of the
Common Law Mind,” in Liminal Discourses. Subliminal Tensions in Law and Literature, Daniela
Carpi, Jeanne Gaakeer, eds. (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2013): 27–36. See also Plowden, Commentaries or
Reports, 212a: “his body politic is a Body that cannot be seen or handled, consisting of Policy and
Government, and constituted for the Direction of the People, and the management of the public
weal.”
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the hunchback king and there finds its ‘final physical manifestation’.” ⁴ Under-
lying this image is the belief that a nation cannot function as a disharmonious
and disabled body, therefore “Richard’s death symbolically purges the nation of
the evils of civil war.”⁵ Richard’s corporeality comes to represent an interpretive
framework for historical events, in particular a failed, misshaped former age
(with the fall of the Plantagenets) and the consequent validation of the new
one, with the advent of the Tudor Dynasty.
On a personal level, physical impairment determines the ascription of dis-
ability by society, whose created constructs prescribe meaning to difference. Al-
ready at the play’s inception Richard recognizes his de-formity (his being mis-
shaped, incomplete), but it is only in Act 1 Scene 3 that we learn the precise
nature of his deformity, when Queen Margaret calls him a “poisonous hunch-
backed toad” (1.3.246). Medieval belief held that such impairment would keep
him “from participating in society’s ‘normal functions’ of daily life.”⁶ However,
Richard proves able to fulfill the functions of a royal, he wields power and is al-
ways responsible for his destiny, claiming agency and the assertion of his sub-
jectivity. He thus disrupts his own disability by disrupting at the same time
the view that posited it as foundational to his character. By the end of the
text, his disability recedes into the background and Richard is restored in his
military and bodily value, as he valiantly leads his troops into war, himself fight-
ing into the battlefield.
However, Shakespeare’s text was meant to be performed more than read,
and performatively, disability is a stage presence. The theatre, “an art of body
and an art grounded in body”⁷ allows it to become a site of negotiation:
“[a]lone among the elements that constitute the stage’s semiotic field, the
body is a sign that looks back.”⁸ Onstage, the body acquires multiple modalities
of expression, it opens itself to play and display and at the same time enters the
imaginative dimension of the audience: in this multimodal context, speech acts
 Ralf Hertel, Staging England in the Elizabethan History Play: Performing National Identity
[2014] (New York: Routledge, 2016), 106.With regard to this, see also John Jowett, “Introduction”
to William Shakespeare, Richard III (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 356.
 Hertel, Staging England in the Elizabethan History Play, 106.
 Abigail Elizabeth Comber, “A Medieval King ‘Disabled’ by an Early Modern Construct: A Con-
textual Examination of Richard III,” in Disability in the Middle Ages. Reconsiderations and Rever-
berations, ed. Joshua R. Eyler (London: Ashgate, 2010): 183– 196, 191.
 Simon Shepherd, Theatre, Body, and Pleasure (New York: Routledge, 2006), 7.
 Stanton B. Garner, Bodied Spaces: Phenomenology and Performance in Contemporary Drama
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), 49. See also Sidia Fiorato “Performances, Regulations
and Negotiations of the Renaissance Body. Legal and Social Perspectives,” in Performing the
Renaissance Body, eds. Sidia Fiorato, John Drakakis (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016), 1–26.
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prompt the audience’s imaginative participation and involve them in the circula-
tion of social energy implied by the construction of the individual character,
through their auricular quality.⁹
The poetics of Elizabethan power was indivisibly linked to a poetics of the
theatre:¹⁰ “figurative art speaks directly to the visual sense, but poetry also ap-
peals to the visual imagination by its capacity to conjure pictures into the minds
of […the] audience.”¹¹ The subject thus opens himself to self-invention in social
networks of established meanings and negotiations of power. In this way, Shake-
speare manages to contrast a huge triumphal stage personality¹² with the rigid
Tudor schema of interpretation based on retributive justice and the religious vi-
sion of disability as a sin. His Richard manages to gain control over the social
perception and manipulation of bodily signifiers and proves able “to sublate
his deformed body into the perfect body of the king.”¹³
Richard III opens with a soliloquy of the homonymous protagonist, a unique
instance in the Shakespearean canon, which signals its stage entrance. The stage
instructions say: “Enter Richard, Duke of Gloucester, solus”; this powerfully pos-
its Richard at the concrete and metaphorical centre of the representation. Such
effect is amplified by the structure of the Elizabethan “thrust stage,”¹⁴ which ex-
tends itself towards the audience, favouring in this way a privileged relationship
of the character with the audience and empowering the value of his soliloquies
and asides. Richard’s stage entrance, “solus,” master of the stage through the
powerful verbal and physical expression of his personality, completely captures
the attention of the audience, since his first words. As Garber asserts, “Shake-
 A.R. Braunmüller, “The Arts of the Dramatist,” in The Cambridge Companion to English Ren-
aissance Drama, eds, A.R. Braunmüller, Michael Hattaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, [1990] 2002): 53–90, 61.
 See Stephen Greenblatt, “Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and its Subversion, Henry
IV and Henry V,” in Political Shakespeare: Essays in Cultural Materialism, eds. Jonathan Dolli-
more, Alan Sinfield (Manchester: Manchester University press, 1994), 18–47, 44.
 Paul Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution. Late-Elizabethan Politics and the Theatre
of Law (Oxford and Portland: Hart, 2010), 1.
 Arthur Percival Rossiter, “Angel with Horns: The Unity of Richard III,” in Rossiter, Angel with
Horns: And Other Shakespeare Lectures (London: Longmans, 1961), 1–22, 2.
 Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity. Materializing the Subject in Shakespeare (Cambridge, Lon-
don: Harvard University Press, 1993), 32.
 The Thrust or apron stage is defined as follows: “This ‘extension’ to the normal proscenium
stage enables the performance space to be prolonged into the auditorium while at the same time
retaining the scenographic possibilities of the separate stage.” (Christopher B. Balme, Cambridge
Introduction to Theatre Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), Kindle Edition,
ch. 3.)
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speare’s Richard is the creation of a powerful political as well as dramatic imag-
ination.”¹⁵
In the incipit, Richard laments the peace granted by Edward IV’s reign as a
time of “discontent,” as it does not allow him the possibility to express his po-
tentialities. As a matter of fact, he had previously distinguished himself by de-
fending the English crown, as it is also reported in historical records and as
later in the tragedy Buckingham will recall in the following terms: “your victories
in Scotland, / Your discipline in war” (3.7.15– 16).¹⁶ The epic terms of the war im-
ages he employs underline how he does not feel he belongs to the new context of
“merry meetings” and “delightful measures”, as it is also indicated by the adver-
sative with which he introduces himself: “But I […]” (1.1.14). The terms he uses to
refer to his own person focus on his physical disability, often indicated as an ab-
sence or incompleteness of form: “not shap’d,” “rudely stamped,” “curtail’d of
this fair proportion” (where “fair” signifies physical perfection¹⁷), “cheated of
feature,” “deform’d, unfinish’d” (1.1.14,16,18,19,20). Richard appears, however,
as striving to transcend such incompleteness precisely when he states that he
can only “descant on my own deformity” (1.1.27); this musical metaphor under-
lines how Richard is celebrating his ability to “counterpoint and discourse upon
a given theme,”¹⁸ that is, his deformity, through a two-voice polyphonic impro-
visation. In an elegant metatheatrical play, he appears to be striving to bring his
own incompleteness to completeness through role playing. This attunes with the
meaning of performance as “acting through form”, which is to say “by means of
form,”¹⁹ or, expanding Watt’s definition, by articulating and negotiating forms.
Richard’s words “Why I, In this weak piping time of peace,/ Have no delight
to pass away the time, / Unless to spy my shadow in the sun” (1.1.24–26) under-
line his ineffable essence, which like a shadow does not possess clear and de-
fined contours, but constantly varies according to his position with respect to
 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare after All (New York: Anchor Books, 2004), 132.
 William Shakespeare, Riccardo III (Milano: Garzanti, 2010). All quotations in the text will be
taken from this edition.
 See Mark Thornton Burnett, Constructing “Monsters” in Shakespearean Drama and Early
Modern Culture (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 90.
 Marie-Hélène Besnaut, Michel Bitot, “Historical Legacy and Fiction: The Poetical Reinven-
tion of King Richard III,” in The Cambridge Companion to Shakespeare’s History Plays, ed. Mi-
chael Hattaway (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 106– 125, 106. See also Christo-
pher R.Wilson, Michela Calore, eds., Music in Shakespeare: A Dictionary (London: Bloomsbury,
2014): in the sixteenth century, “descant” referred both to a kind of vocal counterpoint, and to a
method of improvisation in song; the term originally (in the twelfth century) indicated a two-
voice polyphonic improvisation.
 Gary Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), 165.
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the sun (and therefore maintaining the initial pun of power itself) and, at the
same time, of the observer. Richard willingly identifies with the body of the
actor and exploits its protean qualities and its continuous change²⁰, as well as
the potentialities of multiple roles, which he actualizes through his rhetorical
ability with performative speech acts. When he asserts: “I am determined to
prove a villain” (1.1.30) he in fact ascends to a theatrical dimension which is
fully realized through the kinaesthetic energy of his stage presence and his mas-
tering of the visual and hearing space of the audience; Richard’s image as master
performer becomes the structural principle of the dramatic action and goes back
to the meaning itself of the word “theatre,” which comes from the Greek thea-
tron, that is, “a place for looking. […] a place as well as […] a particular form
of sense perception.”²¹ This characteristic intertwines with the period’s aware-
ness of self-fashioning, that is, “the fashioning of human identity as a manipu-
lable artful process,”²² and involves also speech and an attitude of hearing on
the part of the audience.
The audience is privy to Richard’s intents from their planning stage and sub-
sequently during the development of the events through Richard’s numerous
asides. As a matter of fact, he “shares his wicked plots with the audience before
stepping back into the frame of representation to execute them upon the other
characters, and then returns to the platea to gloat about the efficacy of his per-
formance.”²³ Richard performs the function of chorus, author, director, and main
character of the play. He continuously breaks the fourth wall, proving himself
able to catch the attention of the audience in a sort of dramatic monologue
ante litteram, through which the audience is transported into his mind, where
they learn about his intentions and understand them in a subtle Verfremdungs-
effekt. This is superbly rendered in the opening soliloquy performed by Jonjo
O’Neill in the 2012 Royal Shakespeare Company’s staging of the play. Richard en-
ters the scene solus and delivers his speech in ironic tones which enhance its
metatheatrical dimension. The effect is rendered disturbing by his almost enter-
ing the camera with his face and offering a close up of his eyes and his tricky
expression. O’Neill manages to reach the effect of his Richard condemning the
 As he had affirmed in 3 Henry VI, “I can change shapes with Proteus for advantages”
(3.3.192).
 Christopher B. Balme, The Cambridge Introduction to Theatre Studies (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), Kindle Edition, Introduction: Theatre and Theatre Studies.
 Stephen Greenblatt, Renaissance Self-Fashioning. From More to Shakespeare (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), 2.
 Gina Bloom, Voice in Motion: Staging Gender, Shaping Sound in Early Modern England (Phil-
adelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 111.
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whole context of his parable as the real masquerade by projecting his own con-
scious performance. His determination emerges when after the first part of the
soliloquy he seems to abandon the stage (which would have created an impres-
sion of abandoning the social scene, a self-emargination on the borders of soci-
ety) but then he goes back precisely on the line starting with “But I”. In this way,
he conquers both the stage and the attention of the audience and will hold it for
the whole play. Actually, in this metatheatrical structure, built by the character
himself, the audience tend to suspend their moral judgment to follow the tragic
aspect of a fascinating individual who embodies the libido dominandi: “the line
separating spectator from player is stretched so thin that the demarcation be-
comes precarious as Richard seduces us along with his other victims.”²⁴ The ob-
ject of the larger performance is in fact the control of the audience, of us, as Jo-
wett underlines.²⁵
We assist therefore to a fusion between the outer frame, that is, the “‘cultural
construct’ that involves the production of the theatrical event” and the inner
frame, that is, the theatrical performance itself, “the spectator’s experience of
[the] fictional stage world.”²⁶ The external representation, the “outer play”,
that is the communication between Richard and the audience, is made aware
of the shift with respect to the “inner play,” that is the Shakespearean text; in
such metatheatrical context, a “circulation of social energy” takes place,
which demystifies the concept of sovereignty, underlining its characteristics of
performance and preparing the audience’s attention for Richard’s performative
strategy. Dissembling Richard, a self-willing actor on the political scene, scripts
and enacts (actually, en-acts) his bloody (and bodily) path to power²⁷, in a per-
formative self-construction.
 Waldo F. McNeir, “The Masks of Richard the Third,” Studies in English Literature 1500– 1900,
11.2 (1971): 167– 186, 174.
 John Jowett, “Introduction” to William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Richard III (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), 1-142, 32.
 Susan Bennet, Theatre Audiences. A Theory of Reproduction and Reception (London: Rout-
ledge, [1990], 1997 (2nd edition)), 1.
 See A. J. Boyle, ed., Tragic Seneca: An Essay in the Theatrical Tradition (New York: Routledge,
1997), 195.
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1 Richard and the appropriation of the body
politic
In his first soliloquy, Richard communicates his past actions to the audience and
sets the context for the following scenes: “Plots have I laid, inductions danger-
ous, / […] drunken prophecies, libels and dreams” (1.1.32–33): he grounds the
success of his plans on the counterposition between the nature of the king
“true and just” and his own nature, which is “subtle, false and treacherous.”
(1.1.36,37) In this way, his metaphor of the mirror returns with new meanings;
he had in fact defined himself as “no[t] made to court an amorous looking-
glass” (1.1.15), but having to limit himself to “spy my shadow in the sun”
(1.1.26). Such counterposition recalls the initial pun which identifies his kingly
brother as “this son of York” (1.1.2), whose shining, however, for Richard does
not symbolize peace but serves to illuminate the shadows of the current political
situation. The mirror, besides symbolizing Richard’s protean capacity for change
and being part of his actor’s persona²⁸, at the same time acts as a reflecting sur-
face for the corrupted and distorted society which constitutes the context for Ri-
chard’s action and which precisely for this reason he is able to exploit for his
aims. Richard projects and displaces his deformity onto others²⁹ and he appears
to do this metaphorically reflecting the image of society through his personal
mirror.
After his encounter with Clarence, to whose arrest he contributed by spread-
ing a false prophecy, Richard, once again solus on stage, shares his thoughts
with the audience and confesses he is pursuing a “deep intent”, a “secret
close intent [… he] must reach unto” (1.1.149, 158– 159), and for whose achieve-
ment he expresses his intention to marry Warwick’s daughter, Lady Anne Ne-
ville. Such “secret intent” clearly delineates itself in the following scene, as
his courtship of Anne becomes at the same time the expression of his ambition
to the throne.
Anne enters the scene at the head of the funeral procession of King Henry
VI³⁰ and stops its progress in order to express her lamentation³¹: “Set down,
 See Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare After All [2005] (New York: Anchor Books, 2008), 136.
 Marjorie Garber, Shakespeare’s Ghost Writers: Literature as Uncanny Causality (New York and
London: Methuen, 1987), 39.
 According to historical records, Anne Neville was not present at Henry VI’s funeral. (Cfr.
Geoffrey Bullough, Narrative and Dramatic Sources of Shakespeare (London: Routledge and
Kegan, 1962), 146.) For this reason, her presence in Shakespeare’s text assumes a symbolical
meaning.
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set down your honourable load/ […] Whilst I awhile obsequiously lament /
Th’untimely fall of virtuous Lancaster […] / Be it lawful that I invocate thy ghost /
To hear the lamentations of poor Anne, / Wife to thy Edward to thy slaughtered
son” (1.2. 1,3, 8–9). The scene soon transcends its own occasion. Anne’s first
words define the king as a “holy king” and his body as “Pale ashes of the
House of Lancaster, / […] blood remnant of that royal blood” (1.2.6–7). In this
way, she powerfully calls the attention to the body natural of the dead king,
and, implicitly, to the body politic connected to it.
The funeral ceremony had a social function “concerned with the public per-
sona of the dead nobleman, rather than the burial of his private body. The
church ceremony was about the transfer of his undying title, not taking leave
of the dead.”³² At the moment of death, the body politic immediately in-vested
the successor of the king, in whom it embodied itself, thus enacting an ideal con-
tinuity of kingship.³³ The funeral ritual can therefore be interpreted as the repre-
sentation of the separation between the body natural (the body in the coffin) and
the body politic (the effigy of the dead king) and, at the same time, of the pres-
ervation of the body politic itself, waiting for the ceremony of the presentation
and official investiture of the king’s successor. In the context of the Shakespear-
ean work, the murder of the sovereign, of his body natural, provokes a political
crisis caused by the anomaly in the transition of power, which puts under discus-
sion the metaphysical continuity of the body politic.
In Act 1, Scene 2, the body natural becomes the theatre of the attempted ap-
propriation of the body politic still connected to it. Anne’s words underline her
belonging to the Lancaster royal family in her position as wife of the now
 In religious and literary tradition, the lamentation represented the expression of pain for the
death of a person and as the semantic analysis of the word shows, it was characterized by a
choral and theatrical dimension. See Daniela Carpi, “Caesar’s Body in Shakespeare’s Julius Cae-
sar: Sacralization and de-Sacralization of Power,” Polemos, 9.2 (2015): 281–294, 286.With regard
to this, see also Katharine Goodland, “‘Obsequious Laments’: Mourning and Communal Memory
in Shakespeare’s Richard III,” Religion and the Arts 7.1–2 (2002): 31–64, 31–44: Goodland under-
lines how in the same period of the Shakespearean text the Protestant church was distancing
itself from the practice of “wailing the dead”, considered as a “popish superstition” connected
to the Catholic theorization of the Purgatory, while however it considered the pomp connaturat-
ed to the funeral ritual as functional to the representation and keeping of the social order.
 Jennifer Woodward, The Theatre of Death. The Ritual Management of Royal Funerals in Ren-
aissance England 1570– 1625 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 1997), 35.
 Cfr. Edmund Plowden, Commentaries or Reports (London: Brooke, 1816), 233a quoted in
Ernts Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1997), 13: at the king’s death “there is a separation of the two Bodies,
and […] the Body politic is transferred and conveyed over from the Body natural now dead, or
now removed from the Dignity royal to another Body natural.”
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dead heir to the crown (“Wife to thy Edward”) and seem to claim regency. Her
appeal to the law (“Be it lawful that I invocate thy ghost” (1.2.8)) is grounded
in her transgression of the “customary class and gender rules of heraldic funer-
als which held that mourners should be the same sex and near in degree to the
deceased.”³⁴ In her position as chief mourner she undermines the social hierar-
chy and undermines the legitimacy of the successor Edward.³⁵ Moreover, Anne
pronounces her political lamentation in a civic space, in the streets of London,
at the head of a military procession, as she is at the head of a group of halberds,
thus putting under discussion also the traditional function of funeral procession
which aimed at strengthening the status quo.
Richard interrupts the procession as well with the following words: “Stay,
you that bear that corse, and set it down,” “set down the corse” (1.2.33,36): in
this way, the body of the dead king shifts to the centre of the action. The follow-
ing dialogue configures itself as a struggle for the body politic of the king through
his body natural.
Anne proves to be a cunning counterpoint to Richard in acknowledging and
trying to exploit to her own advantage the theatricality connected to the funeral
ritual and its performative dimension. In a metatheatrical shift, “Anne uses her
onstage audience [and theatre audience] as witnesses for her appeal to justice.”³⁶
The king’s body natural becomes body of evidence, in particular the moment
when, according to Renaissance belief, the victim’s wounds bleed, pointing to-
wards the presence of the murderer. Anne, therefore, tries to exploit this effect
to accuse Richard of “deeds inhuman and unnatural” (1.2.60); she achieves
her intent and she even obtains a confession on the part of Richard “I did kill
King Henry”, “’twas I that stabb’d young Edward” (1.2.183, 185). He also offers
her the tool to exact her revenge “I lend thee this sharp-pointed sword” (1.2.178).
Richard: Lo here I lend thee this sharp-pointed sword,
Which if thou please to hide in this true breast,
And let the soul forth that adoreth thee,
I lay it naked to the deadly stroke,
And humbly beg the death upon my knee. (1.2.178– 182)
However, Anne stops and renounces her aims for two reasons. By inviting Anne
to stab him, therefore by performing a metaphorical re-enactment of his own
 Woodward, The Theatre of Death, 17.
 Katharine Goodland, Female Mourning in Medieval and Renaissance English Drama. From the
Raising of Lazarus to King Lear (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 143.
 Goodland, Female Mourning, 145.
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crime, Richard tries to transfigure his own natural body into the body natural of
the dead king, by likewise becoming “a punctured body, a signifying corpse.”³⁷
Anne therefore stops not to sanction Richard as the king’s successor. On the
other hand, through his rhetorical power of fabulation, Richard disrupts the
legal context she had created through her lamentation, and renders it a context
of courtship by answering her accusations through terms of courtly love:
Anne: Black night o’ershade thy day, and death thy life.
Richard: Curse not thyself, fair creature; thou art both.
Anne: I would I were, to be reveng’d on thee.
Richard: It is a quarrell most unnatural,
To be reveng’d on him that loveth thee.
Anne: It is a quarrell just and reasonable
To be reveng’d on him that kill’d my husband.
Richard: He that bereft thee, lady, of thy husband,
Did it to help thee to a better husband. (1.2.135–143)
This new context disrupts the legitimacy of revenge, subverting the position of
the two speakers. Anne remains aware of Richard’s true nature, as, after re-
nouncing her revenge, she exhorts him to stand up in the following words:
“Arise, dissembler; though I wish thy death / I will not be thy executioner”
(1.2.188– 189), and the scene concludes as follows:
Anne: I would I knew thy heart.
Richard: ’Tis figured in my tongue.
Anne: I fear me both are false (1.2.196– 198)
Finally, Anne surrenders the dead king’s body to Richard when she complies to
his request to “leave these sad designs / to him that has most cause to be a
mourner” (1.2.214–215); in this way, Richard re-establishes the hierarchy of lam-
entation and acquires the symbolic position of the king’s successor, “the prime
mourner.” Anne, therefore, by retreating from her position, actualizes a symbolic
transfer of power: “the remains of the legitimate king embody the immortal
ethos of the kingdom, which is now in Richard’s power.”³⁸
The interruption of the funeral procession in 1.2 leaves the question of legit-
imate succession suspended, “the status of the dignitas unresolved and the state
of the kingdom in turmoil.”³⁹ Actually, in the course of the different phases of the
 Thornton Burnett, Constructing ‘Monsters’ in Shakespearean Drama, 79.
 Goodland, Female Mourning, 146.
 Goodland, Female Mourning, 142.
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funeral ritual, the stability of the kingdom becomes precarious, as the dignitas
connaturated to the political and social body of the king is in a transitional sta-
tus:
this rite of passage progression is animated by a synchronic opposition between the immor-
tal dignity (dignitas) of the kingship and the mortal remains of the king; an opposition that
is radical at first, ambiguous during the procession, and resolved at burial.⁴⁰
Richard deprives the body natural of the Plantagenet king of the solemn ceremo-
ny of the burial: he promises Anne to “solemnly inte[r] / at Chertsey Monastery
this noble king” (1.2.218), but then he stop the alberds and directs them to White-
friars while saying “I’ll turn yon fellow in his grave” (1.2.265). In this way, Ri-
chard takes possession of the dead king’s body politic and keeps it in a suspend-
ed state.
After his encounter with Anne, Richard celebrates the success of his plans in
a new aside and underlines in particular how his performative ability can com-
pensate and even overcome the “social lacks”⁴¹ he had denounced in his open-
ing soliloquy. His rhetorical ability becomes a form that substitutes the bodily
form. He then goes back to the metaphor of the “looking glass”: sure of
Anne’s favours although “misshapen” if compared to her dead husband who
was “Fram’d in the prodigality of Nature” (1.2.255, 248), he seems to plan his
own “self-fashioning” in order to acquire a “shape”, that is, a public persona:
“I’ll be at charge for a looking glass, / And entertain a score or two of tailors /
To study fashions to adorn my body” (260–262). However, such articulation of
a form is not yet final, as soon after he asserts “Shine out, fair sun, till I have
bought a glass, / That I may see my shadow as I pass” (267–268). Richard’s vis-
ibility and his secret plans strengthen themselves, as from “spy my shadow”, he
shifts to “seemy shadow.” The “role-playing” has not ended. As he had previous-
ly asserted, the marriage with Anne serves a “deeper secret intent,” that is, the
acquisition of the crown. Through his union with Anne he inserts himself in a
precise royal genealogy, through their common descent from the line of the Plan-
tagenets (1.2.147). Moreover, as Quiring observes, Richard thus first unites “the
white rose and the red” as Anne belonged to the Neville family, therefore to
 Peter Metcalf, Richard Huntington, Celebrations of Death. The Anthropology of Mortuary Rit-
ual (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 172, and cfr. 162– 165.
 Katherine Schaap Williams, “Enabling Richard: The Rhetoric of Disability in Richard III,”
Disability Studies Quarterly 29.4 (2009).
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the House of Lancaster⁴², thus demonstrating a political acumen which has re-
mained mainly ignored by the critics.
Richard, however, proves to be the dissembler of Anne’s final indictment
when in the aside which follows the scene he asserts: “I’ll have her but I will
not keep her long” (1.2.234); his quick changes in attitude in relation to the po-
litical and social situation characterize him as a “consummate actor who de-
lights self-consciously in his skill in whatever part he is playing; and he invites
us to watch him and share his delight in his skill.”⁴³
2 Margaret and the body politic
Richard envelops his body with his rhetorical ability, thus creating powerful ver-
bal constructions for which he at the same time acts as a prop and which sustain
him to communicate precise intentions and prosecute his aims: “His rhetoric
about his body inevitably leads to performing the kind of body he deems useful.
[…] the materiality of his form remains unclear until Richard [rhetorically] high-
lights his shape […] for specific purposes.”⁴⁴ Richard (fore)grounds a “slippery
view of the self as a role that is formed in moments of exchange and in response
to particular circumstances.”⁴⁵ For example, he rejects the accusations of court
members about his future role as Protector of the royal heir as “dissentious ru-
mors” (1.3.46) and disrupts their basis in his physical aspect which derives from
the beliefs of the period, rendering instead his de-formity a symbol of his inabil-
ity to dis-semble: “Because I cannot flatter and look fair /Smile in men’s faces,
smooth, deceive and cog, / Duck with French nods and apish courtesy, / I must
be held a rancorous enemy.” (1.3.47–50). By acting on visual strategies and the
process of mirroring, Richard re-directs the focus on his misshapen body in a
way which signifies “congruence between his person and his appearance; his
deformity here “speaks” truth since it prevents him from [deceivingly] fashioning
himself.”⁴⁶ In this way, he reverses the animosity he is attributed, even anticipat-
ing the accusations and turning them instead against the queen and her family,
 Bjön Quiring, Shakespeare’s Curse: The Aporias of Ritual Exclusion in Early Modern Royal
Drama (New York: Routledge, 2013), 38.
 Charles W.R.D. Moseley, A Guide to William Shakespeare Richard III (Tirril: Humanities-
Ebooks.co.uk, 2007), ch. 5.
 Schaap Williams, “Enabling Richard.”
 Martine van Elk, “‘Determined to prove a villain’: Criticism, Pedagogy and Richard III,” Col-
lege Literature 34.4 (2007): 1–21.
 Schaap Williams, “Enabling Richard.”
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that is, against the body politic itself. Actually, as Schaap underlines, the fact
that Richard cannot “look fair” has a double meaning that can be attributed
to Richard as object of the vision, but also as subject; the ambiguity of the ex-
pression perfectly inserts itself in his ironic portrait of the court, dominated by
“apish courtesy” and “French nods.”⁴⁷ Richard is the first to pronounce a
curse against the courtiers “A plague upon you all!” (1.3.58) and to denounce
their political schemes. The passage starts with Richard’s strong counterposition
to the group present on stage “They do me wrong” which reproduces in a certain
sense the “But I” of the opening soliloquy; he interrupts their “comedy of pre-
tenses to reveal the hollowness behind these feigned reconciliations”⁴⁸ and un-
derlines “what you have been ere this, and what you are; / Withal, what I have
been, and what I am” (1.3.132– 133).
In 3.4, Richard brings this strategy to its extremes as he accuses the queen
for his withered arm, thereby ascribing to the body politic the disability of his
body natural, in a cunning reversal of terms of the common political thinking
of the period:
See how I am bewitched! Behold, mine arm
Is like a blasted sapling wither’d up!
And this is Edward’s wife, that monstrous witch
Consorted with that harlot, strumpet Shore
That by their witchcraft thus have marked me. (3.4.67–72)
In 1.2 Margaret of Anjou enters the scene, wife of the dead king Henry VI Lancas-
ter, killed by Richard.⁴⁹ As Richard himself underlines at the end of 3 Henry VI,
“she lives to fill the world with words” (5.5.44)⁵⁰, and as a matter of fact the dis-
possessed and exiled queen is transfigured into a verbal dimension. Margaret
seems to perform the role of Richard’s counterpoint as she embodies ambition
for power and the exploitation of its theatrical dimension: her power is based
on her verbal ability for self-definition which allows her to define and sustain
 See Schaap Williams, “Enabling Richard.”
 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 142.
 According to historical records, the queen died in France in 1482, one year before Edward
IV’s death, therefore her function in the Shakespearean work assumes a special relevance. As
a character that transcends the dimension of space and time, Margaret has been interpreted
by critics as a prophetic voice for the future advent of the Tudor dynasty, in a similar role to
the Senecan ghost and its presence in revenge tragedies. Her role, however, opens to other pos-
sible interpretations and functions.
 See Naomi C. Liebler, Lisa Scancella Shea, “Shakespeare’s Queen Margaret. Unruly or Un-
ruled?,” in Henry VI: Critical Essays, ed. Thomas Pendleton (New York: Routledge, 2001),
79–96, 92.
Performance, Power, Politics: The Body as Stage in Richard III 75
her role as queen, actually reduced to a void significant. This aspect represents a
parallel with Richard who builds his ascent to power by exercising his rhetorical
ability in the interpretation of the significant represented by his body: “Playing
against Richard’s assumption that he can control this world through his own
will, his own language and his own protean skill as an actor is another kind
of plot, whose spokesperson in this play is old Queen Margaret.”⁵¹
Margaret significatively enters the scene in a political moment, during the
discussion on royal succession:
She is there and not there, a listener and then suddenly, shockingly, a participant, as if
summoned into dramatic being by the circumstances that have brought these two Yorkists
together, wrangling about the throne – a throne she feels should, in any case, be hers, as
the widow of the dead king Henry VI and the mother of the slain Edward, prince of Wales.⁵²
For this reason, her words can be considered as a sort of funeral lamentation for
the lost body politic (“I am Queen […] by you deposed,” 1.3.161,162) which acts as
a counterpoint to and disrupts Anne’s lamentation and Richard’s strategy.
As a matter of fact, Richard constantly appears as striving to contain her
monologues, as he implicitly acknowledges her as his counterpart and main ad-
versary. In particular, they both appear as striving to codify Richard’s extra-ordi-
nary dimension, his exception, his being a homo sacer, albeit from different per-
spectives. Margaret, by transcending spatio-temporal boundaries, as a liminal
being between two worlds, invests Richard with her past role of sacrificial victim
for the peace of the kingdom. As Liebler and Scancella Shea underline, Margar-
et’s banishment from England had annulled the value of the ritual due to her
French origins, and therefore non effectively part of English society.⁵³ Her
curse therefore invests Richard of the role of pharmakon, at the same time
cause and cure of social evils, due to his physical deformity, both in 1.3 and
in the subsequent 4.4.151. In this scene, to Margaret’s curse, which aims at re-
moving guilt from the deposition and killing of the king, he manages only to an-
swer through the physical presence of his royal body, “the Lord’s anointed.”
Richard, on the other hand, presents his exception by embracing his deform-
ity not as a limitation but as physical and political liberty. The malleability of his
body, his exception, allows him to embody multiple roles and avoid in this way
 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 147.
 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 147.
 See Naomi C. Liebler, Lisa Scancella Shea, “Shakespeare’s Queen Margaret. Unruly or Un-
ruled?,” in Henry VI: Critical Essays, ed. Thomas Pendleton (New York: Routledge, 2001),
79–96, 92.
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normative requirements: “Richard’s distorted physical form runs in tandem with
[…] his distortion of other forms, be they moral, political and legal.”⁵⁴ He there-
fore emerges as a charismatic figure who manages to undermine the juridico-po-
litical order and, by exploiting a situation of political exception, to conquer the
control of the state.⁵⁵ In 4.4 however, Richard’s predominance as “master per-
former” is harshly attacked and as a result, his attempt at convincing queen Eli-
sabeth to consent to his marriage with her daughter remains suspended. Eliza-
beth manages to pierce the involuted outer shape of his role-playing annulling
any further development and theatrical effect. Upon his asking a way to court
her daughter, she replies he has to confess his crimes against her family:
“There is no other way – / Unless thou couldst put on some other shape, /
and not be Richard, that hath done all this” (4.4.285–287), and concludes
with a final metatheatrical indictment “Thy self is self-misus’d” (4.4.377). She fi-
nally induces him to curse himself and this last curse will become effective:
“Death, desolation, ruin and decay” (4.4.409). In this way, Richard self-proclaims
himself homo sacer and starts the process of events which will determine his fall:
“The self destroys the self […and] The actor is taken in by his own skill.”⁵⁶ In the
conclusion of the scene, for the first time Richard does not manage to separate
himself from his role in the plot in order to communicate with the audience; ac-
tually his last aside is a sole verse which misinterprets the woman’s intentions
and does not allude to future plans: “Relenting fool, and shallow, changing
woman!”(4.4.431).⁵⁷
3 Richard and the generation of the body politic
Richard attempts to control the body politic as well as any possibility of its em-
bodiment by killing all the heir in the royal lineage: his brother Clarence, his
 Rebecca Lemon, “New Directions: Tyranny and State of Exception in Shakespeare’s Richard
III,” in Richard III. A Critical Reader, ed. Annaliese Connolly (London: Bloomsbury Arden, 2013),
Kindle Edition, ch. 5 .
 Lemon, “New Directions,” ch. 5
 Moseley, A Guide to William Shakespeare Richard III, ch. 6. See also Quiring, Shakespeare’s
Curse, 4: “One can describe the curse as marking a borderline, as inscribing the difference be-
tween an inside and an outside onto both the body politic and the individual subject. But the
‘outside’ a curse delimits is in fact not an extraterritorial place. Due to the curse’s paradoxical
structure, the outside takes the form of an ‘interiorized outside’ which in Richard’s case leads to
a scission of the two parts.”
 Cfr. Bill Overton, “Play of the King? “King Richard III” and Richard,” Critical Survey 1.1
(1989): 3–9, 5–6.
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brother Edward’s sons. He likewise strives to control the body politic’s new gen-
eration, as it is shown through his relationship with women. The woman’s preg-
nant body becomes a literalization of two bodies, the keeper of the figurative
king’s two bodies.⁵⁸ In planning his marriage, Richard is thinking about ground-
ing his own genealogy, a Ricardian issue, through the potential repository of the
former body politics, which he therefore deems to actualize. Anne, however, re-
jects such intentions by reversing the mirror upon Richard and cursing him with
self generation, notwithstanding the implications for herself. In this way, she
condemns herself to become the body natural which will contain a second Ricar-
dian body natural, and engender a monstrous body politic: Anne “poses an un-
settling threat to Richard’s construction of a strategic self.”⁵⁹
Anne: If ever he have child, abortive be it:
Prodigious, and untimely brought to light,
Whose ugly and unnatural aspect
May fright the hopeful mother at the view (1.2.21–24)
In the case of Elizabeth’s daughter, Richard plans of making her an instrument
for his own line, to generate his own body politic, by regenerating the previous
one, once again in a monstrous birth performed through generational role play-
ing:
Richard: If I have killed the issue of your womb,
[…] I will beget
Mine issue of your blood upon your daughter (4.4.296–298)
Elizabeth: Yet thou dids’t kill my children
Richard:But in your daughter’s womb I bury them,
Where, in that nest of spicery, they will breed
Selves of themselves, to your recomforture. (4.4.422–425)
In this way, Richard on the one hand seems to appropriate the dead body politics
in order to beget his own; on the other hand, he tries to control the body natural
of the royal spouse for a monstrous self-perpetuation. As Thornton-Burnett sug-
gests, the king maintains his indivisibility by generating facsimiles of himself,
“avoiding the imprint of women only by using the womb as a temporary
 See Sid Ray, Mother Queens and Princely Sons: Rogue Madonnas in the Age of Shakespeare
(New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 71. See also François Ost, Shakespeare. La Comedie de
la Loi (Paris: Michalon Éditions, 2012), 199.
 Thornton-Burnett, Constructing ‘Monsters’ in Shakespearean Drama and Early Modern Cul-
ture, 76.
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home for the next Ricardian generation,”⁶⁰ a disposable body natural. He actual-
ly comes to transfigure himself into the body of a pregnant woman by reversing
Margaret’s monstrous description of his disability as “bottled spider” and
“bunch-back’d toad” (1.3.242, 246). In this case his distorting mirror refracts
his image and transfigures it.
This strategy is perfectly illustrated by Cumberbatch’s interpretation of Ri-
chard in The Hollow Crown: as a matter of fact he performs the opening soliloquy
shirtless, thus creating a visual impact of the character’s deformity. He then pro-
ceeds to dress himself while continuing his speech thereby staging his entrance
into character.⁶¹ The following scenes show how he struggles to fit into clothes
(we see the arms of his jacket hanging by his sides) until he starts to in-vest him-
self of the body politic, reaching the extreme of investing himself of the womb of
the body natural generating the body politic itself, as it has been illustrated
above.
Richard acts as a centripetal force, moving from the inner core of London
and trying to engulf everything and everybody that surrounds him. In The Hollow
Crown, Richard moves very quickly through the corridors of the palaces of power,
his hunchbacked position suggesting its disruptive force; this physical attitude
symbolizes the political energeia of his hybris, which absorbs also the body nat-
ural of his future queen. By rendering the body the interpretative framework of
the historical events as well as the tool for their expression, the Shakespearean
text does not merely describe history but en-acts it. Richard becomes thus a met-
aphor for the theatre itself which does not limit itself to describe from an exter-
nal position the historical processes, but “is inscribed into these processes and
performs them.”⁶²
4 Body politic and self-fashioning
In the course of the text, the different characters are introduced according to the
role orchestrated for them by Richard, who therefore “fashions” them through
his verbal ability and renders them a reflection on the surface of his own mirror,
 Thornton-Burnett, Constructing ‘Monsters’ in Shakespearean Drama and Early Modern Cul-
ture, 75.
 See Michael Billington, “Benedict Cumberbatch proves a superb villain in The Hollow
Crown’s Richard III,” The Guardian, March 21, 2016, https://www.theguardian.com/stage/thea
treblog/2016/may/21/benedict-cumberbatch-the-hollow-crown-richard-iii (last access November
6, 2016)
 Quiring, Shakespeare’s Curse, 119.
Performance, Power, Politics: The Body as Stage in Richard III 79
a tool connaturated to each one of his actions which encloses their consequen-
ces and subjects them to an alienating effect through his reflection. As a matter
of fact, he expresses his conspiracy in the following terms: “Shine out, fair sun,
till I have bought a glass, / That I may see my shadow as I pass” (1.2.267–268).
Buckingham seems literally to become embodied and come from the liminal
space of the mirror, a “shadow” that takes form in the moment of Richard’s as-
cent to power, when the latter realizes that Buckingham shares his plans and
identifies him as his double: “My other self, my counsel’s consistory, / My oracle,
my prophet, my dear cousin: / I, as a child,will go by thy direction” (2.3.151– 153).
It is as if Richard’s performative tension embodied itself in another character
who from this moment onwards takes the initiative and determines his ascent
to power in bodily terms which reproduce those used by Richard himself. In
3.1. 199–200, Richard exhorts Buckingham to give form to their complots,
and, as a matter of fact, Buckingham “re-shapes” Richard’s body in his discours-
es to support his claim to the throne and builds his legitimacy in his report of his
speech to the citizens of London: “I did infer your lineaments, / Being the right
idea of your father / Both in your form and nobleness of mind” (3.7.12– 14). In this
way, as Schapp underlines, Richard’s form has been “straightened” in a fashion-
ing of the body politic which “fashions” the body natural investing it of himself.
We can see here the achievement of what Richard had purported in 1.2.260–262,
that is, “I’ll be at charges for a looking-glass, / And entertain a score or two of
tailors/ To study fashions to adorn my body”(1.2.260–262). Such adornment is
realized by Buckingham, who, in particular, inverts the terms of the interpreta-
tion of Richard’s body and transposes its characteristics upon the whole country
(thus creating also a deep identification between the country and the future
king): “The noble isle doth want her proper limbs” (3.7.124), presenting at the
same time Richard as the remedy for such lack.⁶³
Although he had previously celebrated his own histrionic qualities, asserting
“I’ll play the orator” (3.5.4), Buckingham does not succeed in his intent, as it is
testified by the repeated allusions to the absence of the public vocal legitimation
on the part of the population: “The citizens […] say not a word” (3.7.3), “they
spake not a word” (3.7.24), which provokes Richard’s impatience: “Would they
not speak!” (3.7.42) For the first time, he has to face the failure of his typical pro-
cedure through the imposition of a role to the other actors included in his stag-
 Charnes points out that Richard uses his bodily distinctiveness to engineer a substitution of
his deformed body for the imaginary king’s body: “Gaining the crown will enable him to effect a
kind of trade in which he imagines that he exchanges his misshapen half made-up body for the
King’s body and its divine perfection” (Linda Charnes, Notorious Identity. Materializing the Sub-
ject in Shakespeare (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), 32).
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ing of the events. The audience does not respond to Buckingham’s rhetorical
prompts and he has therefore to transfigure their reactions and transform a min-
imal expression of assent into a “general applause and cheerful shout” (3.7.39),
only to exit then the scene to avoid a possible continuation of the verbal ex-
change and lose the weak result he managed to obtain. In the imminence of
the Mayor’s arrival for the sanctioning of the succession, Buckingham organizes
a second mise en scène, that is, the representation of the body politic, the meta-
physical and religious dimension of the divinity that embodies itself in Richard
“look you get a prayer book in your hand, / And stand between two churchmen,
good my lord” (3.7.46–47); in this occasion Buckingham indicates his total iden-
tification with Richard when he defines his intentions in the following terms “I’ll
build a holy descant” (3.7.48). From “descant on my own deformity,” we pass
therefore to a “descant” which takes into consideration the rituality connaturat-
ed to royal succession in order to distort its metaphysical dimension and render
it instrumental for its own purposes. Richard is therefore framed in a role in
which his rhetorical abilities cannot emerge, as instead do his attributes of “vir-
tuous Prince”, “holy and devout religious m[a]n” (3.7.77, 91). The tableaux which
is presented by Buckingham in metatheatrical terms posits the two religious men
as “Two props of virtue for a Christian Prince / To stay him from the fall of van-
ity; / And see, a book a prayer in his hand – / True ornaments to know a holy
man. Famous Plantagenet, most gracious Prince, / Lend favourable ear to our
requests […] take to your royal self / This proffer’d benefit of dignity” (3.7.95–
100, 194–195). With these terms, Buckingham seems to bring to completion
the ceremony of royal succession through the transfer of the dignitas connaturat-
ed to the role of the sovereign, which had been interrupted through the interrup-
tion of the funeral progress of king Henry IV in 1.2. Actually, the stage instruc-
tions recite “Enter Richard aloft”: the vertical architectural plane of the stage
symbolizes the hierarchical order of tradition⁶⁴ which is now visually endorsed
by Richard in Buckingham’s staging.
It is always Buckingham who sanctions Richard’s role through a performa-
tive speech act by acclaiming him in the following terms “Then I salute you
with this royal title: / Long live Richard, England’s worthy King!” (3.7.238–
239). Immediately afterwards, Buckingham proceeds to organize the coronation
for the next day; however, such ceremony is not performed on stage, but trans-
figured and performed only by Richard and Buckingham. Richard’s role-playing
seems to implode the very same moment in which it should have been most un-
 See Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will, 40.
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derlined, that is, the coronation moment⁶⁵, the sanctioning of the investiture of
the body politic. Richard transcends the metaphysical sacrality of the moment,
through a mise en scène of his own ascent to the throne through the help (real
and metaphorical) of the sole Buckingham.
Enter Richard, in pomp, crowned; […]
Richard “Stand all apart. Cousin of Buckingham […] Give me thy hand”
Here he ascendeth the throne. […]
“Thus high, by thy advice / And thy assistance is King Richard seated.” (4.2.1–4)⁶⁶
The moment he becomes king, Richard seems to lose his rhetorical ability and
his control on the events, thus proving that “an artifice is created, not a solid
political reality” and he proves himself “not able to extend this web as a
means of embracing the power of the kingdom”.⁶⁷ As he asserts in 4.2.60–61:
“I must be married to my brother’s daughter, / Or else my kingdom stands on
brittle glass” (emphasis added), that is, he has to try and give a concrete support
to his construction reflected in the mirror. Such an attempt is enacted upon the
news of Richmond’s attack: Richard reacts by making appeal to the parapherna-
lia of his position and to the dignitas connected to his royal lineage: “Is the chair
empty? Is the sword unsway’d? / Is the King dead? The empire unpossess’d? /
What heir of York is there alive but we? / And who is England’s King but
great York’s heir? […]” (4.4.469–472). However, in a context in which the value
of ritual has been disrupted by the vacancy of Richard’s creative logos, such
an attempt remains vane and the previous strategies become a counterpoint to
his intentions. Even later he will make appeal to the dignity of his status: “the
King’s name is a tower of strength / Which they upon the adverse faction
want” (5.3.12– 13).
The disorder created in the state reflects itself in his personality; as he ad-
mits: “My mind is chang’d” (4.4.456). Such situation reaches a climax in the
scene which precedes the battle of Bosworth, in which Richard’s interior and ex-
terior dimension intertwine and finally coexist. They materialize themselves in
 Actually, Richard’s coronation was historically significant as it was the first double corona-
tion (with Queen Anne) since 1308. It is reported that he assembled an army of soldiers outside
the gates of London, in order to avoid possible rebellions.
 In The Hollow Crown, the interpolated coronation scene shows the protagonist enthroned
and silent, looking straight at the camera, therefore at us, the audience, with a gaze full of
irony, sneering upon the whole coronation pomp which underlines his own rhetorical success.
 Richard P. Wheeler, “History, Character and Conscience in Richard III,” Comparative Drama
5.4 (1971–72): 301–321, 310–311. Richard therefore is a forerunner of Prospero, a demiurge, who
gives ‘form’ to himself and the world through words.
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the scene of the appearance of the ghosts, psychological prompts that literally
become embodied in an “in-between world that is the world of the stage.”⁶⁸ In
Richard’s last performance, “the looking-glass is finally turned inward”⁶⁹ and
we witness the realization of the curse that Richard had pronounced upon him-
self in 4.4.399: “Myself myself confound!” As a matter of fact, in this final scene
he seems to disgregate into the multiplicities of his roles: “What do I fear? My-
self? There’s none else by; / Richard loves Richard, that is, I and I. / Is there a
murderer here? No. Yes, I am! / Then fly.What, from myself? […] / I am a villain –
yet I lie, I am not! / Fool, of thyself speak well! Fool, do not flatter […]” (5.3.183–
193).
The morning of the battle we assist to a last powerful attempt at “self-enge-
dering through a narcissistic embrace of self”⁷⁰, once more striving towards self-
affirmation. Richard seems to return to his old role and encourages the troops
demonstrating his military valour and encouraging his army in terms which re-
call the military images of the opening of the tragedy: “A thousand hearts are
great within my bosom” (5.4.348). His last performance sees him as an embodi-
ment of the hybris, as he manages to “enac[t] more wonders than a man, / Dar-
ing an opposite to every danger.” (5.4.2) However, he is defeated by his oppo-
nent’s different theatrical strategy, who enacts a parody of his royal role by
investing five knights with his royal insigna: as Richard observes in his last
lines, “I think there be six Richmonds in the field: / Five have I slain today in-
stead of him. / A horse! A horse! My kingdom for a horse!” (5.5.9– 13).
To Richmond remains to sanction his role through the symbolic transfer of
the crown after Richard’s death, which takes place on the battlefield through
the words of Stanely: “Lo, here, this long-usurped royalty / From the dead tem-
ples of this bloody wretch / Have I pluck’d off to grace thy brows withal”
(5.5.4–6). Once again, a distortion of the coronation ceremony. Richmond’s
first speech as a king sanctions Richard’s deposition (“the bloody dog is
dead”, 5.5.2), thus bringing to completion the curse started by Margaret and
passed through the Duchess and Elisabeth and climaxed in Richard’s self-
curse. Richard’s body is carried off scene, reduced to an empty signifier, and
seems to recede and return to the liminal space of the theatrical dimension:
 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 156.
 Garber, Shakespeare After All, 157.
 John Jowett, “Introduction” to William Shakespeare, Richard III, ed. John Jowett (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 2000), 1– 132, 69.
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“The historical figure who ruled England dissolves into the theatrical figure who
ruled the English stage.”⁷¹
However, Richard’s opponent is a rather flat character, a rex ex machina, so
to speak.⁷² The play presents the events and the contest for the crown exclusively
from Richard’s point of view, therefore, Richmond appears as a conqueror, an
invader, bringing about yet another usurpation. Richmond’s closing words
(“Now civil wounds are stopped, peace lives again”, 5.5.40) echo Richard’s open-
ing lines (“Now is the winter of our discontent made glorious summer by this son
of York”, 1.1.1–2). As Hertel observes, the circle closes, and although Richard is
deposed, his initiatory speech, which has turned out to be mere rhetoric, is ech-
oed by his successor’s one.⁷³
The filmic rendering of Richard III in the series The Hollow Crown perfectly
conveys this final ambiguity, by presenting Henry VII enthroned after the solemn
ceremony of his coronation, but closing on the battlefields, where the new body
politic has been constituted. The final image from above showing the corpses of
the dead soldiers spectrally reveals the components of Henry VII’s body politic,
the bodies which have brought it to life. Henry VII’s royal dignity is undermined
by an ominous shadow upon the final scene of peace, which ominously recalls
“my shadow in the sun.”
For this reason I would interpret Richard III as a notorious case, in the sense
defined by Richard Sherwin, in his theorization of the relationship between law
and the media. Actually, sixteenth-century theatres were the nearest equivalent
to the modern mass media, and contributed to create a public opinion about po-
litical issues.⁷⁴ Notorious cases reveal deep social and cultural conflicts: they are
 Bernard Spivak, Shakespeare and the Allegory of Evil (New York: Columbia University Press,
1972), 395.
 Hertel, Staging England in the Elizabethan History Play, 109. Hertel also underlines the Un-
bestimmtheit of Richmond, whose character appeals to the audience’s imagination in order to
be brought to completion as a metaphor of the future Tudor dynasty. However, both characters’
speeches to their armies were performed in the theatre, very probably addressing the audience.
In this way, the power of Richard’s speech would have affected their perceptions and thereby re-
enacted the political confusion of the Wars of the Roses (ibidem, 112). Actually, theatrical stag-
ings of historical events had the effect of bringing the audience into the inner part of the mystery
of state thus demystifying it. (See Margot Heinemann, “Political Drama,” in the Cambridge Com-
panion to English Renaissance Drama, eds. Braunmüller, Hattaway: 161–205, 177.) People were
led to think about the staged political ideas and given aural images (at the same time pictorial
and auditive) to think with.
 Hertel, Staging England in the Elizabethan History Play, 114.
 See Heinemann, “Political Drama,” 167: As the author observes, “The opening up of secular
political discussion and debate to anyone who could put a penny in the box was something
quite new, and helped to transform the nature of politics.”
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“social dramas that take place on a field of embattled discourse where contested
stories, metaphors, and character types vie for dominance in the culture at
large.”⁷⁵ This attunes also with the etymology of the word “tragedy,” which
comes from the Greek tragoidia or goat-play, and it implies the recognition
that “the tragic hero is essentially another version of the sacrifice offered
throughout known human history to appease an angry god – in other words,
both to acknowledge and repress a contradiction in the culture’s agreed way
of perceiving reality.”⁷⁶ Richard’s case can be seen to embody a political anxiety
about royal succession and is based in the collective legal imagination; his para-
ble stages a competing world view to the official one, a competing nomos,which
is at the basis of his personal legal framework. Richard has to be contained as it
signifies the “outbreak of the uncanny in everyday life,”⁷⁷ but this perspective
finally invests Richmond himself, as it has been argued above.
Recently, Richard has been restored his royal dignity through the belated
burial of his body natural which took place on March 25 2015 at Leicester Cathe-
dral. Through the solemn ceremony, Richard’s body politic was finally restored in
the temporal royal sequence, thus countering the play’s effect of a suspension of
time. As a matter of fact, according to some critics, “In the political discourse of
Richard III, a straight ‘lineal’ progression of time awaits beyond the chronolog-
ical unfolding of the play’s narrative action, and premature births and untimely
deaths are rhetorically figured as bodies moving at a different paces from the rest
of the world.”⁷⁸ The words of the officiating bishop, “Here, in a Cathedral, his-
tory meets the present, here eternity breaks into time” sanction the restoration
of Richard into the linear development of English history, through the symbols
of his royal position: the white rose of York and his name engraved in the coffin.
The ceremony saw the participation of Prince Richard, Duke of Gloucester and
descendant of the king, who manages an association devoted to preserve his
memory, and Benedict Cumberbatch, his second cousin, 16 times removed,
who also played in the role of Richard III in the series The Hollow Crown. In
this stratification of history, the ceremony was concluded with the reading of
a poem by Carol Ann Duffy. Once again, we have to imagine Richard appealing
to the audience’s hearing, and performatively asserting his identity:
 Richard K. Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop. The Vanishing Line between Law and Popular Cul-
ture (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2000), 74.
 See Robert N. Watson, “Tragedy,” in The Cambridge Companion to English Renaissance
Drama, eds. Braumüller, Hattaway, 301–351, 307.
 Sherwin, When Law Goes Pop, 76.
 Jonathan Hsy, “Disability,” in The Cambridge Companion to the Body in Literature, eds. David
Hillman, Ulrika Maude (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015): 24–40, 37.
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My bones, scripted in light, upon cold soil
A human Braille. My skull, scarred by a crown,
Emptied of history. […]
Grant me the carving of my name.
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Gilad Ben-Nun
The Subjugation of International Law to
Power Politics and Mystery of State
(Arcana Imperii) in Shakespeare’s Henry V
Foreword
As William Shakespeare’s literary heritage enters its fourth century, the tendency
to use passages from his oeuvre to denote certain perennial facets of human na-
ture has also come of age. It is now well over a century since Sigmund Freud first
made references to the Bard’s work as he employed themes from the Shakespear-
ean corpus and put them to use in his fields of enquiry, which were far removed
from the literary, theatre-bound ones in which these works originated.¹ In addi-
tion to psychology, Shakespeare’s works have also been used to elaborate on is-
sues in the legal realm – most notably, those concerning the laws of war.² In this
paper, I would like to follow this methodological pattern of using Shakespearean
passages to document phenomena beyond the literary and theatrical realms in
their strict sense. I opt to use Shakespeare as an aid to examine the conjuncture
of secretive elements in statecraft (Arcana Imperii) and the tendency to abuse in-
ternational law in the service of power politics. Both issues are strongly connect-
ed with absolutist regimes and modalities of governance, whose ethos stretches
as far back as late antiquity and whose resurgence and influence were strongly
felt during Shakespeare’s time. In the conclusion, I examine the recent resur-
gence of strong, absolutist tendencies the world over (in Vladimir Putin’s Russia
or Viktor Orbán’s Hungary), in light of Shakespeare’s depiction of absolutism,
 Norman N. Holland, “Freud on Shakespeare,” Proceedings of the Modern Literary Association
(PMLA) 75.3 (1960): 163– 173. For a more detailed account and elaboration on themes from this
article, see Holland’s monograph, Psychoanalysis and Shakespeare (New York: McGraw-Hill,
1964). For a recent contribution in this direction, see: Henriette Michaud, “L’effet de Shake-
speare dans l’œuvre de Freud,” Le Coq-héron no. 202 (2010/3): 55–60.
 See, for example, the monographs by the former president of the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), Theodor Meron: Henry’s Wars and Shakespeare’s Laws
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1993) and Bloody Constraint: War and Chivalry in Shakespeare (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 1998).
For a recent contribution in this direction see: Paola Pugliatti, Shakespeare and the Just War Tra-
dition (London: Routledge, 2016).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-006
and ponder what this might mean vis-à-vis the nature of diplomacy in our day
and age.
A word on method. As a diplomatic historian, whose primary works focus on
the history of international law, I choose to treat Shakespeare’s work first and
foremost as material historical evidence pointing towards a certain zeitgeist of
his time. This methodological approach has influenced my preference for
Henry V over other works in Shakespeare’s corpus that touch upon international
law.³ In contrast to Julius Caesar or even King John, in which the historical events
portrayed were far removed from Shakespeare’s time, those recorded in Henry V
occurred less than two centuries prior to that play’s performance. We know for
certain that Shakespeare had access to several historical accounts concerning
Henry’s 1415 military campaigns in France, as well to his pre-war negotiations
with the French king, Francois VI. Moreover, no other work by Shakespeare por-
trays both issues (Arcana Imperii and the manipulation of international law) in
such an intertwined, dovetailed manner as do the relevant parts in Henry V
(Act 1 Scene 2 and Act 2 Scene 4).
1 The manipulation of international law in
Shakespeare
Tradition has it that, in 1599, Henry V was the first play to be performed on the
stage of the newly opened, timber-built Globe theatre (later destroyed by fire in
1614).⁴ It belongs to a string of historical plays that Shakespeare wrote during the
last decade of the sixteenth century. It is a dramatized version of the historical
events that led to the invasion of France by Henry V in 1415, through his success-
ful military campaigns of 1416, up until his ultimate (albeit short-lived) unifica-
tion of the crowns of France and England through marriage. The passages of the
play that best portray both Arcana Imperii and international law occur in Act 1
Scene 2 (the discussion at Henry’s privy council and the decision by the English
king and his nobles to claim the throne of France) and Act 2 Scene 4 (when Hen-
ry’s messenger – his uncle, the Duke of Exeter – delivers his ultimatum to the
 Both themes – Arcana Imperii and international law – are treated by Shakespeare in King John
and Henry IV Part II. Julius Caesar, and certainly Richard III, all have their ample doses of Arcana
Imperii.
 Hence, the play’s famous reference to “this Woodden O, the very Caskes.” Its first verified per-
formance was in front of James I in 1605, at His Majesty’s court.
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French king, Francois VI, should the latter not relieve himself of the French
crown in Henry’s favour).
In the first of these scenes (1.2), Henry assembles his council of nobles to
hear the learned arguments of the Archbishop of Canterbury as to why he indeed
has the right to the French crown. A remarkable rendering of this scene, with an
arresting cast of Shakespearean actors, can be observed in Kenneth Branagh’s
cinematic adaptation of Shakespeare’s play.⁵ Noting the perennial contest be-
tween Church and State, the king enquires, “where is my gracious lord of Canter-
bury,” upon which the archbishop and the Bishop of Ely rush into the council
chamber blessing the king, under the watchful eyes of the Duke of Exeter (mas-
terfully played by the veteran British actor Brian Blessed), who is discontented
due to their retard.⁶ The king then requests the archbishop to explain to him
and to the council whether he does indeed have a just claim to the throne of
France:
My learned Lord, we pray you to proceed,
And iustly and religiously vnfold,
Why the Law Salike, that they haue in France,
Or should or should not barre vs in our Clayme:
And God forbid, my deare and faithfull Lord,
That you should fashion, wrest, or bow your reading,
Or nicely charge your vnderstanding Soule,
With opening Titles miscreate, whose right
Sutes not in natiue colours with the truth:
In the subsequent passage, the king warns the archbishop of the consequences
that his legal opinion will ultimately have should England go to war with France
based on his legal interpretation:
For God doth know, how many now in health,
Shall drop their blood, in approbation
Of what your reuerence shall incite vs to.
Therefore take heed how you impawne our Person,
How you awake our sleeping Sword of Warre;
We charge you in the Name of God take heed:
 Kenneth Branagh, Shakespeare’s King Henry V (1989). All references here are to this film. In
1944, Laurence Olivier also made a screen adaptation of the play. His version is much more pa-
triotic in its interpretation, having been made during World War II while Branagh’s film enjoys a
much higher degree of realism.
 In the original Shakespearean text, Exeter explicitly mentions to the king that the Archbishop
of Canterbury is not present, upon which Henry specifically sends for the archbishop, thus
stressing further the issue of Church–State tensions.
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For neuer two such Kingdomes did contend,
Without much fall of blood, whose guiltlesse drops
Are euery one, a Woe, a sore Complaint,
Upon this request, the archbishop embarks on a long monologue filled with legal
argumentation based upon the lineage of successions of the Kings of France dat-
ing back over a thousand years, coupled with geographic references to unfami-
liar lands between Germany and France. The archbishop attempts to rebut the
French legal line of argument; this precludes Henry’s claim to the French throne
based upon Salic law, which supposedly did not recognize the right of accession
to the throne via female regal offspring. The archbishop then claims that the ex-
isting French royal line has consistently executed the right of legal accession to
the throne via female lineages, and hence that Henry’s claim, which is based on
his direct ancestral link to Edward III, should be valid as well. During this elab-
orate presentation, the archbishop uses Latin phrases to cite legal sources, with
geographical references to places most probably alien to most of the council
members. Upon a signal from Exeter to make his final point, the archbishop ce-
ments his conclusion with the words “So, that as cleare as is the Summers
Sunne,” to which all the members of the council break out into laughter.
The king, obviously not understanding the bulk of legal argumentation set
forth by the archbishop, asks for his final counsel: “May I with right and con-
science make this claim?” to which the archbishop answers unequivocally,
“The sinne vpon my head, dread Soueraigne.” Once the archbishop had cast
his judgment, Exeter and Westmorland take the floor and urge the king to
take up the sword against France:
Exeter: Your Brother Kings and Monarchs of the Earth
Doe all expect, that you should rowse your selfe,
As did the former Lyons of your Blood
Westmorland: They know your Grace hath cause, and means, and might;
So hath your Highnesse: neuer King of England
Had Nobles richer, and more loyall Subiects,
Whose hearts haue left their bodyes here in England,
And lye pauillion’d in the fields of France.
While Westmorland reiterates to the king that the entire English nobility would
provide the fighting forces required for such a military campaign, it is Exeter’s
argument that is most important here. Exeter speaks of the expectation by
third-party powers – “Brother Kings and Monarchs of the Earth” – that Henry
should make this claim, in order to conform to international diplomatic prece-
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dent and to avoid chaos within the international system, thus pressuring the
king to uphold the diplomatic-legal code of his predecessors. The discussion
ends with the Archbishop of Canterbury pledging to provide the king with the
financial resources to execute this military endeavour, as he whispers in his ear:
In ayde whereof, we of the Spiritualtie
Will rayse your Highnesse such a mightie Summe,
As neuer did the Clergie at one time
Bring in to any of your Ancestors
And thus, the issue is resolved.
What can one infer from this depiction by Shakespeare of the legal discus-
sions concerning England’s international legal justification for her Jus ad Bellum
call against France?⁷ Moreover, what are the characteristics of the realm of inter-
national law according to this depiction? In short, how would the audience ob-
serving the play at the Globe theatre in 1599 have understood what international
law actually was?
To begin with, international law seems, in Shakespeare’s depiction, to com-
prise a very complicated legal field involving multiple layers of required knowl-
edge (the legal codes of other countries, the geographies and intricate histories
of those nations, and a multitude of foreign languages). This complexity con-
trasts starkly with the relative clarity with which Shakespeare chooses to treat
other branches of law – for instance, the law of inheritance and its abuses (in
King Lear) or the laws of debts and mortgages (in The Merchant of Venice).
The intelligent and educated King Henry certainly does not understand whether
he has or has not a claim to the throne of France. If one imagines Shakespeare’s
 The term Jus ad Bellum, coupled with the term Jus in Bello, has served as the bedrock of the
laws of war since ancient Roman times. Jus ad Bellum refers to the laws of nations that provide
the justification for going to war in the first place. Once conflict has commenced, humanitarian
dictums require the execution of Jus in Bello, meaning the correct legal conduct within hostilities
and armed conflict – most notably over the humane treatment of civilians (especially women
and children); the accepted conduct towards prisoners of war; and refraining from deliberate,
unnecessarily destructive policies (most notably “scorched-earth” tactics). For a good overview
of Jus ad Bellum through the ages, see: Stephan Neff, War and the Law of Nations (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2008): 7–68. On the specific influences of St. Augustine and St. Tho-
mas Aquinas on the absolute requirement for a just cause for war in Christian theology (whose
impact was crucial both on the historical figure of Henry V and, not least, on Shakespeare him-
self) prior to the “secularization of war” following the Thirty Years’ War and the Treaty of West-
phalia, see: Frederick H. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1975): 213–292.
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own audience at the Globe, it too would most probably have been in a similar
state of bewilderment to King Henry’s character in the play, waiting patiently
to hear the Archbishop of Canterbury’s ultimate verdict as to the rightfulness
of the English claim.
The contrast between international law and other branches of the law in
Shakespeare deepens when one considers that the former (certainly in Shake-
speare’s time) actually lacked the most fundamental characteristic of law –
namely, the presiding of role of the judge and his ultima ratio. In both The Mer-
chant of Venice and Measure for Measure, the objectivity and conclusiveness of
the judge’s role is indispensable to the plot.⁸ Yet it is precisely this lack of a
final judicial authority in the engagements of nations that accounts for interna-
tional law’s heightened potential for abuse.
And there was indeed abuse of international law by Henry V. As the great
medievalist E.F. Jacob noted in his authoritative historical study of the king,
his claim to the throne of France between 1414 and 1416 was at best “a sham
so as to disguise his preparations for war,” and this aspect of English history
was in all probability rather well known during Shakespeare’s time.⁹
The understanding that international law was more prone to abuse than
other fields of law was certainly not exclusive to Shakespeare. One succinct
(yet powerful) example of this negative quality, from roughly the same period,
appeared just over a century after Shakespeare’s death. In 1724, the great French
jurist Charles de Montesquieu – the father of modern constitutional law and the
inventor of the doctrine of the State’s separation of powers (between the execu-
tive, legislative and judiciary) – published his Persian Letters to great public ac-
claim. By this time, Montesquieu was a recognized legal authority, having served
as the Lifetime President (Président à Mortier) of Bordeaux’ Parlement Régional
since 1716. His book features an exchange of letters between two fictitious Asian
Muslim friends, one (“the Uzbek”) residing in Paris and writing to the other, his
younger friend “Rhedi” in Venice, about what appear to him to be the odd ways
of the Europeans. This genre of writing, in which so-called “objective” outsiders
unmask and expose unspoken negative truths about European societies, was
well known in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. Concerning
 Michael Jay Willson, “View of Justice in Shakespeare’s the Merchant of Venice and Measure
for Measure,” Notre Dame Law Review 70.3 (1993): 695–726, 726.
 Ernst. F. Jacob, Henry V and the Invasion of France (London: Hodder & Stoughton – English
Universities Press, 1947), 5. Although published postwar, Jacob wrote this historical study during
World War II and the German “Blitz” over London. He begins his introduction with an intriguing
parallel between the D-Day landings on the shores of Normandy in June 1944 and Henry’s dis-
embarkation upon those same shores five centuries earlier.
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international law and its manipulation, the Uzbek provides the following obser-
vations:
International law is better understood in Europe than in Asia; and yet it must be said that
the passions of princes, the patience of the people, and the flattery of authors, have corrupt-
ed all its principles.
At the present time this law is a science which teaches princes to what length they may
carry the violation of justice without injuring their own interests. What a design, Rhedi,
to wish to harden the conscience by reducing iniquity to a system, by giving it rules, by
settling its principles, and drawing inferences from it!
[…] one would say, Rhedi, that there are two species of justice wholly different from each
other: one which regulates the affairs of individuals, and rules in civil law; another
which settles the differences arising between peoples, and tyrannizes over international
law; as if international law were not itself a civil law, not indeed of a particular country,
but of the world.¹⁰
2 “Arcana Imperii” in Henry V
The picture of the abuse of international law that emerges from Shakespeare’s
dramatization is immanently associated with competing quests for power by rul-
ers, who, for the sake of that power, sidestep what ought to be “blind” and im-
partial tenets of justice. Yet this abuse of international law is not carried out in a
cognitive limbo; rather, it demands varying degrees of darkness and sombre en-
vironments. The abuse of international justice is facilitated by an enabling polit-
ical environment of concealment and secrecy: a darkness that runs counter to
openly transparent, enlightened, moral and political environments. It is not for
nothing that the age of “Enlightenment” also gave rise to the first fully-fledged
“objective” envisioning of international legal systems. The most notable of these
representative works include Emer de Vatell’s The Law of Nations (1758) and Im-
manuel Kant’s works What is Enlightenment?¹¹ and The Metaphysics of Morals
 Charles de Montesquieu, Persian Letters, trans. John Davidson (London: George Routledge,
1899), Letter XCV (95): 217–218.
 Kant’s original German title, Was ist Aufklärung? implicitly retains within its etymology this
idea of the clarity of the enlightened world that he wished to envisage, as opposed to the obscur-
ity that he openly associated with the age of absolutism, which preceded his generation. The as-
sociation of secrecy with darkness and obscurity, as opposed to transparency, light, and visual
clarity has remained a feature of our world today, as in the workings of the most important NGO
advocating governmental transparency and the fight against institutionalized state-based cor-
ruption, Transparency International. See www.transparency.org
The Subjugation of International Law to Power Politics and Mystery of State 93
(1797) – the latter known in its English translation as The Philosophy of Law: An
Exposition of the Fundamental Principles of Jurisprudence as the Science of Right.
Darkness, in fact, plays a major role in Henry V, especially in Branagh’s cine-
matographic interpretation of the scenes that evolve around international legal is-
sues (1.2 and 2.4). In Act 1 Scene 2 (during the presentation by the Archbishop of
Canterbury at Henry’s privy council), the entire chamber is poorly lit, with the king
walking into the scene backlit with his face blackened and only his silhouette visi-
ble to the spectator. In the second scene in which international legal issues are de-
bated – during the delivery of the armed ultimatum by Exeter to Francois VI, the
King of France – the French chamber is even darker, with Exeter walking from a
bright foyer into the dimly lit chamber of the French king’s council.
The spectator is immediately drawn into an emotional condition of fear – es-
pecially during the ultimatum scene (of whose thematic a separate discussion
follows below). The frightening Duke of Exeter (brilliantly captured in Blessed’s
overbearingly huge stature) enters the dark chamber in full armour (plate mail
over chainmail), sword at the ready, and delivers a chilling ultimatum of all-
out war, along with a vile and gruesome threat of immense bloodshed. This ob-
scenely violent content within its threatening, warlike context is contrasted with
Exeter’s soft-spoken tone of voice and his diplomatically polite speech. The epi-
sode becomes all the more frightening when Exeter and the French Dauphin po-
litely exchange worrisome mutual insults. All this takes place right under the
watchful eye of a deeply fearful and sombre French monarch (masterfully por-
trayed by that great Shakespearean actor Paul Scofield, who plays his part solely
through a fantastic array of facial-expression acting which contrasts with his to-
tally monotone delivery). This entire portrayal of statecraft – being undertaken in
dark rooms, behind closed doors, in utter secrecy – is the very essence of the
“Mystery of State” (Arcana Imperii) that Shakespeare was attempting to portray.
To what does this notion of Arcana Imperii pertain, and how does it connect
to the manipulation and abuse of international law? Moreover, if Arcana Imperii
is indeed what Shakespeare was pointing to here, where and how could he have
come across it?
The term broadly refers to the existence of a secretive ethos, which under-
pins the entire realm of statecraft and policy making within a given political en-
tity. Arcana Imperii not only condones the handling of state affairs behind closed
doors and away from the public eye – it in fact advocates these conditions out-
right, as it stresses the dangers of populism and mob rule (“ochlocracy” is the
Aristotelian term) when these make their way into the directing of international
and state affairs. Arcana Imperii has always been intimately associated with au-
tocratic, absolutist, and non-democratic or non-republican regimes. The German
translation for the term – Geheimpolitik – immediately triggers acute, traumatic
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connotations of the Geheime Staatspolizei (“Secret State Police”) of the Nazi re-
gime, better known via its notorious acronym GESTAPO, and the later workings
of its East German successor, the “Staatssicherheit,” more widely recognized by
its respective acronym: the STASI.
Yet the concept of Arcana Imperii and the very idea that statecraft inherently
rests upon some sort of mysterious, secretive, non-explicable and even intuitive
(that is, illogical) bedrock of ideas and practices have their origins in late antiq-
uity. It was in fact Tacitus, in a famous passage from his Annales, who first made
explicit use of the term.¹² While the idea carried forward through the Middle
Ages, it was only in the early modern period, with the sixteenth- and early sev-
enteenth-century rise in national consciousness in both the French and German-
speaking intellectual-political milieus, that the term was revived with significant
success. Arnold Clapmar in Prussia and, especially, the intellectual circle around
Cardinal Richelieu in early seventeenth-century France developed Arcana Imper-
ii as their-conduct-of-choice for both domestic and, particularly, international
statecraft.¹³ However, amidst the religious yet nakedly realistic political realities
of the early modern era, Niccolò Machiavelli’s lure, strong as it undoubtedly was,
could not be easily called upon without exposing oneself to accusations of Chris-
tian heresy – especially given the pervasive, overbearing influence that the mor-
alistic ethos of Thomism exerted upon matters of state. Yet Tacitus was an entire-
ly different source. The Roman historian was compulsory reading in the political
education of any learned man, let alone senior magistrate, anywhere in seven-
teenth-century Europe.What everybody knew about Arcana Imperii from Machia-
velli’s Prince but could not quote for fear of being charged with heresy was thus
enabled, both discursively and politically, thanks to its sanctioning by Tacitus.
That Arcana Imperii was, by the 1630s, salient in Europe is well. However,
Shakespeare had already put on Henry V in 1599, and it was certainly not the
only one of his historical plays to include overt representations of the concept
(the most obvious came in Richard III as early as 1592!). This means that Shake-
 Tacitus, Annales 2:36: “that the proposal went deeper than this, and trespassed on the arca-
na of sovereignty” (haud dubium erat eam sententiam altius penetrare et arcana imperii temp-
tari), translated by John Jackson in Tacitus II (Loeb Classical Library: London and New York,
1931). For a full explanation of the borrowing that early-modern writers took from Tacitus,
see: Peter Donaldson, Machiavelli and Mystery of State (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1988), viii, n. 3.
 On Clampar, see: Richard Tuck, Philosophy and Government 1572– 1651: Ideas in Context
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 124– 126. See also: Donaldson, Machiavelli,
111– 165. On Richelieu’s dealings with Arcana Imperii, see: William F. Church, Richelieu and Rea-
son of State (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972), 13–81.
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speare must have come across Arcana Imperii in its acute form at an even earlier
date – at the latest, some time in the 1580s. Conclusive proof as to where the
Bard actually obtained his ideas for Arcana Imperii is beyond the scope of this
paper; if this is at all possible (depending upon available existing sources, in
terms of the methodological “burden of proof” required by historians to justify
such a claim), this would merit a full-blown study in its own right. Rather, what I
will try to do in the following pages is provide a hypothesis as to where Shake-
speare might have taken some of these ideas from. I do this in the hope (and
open-ended call) that other scholars will test this hypothesis of mine further,
and see if it “holds water.”
Arcana Imperii is intimately connected with the rise of the early modern Eu-
ropean nation-state. The late sixteenth century was a crucial time, with two of
the paradigmatic nation-states – Great Britain and France – actually coming
into being. Germany and Italy did not come into their own before their unifica-
tions in the nineteenth century. Spain was more of an empire on the world seas
than a confined nation-state, and as for the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires –
these were relatively decentralized multiethnic entities. In the Europe of the
late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, the rise of the State was embodied
in these two countries: France and Great Britain (albeit only after the unification
of the crowns of Scotland, England and Ireland under James I in 1603 – after the
writing of Henry V). However, the most crystallized model of statehood – which
encompassed Arcana Imperii in its most naked form, and which could have
pressed itself upon Shakespeare’s psyche as he began engaging with these
ideas during the 1580s – must surely have been France. And it was France
that first provided the world with that vital concept, the conditio sine qua non
for any full statehood to come into being: sovereignty.¹⁴
In 1576, in his Six Books of the Republic, the French jurist Jean Bodin first for-
mulated the concept of sovereignty as the non-divisible and exclusive control of
all means of power over a people in a defined territory. Bodin wrote the Six Books
in direct relation to the violent slaughter of the Huguenots in the 1572 St. Bartho-
lomew’s Day massacre, which he justified from a French royalist perspective
given the Huguenots’ perceived direct attack on the French crown and, conse-
 For an important explanation as to why the State arose specifically in the late sixteenth and
early seventeenth centuries – as an answer to the chaos of the wars of the Reformation, the Thir-
ty Years’ War, and as a result of the economic havoc that the expansion into the New World had
wrought upon decentralized empire-economies in Europe – see: Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle
for Stability in Early Modern Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976): 61–99.
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quently, on the State.¹⁵ The threat that the Huguenots posed to the French crown
was more statutory than religious (after all, the French King Henry IV, who later
issued the Edict of Nantes, was himself a Protestant). The strong and affluent Hu-
guenot nobility, headed by Gaspard de Coligny, had requested noble prerogatives
and a limitation of the Crown’s sovereign powers in a similar manner to de-
mands being voiced by the British nobility (which eventually resulted in the Eng-
lish Civil War and the beheading of one king, until parliamentary prerogatives
were firmly cemented in 1689). The French crown’s conceptual answer to the Hu-
guenots’ demand for a power-sharing arrangement (e.g. the limitation of the
power of the crown in one way or another) was answered in Bodin’s concept
of sovereignty, which he saw as ipso facto indivisible and which he thus framed
in his well-known Aristotelian syllogism as:
Sovereign Authority is absolute
The King of France is sovereign
The King of France is absolute¹⁶
Many signals point to the possibility that Shakespeare was acquainted with Bod-
in’s thought on sovereignty and statecraft. In 1581, the jurist accompanied Fran-
cois of Anjou to England; the French prince, who was wooing the young English
Queen Elizabeth I, spent several months in London along with his entourage, to
which Bodin belonged. We also have evidence that Bodin remained in contact,
and on good terms, with Francis Walsingham, Queen Elizabeth’s “spymaster,”
and that during these years Bodin also worked on a large treatise denouncing
sorcery and witchcraft – yet another venture into alternative worlds of secrecy
and darkness.
The events of August 1572, during the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre,
probably had a certain influence upon Shakespeare. In 1593, Christopher Mar-
lowe’s playMassacre at Paris – which depicts the events surrounding the actions
of the instigator of the killings, the Duke de Guise – was first performed.
Marlowe’s influences on Shakespeare are common academic knowledge,
and have been amply demonstrated. In fact, his literary impact on Shakespeare
is virtually unquestionable when one considers the acute resemblances between
 Julian H. Franklin, Jean Bodin and the Rise of Absolutist Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1973), Ch. 3: “The Shift to Absolutism”: 41–69.
 Franklin, Jean Bodin, 68. For a full exposition on the indivisible character of sovereignty, see
Book I Ch. 8 of Bodin’s Six Books in Bodin: On Sovereignty – Cambridge Texts in the History of
Political Thought, ed. and trans. Julian H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992): 1–45.
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Marlowe’s The Jew of Malta and Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice or the re-
demptive–punitive elements in Macbeth in comparison to Marlowe’s Doctor
Faustus, as well as similarities between Shakespeare’s historical plays and Mar-
lowe’s Edward II. The two playwrights knew each other well and ample evidence
points to Shakespeare’s acquaintance with Marlowe’s employment as a spy in
the service of Walsingham – especially in connection with the character of the
“English Agent” in Massacre at Paris, which in all probability was Marlowe’s
own self-portrayal of the spy that he indeed was.¹⁷ If Marlowe was living a
“life on the edge,” which included considerable secretive elements that were
connected to the Elizabethan court’s real-life spy networks and a secretive
state apparatus, the chances are that Shakespeare knew about (and probably
tactfully kept a safe distance from) these secretive elements under the English
crown.
In his Massacre at Paris, Marlowe was the first English dramaturge to pro-
vide a staged depiction of the events that led up to the St. Bartholomew’s Day
atrocities. The play roughly follows the sequence of events from the declaration
of the forthcoming marriage of Henry of Navarre to Margaret of Valois, through
the riots and killings in Paris up to the execution of the Duke de Guise. Through-
out, the piece is dominated by Guise’s character, who is portrayed as a classic
Machiavellian, conniving political operator – albeit one who is totally committed
to the preservation and protection of both the French crown and its Catholicism.
The audience is struck by the extent to which Guise, the play’s bête noire, is pre-
pared to sacrifice his moral principles, and later even his life, for the sake of the
monarchical Catholic French crown. Early in the play, as he enters for the very
first time (Scene II), the duke provides the audience with a much-needed and
rare insight into his true motivations for the sake of the protection of France:
What glory is there in a common good,
That hanges for every peasant to atchive?
That like I best that flyes beyond my reach.
Set me to scale the high Peramides,
And thereon set the Diadem of Fraunce,
Ile either rend it with my nayles to naught,
Or mount the top with my aspiring winges,
Although my downfall be the deepest hell.¹⁸
 Richard Wilson, “Tragedy, Patronage and Power,” in The Cambridge Companion to Christo-
pher Marlowe, ed. Patrick Cheney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004): 207–231, 207.
 Christopher Marlowe, Massacre at Paris (1581), in The Complete Works Of Christopher Mar-
lowe (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1987– 1998), vol. 5. Scene II – last monologue before the scene’s
ending.
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As for the personal, dubious attributes that Guise intends to employ to these
ends, he leaves the audience with very little doubt about any moral scruples
he might have had:
For this, I wake, when others think I sleepe,
For this, I waite, that scorn attendance else:
For this, my quenchles thirst whereon I builde
Hath often pleaded kindred to the King.
For this, this head, this heart, this hand and sworde,
Contrive, imagine and fully execute¹⁹
All this must be done through the inner dealings of secretive state matters, of
which neither the peasants (to whom Guise eluded earlier) nor the nobility
have any understanding:
Matters of importe, aimed at by many,
Yet understoode by none.²⁰
3 The ultimate impact of Arcana Imperii upon
Shakespeare – King James I
So much for the circumstantial influences that might have triggered Shake-
speare’s interests in Arcana Imperii. Yet beyond these arguable influences,
which methodologically are suggestive at best, there remains the more immedi-
ate and direct effect that Arcana Imperii must have exerted upon Shakespeare
due to his immediate and direct exposure to it – in the open and official procla-
mations of his king (and direct employer!), James I.
Thanks to Ernst Kantorowicz’s pioneering enquiry into the ecclesiastical ori-
gins of monarchical justifications – later published in his renowned work, The
King’s Two Bodies – we are able to embed Shakespeare within his true, immedi-
ate political context.²¹ In his “intellectual run-up” to this book, Kantorowicz pub-
lished several important studies, within which he delved into various facets of
monarchy. In one of these studies, published in 1957, the German-American his-
torian claimed that the absolutism that began in the sixteenth century, and
 Marlowe, Massacre, Scene II.
 Marlowe, Massacre, Scene II.
 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, The King’s Two Bodies: An Enquiry into Medieval Political Theology
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1960).
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which reached its zenith in the seventeenth, in fact borrowed its authority and
insignia from the ecclesiastical world of the Catholic Church.²² While this
claim ought to be revisited, given Tacitus’ (that is, the non-Christian) historical
precedence for medieval Christian theology, which would fault Kantorowicz’s
claim with a good measure of anachronism, the article itself is filled with first-
class (and hitherto overlooked) early seventeenth-century absolutist sources
that shed much new light upon Arcana Imperii. In 1610, King James I complained
that “nothing is now unsearched into, neither the very highest mysteries of God-
head nor the deepest mysteries that belong to the persons or state of King and
Princes.”²³ In 1616, James spoke of: “My Prerogative or mystery of State and of
the mysterie of the King’s power, and of the mysticall reverence, that belongs
unto them.”²⁴ Kantorowicz continues his quotations with one of the most repre-
sentative examples of James I’s attitude towards the British Parliament, the ulti-
mate qualifier of regal power: the king “ordered the speaker of the House of
Commons to acquaint that house with our pleasure that none therein shall pre-
sume to meddle with anything concerning our government or mysteries of
State.”²⁵
James I ascended to the throne of England in 1603. We know for a fact that
the first proven performance of Henry V (as opposed to the hearsay tradition that
places its premiere at the Globe theatre in 1599) was at court – with the king as a
member of its audience. James I’s absolutist tendencies, as James VI of Scotland,
were well known long before he acquired the English throne. While we do not
have the words “mysteries of State” themselves in the play, Shakespeare’s refer-
ence to Arcana Imperii is unmissable.When one considers the king before whom
 Ernst H. Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State: An Absolutist Concept and its Late Mediaeval Ori-
gins,” The Harvard Theological Review 48.1 (January 1955): 65–91. Kantorowicz’s central ques-
tion – “How, by what channels and by what techniques, were the spiritual arcana ecclesiae
transferred to the state [so] as to produce the new secular arcana imperii of absolutism (66) –
already establishes as its meta-logical forgone conclusion that such a transfer from the spiritual
to the temporal world indeed took place. This position by Kantorowicz is somewhat problematic
given that he himself acknowledges (69, n.18) the origins of Arcana Imperii in the very same pas-
sage from Tacitus quoted here, above. I would argue that the mysterious elements of statehood
need not necessarily have come only from the Christian spiritual world, as they existed full-well
within the “real world” of northern European folk mythologies concerning statehood – most no-
tably, in stories of the Knights of the Round Table, and even of Alexander of Macedon’s myste-
rious ability to untie the Gordian knot (which, in itself, is a state-based mythological element
already found in Homer). Subsequent scholars would do well to examine this alternative to Kant-
orowicz’s origin of mystery.
 Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State,” 68.
 Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State,” n. 10.
 Kantorowicz, “Mysteries of State,” n. 11.
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the play was first enacted; when one considers the well-known intellectual im-
pact that Marlowe exerted upon Shakespeare; and when one merges Shake-
speare’s contemporary political context, of the bitter rivalry between European
monarchs who demanded to be gods and who thus refused to accept any parlia-
mentary limits upon their powers (be that in France with the Huguenots or in
England with the “long and short” parliaments) we can grasp the full impression
that Arcana Imperii probably had upon Shakespeare.
4 Conclusion: The return of Arcana Imperii and
the end of democratic diplomacy
It is now time to revisit the topic with which I began this paper – namely, inter-
national law and its susceptibility to abuse, as portrayed by Shakespeare in
Henry V – and to examine the intimate connections between Arcana Imperii, in-
ternational law, and the realm of international diplomacy.
If time travel were possible, and one were to invite the signatories of the
1648 Treaty of Westphalia to visit the UN building in New York as the General
Assembly was in its annual session (from September to December each year),
with its habitual marathon of UN Security Council sessions, these guests
would probably be appalled and disgusted by the publicity and openness with
which diplomacy is exercised at the turn of the third millennium. While esti-
mates vary as to exactly how many people were fully acquainted with the
exact details inscribed into the Westphalian Treaties even at their most numer-
ous these did not exceed several thousands of people the world over. And one
must remember that we are talking about the treaties that ended the Thirty
Years’ War in Europe – a conflict that annihilated roughly a third of the popula-
tion of the continent and its livelihoods.²⁶ Since the end of World War I, and es-
pecially since the creation of the UN after World War II, the world entered a new
phase in the history of diplomacy – the age of “democratic diplomacy.”²⁷ The
hallmark of this new diplomacy is its subordination to public scrutiny, as the
contents of and negotiations regarding international treaties, pacts, and diplo-
 Several historians, foremost amongst them Chicago University’s Michael Geyer, have subse-
quently argued that in proportional terms the impacts of the Thirty Years’ War far exceeded the
destruction and trauma caused by World War II.
 Harold Nicolson, Diplomacy, 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963): 80– 103.
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matic alliances are known to electorates in democratically governed countries,
and are subject to the latter’s public control and questioning.²⁸
To understand the stark difference between Shakespeare’s time and our
own, it would be sufficient to compare the manner in which a military ultima-
tum, the critical moment in any diplomatic engagement, was delivered in Shake-
speare’s time, under absolutism, with such a delivery in the age of democratic
diplomacy. One can, in fact, compare the two visually by contrasting the ultima-
tum delivered by the Duke of Exeter to the French court in Branagh’s cinematized
version of Henry Vwith that delivered by Adlai Stevenson of the United States to
Ambassador Valerian Zorin of the USSR at the publicly televized UN Security
Council session of October 1962 on the subject of Cuba.²⁹ In 1416, the ultimatum
was delivered in a dark and secretive chamber to a small group of men, the result
of whose deliberations would “impawne,” in Shakespeare’s words, the life and
well-being of their two nations. The 1962 ultimatum was delivered on public tele-
vision and broadcast around the world. When Ambassador Zorin continued to
attempt to mask his intentions concerning the placement of Soviet nuclear weap-
ons in Cuba, around 100 miles off the coast of the United States and rebuked the
American diplomat, declaring that he was not under prosecution in a US court
room, Stevenson uttered the words that have since gone down in the pantheon
of diplomatic conduct: “You are in the courtroom of world public opinion.”
There is a message here for us all. In both cases, in the 1416 confrontation
between England and France (so well portrayed by Shakespeare in Henry V)
and during the Cuba Missile Crisis, two world powers experienced the acute pre-
sentation of an ultimatum before all-out war was intended to be waged upon
them. For all the inherent differences of these two examples, one cannot deny
the mitigating, indeed soothing, effect that public pressures (on both sides of
the Iron Curtain, it should be added) played in preventing war in 1962. The de-
 This change in the nature of diplomacy was evident to Harold Nicolson himself, who, just
before his death in 1963, published his well-known essay “Diplomacy Then and Now” in Foreign
Affairs (October 1961) (reprinted in Nicolson, Diplomacy, 244–262. Nicolson joined the British
Foreign Office several months prior to the outbreak of World War I, and, as the youngest dele-
gate at the British Embassy in Berlin at the time (as per diplomatic protocol), was chosen for the
task of delivering Britain’s declaration of war upon Germany in August 1914. He then served as
the first secretary of the British delegation to the Versailles negotiations, and witnessed first-
hand how public opinion swayed the diplomats there towards the cruel surrender terms im-
posed upon Germany in that treaty, which Nicolson himself criticized at the time.
 For the ultimatum delivered by Exeter in Branagh’s version of Henry V, see: www.youtube.-
com/watch?v=mKHihAPr2Rc&t=3s (last access February 3, 2017) For the speech by Adlai Steven-
son at the UN Security Council, see: www.youtube.com/watch?v=xgR8NjNw__I (last access Feb-
ruary 3, 2017)
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mocratization of diplomacy – that is, the extrication of Arcana Imperii from state-
craft under democratic regimes – has gone hand in hand with an enhancement
of public accountability; with the rise of the ethos of human rights; and ultimate-
ly, as in the Cuba Missile Crisis, with belligerent leaders succumbing to a public
opinion opposed to an unaccountable bloodletting. The involvement of demo-
cratic publics in diplomacy has also been a harbinger of the promotion of fairer
and more transparent conduct with regard to international law – its development
and usages.
With the recent rise – or rather resurfacing, for they have always festered be-
neath the visible surface – of absolutist tendencies in many of the world’s re-
gimes (as in Benjamin Netanyahu’s Israel, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Turkey,
Trump’s US, and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary) one can certainly anticipate a return
to Arcana Imperii, and its corresponding tendency of abuse of international
law in the service of narrow political objectives and at the expense of the
well-being of publics at large. Shakespeare’s archetypal depiction of these two
traits provides an insight into the dangers of the world of diplomacy that were
once, for a period during the twentieth century, held at bay, and whose re-emer-
gence in the near future is unfortunately more probable.
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Part Two Ethnicity and Alterity

Heinz Antor
Ethnicity, Alterity and the Law in
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice
In his play The Merchant of Venice,¹ first performed in 1596 or 1597, William
Shakespeare engages intensely with what it means to live in a multicultural en-
vironment in which encounters with otherness are part of everyday life and in
which alterity can also lead to conflicts that need to be resolved peacefully
through the workings of the law. This is not the only time the Elizabethan play-
wright negotiated the complications of racial and ethnic otherness, an earlier ex-
ample being Shakespeare’s depiction of blackness in Titus Andronicus (1589–92/
1594) and the most famous later instance of course being his dramatization of
the story of Othello, The Moor of Venice (1601). It is no coincidence that both
his play about the Jewish moneylender and that about the black general have
the same setting since Venice in Shakespeare’s day was not only one of the lead-
ing political, military and economic powers in the Western world, but widely ad-
mired as a centre of culture and a potential point of reference, if not a model, for
the negotiations of change in an England that was about to become an early cap-
italist and colonial superpower on the world stage.² But nowhere else in his
works did Shakespeare link issues of otherness with those of justice and the
law to such an extent as in The Merchant of Venice.
The first scene of the play immediately establishes the commercial context in
which life in a trading nation with international economic relations has to be
seen, with Antonio shown to be fretting, as Salarino surmises, about the success
of his various enterprises and the fate of his diverse merchant ships at sea. The
theme is continued with the arrival of Bassanio and his confession that he has
spent too much money and will thus not be able to pay back his debts, including
that owed to Antonio. Bassanio’s plea for further credit from Antonio, who, since
his argosies have not yet returned, is short of ready money himself, raises the
issue of borrowing money from a third party. This economic initiation into the
 William Shakespeare, The Comical History of the Merchant of Venice, or Otherwise Called the
Jew of Venice, in The Complete Works, eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 1986), 479–508.
 As Andrew Hadfield has stated, “perhaps the most significant reasons that Englishmen ad-
mired Venice were political. […] for […] Shakespeare, representing Venice was an […] obvious
means of thinking about the problems and opportunities of Elizabethan England”; Andrew Had-
field, “Shakespeare and Republican Venice,” in Visions of Venice in Shakespeare, eds. Laura Tosi
and Shaul Bassi (Farnham: Ashgate, 2011), 67–82, 67–68.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-007
play enables the introduction of two of its main themes, i.e. the issue of gender
in the love story between Bassanio and Portia that results from it as well as the
topic of credit and usury through the linkage to Shylock, who is not only a mer-
chant, but also a Jewish moneylender characterized by his ethnic alterity.³
Again, in the brief conversation between Portia and Nerissa that makes up
the second scene of the play, we are not only made familiar with the ploy of
the three caskets devised by Portia’s father as a means of finding the right hus-
band for his daughter, but this is also linked to the two main themes just men-
tioned. On the one hand, Portia’s being bound to her father’s method of choosing
a husband for her raises the issue of patriarchal domination and arbitrariness⁴
versus paternal wisdom and benevolence. But on the other hand, more indirect-
ly, Portia’s words also raise the issue of alterity since all her suitors, whom Ner-
issa enumerates one after the other, are foreigners come from afar to woo the fair
lady from Belmont, and they are all of them – whether they come from Naples or
the Palatinate, from France or England, Scotland, Germany or Morocco – rejected
without fail or made fun of by Portia. Foreigners, it seems, simply are not up to
par for Portia,⁵ the only exception being Bassanio, whom she remembers favour-
ably. It is doubtful, however, whether the gentleman from Venice is indeed per-
ceived by Portia as a foreigner since Venice in this play is the geographic point of
focalization and Belmont seems to be situated rather close to the Republic. The
 Sàez also refers to the interlinkages between the various themes of the play when she states
that “[l]ove is also related to law and justice and the world of commercial bonds.” Rosa Sáez,
“Religion, Law and Justice in The Merchant of Venice, Los Intereses Creados and La Ciudad Ale-
gre y Confiada,” Actas del congreso internacional de la Sociedad Espanola de Estudios Renacen-
tistas Ingleses (SEDERI), Proceedings of the III International Conference of the Spanish Society for
English Renaissance Studies (Granada: SEDERI, 1992), 267–275, 273. Oldrieve similarly emphasiz-
es the link between issues of gender and ethnicity when she points out that “[i]n The Merchant
of Venice Shylock and Portia both represent marginalized groups, the one an ethnic and religious
minority, and the other women.”; Susan Oldrieve, “Marginalized Voices in The Merchant of Ven-
ice,” Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 5.1 (1993): 87–105, 87.
 Spinosa, for example, argues that Portia is “a devotress to the arbitrariness in male activity
both of her father’s casket game […] and of the preposterous lies of men”; Charles Spinosa, “Shy-
lock and Debt and Contract in The Merchant of Venice,” Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 5.1
(1993): 65–85, 80. Oldrieve also emphasizes that “Portia’s first appearance onstage [sic] show her
struggling to balance her needs as an individual against the demands of the patriarchal society
in which she lives.”; Oldrieve, “Marginalized Voices,” 88.
 Ojeda Alba therefore points out that Portia’s “racial prejudice is shown, for instance, when
she talks about Morocco’s black complexion […].”; Ojeda Alba, “Justice and Injustice in The Mer-
chant of Venice,” Cuadernos de literatura inglesa y norteamericana 9.1–2 (2006): 11–23, 21. Sáez
also rejects interpretations that attribute an “apparent lack of racial prejudice” to Portia;
Sáez, “Religion, Law and Justice,” 270–271.
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general impression created by Portia’s comments on her wooers thus remains
one of negativity and rejection of the culturally other.
In the scene that follows Shylock makes his first appearance, and signifi-
cantly, in the stage directions he is referred to as “Shylock the Jew,” which im-
mediately opens up the possibility of re-introducing the theme of money-lending
for interest since Christians were not supposed to engage in this kind of business
so that it is because of Shylock’s ethnic otherness that Bassanio and Antonio
turn to him for financial help. This, however, also turns into an occasion on
which the mutual resentment between Christians and Jews becomes palpable,
primarily in Shylock’s own words, for example in his negative reaction to Bassa-
nio’s invitation to dinner, which he refuses to accept on religious grounds:
bassanio: If it please you to dine with us.
Shylock (aside): Yes, to smell pork, to eat of the habitation which your prophet the Nazarite
conjured the devil into! I will buy with you, sell with you, talk with you, walk with you, and
so following, but I will not eat with you, drink with you, nor pray with you. (1.3.30–35)
Shylock here points out that cultural alterity need not be an obstacle to econom-
ic transactions but is certainly a dividing factor when it comes to religiously de-
termined everyday activities such as eating and worshipping. That this is not
only motivated by Shylock’s adherence to a different set of rules but by a
deep-seated and religiously motivated hatred is expressed in his aside following
the appearance of Antonio about whom he says:
Shylock (aside): How like a fawning publican he looks.
I hate him for he is a Christian;
But more, for that in low simplicity
He lends out money gratis, and brings down
The rate of usance here with us in Venice.
If I can catch him once upon the hip
I will feed fat the ancient grudge I bear him.
He hates our sacred nation, and he rails,
Even there where merchants most do congregate,
On me, my bargains, and my well-won thrift –
Which he calls interest. Cursèd be my tribe
If I forgive him. (1.3.39–50)
The image of Shylock presented here is an ambiguous one⁶ in as far as he is
shown to be both hater and hated. He hates Antonio for religious and economic
 Hamilton points out that many critics “have argued that the hallmark of The Merchant of Ven-
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reasons, but he is also discriminated against as an interest-charging moneylend-
er by the latter for the same reasons. To Shylock, the problems he has with An-
tonio are not only a personal matter between two economic rivals from different
cultural backgrounds, but also a matter of collective identity. The individual
grudge he bears Antonio within a collective frame of reference is turned by
him into a duty towards his fellow Jews to harm his Venetian rival. Shylock’s per-
sonal interest is thus justified by reference to a wider ethnic community, which
allows him to use the alterity evinced by Antonio to harm him. The imagery used
here by Shylock already points forward to what is to come in its references to
feeding on Antonio to assuage his hatred of the other. Food here signifies the
negativity of cultural difference, and the cannibalistic dimension of Shylock’s
thoughts not only characterizes him as a potential savage but also underlines
his willingness to annihilate otherness by engorging it and thus transforming
it into part of the self, i.e. into sameness. As a result, the audience can see
that Shylock may be discriminated against by Antonio on the Rialto,⁷ but the
Jew is nevertheless depicted as the far less sympathetic character through the in-
sight into the negativity of his thoughts provided by this aside.
This negative characterization of Shylock is continued in the dialogue that
follows between him and Antonio, in which the latter’s habit of never charging
interest for lending money to others is once more cited in front of Shakespeare’s
Christian audience, and when Shylock tries to justify his diverging practice by
telling a story about the biblical figure of Jacob, this is turned against him by An-
tonio in a mocking remark to Bassanio:
antonio: Mark you this, Bassanio?
The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose.
An evil soul producing holy witness
Is like a villain with a smiling cheek,
A goodly apple rotten at the heart.
O, what a goodly outside falsehood hath! (1.3.96– 101)
Even though many a Christian Elizabethan groundling may have shared Anto-
nio’s view of Shylock here and cast him in the role of Satan, an othering device
we come across in Othello as well, just as in the case of the strategy of declaring
ice is ‘ambiguity’.”; Marci A. Hamilton, “The End of Law,” Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature
5.1 (1993): 125– 136, 125.
 Oldrieve emphasizes the connection of racial and economic motives in Antonio’s behavior to-
wards Shylock: “his [i.e. Antonio’s] berating Shylock would reflect not just anti-semitism, but an
anti-semitism used to give the Christian an economic advantage.” Oldrieve, “Marginalized Voi-
ces,” 92.
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the other to be a man-eating uncivilized cannibal, it is obvious that Antonio in
his remarks does not take up Shylock’s biblical example at all. Rather, he ignores
the Jew’s argument and instead vilifies his opponent by falling back on anti-se-
mitic stereotypes, maligning the other in a way that takes for granted as a given
Shylock’s evil character. Consequently, it is only logical that this is followed by a
complaint in which Shylock points out all the various humiliations Antonio has
subjected him to, among which there figures yet another othering strategy
Shakespeare also has his discriminating characters use in Othello, namely that
of debasing the other to the subhuman status of an animal. To Antonio’s calling
him a “cut-throat dog” (1.3.110) and spitting at him, Shylock reacts with the ques-
tion: “Should I not say/’Hath a dog money? Is it possible/A cur can lend three
thousand ducats?’” (1.3.119– 121), thus re-asserting himself as a human agent
and launching an appeal to put oneself in his position in order to realize what
it feels like to be othered and debased in such a way. This is a strategy Shylock
will use again later in the play. Shakespeare, having provided his audience with
food for engaging in the stereotypical white Christian mechanisms of anti-semit-
ic discrimination, also provides us with the necessary material for a change of
perspective, thus allowing us to put ourselves in Shylock’s shoes and to see mat-
ters from his perspective.⁸
When Antonio ignores Shylock’s argument and merely reacts with a repeti-
tion of his scathing remarks on the inappropriateness of charging interest when
lending money, the Jew seemingly gives up his position and offers to lend money
to Antonio without charging interest in order to at long last become his friend.
However, the bond Shylock suggests, as we know, turns out to be anything but
a token of friendship, and the wording chosen by Shylock when he suggests it
with hindsight and in view of the Jew’s earlier expressions of hatred as well
as his determination to take revenge can only be read as an example of equivo-
cation:
Shylock: This kindness will I show.
Go with me to a notary, seal me there
Your single bond, and, in a merry sport,
If you repay me not on such a day,
In such a place, such sum or sums as are
Expressed in the condition, let the forfeit
Be nominated for an equal pound
 Gross notes that “[t]he seeds of sympathy are there […] Shakespeare simply tried to imagine,
within the confines of the plot, and within the limits that his culture set him, what it would be
like to be a Jew.” John Gross, Shylock: A Legend and Its Legacy (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1992), 349.
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Of your fair flesh to be cut off and taken
In what part of your body pleaseth me. (1.3.142–150)
The “sport” suggested by Shylock, as we know,will turn out not to be so merry at
all, and this act of equivocation can only be seen as a strategy chosen by the Jew
to take revenge on white Christians in the person of Antonio, who is therefore
referred to as “fair” here, the whole deal thus taking on the quality of an
inter-racial undertaking. That what is depicted as an amicable offer on the sur-
face is conflictual rather than friendly is underlined by the discussion that fol-
lows in which Antonio declares himself willing to accept the offer and says
that “there is much kindness in the Jew” (1.3.152) – mind the ethnically generic
reference to Shylock here again – while Bassanio counsels Antonio against ac-
cepting Shylock’s suggestions and the latter reacts by accusing Christians of al-
ways suspecting others without justification. The first act thus ends with the ten-
sion between belief in the possibility of the other’s melioration and forebodings
based on the assumption of an incurably negative alterity of the non-white and
presumably evil Jew:
Antonio: Hie thee, gentle Jew. [Exit Shylock]
The Hebrew will turn Christian; he grows kind.
Bassanio: I like not fair terms and a villain’s mind. (1.3.175–178)
Interestingly, Antonio’s optimistic consideration of the possibility of Shylock
changing his mores here is based yet again on the assumption of the latter’s
total assimilation to Christianity and the annihilation of his otherness, a notion
Bassanio cannot bring himself to consider as feasible.
Act two opens by taking up the dominant theme of Act one again, in the first
scene through the characterization of the Prince of Morocco as an exotic racial
other, and in scene two by Lancelot’s description of his master Shylock as a
Jew and hence – from a Christian perspective – a fiend and a devil, thus perpet-
uating the anti-semitic stereotypes of the time. However, the negative categoriza-
tion of the racially and ethnically other is transcended in Lancelot’s hesitation as
to whether his conscience would allow him to run away from his master, which
raises the issue of whether a different set of rules can be applied to the other or
whether the same norms should apply to all, a question that already foreshad-
ows some of the problems of the trial scene later in the play. In Lancelot, how-
ever, it is his rejection of the other that wins over his qualms and makes him run
away in spite of what his conscience tells him. He justifies his defection to Bas-
sanio with his fear of infection, “for I am a Jew if I serve the Jew any longer”
(2.2.107). As a reason for his change of allegiance he tells Bassanio that “you
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have the grace of God, sir, and he hath enough” (2.2.145– 146), thus drawing a
distinction between a good Christian and a materialist Jew in a rhetorical gesture
that once more reconfirms negative stereotypes. As if this were not enough, the
short third scene of Act two stages another defection from Shylock, this time by
his daughter Jessica. She complains that “Our house is hell” (2.3.2), thus taking
up the earlier negative categorization of the Jew as a devil, and she admits to her
racial identity with her father but denies her cultural allegiance to him and his
religion when she declares: “But though I am a daughter to his blood,/I am not
to his manners” (2.3.18– 19), a statement that is immediately followed by her de-
cision to marry Lorenzo and convert to Christianity, thereby providing another
example of the annihilation of Jewish otherness through assimilation to the
white Christian norm. That this is to be seen as a crossing of a primarily racial
borderline becomes clear in Lorenzo’s reaction to Jessica’s letter, which, he de-
clares, is written in “a fair hand,/ And whiter than the paper it writ on/Is the
fair hand that writ.” (2.4.12– 14) The greatest part of the remaining scenes in
Act two is likewise devoted to the negative characterization of the non-white
other, mainly in the shape of Shylock the Jew, ranging from the latter’s declara-
tion that he will “go in hate, to feed upon/The prodigal Christian” (2.5.14– 15),
which yet again has cannibalistic overtones, to Shylock’s reprehensible confu-
sion of priorities in his divided lament over both the theft of his money and
the loss of his daughter:
‘My daughter! O, my ducats! O, my daughter!
Fled with a Christian! O, my Christian ducats!
Justice! The law! My ducats and my daughter!
[…]
Stol’n by my daughter! Justice! Find the girl! (2.8.15–21)
Not only does Shylock discredit himself here by obviously mourning the loss of
his money to the Christians at least as much if not more than the loss of his
child,⁹ but he also seeks redress by having recourse to the law which, apparently,
seems to him to be the adequate means of re-establishing justice.
This is not only another early signpost towards the later trial scene, but it
initiates a discourse on what is just in intercultural and interracial contexts of
alterity, and it provides Shakespeare with the opportunity of allowing his audi-
ence insights into the perspective of the slighted Jew beyond the mere processes
 Ojeda Alba also critically observes that in this passage Shylock “laments both the loss of his
daughter and the loss of his ducats, mixing the two as if both paternal love and money were at
the same level.” Ojeda, “Justice and Injustice,” 15.
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of anti-semitic stigmatization that have by now been re-enacted so often. No-
where does this become more apparent than in Shylocks famous soliloquy in
the first scene of Act three where he tells Salarino that he will insist on taking
Antonio’s flesh if the latter fails to fulfil his bond, and be it only
To bait fish withal. If it will feed nothing else it will feed my revenge. He hath disgraced me,
and hindered me half a million; laughed at my losses, mocked at my gains, scourned my
nation, thwarted my bargains, cooled my friends, heated mine enemies, and what’s his rea-
son? – I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses,
affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the
same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and
summer as a Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not
laugh? If you poison us do we not die? And if you wrong us shall we not revenge? If we
are like you in the rest, we will resemble you in that. If a Jew wrong a Christian, what is
his humility? Revenge. If a Christian wrong a Jew, what should his sufferance be by Chris-
tian example? Why, revenge. The villainy you teach me I will execute, and it shall go hard
but I will better the instruction. (3.1.49–68)
This is an example of powerful rhetoric contributing to the audience momentar-
ily identifying with a speaker who has been viewed critically so far – similar to
other examples in Shakespeare’s work, such as in Macbeth, to name but one
other text. Shakespeare here manages to make his Christian audience see the
Jew’s point of view, and he gives Shylock strong arguments. The latter does
not only complain about the slights and mistreatment he has suffered from An-
tonio in the past, but he also justifies his protest against these by referring in a
very convincing and impressive way to a common humanity beyond the border-
lines of race or ethnicity. Beyond the alterity of different nations and religions, he
claims, there lies a fundamental sameness of, for example, Jews and Christians
as human beings that constitutes a form of identity in the midst of alterity. He
thus establishes an ethical claim as to the dignity and respect with which all
human beings should be treated, irrespective of their origin or background,
and this claim confers a certain dignity on the speaker of these lines.¹⁰ However,
unfortunately, Shylock is so embittered that he is not able to draw the conclusion
of breaking through the nefarious cycle of negative othering. He goes wrong the
moment he uses his argument of sameness as a justification for revenge, claim-
ing that abuse and maltreatment need to be paid back in kind. Shylock’s earlier
wish for justice here degenerates into a perverted claim for the satisfaction of
 This was seen differently by the well-known American actor Edwin Booth, who, in 1884, in a
letter to the theatre critic William Winter, wrote that “I have searched in vain for the slightest
hint of anything resembling dignity in the part [i.e. that of Shylock]”; Ojeda Alba, “Justice
and Injustice,” 11.
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hateful feelings.¹¹ He rejects the option of silently suffering the wrongs commit-
ted by Christian Venetians and insists on re-establishing a balance by wronging
Christians back in turn, a solution that places the principle of negative alterity
above the notion of a common humanity. Not only does he lose again here
much of the dignity he has gained through his earlier words on the sameness
of all humans,¹² but he also characterizes the rejected option of silent suffering
as “a Christian example,” thus re-emphasizing the otherness of humans on dif-
ferent sides of racial and ethnic borderlines. Shylock’s soliloquy characterizes
him as a tragic character,¹³ with his desire for revenge being the tragic flaw
that causes the fall of a potentially dignified man. The audience has only been
offered a short glimpse of a more positive side of Shylock, but not more.¹⁴ In
the ensuing exchange, therefore, the Jew is shown again as the greedy money-
lender who would prefer to see his daughter dead rather than lose his money
and his diamonds (3.1. 78–90), and Shakespeare reverts to the presentation of
Shylock as an ugly character when he has him rejoice at the news of Antonio’s
loss of one of his argosies. The offended Jew’s thirst for revenge smothers any
pity and human fellow-feeling he might otherwise have evinced and his repre-
hensible side comes to the fore again: “I will have the heart of him if he forfeit,
for were he out of Venice I can make what merchandise I will. Go, Tubal, and
meet me at our synagogue. Go, good Tubal; at our synagogue, Tubal.” (3.1.117–
121) Shylock shows himself willing to sacrifice another’s life to his economic in-
terests, which is not only an unethical attitude here but one which, through the
double mention of the synagogue at the end of this quotation, is marked as Jew-
ish.
The stage is thus set for the trial scene in which Shylock will not only claim
his pound of flesh but in which questions of justice and the law will be posed
with reference to intercultural contexts of alterity. In preparation for the negotia-
tion of such issues, however, at the end of Act 3.2, in which Bassanio chooses the
right casket in Belmont and wins the hand of Portia, we also learn more about
Shylock’s further behaviour in Venice, which seems to spiral completely out of
 This is why Rosa Sàez, referring back to an earlier reading by John Palmer, claims that “the
speech is a rationalization of his [i.e. Shylock’s] thirst for revenge, not the generally believed
plea for human tolerance.” However, we are not faced with two mutually exclusive alternatives
here, but rather with two contradictory sides of one and the same character. Shylock’s speech
contains both aspects mentioned by Sàez; Sàez, “Religion, Law and Justice,” 269.
 Cf. Ojeda Alba, “Justice and Injustice,” 15: “He loses the grandeur and dignity that he had.”
 Ojeda Alba also refers to him as such; Ojeda, “Justice and Injustice,” 13.
 This is sufficient, however, to explain “why criticism has seldom reached consensus when it
comes to evaluating this character.” Ojeda Alba, “Justice and Injustice,” 12.
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control with regard to his bond with Antonio. We learn that Shylock tries to in-
strumentalize justice and the law in order to quench his thirst for revenge. Sale-
rio reports that
He plies the Duke at morning and at night,
And doth impeach the freedom of the state
If they deny him justice. Twenty merchants,
The Duke himself, and the magnificoes
Of greatest port, have all persuaded with him,
But none can drive him from the envious plea
Of forfeiture, of justice, and his bond. (3.2. 275–281)
The audience know by now, however, that the notion of justice used by Shylock
is a perverted one in as far as it is based merely on the notion of revenge and
turned into a tool here for the satisfaction of his personal thirst for hurting An-
tonio back, although he claims that general issues of state are at stake. That
things threaten to get out of proportion is made quite clear by what Jessica
has to report about her father:
When I was with him, I have heard him swear
[…]
That he would rather have Antonio’s flesh
Than twenty times the value of the sum
That he did owe him; and I know, my lord,
If law, authority, and power deny not,
It will go hard with poor Antonio. (3.2.282–288)
The authority of the law here is invoked by Shylock’s daughter as a necessary
means of curbing her father’s vengeful and disproportionate excess. But when
Jessica refers to the law here, what she really means is the principle of equity be-
cause, viewed from a purely formalist point of view, Shylock’s claim may be jus-
tified and lawful – Antonio is not able to fulfil his bond after all – while a result-
ing condemnation of Antonio in the terms specified by his bond with Shylock
would appear to be excessive, disproportionate and unjust.¹⁵ The demented
 Maxine MacKay even reads the play as one “reflect[ing] clearly a conflict between the courts
of law and of equity (chancery) in Elizabethan England”; Maxine MacKay, “The Merchant of Ven-
ice: a Reflection of the Early Conflict Between Courts of Law and Courts of Equity,” Shakespeare
Quarterly 15.4 (1964): 371–375, 371. For a survey of recent discussions of the role of equity in The
Merchant of Venice see B.J. and Mary Sokol, “Shakespeare and the English Equity Jurisdiction:
The Merchant of Venice and the two texts of King Lear,” The Review of English Studies 50 (1999):
417–439. Stretton, referring to Shylock’s claim to a pound of Antonio’s flesh, points out that “the
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craze for getting his own back again on Antonio created by Shylock’s victimiza-
tion as an ethnic other at the hands of the Venetian Christians has thus led to the
creation of a legal and ethical problem and a potential crisis of legitimacy for the
Venetian system of justice. The task to be faced now by the protagonists is how to
find a way of leaving the law intact without producing a cruel, inequitable and
unjust outcome in the confrontation between Antonio and Shylock.¹⁶
Act 3.3 further discredits the Jew because it shows the whole intransigence of
his position. He tells the jailer: “Tell me not of mercy” (3.3.1), and in conversation
with Antonio he reproduces the logic he already used in his famous soliloquy in
Act 3.1., arguing that he will act according to the way in which he has been dis-
cursively constructed earlier: “Thou called’st me dog before thou hadst a cause,/
But since I am a dog, beware my fangs.” (3.3.6–7) The discursive strategies of
discrimination and of othering practised by the Christians now threaten to fall
back upon them as a threat to the life of Antonio as one of Christian Venice’s
foremost representatives in this play. While Shylock cites his racial and ethnic
victimization as the reason for his obstinate insistence on his bond with Antonio
being followed to the letter and his refusal to listen to “Christian intercessors”
(3.3.16) –mind the use of the adjective here,which stresses religious and cultural
alterity – Antonio sees a primarily economic motivation in the Jew’s behaviour
who he claims wants to get rid of somebody who “oft delivered from his [i.e. Shy-
lock’s] forfeitures/Many that have at times made moan to me” (3.3.22–23).¹⁷ He
thus makes the Jew appear in an even more negative light and completely disre-
gards the repeated slights and racial slurs suffered by Shylock. Rather, Antonio
is aware of the plight he finds himself in because he realizes that the Duke can-
not show mercy towards him in this case since this would jeopardize Venice’s
status as an open and cosmopolitan market-place in which the law is reliably ap-
metaphorical device of an unnecessarily harsh penalty fell on receptive ears in the 1590s, when
bond forfeitures had been running high and litigants in equity courts regularly complained that
the scale of penalties was excessive in comparison to the harm caused by default.”; Tim Stretton,
“Conditional Promises and Legal Instruments in The Merchant of Venice,” in Taking Exception to
the Law: Materializing Injustice in early Modern English Literature, eds. Donald Beecher, Travis
Decook, Andrew Wallace, and Grant Williams (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2015): 71–
99, 79.
 As early as 1952 M.C. Bradbrook indirectly referred to the inequitable element in Shylock’s
position when he wrote that the latter “stands for the Law […] for the legal system which, to
be just to all in general, must only approximate to justice in particular cases.”; Muriel C. Brad-
brook, Shakespeare and Elizabethan Poetry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1952), 172.
 Kornstein remarks that “restraint of trade may lurk behind much of the action in The Mer-
chant of Venice. Shylock and Antonio are competitors […].”; Daniel J. Kornstein, “Fie Upon Your
Law!,” Cardozo Studies in Law and Literature 5.1 (1993): 35–56, 40.
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plied irrespective of the racial, ethnic or national background of the traders who
use it:
The Duke cannot deny the course of law,
For the commodity that strangers have
With us in Venice, if it be denied,
Will much impeach the justice of the state,
Since that the trade and profit of the city
Consisteth of all nations. (3.3.26–31)
It is thus out of raison d’état¹⁸ that Antonio resigns himself to losing a pound of
flesh. At the end of the short prison scene in Act 3.3., therefore, an image of the
Venetian merchant as a responsible and altruistic man is contrasted negatively
with an image of Shylock as a spiteful, greedy and vengeful other who, in the
blind pursuit of his economic advantage, appears as inhuman and unjust. The
more understanding attitude towards Shylock potentially fostered by the Jew’s
great soliloquy here is made almost impossible again, and the play once more
takes on a more anti-semitic tinge.¹⁹
In typically Shakespearean fashion, however, the text swerves back to a dis-
cussion of racial and ethnic othering as a strategy of discrimination in the scene
between Lancelot and Jessica in Portia’s garden in which Lorenzo worries about
the negative effects of Jessica’s family background on the girl: “Yes truly; for look
you, the sins of the fathers are to be laid upon the children, […] for truly I think
you are damned” (3.5. 1–5).²⁰ Lancelot sees Jessica’s only chance in the “hope
that your father got you not, that you are not the Jew’s daughter” (3.5.9–10),
thus declaring being a bastard to be preferable to being a Jew. Jessica, in turn,
replies that she “shall be saved by my husband. He hath made me a Christian.”
(3.5.17– 18). The dividing line between different racial and ethnic groups here is
left intact and shown to be very strong, the only chance of overcoming it being a
complete change of identity through total assimilation. Once more, the annihila-
 Cohen comments on Antonio’s words as an example of “the close connection between com-
mon law and nascent capitalism”; Stephen A. Cohen, “’The Quality of Mercy’: Law, Equity and
Ideology in The Merchant of Venice,” Mosaic 27.4 (1994): 35–54, 41.
 This is one of the reasons why Isaac speaks about “the problem of the anti-Semitism implicit
in Shakespeare’s text.”; Dan Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye: Reflections on the Talmud in The
Merchant of Venice,” MAARAV: A Journal for the Study of the Northwest Semitic Languages and
Literatures 8 (1992): 349–374, 352.
 Ojeda Alba correctly points out that “(w)hat Jessica does not understand is that in spite of
her alliance to Christianity she will continue to be unaccepted, as is later demonstrated by the
fact that she is still socially classified as an outsider (…).”; Ojeda, “Justice and Injustice,” 18.
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tion of the other is shown to be the prevalent model of thinking about alterity
among the Venetian protagonists of the play. The notions of hybridity and toler-
ant openness are not taken into account in the binary patterns of the charac-
ters.²¹
Act four opens with a conversation between the Duke and Antonio which re-
capitulates the negative characterization of Shylock presented in the previous
acts. Shylock is not mentioned by name, but rather referred to by the Duke as
“A stony adversary, an inhuman wretch/Uncapable of pity, void and empty/
From any dram of mercy” (4.1.3–5). Lack of empathy is used here as a damning
attribute that takes Shylock’s othering so far as to put in doubt his very status as
a human being, a strategy we also come across in Shylock being treated as a dog,
as we have been told earlier, or, to use an example from another play, in Othello’
being referred to as “an old black ram” (1.1.88).²² When the Duke appeals to Shy-
lock to show mercy to Antonio, he phrases this in such a way as to threaten the
Jew with the stigmatization of a double othering:
[…] touched with human gentleness and love,
Forgive a moiety of the principal,
Glancing an eye of pity on his losses,
[…]
And pluck commiseration of his state
From brassy bosoms, and rough hearts of flint,
From stubborn Turks and Tartars never trained
To offices of tender courtesy,
We all expect a gentle answer, Jew. (4.1.24–33)
The duke argues here that if Shylock does not show clemency, he will be consid-
ered to be worse than Venice’s greatest enemies, the Turks, and more hard-heart-
ed than the Tartars, who function here as the epitome of the exotic and inhuman
other.²³ However, the gentle answer the Duke expects from the Jew to the latter
would also be a gentile answer, i.e. one he does not find himself capable of pro-
ducing. This is why, in his rejection of the Duke’s plea, he refers back again to his
 This kind of thinking in the divisive terms of racial othering is reinforced at the end of the
scene when Lorenzo enters and – albeit in playful banter – accuses Lancelot of “the getting up
of the Negro’s belly” (3.5.36–37), an act of miscegenation that needs to be answered for “to the
commonwealth” (3.5.35–36).
 William Shakespeare, The Tragedy of Othello, the Moor of Venice, in The Complete Works, eds.
Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 925–964.
 Cohen also points out that the Duke tells Shylock that if he does not show mercy, he will
“remain more alien than even the Turks and Tartars in pursuing his suit”; Cohen, “The Quality
of Mercy,” 42.
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religious identity: “by our holy Sabbath have I sworn/To have the due and forfeit
of my bond.” (4.1.35–36). In addition, Shylock underlines the threat a formal
breach of law would constitute to Venice’s status as an international market-
place, and he rejects any further negotiation of the matter by referring to his in-
sistence on the pound of flesh as an arbitrary whim: “say it is my humour. Is it
answered? […] So can I give no reason, nor I will not,/ More than a lodged hate
and a certain loathing/I bear Antonio” (4.1.42, 59–61). Communication has all
but broken down by now, and the divisive mechanisms of racial and ethnic al-
terities fighting each other have taken over. Never does this get lost in the verbal
altercations of this scene.When Antonio declares that it is useless to argue with
Shylock, he refers to him as “the Jew” (4.1.69) and claims that immovable cruelty
is lodged like a force of nature in “His Jewish heart” (4.1.79), thus attributing Shy-
lock’s inability to show mercy to his religion.²⁴
When the Duke once more threatens Shylock by telling him that if he does
not show mercy he can expect none, the Jew cleverly defends his position by in-
sisting on strict adherence to the law and yet again pointing to the sameness be-
tween the actions of the Christian Venetians and his own:
What judgement shall I dread, doing no wrong?
You have among you many a purchased slave
Which, like your asses and your dogs and mules,
You use in abject and in slavish parts
Because you bought them. Shall I say to you,
“Let them be free, marry them to your heirs.
[…]” You will answer
“The slaves are ours.” So do I answer you.
The pound of flesh which I demand of him
Is dearly bought. ‘Tis mine, and I will have it. (4.1.88–99)
 Sàez also refers to the religious dimension of different approaches to mercy and emphasizes
that “Shylock follows a legalistic system imposed by his Old Testament Jehovah, while Antonio
represents the New Testament, and almost re-enacts Christ.”; Sàez, “Religion, Law and Justice,”
274. Johnson also sees “the encounter between the two men […] as the conflict between the law
of the Old Testament or the letter of the law and grace of the New Testament or the spirit of the
law.”; Lonnell E. Johnson, “Shylock’s Daniel: ‘Justice more than thou desir’st’,” CLA Journal 35.2
(1991): 353–366, 353. Majeske points out that Shylock is “punished severely, in harsh Old Testa-
ment form.”; Andrew Majeske,”Striking a Deal: Portia’s Trial Strategy in Shakespeare’s The Mer-
chant of Venice,” in Justice, Women, and Power in English Renaissance Drama, eds. Andrew Ma-
jeske and Emily Detmer-Goebel (Madison: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2009): 153–173,
164.
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Shylock’s argument is twofold here. On the one hand, he refers to the strict legal-
ity of his claim. In a purely formalistic sense, he has indeed done nothing wrong.
But he is aware of the moral condemnation his insisting on the pound of flesh
might produce, which is why, on the other hand, he comes up with the compar-
ison between his behaviour and the slavery practised by the Christian Venetians,
which both constitute the free use of property. In other words, he tries to reject
the moral claims of the Christians as spurious in order to deconstruct their ex-
pectation of mercy from him and thus justify what his adversaries see as unjus-
tifiable. And again, he constructs a wider context in which his individual case
becomes a testing ground for the reliability and therefore the credibility of the
law in Venice when he finishes with the following words: “If you deny me, fie
upon your law:/There is no force in the decrees of Venice.” (4.1.100– 101)
When Gratiano makes one last attempt at softening Shylock, this proves to
be unsuccessful and merely leads to further invective and negative othering of
the Jew, in which Gratiano calls the latter an “inexorable dog” (4.1.128), “woolv-
ish, bloody, starved, and ravenous” (4.1.137), thus placing the Jew yet again in
the realm of animals and beasts and thereby denying Shylock’s humanity. The
Jew remains obstinate, however, and retreats once more into his formalist posi-
tion by repeating: “I stand here for law” (4.1.141). Shakespeare has constructed
the perfect and seemingly insoluble stalemate²⁵ here, then, with the formal
claims of the law being opposed to considerations of equity and ethics in a sit-
uation in which the reputation of Venice as a reliable international marketplace
governed by legal norms as well as questions of justice are at stake.²⁶ This is the
perfect context for Portia’s ploy in her role as Bellario’s emissary to unfold its
maximum effect.
The scene that ensues turns into a magnificent negotiation of issues of law,
justice, ethics, equity and alterity. In her very first words to Shylock, Portia refers
to his perceived otherness when she tells him: “Of a strange nature is the suit
you follow,/Yet in such rule that the Venetian law/Cannot impugn you as you
 Mackay in this context speaks of an “impasse”; Mackay,”Reflection of the Early Conflict,”
373.
 Cf. Kornstein who states that “[i]n essence, Shylock is saying […] that a ruling in Antonio’s
favor will upset the entire reliability of commercial contracts in Venetian law, and discourage
merchants and moneylenders from doing business in Venice.”; Kornstein, “Fie Upon Your
Law!,” 43. Posner also points out that a decision denying Shylock’s claim on the grounds of
that claim being inequitable “would be an example of the operation of discretionary justice,
of which aliens doing business with Venetians would be understandably mistrustful.”; Richard
A. Posner, “Law and Commerce in The Merchant of Venice,” in Shakespeare and the Law: A Con-
versation Among Disciplines and Professions, eds. Brian Cormack and Martha C. Nussbaum (Chi-
cago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013): 147–155, 152.
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do proceed.” (4.1..174– 176) When Portia describes the Jew’s claim as “strange”
here, she does not only characterize it as highly unusual, but also as something
that is alien to Christian Venetian customs so that yet again Shylock is positioned
in the realm of the foreign, the unknown and the inacceptable.²⁷ After Antonio’s
admission that he cannot fulfil the bond, Portia produces her great soliloquy on
mercy, which she characterizes as a divine attribute beyond the merely temporal
power of rulers and lawgivers and therefore as something that should overrule
the earthly justice produced by formal systems of law: “I have spoken thus
much/To mitigate the justice of thy plea” (4.1.199–200), she says in an attempt
to soften Shylock’s insistence on blindly following the formal procedures of the
law. When this proves unsuccessful, a second such attempt to escape what ab-
stract law prescribes in the case at hand is started by Bassanio who not only of-
fers to pay Antonio’s debt “ten times o’er” (4.1.208) but also appeals to the Duke
to overrule what the law prescribes, which he sees as “a little wrong” committed
“To do a great right” (4.1.213). What the Venetians would need here is a court of
Chancery and an equitable decision, but such an institution is not available in
the context of the play, which is why Portia immediately contradicts Bassanio
and points out that “It must not be. There is no power in Venice/Can alter a de-
cree established./’Twill be recorded for a precedent,/And many an error by the
same example/Will rush into the state. It cannot be.” (4.2.215–219) The tension
is thus heightened, and so is the suspense felt by the audience as to how the cir-
cle can be squared and the claims of the law may be overridden without lasting
damage to Venice so that Antonio can be saved.
Shylock’s rigidity and his refusal to exercise mercy and accept the offered
payment of Antonio’s debt by Bassanio despite his formally legal claims place
him in the wrong in several respects. To begin with, he refuses to show the
human empathy towards Antonio he himself implicitly demanded for himself
in his great soliloquy “If you prick us, do we not bleed?” (Cf. 3.1. 49–68). Signif-
icantly, it is in this speech, in which he shows his more humane side, that he
generates brief moments of sympathy in the audience, only to destroy them
again through his vengeful attitude.²⁸ Rejecting Bassanio’s offer of money also
 And indeed, as Majeske puts it so aptly, “Portia is acting in the trial more as an advocate
than as an impartial judge”; Andrew Majeske, “Striking a Deal,” 153. Hamilton, refers to Anto-
nio’s claim as “an outlandish request.”; Hamilton, “The End of Law,” 129.
 Greenstein aptly summarizes the speech’s ambivalent nature: “His [i.e. Shylock’s] oft-cited
speech, ‘Hath not a Jew eyes?’, may be a humanistic appeal to the senses, but it equally appeals
to the lex talionis (an eye for an eye) within the courtroom context and tale of revenge.”; Michael
Greenstein, “Breaking the Mosaic Code: Jewish Literature vs. the Law,” Mosaic 27.3 (1994): 87–
106, 89.
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shows Shylock as a very narrow-minded and inflexible as well as literal-minded
interpreter of the letter of the law, according to which Antonio himself must
repay his debt rather than someone else. Moreover, in doing this, Shylock denies
Antonio the possibility of borrowing the necessary money from Bassanio al-
though he is a moneylender himself. This constitutes the Jew’s revenge²⁹ for An-
tonio’s criticism of his moneylending practice and thus is a product of the ethnic
conflict that dominates the play. This is also documented by Shylock’s claim that
to show mercy would constitute an act of perjury, i.e. by a religious and therefore
culturally determined argument, since “I have an oath in heaven.” (4.1.225). The
consequence, from Shylock’s point of view, is quite clear and again due to the
fundamental alterity he feels between himself and his Christian environment:
“No, not for Venice.” (4.1.227). Finally, the intransigent literal-mindedness with
which Shylock reads the legal bond in a purely formalist and mechanistic way
without any regard for wider considerations of appropriateness, proportionality,
ethics, equity and justice prepares the ground for what is to follow, namely Por-
tia’s no less literal-minded interpretation of the bond³⁰ and its consequences for
Shylock which potentially opens up the possibility of interpreting these as an in-
stance of poetic justice.³¹
In the midst of a seemingly insoluble quandary in which Antonio’s life al-
most seems lost, Bassanio rails against Shylock and refers to him as “this
devil” (4.1.284) in a moment of ultimate moral othering that results from the ap-
parent hopelessness of the situation. Gratiano similarly engages in yet another
othering strategy by reviving the animal comparison used previously and refer-
ring to “this currish Jew” (4.1.289). Shylock in turn bemoans the fact that his
daughter Jessica has married a Christian rather than a Jew. We are looking
here at the moment immediately before Portia comes up with the solution that
will save Antonio’s life, namely the granting of the pound of flesh to Shylock,
coupled with the strict warning that not a single drop of blood must be shed be-
cause this would be a transgression of the bond. It is no coincidence that the eth-
 Korda also points out that “Shylock’s hatred of Antonio leads him to succumb to a passion
that privileges vengeance above profit or precision. Over the course of the play, this passion sup-
plants the profit motive entirely.”; Natasha Korda, “Dame Usury: Gender, Credit, and (Ac)count-
ing in the Sonnets and The Merchant of Venice,” Shakespeare Quarterly 60.2 (2009): 129–153, 149.
 Stretton even claims that “her reliance on strict legalism exceeds Shylock’s.”; Stretton, “Con-
ditional Promises and Legal Instruments,” 71, and Kornstein refers to her “hypertechnical inter-
pretation” of the law: Kornstein, “Fie Upon Your Law!,” 38.
 This potential, however, as will be shown, is not fulfilled. On poetic justice and The Mer-
chant of Venice cf. Verena Olejniczak Lobsien, “’Richtet nicht, damit ihr nicht gerichtet werdet!’
Biblische, säkulare und poetische Gerechtigkeit im England der frühen Neuzeit,” Poetica: Zeit-
schrift für Sprach- und Literaturwissenschaft 37.3–4 (2005): 311–347, esp. 334–347.
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nic identities of the characters involved are repeatedly stressed here because the
conflict is thus turned into one between Christians and Jews.When Portia finally
makes her point she does not merely warn Shylock that he should not spill any
blood, but tells him that “if thou dost shed/One drop of Christian blood, thy
lands and goods/Are by the laws of Venice confiscate/Unto the state of Venice.”
(4.1.306–309) Blood here comes with a religious denomination – it is Christian
blood – and obviously marks the alterity of the protagonists.³² Consequently,
Gratiano, in his enthusiastic delight about Portia’s legal trick,³³ addresses Shy-
lock by not using his name, but an ethnic epithet: “Mark, Jew! O learnèd
judge!” (4.1.310). The tables have now been turned on Shylock, and the way
seems to be open for teaching him a lesson in equitable and legal behaviour
as well as in mercy and justice beyond the mere following of formal regulations.
When Portia tells him that “as thou urgest justice, be assured/Thou shalt have
justice more than thou desir’st” (4.1.313–314), she turns Shylock’s demand for
justice into a threat against him because of his mechanistic and inequitable lit-
eral application of the law.³⁴
This could turn into a moral lesson for Shylock, whose utter intransigence
needs to be curbed even though we can see the history of discrimination and suf-
fering at the hands of the Christians that lies behind him. However, what hap-
pens is much more than a reestablishment of the right measure and of propor-
tionality in legal matters and rather constitutes a renewed perversion of the
spirit of the law, which is why Isaac claims that “Shakespeare has posited a
court ready to corrupt common rules of equity and jurisprudence in order to con-
vict Shylock on the basis of a quibble.”³⁵ When Shylock realizes that he cannot
 Cf. Spinosa, “Shylock and Debt and Contract,” 80: “The law has all along distinguished
Christian blood from other blood. […] At issue here is that Shylock, an alien, seeks to cut a citi-
zen’s flesh.”
 Cohen also refers to “Portia’s famous ‘quibble’”; Cohen, “The Quality of Mercy,” 48, and so
does Anna Maria Cimitile, “The (Un)Fixity of the Law: Modalities of Stasis in The Merchant of
Venice,” anglistica 1.1–2 (1997): 27–60, 40. Hartman similarly refers to the “tricksy-ness” of
words in the play; Geoffrey Hartman, “The Tricksy Word: Richard Weisberg on The Merchant
of Venice,” Law and Literature 23.1 (2011): 71–79, 74. Bilello even talks about “Portia’s con”
and “Portia’s fraud”; Thomas C. Bilello, “Accomplished with What She Lacks: Law, Equity
and Portia’s Con,” Law and Literature 16.1 (2004): 11–32, 11, 12.
 This is why Tucker speaks about “the equitable principles which explain Portia’s pleadings
in regard to Shylock’s insistence upon the letter of the law.”; E.F.J. Tucker, “The Letter of the Law
in The Merchant of Venice,” Shakespeare Survey 29 (1976): 93–101, 94.
 Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,” 357. Similarly, Ojeda Alba reads the play as a “tale of ef-
fective injustice”; Isaac, “Justice and Injustice,” 21, and Sáez states that “Shakespeare questions
the moral validity of the Christian’s attempt to impart justice.”; Sáez, “Religion, Law and Jus-
tice,” 267. Stretton therefore, joins “a growing number of scholars [who] argue that the equity
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have Antonio’s pound of flesh without shedding a drop of blood and thus jeop-
ardizing himself, he accepts Bassanio’s suggestion to be paid three times the
amount owed by the merchant. However, not only does Portia insist on the
bond being fulfilled literally by the cutting of exactly one pound of flesh, thus
practising Shylock’s earlier literal-mindedness back upon him,³⁶ but she also
connects this with a threat to his life: “If thou tak’st more/Or less than just a
pound, [..] if the scale do turn/But in the estimation of a hair,/ Thou diest,
and all thy goods are confiscate.” (4.1.323–329). Even now, if Portia relented
at last and insisted on Shylock getting back no more than what he is owed,
this could be understood as a lesson drastically taught. But even when Shylock
himself says: “Give me my principal, and let me go” (4.1. 333), this does not hap-
pen. Instead, Portia remains adamant and states: “He hath refused it in the open
court./He shall have merely justice and his bond.” (4.1.335–336).³⁷ Once again, it
is Shylock’s alterity, his not being a Christian Venetian, that determines what
happens, as becomes clear in Portia’s words:
It is enacted in the laws of Venice,
If it be proved against an alien
That by direct or indirect attempts
He seek the life of any citizen,
The party ‘gainst the which he doth contrive
Shall seize one half his goods; the other half
Comes to the privy coffer of the state,
And the offender’s life lies in the mercy
Of the Duke only, ‘gainst all other voice –
In which predicament I say thou stand’st,
[…]
Down, therefore, and beg mercy of the Duke. (4.1.354–360)
That Shylock now is forced to beg for mercy himself, having refused such mercy
to Antonio before, could still be interpreted as part of a lesson in humane behav-
iour he is to be taught, but this becomes doubtful here because it is paired with
the complete confiscation of his fortune, which does not only appear to be dis-
proportionate but, coupled as it is with a rule applying to aliens only, takes on a
dispensed in the Court of Chancery, which served to mitigate the harsh effects of strict applica-
tions of common law, does not feature anywhere in the play (except perhaps in its absence)”;
Stretton, “Legal Instruments,” 72.
 Isaac similarly says that “Portia too begins to do close readings of the text – and beats Shy-
lock at his own game.”; Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,”: 354.
 This is why Sáez correctly claims that Portia “is not exactly merciful when turning the case
against Shylock.”: Sáez, “Religion, Law and Justice,” 268.
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xenophobic tinge and turns out to be an act of discrimination of the non-Vene-
tian other.³⁸ This is apparent in the very choice of words when the Duke pardons
Shylock and lets him live: “That thou shalt see the difference of our spirit,/I par-
don thee thy life before thou ask it” (4.1.365–366). The difference referred to here
is one that is used to construct the Jew into the position of a negative alterity that
is used as a foil in front of which the positive identity of Christian Venice and its
supposed clemency can be constructed. In view of the acts of discrimination, the
racial slurs and the ethnically motivated slander in the first part of the play, this
cannot be read as an act of Christian altruism, but must be seen as a strategic
manoeuvre in the confrontation between Christians and Jews.
This is confirmed when the Duke asks Antonio to also show mercy to Shy-
lock, which the merchant does in a very ambiguous way. On the one hand, he
asks the Duke to let Shylock keep half his fortune, but on the other hand, this
is linked to two conditions: that the Jew’s fortune ultimately goes to Lorenzo
and Jessica, who has converted to Christianity, and that Shylock himself “pres-
ently become a Christian” (4.1.384). The Other here is spared, but at the cost
of ceasing to be an Other, i.e. at the price of annihilation. Alterity is thus
done away with by force, and the notion of justice behind this can only be under-
stood from an ethnocentric Christian point of view.³⁹ That ethnicity and other-
ness are indeed what is at stake here is confirmed by the way Portia asks for Shy-
lock’s reaction to Antonio’s proposal. She once more uses the ethnic epithet to
address Shylock rather than his name: “Art thou contented, Jew? What dost
thou say?” (4.1.390). Shylock’s answer, “I am content” (4.1.391), merely signals
his agreement with the conditions stipulated by Antonio, but not his being sat-
isfied with the outcome of the trial scene. He can only leave the scene as a loser
and as a broken man with the following words:
 Cf Sàez who reads this as a criticism of the Christians’ ethos in the play and points out that
“Shakespeare precisely denounces the inconsistency of the devotion to a faith that preaches
love, mercy and charity when it encourages intolerance; intolerance based not only on religion
but also on race.”; Sàez, “Religion, Law and Justice,” 270. Kornstein simply refers to the Alien
Statute as “an outrage, at least to 20th century readers”; Kornstein, “Fie Upon Your Law!,” 48.
 Weisberg, in this context, quite aptly characterizes Antonio’s behaviour as “Draconian
‘mercy’.”; Weisberg, “Antonio’s Legalistic Cruelty,” 16. Greiner also remarks on the annihilation
of the Jewish Other and points out: “Dass das Stück […] Bedürfnissen der Abwertung, ja der Aus-
löschung nicht allgemein des Fremden, sondern spezifisch des Jüdischen (mit der Zwangstaufe
am Ende) entgegenkommt und so auch funktionalisiert worden ist, […] lässt sich nicht leugnen.”
(Bernhard Greiner, “Is that the Law? Die Metaphorisierung des Rechts als Problem der Interpre-
tation des Kaufmann von Venedig,” in Shylock nach dem Holocaust: Zur Geschichte einer deut-
schen Erinnerungsfigur, eds. Zeno Ackermann and Sabine Schülting (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011):
189–200, 194.
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I pray you give me leave to go from hence.
I am not well. Send the deed after me,
And I will sign it. (4.1.392–394)
Significantly, these are the last words spoken by Shylock in the play. He does not
make an appearance any more and – even more importantly – he is practically
not spoken of any more⁴⁰ although we are only in the first scene of Act four here,
with one more scene and a whole act still to follow. This is why Isaac states that
“the fifth act of Merchant has always been a problem, a challenge to any modern
production” and refers to Morris Carnovsky who pointed out “that should he
ever direct Merchant, he would either do it without the fifth act, or portray the
Venetian lovers as obnoxious teen-age brats.”⁴¹ Shylock’s “I am not well”
(4.1.393) goes totally unheeded because the ethnic other simply does not
count. The annihilation of the other through the forced act of conversion finds
its outward and formal equivalent in the total disappearance in the play of the
character that embodied alterity.⁴² What follows is concerned with the playful
bantering between Portia and Bassanio and the general tying up of the compli-
cations created by the various love interests. Shylock’s feelings and thoughts, un-
 Except in 4.2.1–2 where Portia makes sure Shylock fulfils the conditions of the doubtful par-
tial pardon he has received by telling Nerissa: “Enquire the Jew’s house out, give him this deed,/
And let him sign it.” Shylock is briefly referred to one very last time by Nerissa again when, in
5.1.291–293, she hands over to Lorenzo and Jessica the signed deed in which Shylock bequeathes
his whole remaining fortune to the couple after his death.
 Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,” 351–352. Indeed, as Kornstein points out, “throughout
much of the 19th century, English productions of The Merchant of Venice simply stopped the
play after Shylock’s humiliation at the end of the Fourth Act, dropping entirely the last act.”
He also, following Richard Weisberg’s study of the play in Poethics (1992), argues in favour of
the “overlooked legal significance” of Act five, but in terms of the play’s treatment of the ethnic
other, the fifth act is indeed only relevant with regard to its complete ignoring of Shylock; Korn-
stein, “Fie Upon Your Law!,” 50. Geoffrey Hartman, therefore, comments on the play’s ending in
the following words: “If there should be an ethics here, it is too ‘embedded’ for me to discern it.
No one at Belmont gives a thought to Shylock. […] He who disturbs the peace has been purged.”;
Geoffrey Hartman, “The Tricksy Word,” 78. Cavell also observes that “I have never satisfied my-
self about the ending of The Merchant of Venice, reading or attending it. Shylock’s defeat has
kept seeming to me to be abruptly pat and his thwarting and grief go insufficiently expressed”;
Stanley Cavell, “Saying in The Merchant of Venice,” in Shakespeare and the Law: A Conversation
Among Disciplines and Professions, eds. Brian Cormack and Martha C. Nussbaum (Chicago and
London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013): 221–230, 221.
 This annihilation of the other graphically came out in a production of the play by George
Tabori “where Merchant was being performed by the Jewish inmates as entertainment for the
SS officers. […] the Nazi guards […] wrestle Shylock to the ground, and stab him to death
with his own knife.”; Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,”: 352.
Ethnicity, Alterity and the Law in Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice 127
like in the earlier scenes of the play, are not given any space here but are rather
silenced.⁴³ As a human subject, Shylock has all but ceased to exist. He is left be-
hind as a problem solved, an ethnic other reduced to sameness in a Venice that
prides itself on its international trade connections but is not devoid of anti-sem-
itism and the mechanisms of racial and ethnic discrimination of the other.⁴⁴ The
Merchant of Venice is usually listed among Shakespeare’s comedies, but from
Shylock’s point of view, it is much closer to tragedy.⁴⁵ What keeps us from seeing
him as a fully tragic figure is the fact that he is not a noble character with a fatal
flaw which, in a moment of hubris, causes his downfall. Rather, he does display
a deeply human dignity, maybe even momentary grandeur, in his great soliloquy
when he asks “If you prick us, do we not bleed?” (III.i.50–51), but he is also too
greedy, too obstinate and too vengeful a character with too little sense of propor-
tion to fully qualify for the status of a tragic character.⁴⁶
 It is not without some justification, therefore, that Sinsheimer refers to Shakespeare’s play as
“the most ingenious satire on justice and the courts of law in the literature of the world.”; Her-
mann Sinsheimer, Shylock: The History of a Character [1947] (New York: The Citadel Press, 1963),
196.
 To read the fact that Shakespeare’s allowing us to see Shylock’s perspective as well consti-
tutes the basis for an interpretation in which “The Merchant can be understood as a pro-Semitic
play” is one-sided because it ignores the all-too-facile dismissal of Shylock after Act 4.1; Ojeda
Alba, “Justice and Injustice,” 13.
 Isaac argues that this is another reason why Shakespeare had to get rid of Shylock before the
fifth act: “this man Shylock – this Jew – with his rage and a class-action cue for passion and
revenge, almost ruined a romantic fairy-tale comedy; and Shakespeare had to get him off the
set as quickly and as quietly as possible […] so that the kids could have their fifth act moonlight
and music.”; Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,” 371. But “[i]t must have been hard for Shake-
speare not to let Shylock have one last thunderous speech filled with curses and tears” which
is why The Merchant of Venice can be regarded as “[a] problem play if ever there was one.”;
Isaac, “The Worth of a Jew’s Eye,” 372. Hadfield also refers to The Merchant of Venice as “a prob-
lematic play”; Hadfield, “Shakespeare and Republican Venice,” 77. Mesquita therefore claims
that the trial scene is the play’s “point of crisis as a literary genre, determining its classification
as a comedy or a problem play.”; Filomena Mesquita, “Travesties of Justice: Portia in the Court-
room,” in Shakespeare and the Law, ed. Daniela Carpi (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 2003): 117– 125,
117.
 Colley therefore also claims that “he [i.e. Shylock] is no tragic character.”; John Scott Colley,
“Lancelot, Jacob, and Esau: Old and New Law in The Merchant of Venice,” Yearbook Of English
Studies 10.(1980): 181–189, 181. Weisberg argues that “the play remains a comedy” and concludes
that “Shylock must fall because ethical behavior […] sits poorly on a religious outsider trying to
exert himself lawfully in a comedic environment.”; Weisberg, “Antonio’s Legalistic Cruelty,” 18.
Kornstein aptly remarks that “[c]lassifying The Merchant of Venice has always been difficult. […]
There is nothing funny about this play […]. It is, truly speaking, neither a comedy nor a tragedy
nor a history. It is a dramatic crystal of many legal issues […].”; Kornstein, “Fie Upon Your
Law!,” 54.
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What this play, just as Othello, Shakespeare’s other great Venetian drama,
demonstrates, are the pitfalls and dangers of the mechanisms in which ethnic
or racial alterity are constructed in multi- and intercultural legal contexts. The
Merchant of Venice, in its depiction of both the Christian Venetians and of Shy-
lock the Jew, anatomizes the processes of cognitive hostile delimitation between
members of different ethnic groups, it provides and very tentatively criticizes ex-
amples of anti-semitism while at the same time it is wide open itself to the
charge of anti-semitism in its total silencing and exclusion of Shylock after
Act. 4.1.⁴⁷ To read the play as a deconstruction of and a warning against xeno-
phobia and anti-semitism is easier from a twenty-first century point of view,
and it can safely be assumed that most of Shakespeare’s contemporary audience
rather gloated over the subjection of the Jew.⁴⁸ We should not forget, on the other
hand, that the very mechanisms of discrimination displayed and analysed in the
play are still all too widespread today – recent events in Western Europe and the
United States of America being a shameful example. It is this openness to inter-
pretation and Shakespeare’s artistry in showing up both the weaknesses and
strengths of the Venetians’ and Shylock’s cases that has turned this text into a
classic that has lost nothing of its topicality today, and it is to be hoped that fu-
ture generations will see it as a warning against stereotypical constructions of
alterity as a negative other rather than as a confirmation of their own xenopho-
bic prejudices.
 This is why Gross said about the play that “its complexities, ambiguities, and shifts con-
found interpretation.”; Gross, Shylock, 386. This is not quite accurate, though, because rather
than confounding interpretation, the play merely makes simplistic readings impossible: “Shake-
speare was well aware of the pervasive injustice in the play and […] in his view both Jews and
Christians are in the wrong.”; Ojeda Alba, “Justice and Injustice,” 22. Weisberg is more careful
and accurate when he says that The Merchant of Venice “is clearly one of Shakespeare’s most
complex and ironic plays.” One can also read Shylock’s complete disappearance as a strong
marker of Venice’s anti-semitism in the play, which could thus become the agent of the decon-
struction of such a xenophobic attitude.
 Ojeda Alba rightly concludes that “Elizabethan audiences laughed at Shylock and were
steered to be as unconcerned with his fate as were all his fellow characters.” Ojeda Alba, “Justice
and Injustice,” 11.
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Shakespeare’s Twin Brother: Foreigners,
Outlaws, and The Comedy of Errors
1 Immigration and the imminence of death
It begins with a ship, negotiating choppy waters, traversing the Mediterranean
Sea. On board is a family: a husband and wife, their twin sons, and adopted
twin boys. The husband has paid the skipper for their passage. A violent
storm suddenly erupts. The vessel is not up to the job. It sinks. The crew escapes
in a small lifeboat, leaving the family clinging to the wreckage. Awooden mast is
all that stands between them and death by drowning. Their lives are saved by
fishermen, happening to be in the vicinity. Pirates abduct two of the boys, sep-
arating the family for years to come. But at least the parents and their children
do not drown. The scenario is familiar. It is a tale we see played out on our tele-
vision screens on a frequent basis, as news bulletins broadcast the latest instan-
ces of migrants, fleeing via the North African or Levantine coast persecution and
poverty in their desolate homelands for what they hope will be a better life on
the other (European) side of the Mediterranean. The camera pans across a cap-
sized boat, its terrified passengers scrambling to gain a slippery foothold on its
upturned hull.¹ They are the lucky ones. The presence of a camera crew means
that their location has been identified. A naval vessel, as likely as not from Italy,
is on its way and will rescue them. For the thousands who are not so lucky, the
story ends in death by drowning.
Except that the scenario of the storm-tossed, sinking ship and its human
cargo with which this essay opens is not another television news report of the
latest doomed attempt at escape by Syrian, Libyan, or sub-Saharan-African ref-
ugees.² It is the story of a shipwreck, told by the merchant of Syracuse, Egeon, at
the start of Shakespeare’s The Comedy of Errors. Egeon is the father of the Anti-
pholus twins, who were separated as babies when the ship bearing them to Syr-
acuse from Epidamnum sank, and were united in Ephesus only at the end of the
 See Justine Poon, “How a Body becomes a Boat: The Asylum Seeker in Law and Images,” Law
& Literature 30 (2018): 105–121.
 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2,510 refugees drowned in
the Mediterranean between January 2016 and the end of May 2016: http://www.aljazeera.com/
news/2016/05/unhcr-2500-refugees-drowned-europe-2016-160531104504090 (last access April 10,
2017).
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-008
play, some twenty-five years after they last saw each other. At the start of the
play, Egeon has been sentenced to death for pitching up in Ephesus (after an ex-
tensive and unsuccessful search for his son, Antipholus of Syracuse), in breach
of a statute passed by the Ephesian Parliament (the consequence of a trade war
with Syracuse). The Duke Solinus informs Egeon that
It hath in solemn synods been decreed,
Both by the Syracusians and ourselves,
To admit no traffic to our adverse towns;
Nay, more, if any born at Ephesus
Be seen at any Syracusian marts and fairs;
Again, if any Syracusian born
Come to the bay of Ephesus, he dies,
His goods confiscate to the Duke’s dispose,
Unless a thousand marks be levièd
To quit the penalty and to ransom him. (1.1.13–22)³
Thus, the dreadful doom of law intercedes. Egeon has neither money nor friends
to pay the ransom, and therefore at five o’clock in the afternoon of the same day
on which he arrived in Ephesus he will be executed. Time and the hours in the
day are crucial factors not only in the action of the play, but are relevant also to
the meta-theatrical significance of The Comedy of Errors, a point to which I shall
return. Unknown to Egeon, one of his twin sons, Antipholus of Ephesus, has
lived in Ephesus for the past twenty years. His other son, Antipholus of Syra-
cuse, left his father’s home seven years before the play began, at the age of eight-
een, to search for his lost brother.⁴ He too pitches up in Ephesus. Like his father,
as a Syracusian in Ephesus, his life is in mortal danger. He is advised by an
Ephesian merchant to deny his Syracusian provenance and “give out you are
 All references to the text of the play are from William Shakespeare, The Comedy of Errors, ed.
R.A. Foakes (London: The Arden Shakespeare, 1962).
 After the shipwreck, Antipholus of Ephesus, his mother Emilia, and Dromio of Ephesus, were
rescued “By men of Epidamnum” (5.1.355); but “rude fishermen of Corinth” (5.1.357) boarded
their ship, abducted Antipholus and Dromio, and returned with them to Corinth. They left Emilia
with the men of Epidamnum. Eventually, she too arrived in Ephesus. Menaphon, uncle of Duke
Solinus, brought Antipholus to Ephesus (5.1.367–368). Antipholus of Syracuse (who was rescued
from the shipwreck, along with his father and Dromio of Syracuse) left his home in Syracuse at
the age of eighteen to search for his brother (1.1.125); according to Egeon, he has been gone for
“seven short years” (5.1.309), making the twins twenty-five years of age when the play begins.
The Duke informs Egeon that he has been “patron to Antipholus [of Ephesus]” (5.1.326) for twen-
ty years; therefore Antipholus was five years of age when he was brought to Ephesus from Cor-
inth.
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of Epidamnum” (1.2.1). Egeon, Antipholus of Syracuse, and his servant Dromio
(whom Egeon bought at birth, along with his twin brother,⁵ who happens also
to be called Dromio, and is the servant of Antipholus of Ephesus) are in effect
illegal immigrants.
2 Shakespeare, racial tension, and the London
apprentices
Shakespeare had first-hand experience of immigrants. He lodged with a family of
French Huguenots, the Mountjoys, who had fled persecution in their native
France and settled in the City of London. Like many of his exiled compatriots,
Christopher Mountjoy (from Crécy in north-western France) became a successful
entrepreneur in one of the textile-related crafts that flourished in Elizabethan
and Jacobean London, that of the “tiremaker”: “head-tires” or “attires” were a
form of ornate headwear for women. In Charles Nicholl’s study of Shakespeare’s
life as The Lodger, he adduces the strongest possible evidence that, while work-
ing in London, Shakespeare resided with the Mountjoys at their house in Silver
Street between 1602 and 1604.⁶ The Comedy of Errors predates this period by ap-
proximately ten years. References in the play to a French civil war suggest that at
the earliest it was not written until late 1593, in July of which year Henry of Nav-
arre became Henry IV of France.⁷ By this date Shakespeare would have witnessed
the often violent response in certain quarters to the influx of immigrants that was
a notable and notably public feature of life in London in the 1590s: rising levels
of immigration, severe inflation, and alarmingly low wages all contributed to the
London apprentice riots of the 1590s.⁸ In 1590, the crown responded to the Lon-
 “Those, for their parents were exceeding poor, / I bought, and brought up to attend my sons.”
(1.1.56–57)
 Charles Nicholl, The Lodger: Shakespeare on Silver Street (London: Penguin, 2007), 4, 17.
 Syr. Ant.Where France? Syr. Dro. In her forehead, armed and revolted, making war against her
heir. (3.2.120–122) See The Comedy of Errors, ed. Foakes, Introduction, xviii-xix. On the French
civil war of this period, see Mack P. Holt, The French Wars of Religion, 1562– 1629 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005). It is arguable that the title of Shakespeare’s play derives
from a line in Sidney’s The Defence of Poesie (published in 1595, but written c. 1580): “[…] Com-
edy is an imitation of the common errors of our life […]”, Philip Sidney, The Defence of Poesie
(London: W. Ponsonby, 1595), sig. E4.r.
 For a collection of essays on the subject, see Ruben Espinosa and David Ruiter eds., Shake-
speare and Immigration (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016). Manning records thirty-five instances of
serious disorder in London between 1581 and 1602: Roger B. Manning, Village Revolts: Social
Protest and Popular Disturbances in England, 1509– 1640 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 187. The
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don riots with a Proclamation, imposing curfews on apprentices.⁹ But if the
maintenance of public order was a preoccupation of the state authorities, so
too was the perceived cause of civil unrest. So-called “Blackamoors” (from
North Africa, as opposed to so-called “Negars” from West Africa) were the sub-
ject of opprobrium in the last years of Elizabethan rule, their numbers in Eng-
land having increased following the capture of many Africans during the recent
war with Spain. In 1601, a draft Proclamation of “Negroes and Blackamoors” de-
manded the deportation of black people,¹⁰ on grounds that English “masters”
should be encouraged to use their compatriots in service because English sub-
jects were suffering “hard times of dearth.”¹¹
Shakespeare had addressed the issue of civil rebellion in one of his earliest
plays, Henry VI, Part 2 (c. 1590–91). Confusingly, this was almost certainly the
first play that he wrote in the Henry VI trilogy, under the discursive title The
First Part of the Contention of the Two Famous Houses of York and Lancaster
with the Death of the Good Duke Humphrey. It was only with the publication of
the First Folio in 1623 that the plays were listed as the First, Second, and Third
Parts of King Henry the Sixth. Henry VI, Part 2 contains the scenes of the Jack
Cade Rebellion, and includes the line of one of the rebels, Dick the Butcher,
which (for lawyers at least) has immortalised the play: “The first thing we do
let’s kill all the lawyers” (4.2.78).¹² Jack Cade’s rebellion in 1450 was only periph-
London riots of 1595 “constituted the most dangerous and prolonged urban uprising in Eng-
land”: Manning, Village Revolts, 208. For a collection of essays on the subject of civil disorder,
see also Rebellion, Popular Protest and the Social Order in Early Modern England, ed. Paul Slack
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984).
 The 1590 Proclamation required that apprentices “tarry and abide within their several houses
and not to be suffered to go abroad after nine of the clock at night, upon pain of imprisonment”:
“Enforcing Curfew for Apprentices,” in Tudor Royal Proclamations, eds. Paul L. Hughes and
James F. Larkin, 3 vols. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), vol. 3, 60. See M.J. Power, “Lon-
don and the Control of the ‘Crisis’ of the 1590s,” History 70.230 (1985): 371–385; R.B. Outhwaite,
“Dearth, the English Crown and the ‘Crisis’ of the 1590s,” in The European Crisis of the 1590s:
Essays in Comparative History, ed. Peter Clark (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985), 23–43.
 On the draft Proclamation of 1601, see Andrew Dickson, “Multiculturalism in Shakespeare’s
Plays,” available at http://www.bl.uk/shakespeare/articles/multiculturalism-in-shakespeares-
plays (last access April 10, 2017).
 Quoted in Emily C. Bartels, “Too Many Blackamoors: Deportation, Discrimination, and Eliz-
abeth I,” Studies in English Literature, 1500– 1900 46.2 (2006): 305–322, 317. See also, Ania
Loomba, Shakespeare, Race, and Colonialism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Laura
Hunt Yungblut, Strangers Settled Here Amongst Us: Policies, Perceptions and the Presence of Ali-
ens in Elizabethan England (London: Routledge, 1996).
 See Charles Hobday, “Clouted Shoon and Leather Aprons: Shakespeare and the Egalitarian
Tradition,” Renaissance and Modern Studies 23 (1979): 63–78. Philip Henslowe recorded receipts
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erally related to the threat posed by immigrants to the indigenous population (or
more specifically, the threat of military invasion by the French, following the loss
of Normandy by the English). It was more overtly concerned with corruption and
abuse of governmental power, although Shakespeare’s depiction of events refers
to causes of rebellion in London during the 1590s: inflation, and the price of corn
and foodstuffs being two of them. Cade vows that, when he is crowned king,
“There shall be in England seven halfpenny loaves sold for a penny” (4.2.67–68).
The theme of apprentices and their perceived injustices at the hands of their
masters is evident in Henry VI, Part 2. The unnamed “Second Rebel,” for exam-
ple, complains that “The nobility think scorn to go in leather aprons”
(4.2.13– 14). Apprentices figure also in the dramatis personae. The unnamed
“Third Prentice” proposes a toast to Peter Thump, apprentice to the armourer
Thomas Horner: “And here’s a quart for me, and be merry, Peter, and fear not
thy master. Fight for credit of the prentices!” (2.3.73–75). But ultimately, the ap-
prentices and rebels of Henry VI, Part 2 serve the function (at least in part) of a
comic interlude, albeit one that provides a satirical reflection on misgovernment
by the ruling elite. These characters and the scenes in which they appear are pe-
ripheral to the main action of the play, which concerns the fatal dynastic struggle
between the Houses of York and Lancaster. For a highly stylised depiction of the
relationship between master and apprentice that is central to the drama, we
must look elsewhere: to the relationship between master and servant in The
Comedy of Errors. Indeed, in this virtuosic rendering of The Menaechmi by Plau-
tus (d. 184 B.C.), the greatest dramatist of the Old Latin period, Shakespeare en-
hances the potential for comedy (especially and obviously through the device of
mistaken identity) by doubling the number of twins in the play. Where Plautus
created only the Menaechmus twins, Shakespeare created the Antipholus
twins and their respective servants (also twins), the Dromios of Syracuse and
of Ephesus. Antipholus of Syracuse refers to his servant as a slave – “I’ll to
the Centaur to go seek this slave” (1.2.104) – but this is more a derogatory and
familiar term for his servant (as well as an allusion to the classical sources of
the play: “Dromo” was a generic word in Roman drama for a slave), than an ac-
of £3 16s 8d for a performance by Lord Strange’s Men of a “new” play at the Rose Playhouse in
March 1592, which Henslowe entitled “harey the vj”: Henslowe’s Diary, ed. R.A. Foakes (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 16;Wells and Taylor argue that the play to which Hen-
slowe refers was probably Henry VI, Part 1, the last in the trilogy to be written and performed:
William Shakespeare: The Complete Works, eds. Stanley Wells and Gary Taylor (Oxford: Claren-
don, 2005), 125. Specifically, on the line “Let’s kill all the lawyers,” see Paul Raffield, Shake-
speare’s Imaginary Constitution: Late Elizabethan Politics and the Theatre of Law (Oxford: Hart
Publishing, 2010), 153.
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curate description of Dromio’s societal status when applied to late Elizabethan
England.¹³
As Robin Blackburn noted in his study of slavery in Europe, at the time of
the Domesday Book (1087) approximately ten per cent of the population of Eng-
land were slaves, but soon after the Norman Conquest the feudal system led to
the rapid attenuation of slavery in England, and the creation of a relationship
between masters and servants, in which the latter became “specialist workers”
and were not in a “fully servile condition.”¹⁴ This was the period in which ap-
prenticeships were founded. In 1563, the year before Shakespeare was born,
the formal structure of apprenticeships was defined by the Statute of Artificers
(5 Eliz. I. c. 4).¹⁵ Henceforth, the state arrogated to itself responsibility for regu-
lating functions previously undertaken by feudal craft guilds. The apprenticeship
was regulated by contract, subject to English common law. I emphasise the legal
status of the master and servant relationship (employer and employee relation-
ship, in modern parlance) because the presence of formal legal structures – of
commercial contracts between individual parties, but also the social contract be-
tween governor and governed, and between citizen and citizen – is central to an
informed understanding of The Comedy of Errors.
The farcical element of the plot is driven by a contractual dispute over the
manufacture and delivery of a gold chain or necklace: the “carcanet” (3.1.4),
which Antipholus of Ephesus has commissioned the goldsmith Angelo to
make for his wife Adriana. Laissez-faire market forces and the enforcement of le-
gally binding agreements are represented in the play by a long list of characters
from the realms of commerce and law: Angelo (the goldsmith); Balthazar (the
merchant); the First Merchant (who befriends Antipholus of Syracuse); the Sec-
ond Merchant (Angelo’s creditor); an Officer of the Law; a Jailer; and the supreme
magistrate Solinus, Duke of Ephesus. But the conflict between characters is re-
solved at the end of the play only when they realise that there is another type
of contract (less formal than that for the purchase of goods, but no less symbolic
of agreement) that binds them into a civic relationship: a social contract based
upon the bonds of friendship and community. In this respect, the gold chain or
 Bartels notes that slavery “had been abolished from England and most of Europe by the six-
teenth century”: Bartels, “Too Many Blackamoors,” 313.
 Robin Blackburn, “The Old World Background to European Colonial Slavery,” The William
and Mary Quarterly 54.1 (1997): 65– 102, 71.
 See Chris Minns and Patrick Wallis, “Rules and Reality: Quantifying the Practice of Appren-
ticeship in Early Modern England,” The Economic History Review 65.2 (2012): 556–579; also,
Donald Woodward, “The Background to the Statute of Artificers: The Genesis of Labour Policy,
1558–63,” The Economic History Review 33.1 (1980): 32–44.
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carcanet is no mere prop. It has powerful juristic connotations, traceable to the
Platonic description of public law as a “golden and holy” cord or chain, attached
to citizens and connected to the gods, “tugging” at the populace to make it com-
pliant with a prescribed and divinely ordained legal order.¹⁶
The contract between Antipholus of Syracuse and Dromio of Syracuse was of
a different type: it was a contract of employment or service, rather than a con-
tract for goods (the apprenticeship was sealed and made legally binding by
the signing of indentures, which usually adhered to the same formula); but it
was a contract all the same, and for an Elizabethan audience the implications
of the threats made by both Dromios unilaterally to terminate their contracts
of service with their respective masters would have been immediately apparent.¹⁷
The Statute of Artificers 1563 provided that
if any artificers be retained in service, or to work in great or for a time, do depart from his
service or work without licence until the work is finished or the time be fully come up, the
offender shall have one month’s imprisonment and shall forfeit 20s. 0d.¹⁸
The roles of servant and apprentice often overlapped. An apprentice pledged to
serve his master (there were small numbers of female apprentices during this pe-
riod, mainly in the textile-related crafts, such as millinery and silk-work),¹⁹ to
 Plato, The Laws, trans. Trevor J. Saunders (London: Penguin, 2004), 31, Bk. 1.II.644e-645a.
The Italian jurist Giambattista Vico observed in La Scienza Nuova (published in 1725) that the
words for law derive from those for tendons or cords. Commenting on Vico’s magnum opus (pub-
lished in 1725), George Hersey notes that Vico developed tropes of the word corda, meaning var-
iously tendons, sinews, lyre strings and musical chords, all of which implied (quoting Vico) “the
union of the cords and powers of the fathers, whence derived public powers”: George Hersey,
The Lost Meaning of Classical Architecture: Speculations on Ornament from Vitruvius to Venturi
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1988), 5. See also, Sir John Fortescue: “The Law, under which
the People is incorporated, may be compared to the Nerves or Sinews of the Body Natural;
for, as by these the whole Frame is fitly joined together and compacted, so is the Law that Lig-
ament (to go back to the truest Derivation of the Word, Lex à Ligando) by which the Body Politic,
and all its several Members are bound together and united in one entire Body,” Sir John Fortes-
cue, De Laudibus Legum Angliae, ed. John Selden (London: R. Gosling, 1737), 22. On the juristic
symbolism of the carcanet in The Comedy of Errors, see Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Con-
stitution, 63–64.
 When his master gives him money for safekeeping in the Centaur, Dromio of Syracuse says:
“Many a man would take you at your word, / And go indeed, having so good a mean.”
(1.2.17– 18) Threatened with a beating by his master’s wife, Dromio of Ephesus remarks: “If I
last in this service you must case me in leather.” (2.1.85)
 Quoted in Woodward, “The Background to the Statute,” 43.
 See Jennifer C. Ward, Women in Medieval Europe: 1200– 1500 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016),
22; also, Ann Minister, “Pauper Apprenticeship in South Derbyshire: A Positive Experience?,” in
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keep his secrets, to do his commandments, not to commit fornication nor to
marry, and not to run away. In return, the master was obliged to feed, lodge,
and clothe his servant (regulations prohibited an apprentice from wearing
clothes other than those provided by his master):²⁰ in all respects the Antipholus
twins fulfil these obligations. The Dromios followed the established pattern of
apprentices becoming part of their masters’ respective households, living
under the same roof, as they would have done with their own father had
Egeon not paid money to buy them as babies.²¹ He informs the Duke near the
start of the play: “Those, for their parents were exceeding poor, / I bought,
and brought up to attend my sons.” (1.1.56–57) In this respect also, the act of
payment to the parents of the Dromio twins bore similarity to the creation of a
conventional apprenticeship. As Mihoko Suzuki notes in an article on the Lon-
don Apprentice Riots of the 1590s, apprenticeships were (like marriages) often
“arranged by parents and relatives,” the main difference between the conven-
tional arrangement and the action of Egeon in buying the Dromio twins being
that parents often paid a substantial premium in order formally to create an ap-
prenticeship.²²
I have dwelt on the subject of apprenticeships because the topic leads me to
the significant theme of violence, which was the most obvious feature of the ap-
prentice riots of the 1590s, as it is also a notable aspect of The Comedy of Errors.
There, the Ephesian Dromio complains that he has “some marks [of his master]
upon my pate” and “Some of my mistress’ marks upon my shoulders,”
(1.2.82–83) and throughout the play, at frequent intervals, we witness the two
servants being beaten by their masters. The brutal beating of his servant by Anti-
pholus of Ephesus, using a “rope’s end” (SD 4.4.17), reflects not only the beating
of apprentices by their masters (as Steven R. Smith notes, “there are numerous
cases of apprentices suing their masters as a result of mistreatment”);²³ it would
Experiences of Poverty in Late Medieval and Early Modern England and France, ed. Anne M. Scott,
(Abingdon: Routledge, 2016), 63–84, 81–82; Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, “Failure to Become
Freemen: Urban Apprentices in Early Modern England,” Social History 16.2 (1991): 155– 172;
Ilana Krausman Ben-Amos, “Women Apprentices in the Trades and Crafts of Early Modern Bris-
tol,” Continuity & Change 6.2 (1991): 227–252.
 Steven R. Smith, “The London Apprentices as Seventeenth-Century Adolescents,” in Rebel-
lion, Popular Protest, ed. Slack, 219–231, 220.
 Smith, “The London Apprentices,” 221.
 Mihoko Suzuki, “The London Apprentice Riots of the 1590s and the Fiction of Thomas De-
loney,” Criticism 38.2 (1996): 181–217, 190.
 Smith, “The London Apprentices,” 222. Smith quotes from the records of the Middlesex Ses-
sions of the Peace and of the Mayor’s Court; in one case, an apprentice “was beaten so severely
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also recall for late Elizabethan audiences the whippings regularly doled out to
those rioting apprentices who were apprehended and subsequently subjected
to the full rigour of law. For example, on 27 June 1595, it was recorded that “cer-
taine young men apprentizes and other, were punished by whipping, setting on
the pillory, ec. for taking butter from the market women in Southwarke.”²⁴ Those
particular apprentices got off relatively lightly. In other instances, rioting appren-
tices were executed for their violent unrest: for example, John Stow records that
on 22 July 1595, “five of those unruely youths that were on the Tower hill appre-
hended, they were condemned, and had iudgement to be drawne, hanged and
quartered.”²⁵ Michel Foucault famously opined that judicial punishment “be-
longs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which power is manifested,”²⁶
and such is the case obviously with the punishment of the rioting apprentices,
and indeed with the violent treatment meted out to the Dromios by their masters.
But the power with which I am concerned in the present study is less the power
of the sovereign than the power of the victim of oppression to subvert the author-
ity of the sovereign by turning against the outsider, alien, or foreigner.
Much of the violence perpetrated by the apprentices was directed at foreign-
ers, the presence of which in growing numbers on the streets of London was a
major source of the apprentices’ unrest. On 16 April 1593, members of the
Privy Council signed a letter addressed to the Lord Mayor of London, the subject
of which was a libellous, “lewde and vyle ticket or placarde set up upon some
post in London purportinge some determynacion and intencion the apprentyces
should have to attempt some violence on the strangers.” Again, on 22 April 1593,
the Privy Council lent its signature to a letter sent to the Master of Requests, Dr
Julius Caesar, the subject of which was
certaine libelles latelie published by some disordered and factious persons in and about
the cittie of London, shewinge an intente in the artyficers and others who holde themselves
prejudiced in theire trades by strangers to use some course of vyolence to remove the saide
that ‘he could not go upright, and that he did spit blood for a fortnight after,’” Smith, “The Lon-
don Apprentices,” 222.
 John Stow, The Abridgement or Summarie of the English Chronicle, first collected by Master
Iohn Stowe, ed. Edmond Howes (London: John Windet for the companie of Stacioneres, 1607),
499–500.
 Stow, The Abridgement or Summarie, 501.
 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (Lon-
don: Penguin, 1991), 47.
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strangers or by way of tumulte to suppresse them,
a matter very dangerous and with all deligence to be prevented.²⁷
By far the most notorious of the libels posted in public places was the poem,
written in blank verse and posted on a wall in the Dutch Churchyard in Broad
Street in May 1593. Commonly known as “The Dutch Church Libel,” the poem
opens with the following lines:
Ye strangers yt doe inhabite in this lande
Note this same writing doe it understand
Conceit it well for savegard of your lyves
Your goods, your children, & your dearest wives
Your Machiavellian Marchant spoyles the state
Your usery doth leave us all for deade
Your Artifex, & craftesman works our fate,
And like the Jewes, you eate us up as bread […]
The xenophobic theme persists uninterrupted for another forty-five lines, and in-
cludes the explicit threat:
Weele cutt your throtes, in your temples praying
Not paris massacre so much blood did spill
As we will doe iust vengeance on you all
In counterfeitinge religion for your flight […]
The poem ends with the following stern injunction: “Fly, Flye, & never re-
turne.”²⁸ The signature at the bottom of the poem reads: “per. Tamberlaine,”
the eponymous Asiatic conqueror of Christopher Marlowe’s play, which had
been performed in London in 1587–88. In 1592, Marlowe dramatised the St. Bar-
tholomew’s Day Massacre of 1572 in a play entitled Massacre at Paris, to which
the above poem refers. The finger of suspicion pointed indubitably at Marlowe.
On 18 May 1593, the Privy Council issued a warrant for his arrest, after Thomas
Kyd claimed under torture that heretical papers found in his lodgings belonged
to the playwright. Marlowe was released after two days of questioning by the
Privy Council. On 30 May 1593 he was killed in a pub at Deptford; stabbed in
the eye, apparently by Ingram Frizer, a servant of Marlowe’s patron, Sir Thomas
Walsingham.
 Acts of the Privy Council of England [1592–93], ed. John Roche Dasent, 46 vols. (London:
HMSO, 1901), 24: 187, 200–201.
 The poem was discovered by Arthur Freeman in the Bodleian Library, MS.Don.d.152 f.4v. It is
entitled: “A Libell, fixte upon the French Church Wall, in London. Ann° 1593°.”
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Whether Marlowe or Kyd was responsible for the Dutch Church Libel, or
whether responsibility lay with agents of the Privy Council seeking to discredit
either or both men, we shall probably never know for certain. But on 11 May
1593, soon after discovery of the Dutch Church Libel, the court of Star Chamber
ordered officers of the City of London to arrest those suspected of its publication
and to torture those who refused to confess the truth. Arthur Freeman attributes
the extreme reaction of the court to the failure of the Lord Mayor of London on
previous occasions to deal firmly with “unruly apprentices and journeymen.”²⁹
Whatever the reason, the fear of state authorities that foreigners were capable
of provoking sedition within the capital was palpable.
3 Xenophobia, riots, and The Book of Sir
Thomas More
The narrative of alienation and retribution that characterizes the plot of The
Comedy of Errors reflects contemporaneous events in London. As I have indicat-
ed, resentment at the rising level of immigration was a primary cause of the ap-
prentice riots of the early 1590s. Shakespeare returned to the theme of immi-
grants and race riots in a later, multi-authored work on which he collaborated
with no fewer than six authors. The contributors to The Book of Sir Thomas
More (written c. 1600) were Henry Chettle, Thomas Dekker, Thomas Heywood,
Anthony Munday, Edmund Tilney (who held the important government post of
Master of the Revels: in effect, the state censor of dramatic works), an anony-
mous playhouse scribe, and Shakespeare himself.³⁰ As the title of the play sug-
gests, the drama concerns the life of Sir Thomas More, up to and including his
fall from royal grace and subsequent execution in 1535. More’s relationship
with Henry VIII, his elevation to the office of Lord Chancellor, his refusal to con-
done the annulment of marriage between the King and his first wife Catherine of
Aragon, his further refusal to take the Oath of Supremacy (declaring the King to
be Supreme Head of the Church in England), and his trial for High Treason, have
all been well documented (and dramatized in Robert Bolt’s play A Man For All
 Arthur Freeman, “Marlowe, Kyd, and the Dutch Church Libel,” English Literary Renaissance
3.1 (1973): 44–52, 45.
 On the authorship and date of composition of Sir Thomas More, see “Sir Thomas More,” in
William Shakespeare and Others: Collaborative Plays, eds. Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen,
with Jan Sewell and Will Sharpe (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 352–353.
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Seasons).³¹ For the purposes of the present analysis the play about More on
which Shakespeare collaborated – The Book of Sir Thomas More – is distinctive
for the concentration of its entire first half on the notorious May Day race riots of
1517, during the tenure of Thomas More as under-sheriff of London (by which
time he had been appointed Privy Counsellor). More’s role in these violent events
was to address the rioters in his role as under-sheriff and (temporarily at least) to
calm them. The occasion was also known as the Evil or Ill May Day, on account
of the extraordinary levels of violence displayed by London apprentices towards
foreigners in general, and immigrant Flemish workers, foreign bankers and mer-
chants in particular. These people are described in the play as “Lombards.” In
the context of The Book of Sir Thomas More, the word refers in generic terms
to foreign inhabitants of Lombard Street, near St. Paul’s in the City of London,
in which immigrant workers, bankers, and merchants congregated. The land
on which Lombard Street was built had been granted by King Edward I (1272–
1307) to emigrant goldsmiths from northern Italy – the Lombards themselves.³²
The first half of The Book of Sir Thomas More is based on actual events (re-
corded by the chronicler Edward Hall), following a xenophobic speech made at
the instigation of a city broker, named John Lincoln – the so-called “leader of the
rebels” in the play. The speech (which was delivered by one Doctor Bele) en-
joined all “Englishemen to cheryshe and defende themselves, and to hurte
and greve aliens for the comon weale.”³³ The writers of the play dramatised en-
tire sections of Hall’s description of the riot. For example, the play opens with a
dispute between a “Lombard” called Cavaler and a carpenter called Williamson,
the former seizing a pair of doves purchased by the latter on the grounds that
doves were too dainty a dish “for a coarse carpenter” (1.1.17). This derives from
a passage in Hall’s Chronicle, in which
 See for example, Peter Ackroyd, The Life of Thomas More (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998);
John Guy, The Public Career of Sir Thomas More (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). The
1966 film of A Man For All Seasons, directed by Fred Zinnemann and starring Paul Scofield,
won six Oscars, including those for Best Picture, Best Director, and Best Actor.
 See John Timbs, Curiosities of London (London: Longman, Green, Reader, and Dyer, 1868),
530–532. The Germanic Lombards or Longobardi invaded the Italian peninsula in 568 A.D.
and ruled until 774 A.D. when the Frankish King Charlemagne conquered Pavia, the capital of
Lombardy, and annexed the Kingdom of Italy to his empire; see Neil Christie, The Lombards:
the Ancient Longobards (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995).
 Edward Hall, “The viii yere of Kyng Henry the viii” in The Union of the Two Noble and Illustre
Famelies of Lancastre & Yorke (London: Richardi Graftoni, 1548): fo. lx.v; also quoted in Steve
Rappaport, Worlds Within Worlds: Structures of Life in Sixteenth-Century London (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 15.
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a Carpenter in London called Willyamson whiche bought two stockdoves in Chepe [the mar-
ket in Cheapside], and as he was aboute to paye for them a Frencheman tooke them oute of
hys hande, and sayde they were not meate for a carpenter: well sayde the Englishman I
have bought them and now payd for them, naye sayde the Frencheman I will have them
for my lorde the Ambasador, and so for better or worse, the Frencheman called the Eng-
lisheman knave and went awaye with the stockdoves.³⁴
In the play, the carpenter Williamson informs Cavaler that “I bought them [the
stockdoves] in Cheapside, and paid my money for them,” (1.1.13) whereupon Cav-
aler urges his fellow “Lombard,” Francis de Bard: “let us go complain to my lord
Ambassador” (1.1.48). And so it continues, the writers of the play adapting events
and paraphrasing passages from Hall’s Chronicle, thereby providing a realistic,
dramatised documentary of the race riots of May Day 1517 (as far as we know,
the play was never staged during Shakespeare’s lifetime, its subject matter
being deemed too contentious for performance in a public playhouse).³⁵
Characters in the play speak in phrases that resonate with a twenty-first-cen-
tury audience, the early modern idiom finding a peculiar echo in sentiments ex-
pressed during the United Kingdom’s 2016 Referendum campaign on member-
ship of the European Union. Lines such as “What, one stranger take thy food
from thee, and another thy wife!” (1.1.22–23); “Shall strangers rule the roost?”
(2.2.1–2); and “Shall these enjoy more privilege than we / In our own country?”
(2.2.27–28) find parallels in the lexicon of certain “Brexit” affiliates. Even recent
wars with neighbouring nation-states in continental Europe are invoked by char-
acters in The Book of Sir Thomas More in defence of the riots: “I am ashamed that
freeborn Englishmen, having beaten strangers within their own homes, should
thus be braved and abused by them at home,” (1.1.49–51) exclaims an outraged
rioter. It will be remembered that during the 2016 EU Referendum campaign in
the United Kingdom, some of the few surviving British veterans of the Second
World War were wheeled out by various media outlets in the UK to air the col-
lective opinion that they had not fought and defeated the Germans in a world
war only to see their country subjugated to German rule in the iniquitous form
of the European Union. In Thomas More’s speech to the rioting apprentices
(which was the principal authorial contribution of Shakespeare to the play),
the humanitarian counterpoint to these xenophobic opinions was offered.
More asked the rioters to “Imagine that you see the wretched strangers, /
 Hall, “The viii yere of Kyng Henry the viii,” fo. lix.v.
 “Sir Thomas More,” eds. Bate and Rasmussen, Introduction, 350. The editors note that one of
the contributors to the play, Master of the Revels Edmund Tilney, wrote on the manuscript:
“Leave out the insurrection wholly,” 350. Nicholl notes that “The events depicted are parallel
with the riots of 1593,” Nicholl, The Lodger, 179.
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Their babies at their backs, with their poor luggage / Plodding to th’ports and
coasts for transportation” (2.4.70–72). For a modern audience these lines recall
images both of the former Calais “Jungle” encampment for migrants and Alan
Kurdi, the Syrian boy of Kurdish extraction, who drowned on 2 September
2015 in the Mediterranean Sea when the small inflatable boat in which his family
hoped to reach the Greek island of Kos capsized, only a few minutes after setting
sail from the Turkish port of Bodrum.³⁶
The Book of Sir Thomas More provides a realistic depiction of the fractious
relationship between wealthy “Lombards” residing in the City of London and
the poor craftsmen and apprentices who lived alongside them. According to
Hall’s Chronicle,
the multitude of straungers was so great aboute London, that the poore English artificers
coulde skace get any lyvynge: And moost of all the straungers were so proude, that they
disdayned, mocked and oppressed the Englishemen, whiche was the beginnynge of the
grudge.³⁷
Such was the fractious relationship between Williamson and Cavaler in The Book
of Sir Thomas More.While the play (the first half anyway, which deals exclusively
with London’s race riots) may be read on one level as an insightful social history
of race relations in sixteenth-century London, it does not tell us much about
Shakespeare’s treatment of the theme of foreigners in a hostile land. He wrote
only one scene in the play: Act Two, Scene Four, where Sir Thomas More momen-
tarily quells the rioting mob with a speech in which he reminds the rebels of the
common humanity shared by indigenous subjects and foreign strangers alike. By
asking the rioters to put themselves in the position of the immigrants – “What
country would give you harbour?” (2.4.126) – he reminds them that “you must
needs be strangers” (2.4.130).³⁸
 On 26 October, 2016 the French authorities announced that the Calais “Jungle” encampment
had been cleared. For an account of quotidian existence in the Calais “Jungle,” see Angelique
Chrisafis, “‘At night it’s like a horror movie’ – inside Calais’s official shantytown,” The Guardian,
April 6, 2015: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/06/at-night-its-like-a-horror-movie-
inside-calaiss-official-shanty-town (last access April 10, 2017).
 Hall, “The viii yere of Kyng Henry the viii,” fo. lix.v.
 Emphasis added.
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4 Classical friendship and Christian community
in The Comedy of Errors
“What country would give you harbour?” This is the same question that Shake-
speare asks the audience throughout The Comedy of Errors. If you were to be
placed in the precarious position of Egeon and Antipholus of Syracuse, what
country would give you safe refuge? In this play, Shakespeare eschewed realism,
incorporating instead a variety of styles and genres: farce, lyrical poetry, and ro-
mance (as in the late romances Pericles, Cymbeline, The Winter’s Tale, and The
Tempest)³⁹. The effect is to create a non-realistic dreamscape in which mistaken
identity drives a frenetic plot that manages to accommodate within its comedic
mayhem the serious theme of alienation.
As indicated above, the action of The Comedy of Errors takes place in less
than one day, and throughout the play the audience is reminded that the hour
of Egeon’s impending execution (five o’clock that afternoon) is approaching.
The clock is ticking, and (as various characters apprise the audience) it is ticking
very quickly: “Within this hour it will be dinner time,” (1.2.11) Antipholus of Syr-
acuse informs his servant upon arrival in Ephesus near the start of the play; a
few moments later, “The clock hath stricken twelve upon the bell” (1.2.45); a
few moments after that, Adriana tells her sister, “Sure, Luciana, it is two
o’clock”⁴⁰ (2.1.3). The condensing of time in this fashion is a useful dramatic de-
vice, which drives the narrative to its expected conclusion, the death of Egeon:
“By this I think the dial points at five; / Anon I’m sure the Duke himself in per-
son / Comes this way to the melancholy vale, / The place of death and sorry ex-
ecution” (5.1.118–121). This being a comedy, there is no public beheading, “Be-
hind the ditches of the abbey here” (5.1.122). Egeon is reunited with his wife
Emilia (who in the twenty-five years since they last saw each other has become
Abbess of the Ephesian Priory, on the steps of which they meet), his twin sons,
 Coleridge and Hazlitt both used the word “romance” to describe these plays: see William
Shakespeare, Cymbeline, ed. Martin Butler (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), Intro-
duction 6–7. On Shakespearean romance as “the idea of a quest for discovery or self-discovery
[…] a psychological journey,” see William Shakespeare, Cymbeline, ed. Roger Warren (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1998), Introduction, 16. Stephen Orgel states that in connection with
a category of Shakespearean plays, the phrase “romance” was first used by Edward Dowden,
in Shakespeare: A Critical Study of His Mind and Art, published in 1875: William Shakespeare,
The Tempest, ed. Stephen Orgel (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), Introduction 4, fn. 3.
 On time and the making of contracts in The Comedy of Errors, see Raffield, Shakespeare’s
Imaginary Constitution, 65.
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and their twin servants. Egeon is pardoned by a benevolent Duke, who also
waives the ransom for his life: a higher, moral law – unwritten, other than in
the hearts of men – supplants the authority of statute.⁴¹
In only one other of his plays, The Tempest, did Shakespeare compress the
action of the drama into less than one day. And in none of his plays other than
The Comedy of Errors did he confine the action to one specific location, an Ephe-
sian street or “mart” in front of three houses: the house of Antipholus of Ephe-
sus; the house of the Courtesan; and the House of God, the Priory (even in The
Tempest the action is scattered across various parts of the island). This points us
to interpretations in the early modern period of the Aristotelian classical unities
(those of time, place, and action), as discussed in The Poetics of Aristotle, to
which European dramatists of the sixteenth and seventeenth century tended
to adhere. In none of the plays that he wrote before The Comedy of Errors
(and in none that he wrote after, with the exception, as indicated above, of his
last sole-authored play The Tempest) does Shakespeare demonstrate any interest
in complying with the imperatives of the classical unities. Indeed, the action of
each of the History plays in the First Tetralogy (c. 1591–94) covers several years,
involves numerous sub-plots, and is located in various places in England and
France. Of course, the restriction of the action to a single location in which
one main story is enacted, in a timespan limited to a few hours, suits the farcical
convention to which most of The Comedy of Errors subscribes.⁴² But stylistic con-
formity with the classical unities is important also for the allusion inherent
therein to the work of Aristotle, and it is in this respect that the meta-theatrical
significance of The Comedy of Errors (to which I refer near the start of this essay)
would have registered with the more astute (and classically educated) members
of the late Elizabethan audience.⁴³
 Sir Edward Coke and Sir John Davies both described common law as a law “written only in
the heart”: the former in his report of Postnati. Calvin’s Case in Part 7 of The Reports (1608), the
latter in the Preface Dedicatory to Le Primer Report des Cases (1615); see Paul Raffield, “Common
Law, Cymbeline, and the Jacobean Aeneid,” Law & Literature 27.3 (2015): 313–342, 317.
 See Richard Janko, Aristotle on Comedy: Towards a Reconstruction of Poetics II (London: Ger-
ald Duckworth, 2002).
 “[…] the plot being a representation of a piece of action must represent a single piece of ac-
tion and the whole of it; and the component incidents must be so arranged that if one of them be
transposed or removed, the unity of the whole is dislocated and destroyed”: Aristotle, The Po-
etics, trans.William Hamilton Fyfe (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1946), 33–35, c.
VIII. On the particular form of classical education in Elizabethan grammar schools, see Carol
Chillington Rutter, “Shakespeare and School,” in Shakespeare Beyond Doubt: Evidence, Argu-
ment, Controversy, eds. Paul Edmondson and Stanley Wells (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2013), 133– 144. On the study of rhetoric at schools and the universities, see Peter
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The Aristotelian allusion in The Comedy of Errors is confined not only to the
classical unities and The Poetics. It extends to The Politics and The Nicomachean
Ethics. In Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution I argued that the ideal system of
justice on which Shakespeare reflected in Henry IV, Part 2 was Aristotelian, in the
sense that the integration of the legal institution into the society it sought to reg-
ulate was contingent upon the recognition that community, association, or
friendship was a crucial factor in creating and maintaining the polis.⁴⁴ In
Book I of The Politics, Aristotle used the microcosm of the village community
to demonstrate the interdependency of the various constituent members of the
State. They were “homogalactic”: literally, they suckled from the same source
of milk, the communal cow.⁴⁵ Of equal relevance to Henry IV, Part 2 and The Com-
edy of Errors is the political importance that Aristotle attached to friendship in
Books VIII and IX of The Nicomachean Ethics. For Aristotle, friendship was the
bond of communities and was also, he claimed, more important to lawgivers
even than justice, simply because the primary objective of lawgivers was the at-
tainment of concord and the elimination of faction, and concord was synony-
mous with friendship.⁴⁶
The major theme of Aristotelian friendship in The Comedy of Errors is tran-
scribed in the shared name of one set of twins: Antipholus. The name translates
from the original Greek as “against friend” (“anti philos” or “αντι φιλοσ”). Anti-
pholus of Syracuse is the lost brother, in search of friendship. He is the archety-
pal alien, thrust into an Ephesian society that is hostile towards Syracusians and
whose citizens are divided by the commercial imperatives of monetary profit. The
image of the stateless citizen in search of his identity not only as a sentient being
Mack, Elizabethan Rhetoric: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
76; also, Peter Mack, A History of Renaissance Rhetoric 1380– 1620 (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2011).
 Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 171.
 Aristotle, The Politics, trans. T.A. Sinclair (London: Penguin, 1992), 58–59, 61, Bk.
I.II.1252b15–27, 1253a29–b1. On the importance of cattle to communal existence in ancient
Greece, see Jeremy McInerney, The Cattle of the Sun: Cows and Culture in the World of the Ancient
Greeks (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010). Regarding the commonwealth described
in Sir Thomas Smith’s De Republica Anglorum, Burrow argues that Smith (despite his claims to
the contrary) presents “a single, Aristotelian model of what a commonwealth suited to the Eng-
lish temperament should be”: Colin Burrow, “Reading Tudor Writing Politically: The Case of 2
Henry IV,” The Yearbook of English Studies 38.1/2 (2008): 234–250, 240.
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. J.A.K. Thomson (London: Penguin, 2004), 200–
201, Bk. VIII.I.1155a1–32. On the bonds of friendship, which form the basis of the Aristotelian
polis, see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: a Study in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth,
1981), 146.
Shakespeare’s Twin Brother: Foreigners, Outlaws, and The Comedy of Errors 147
but also as a person linked to his fellow man by their common humanity is con-
jured in Antipholus’s description of himself soon after his first entrance, an
image derived both from the shipwreck in which he almost drowned as a
child and his more recent encounter with the Mediterranean Sea, in search of
his lost twin:
I to the world am like a drop of water
That in the ocean seeks another drop,
Who falling there to find his fellow forth,
(Unseen, inquisitive) confounds himself. (1.2.35–38)⁴⁷
His irascible (and occasionally deranged) twin, Antipholus of Ephesus, is for
most of the play the personification of discord; he is literally anti philos or
“against friend.” All of his relations, whether with his wife, his servant Dromio,
or the various merchants, moneylenders, and craftsmen with whom he deals, are
characterised either by disharmony or violence (I refer above to the “rope’s end,”
which he threatens to “bestow / Among my wife and her confederates / For lock-
ing me out of my doors by day” (4.1.16– 18)).⁴⁸ Caught up in the maelstrom of far-
cical action, revolving around mistaken identity but driven by the relentless ob-
session of Ephesian citizens (and the Ephesian legal institution) with
mercantilism, he finds some kind of spiritual, emotional, and social repose
only at the end of the play, when he is reunited with his twin brother and
they leave the stage, for the last time, together.⁴⁹ Their overjoyed mother Emilia
speaks for the audience as well as herself when she announces: “After so long
grief, such felicity” (5.1.406).
 The image recurs when Adriana speaks of her love for her husband: “For know, my love, as
easy mayst thou fall / A drop of water in the breaking gulf, / And take unmingled thence that
drop again / Without addition or diminishing, / As take from me thyself, and not me too.”
(2.2.125–29) See The Comedy of Errors, ed. Foakes, 14, note to 1.2.35–38.
 Kinney notes the “customary definitions and discussions” of the play, which comment on
“the aggressive, hostile, and violent movement and sensing a basic theme the destruction of
the family and of family values”: Arthur F. Kinney, “Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors and the Na-
ture of Kind,” Studies in Philology 85.1 (1988): 29–52, 30; for an exemplar of this “customary”
definition, see Bentley’s Life of the Drama, in which the author argues that “Farce is perhaps
even more notorious [than melodrama] for its love of violent images”: Eric Bentley, The Life
of the Drama (London: Methuen, 1965), 219.
 Shakespeare was himself the father of twins: Hamnet and Judith (b. 1585); Hamnet died aged
eleven in 1596. On the depiction and interpretation of twinship in early modern literature, see
Daisy Murray, Twins in Early Modern English Drama and Shakespeare (Abingdon: Routledge,
2017).
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As noted above, the golden chain or carcanet, purchased by Antipholus of
Ephesus as a gift for his wife Adriana, has obvious Platonic connotations of pub-
lic law and the legal order;⁵⁰ but the dispute over its purchase also performs the
metaphorical function of signifying a society bound together only by the com-
mercial pressures of the market, having broken the true bonds of friendship
through which a political community may be recognised.⁵¹ The emphasis on so-
cial harmony engendered by the bonds of friendship extends to the last lines of
the play, when the Ephesian Dromio announces to his twin brother: “We came
into the world like brother and brother, / And now let’s go hand in hand, not
one before the other” (5.1.425–26). The bonds of friendship (upon which the
foundations of the Aristotelian polis were built) is the final, healing image of
the play.
The first recorded performance of The Comedy of Errors was at Gray’s Inn on
28 December 1594, described in the anonymous account of the revels Gesta
Grayorum as The Night of Errors;⁵² when revels turned to riot and the honoured
guests of Gray’s Inn – the Ambassador of the Inner Temple and his retinue – left
in a huff.⁵³ Scholarship regarding the Gray’s Inn revels of 1594 tends to concen-
trate exclusively on the riotous events of that fateful night;⁵⁴ but this is to over-
look the thematic similarity between The Comedy of Errors and the Gray’s Inn
revels themselves. The overarching theme of the Candlemas revels of 1594 was
friendship and the warm reception of foreigners by a host nation-state (a matter
of striking contemporaneous relevance, given the race riots of the early 1590s
discussed above). The hosts of the revels, Gray’s Inn, had invited their “ancient
Friend the State of Templaria” (the Inner Temple) to attend Gray’s Inn (whose
 See text to n. 16, above.
 See Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 53; see also Ian Ward, Shakespeare and
the Legal Imagination (London: Butterworths, 1999), 137.
 Anonymous, Gesta Grayorum or The History of The High and Mighty Prince Henry Prince of
Purpoole Anno Domini 1594, ed. Desmond Bland (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1968),
32. Gesta Grayorum was first published in 1688 by William Canning.
 Gesta Grayorum, ed. Bland, 31; after the departure of the Ambassador, “a Comedy of Errors
(like to Plautus his Menechmus) was played by the Players,” 32.
 On The Night of Errors, see Raffield, Shakespeare’s Imaginary Constitution, 51–52; also Paul
Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Modern England: Justice and Political Power, 1558–
1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 111– 123; Bradin Cormack, “Locating The
Comedy of Errors: Revels Jurisdiction at the Inns of Court,” in The Intellectual and Cultural
World of the Early Modern Inns of Court, eds. Jayne Elizabeth Archer, Elizabeth Goldring and
Sarah Knight (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2011), 264–285; William N. West,
“‘But this will be a mere confusion’: Real and Represented Confusions on the Elizabethan
Stage,” Theatre Journal 60.2 (2008): 217–233.
Shakespeare’s Twin Brother: Foreigners, Outlaws, and The Comedy of Errors 149
ruler for the duration of the revels was “Henry, Prince of Purpoole, Arch-Duke of
Stapulia and Bernardia, Duke of High and Nether Holborn, Marquis of St Giles’s
and Tottenham,” among other noble titles) on the evening of Holy Innocents’
Day (28 December).⁵⁵ The words “friendship” and “amity” recur throughout
the account of the night’s festivities. Following the indignity suffered by the Am-
bassador of the state of Templaria on The Night of Errors (the cause of which,
according to the anonymous Gesta Grayorum, was “a great Witchcraft”: echoing
the malign presence of witchcraft and sorcery in the Ephesus of The Comedy of
Errors),⁵⁶ the host “nation” (Gray’s Inn) expressed its profound regret that “our
dearest Friend, the State of Templaria” was “disappointed of their kind Entertain-
ment.”⁵⁷ A few days later, friendship was restored and reaffirmed. On the evening
of Friday 3 January 1595 “an Altar to the Goddesss of Amity” was erected in Hall.
Worshipping at the altar were members of the two Inns, dressed as archetypal
“friends” from classical literature. These included Theseus and Perithous,
Achilles and Patroclus, Pilades and Orestes, and Scipio and Lelius: “Lastly,
were presented Graius and Templarius; and they two came lovingly, Arm in
Arm, to the Altar, and offered their Incense as the rest.” After this touching dis-
play of mutual love and affection, the High Priest or “Arch-Flamen” to the God-
dess of Amity “did pronounce Grayus and Templarius to be as true and perfect
Friends, and so familiarly united and linked with the Bond and League of sincere
Friendship and Amity, as ever were Theseus and Perithous” and the other arche-
types of male friendship who paid homage to the Goddess of Amity.⁵⁸
 Gesta Grayorum, ed. Bland, 23, 29.
 The Acts of the Apostles describes Ephesus, as visited by St. Paul, as a place of “exorcists”
and “evil spirits” (19.13), in which people “used curious arts” (19.19). The Biblical association of
Ephesus with witchcraft is emphasised by Antipholus of Syracuse:
They say this town is full of cozenage,
As nimble jugglers that deceive the eye,
Dark-working sorcerers that change the mind,
Soul-killing witches that deform the body […] (1.2.97–100)
See Richmond Noble, Shakespeare’s Biblical Knowledge and Use of The Book of Common Prayer,
as exemplified in the Plays of the First Folio (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1935), 106– 107.
 Gesta Grayorum, ed. Bland, 32.
 Gesta Grayorum, ed. Bland, 35–36. On the symbolism of these rites, and the early modern
legal profession as “a fraternity predicated upon the image of masculine friendship,” see
Paul Raffield, The Art of Law in Shakespeare (Oxford: Hart Bloomsbury, 2017), 57–58. The
word “homosociality” is used by Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen to describe the nature of relationships
in a professional or working environment. He uses the term “‘political’ zone” to describe this
location, an area occupied (he posits) predominantly by men: Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen, The Freu-
dian Subject, trans. Catherine Porter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), 76, 78. On the
cult of masculinity at the early modern Inns of Court, see Lynne Magnusson, “Scoff Power in
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In the plethora of classical references and allusions at the Gray’s Inn revels
of 1594, it should not be forgotten that The Comedy of Errors unites a Plautine
plot with a profoundly Christian theme: that of birth and rebirth. Christianity
emerges from paganism, just as comedy emerges from Plautine farce. The choice
of play for performance on the evening of Holy Innocents’ Day was not acciden-
tal: The Feast of Holy Innocents commemorated the slaughter of young, male
children in Bethlehem, ordered by King Herod and recorded in The Gospel Ac-
cording to St. Matthew (2.16). In 1604, ten years after the performance of The Com-
edy of Errors at Gray’s Inn, the play was again performed on Holy Innocents’ Day,
at the court of King James I.⁵⁹ Like Christ, both the Antipholus and Dromio
twins – “the calendars of their nativity” (5.1.404) – were born in an inn
(1.1.53); Antipholus of Syracuse declares himself to be “a Christian” (1.2.77); Dro-
mio of Syracuse calls for his rosary – “O for my beads” – and crosses himself
“for a sinner.” (2.2.188); Act Four opens with a reference to Pentecost (4.1.1);
the schoolmaster Doctor Pinch performs a Christian exorcism on the distraught
Antipholus of Ephesus (4.4.52–55); and the play ends with an invitation to a
feast, in celebration of reunion and rebirth: “Go to a gossips’ feast, and joy
with me” (5.1.405). The Epidamnum of Plautus’s Menaechmi has been trans-
formed into the Christian, specifically Pauline, setting of its mise-en-scène,
Ephesus.⁶⁰
In the classical world, Ephesus had been one of the twelve cities of the Ion-
ian League, before coming under control of the Roman Republic in 129 B.C. It be-
came the capital of pro-consular Asia in twenty-seven B.C. during the reign of the
Roman emperor Augustus. Ephesus was also a cultural hub during the classical
era: it contained the Library of Celsus, the Temple of Artemis (Diana), and a the-
atre.⁶¹ In the post-classical period, Ephesus was the site of several Christian
Love’s Labour’s Lost and the Inns of Court: Language in Context,” Shakespeare Survey 57 (2004):
196–208.
 See Kinney, “Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors,” 31–32.
 Kinney, “Shakespeare’s Comedy of Errors,” 38. Epidamnum had a strong Middle Eastern, Is-
lamic character, and was notable (among other things) for the number of its mosques. Captured
by the Ottomans in 1501, it is now the chief seaport of Albania, known as Durrës (Durazzo).
 See Guy Maclean Rogers, The Mysteries of Artemis of Ephesos: Cult, Polis, and Change in the
Graeco-Roman World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012). Relevant to the theme of com-
merce in The Comedy of Errors is that St. Paul was briefly imprisoned in Ephesus, having clashed
there with artisans selling statuettes of Artemis. For a collection of essays on the life, writings,
and theology of St. Paul, see James D.G. Dunn ed., The Cambridge Companion to St Paul (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); for specific discussion of The Epistle of Paul the Apos-
tle to the Ephesians, see Andrew T. Lincoln, “Ephesians,” in Cambridge Companion to St Paul, ed.
Dunn, 133– 140.
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Councils in the Fifth Century A.D.⁶² Of course, Ephesus was also the setting for
The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians (St. Paul lived there from 52 to
54 A.D.), and one of the seven churches of Asia to which The Revelation of St.
John the Divine was addressed.⁶³
In her guise as the Abbess, before being reunited with her husband Egeon,
Emilia embodies the Pauline injunction to perform charitable acts. “It is a
branch and parcel of mine oath, / A charitable duty of my order,” (5.1.106–
107) she informs Adriana regarding her intention to make Antipholus of Ephesus
“a formal man again.” (5.1.105) It is a duty that she would be obliged to discharge
for anyone in need, Ephesian subject and foreigner alike. Her charity did not,
would not, and was not permitted to distinguish between races. She was herself
an immigrant, like her husband, her two sons, and their two servants. If the play
does contain a didactic message then it is that citizens and states are morally
obliged (whether by the political philosophy of the classical world or the Pauline
injunction to perform charitable acts, founded in the tenets of Judaeo-Christian
theology) to extend the bonds of friendship not only to each other, but to all
those who seek refuge and asylum because they have nowhere else to turn. In
the words of St. Paul, from The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians:
“And be ye kind one to another, tenderhearted, forgiving one another, even as
God for Christ’s sake hath forgiven you.” (Ephesians 4.32)
 Ephesus was the most important city of the Byzantine Empire, after Constantinople, before
its conquest by the Ottomans in 1304. See Clive Foss, Ephesus after Antiquity: A late antique, By-
zantine and Turkish City (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979); on political and com-
mercial relations between early modern England and the Muslim world, see Jerry Brotton,
This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic World (London: Allen Lane, 2016).
 “I am Alpha and Omega, the first and the last: and, What thou seest, write in a book, and
send it unto the seven churches which are in Asia; unto Ephesus, and unto Smyrna, and unto
Pergamos, and unto Thyatira, and unto Sardis, and unto Philadelphia, and unto Laodicea.”
(The Revelation of St. John the Divine 1.11) All quotations are from the Authorized King James Ver-
sion of The Bible.
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Part Three Legal Theory

Jeanne Gaakeer
Fuss about a Footnote, or the Struggle for
(the) Law in German Legal Theory
Overture: remembrance of times past
When I first started my research in Law and Literature, the then dominant debate
was on Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice and so I included an overview of
the often diametrically opposed interpretations of the play in my 1994 Ph.D. the-
sis. My reading of Heinrich Heine’s essays on female characters in Shakespeare’s
plays¹ with its strong defense of Shylock – in his analysis of Jessica, Heine refers
to a Drury Lane performance that he attended, on which occasion a lady in the
audience became passionate about the injustice that she perceived done to Shy-
lock² –, combined with Richard Weisberg’s reference, albeit in a note, in Poethics³
to Rudolf von Ihering’s view that Portia uses a foul trick to bring Shylock down,
brought me to the fierce and rather odd attack in German legal theory of Rudolf
von Ihering by Josef Kohler on the interpretive position taken by Portia.
In Anglo-American as well as European Law and Literature in the 1990s,⁴
however, this debate if at all mentioned was mainly relegated to the footnotes,
or used to denote controversies between scholars, and no extensive analyses
 Heinrich Heine, Shakespeares Mädchen und Frauen [1838]. Translated into English as either
Shakespeare’s Girls and Women or Shakespeare’s Maidens and Women.
 Heinrich Heine, Shakespeare’s Maidens and Women, in The Works of Heinrich Heine, trans.
from the German by Charles Godfrey Leland, vol. I (London: Heinemann, 1906), 377, (last access
November 1, 2016). https://archive.org/stream/worksofheinrichh01heinuoft/worksofheinrichh01
heinuoft_djvu.txt: “WHEN I saw this piece played in Drury Lane there stood behind me in the
box a pale British beauty who, at the end of the fourth act, wept passionately, and many
times cried out, ‘The poor man is wronged!’.” Cf. Julius Hirschfeld, “Portia’s Judgment and Ger-
man Jurisprudence,” The Law Quarterly Review (1914): 167–174, 167.
 Richard Weisberg, Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1992), 207, note 41.
 See Uwe Diederichsen, “Shakespeares ‘Kaufmann von Venedig’. Jurisprudenz auf dem Forum
der Bühne,” in Literatur und Recht, literarische Rechtsfälle von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart,
ed. Ulrich Mölk (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1996), 186–228, who mentions Ihering and Kohler
but mainly devotes his article to contemporary Law and Literature on the subject. Theodore Ziol-
kowski, The Mirror of Justice, literary reflections of legal crises (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1997), 173– 174, finds a dispute comparable to that of Von Ihering and Kohler in Richard
Weisberg’s and Richard Posner’s on the topic of Portia’s interpretation of the bond.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-009
were offered. Neither was O. Hood Phillips’ earlier Shakespeare and the Lawyers⁵
very helpful, because he paid no attention whatsoever to the underlying theories
of law espoused by Von Ihering and his critics. In my own thesis, too, I left it at
some short paragraphs and then forgot about it. Now with the celebration of
Shakespeare 400 I think it fitting to return to the topic, not least because the
whole German debate rests upon the different readings of one single footnote
in Von Ihering’s The Struggle for Law, so that the question to me at least is:
Why the fuss about the footnote? Shakespeare’s use in The Merchant of Venice,
consciously or not, of the controversial concept of the laceration of a debtor by
his creditor in the Roman Law of the Twelve Tables, as the background for the
infamous bond, triggered extensive commentaries that, I suggest, not only
prompted discussion about the prolonged, pervasive influence of Roman law
on German jurisprudence but also projected a dark light on German law and
legal theory in the early twentieth century. There is, therefore, a hiatus to be rem-
edied in this proto-Law and Literature debate. That is why I aim to make a fuss
about a footnote, though differently than my predecessors.
1 The modern use of Roman Law
The reception of Roman law throughout continental Europe was a gradual proc-
ess that started with the rediscovery of the Corpus Iuris Civilis in the eleventh
century. Suffice it to say for purposes of this article that in due course Roman
law became the ius commune that superseded local law in that it became the start-
ing point also for the interpretation of customary law. Its claim for legitimacy was
generally accepted and eventually Roman law permeated all (sub)fields of law in
that its tripartite conceptual framework of res, persona, and actio formed the
basis for subsequent developments.⁶
With the onset of the view of natural law based on human reason, the recta
ratio, as developed by the legal theorists of the seventeenth- and early eight-
eenth century such as Hobbes, Grotius, and Pufendorf, things already began
to change. The Enlightenment view on rational law in the second half of the
eighteenth century further brought the idea of law as a system of codified
rules and the concept of democracy under the rule of law. The status and influ-
 Owen Hood Phillips, Shakespeare and the Lawyers (London: Methuen, 1972), 91–118.
 Cf., Helmut Coing, Die ursprüngliche Einheit der europäischen Rechtswissenschaft (Wiesbaden:
F. Steiner, 1968), 12. For a more detailed treatment of the development of Roman law in the European
context, see Jeanne Gaakeer, “Reverent Rites of Legal Theory: unity-diversity-interdisciplinarity,”
Australian Feminist Law Journal 36 (2012): 19–43.
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ence of Roman law faded into the background in most European countries that
embraced the concept of the nation-state and its consequence, the codification
of national positive law.
In Prussia, however, the theorists of the Historical School of jurisprudence,
Friedrich Carl von Savigny (1779– 1861) and Georg Friedrich Puchta (1798– 1846),
vehemently opposed the very idea of codification. Von Savigny specifically at-
tacked Prussian General Legal Code of 1794, the project initiated by Frederick
the Great. The priority of human reason to understand law as advocated by En-
lightenment thinkers was rejected because it was ahistorical, the French Revolu-
tion was viewed as a dangerous thing as was the codification ideal of the later
Napoleonic era. In 1815 Von Savigny warned the German peoples not to follow
the example of the French codification in his Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetz-
gebung und Rechtswissenschaft.⁷ Romantic in its cherishing of the ideal of tradi-
tion as a source of knowledge, the Historical School aimed to understand law
historically, i.e. it sought for the meaning of legal concepts in the context of
their origin. To Von Savigny, then, the true legislator is found in the spirit of
the people, the Volksgeist, a term coined by Johann Gottfried Herder. This thesis
that the root of law is to be found in the people builds on Herder’s views on the
organic relation between language and culture.⁸ Von Savigny then argued that
the development of Roman law could be traced throughout the centuries and
had therefore developed from the consciousness of the people. Thus German
law was the natural synthesis of Roman law. Ironically, Herder himself, who
had briefly studied under Kant’s tutelage but of whose Enlightenment stance
he was also critical, fulminated against the lack of originality of German litera-
ture, the cause of which he took to be precisely the Romanist influence pervasive
in German society.⁹ It should also at once be noted that the Romanist strand of
the Historical School that is usually taken to have started with Von Savigny’s
1803 study Das Recht des Besitzes, had a counterpart in the Germanist strand
of those, Jacob Grimm among them, who saw the Volksgeist exemplified in me-
dieval Germanic law. And, paradoxically, given that Roman law was case-based,
 Translated by Abraham Hayward as Of the Vocation of our Age for Legislation and Jurispru-
dence (New York: Argo, 1975).
 For an analysis of Herder’s thought, see Jeanne Gaakeer, “Close Encounters of the ‘Third’
Kind,” in Diaspora, Law and Literature, eds. Daniela Carpi and Klaus Stierstorfer (Berlin and
Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), 41–67.
 Johann Gottfried Herder, Fragmente über die neuere deutsche Literatur (1766– 1767), in Johann
Gottfried Herder, Werke, Band I Herder und Sturm und Drang 1764– 1774, erste Sammlung, zweite
völlig umgearbeite Ausgabe (1768), ed. Wolfgang Pross (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1984),
71–90.
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Von Savigny and his followers of the Historical School used the Roman Digests or
Pandectae to build a strict, closed system of legal concepts. They were more in-
terested in the nature of law than in its societal effects or goals. Thus the usus
modernus pandectarum or Pandektenwissenschaft while pretending to be the
modern legal garb of the Corpus Iuris Civilis,¹⁰ soon became a deductive, formal-
ist jurisprudence of concepts, the Begriffsjurisprudenz, one that was devoid of
any ethical or social notion.
It should, however, also at once be noted that Von Savigny’s position within
legal theory was and remains pivotal. Not only did Von Savigny reject natural
law and was instrumental in getting it removed from German legal curricula,¹¹
his success in building a Roman-law based system was amazing to say the
least. If we consider the decline of Roman law in the rest of Europe and the
fact that the Holy Roman Empire had collapsed in 1806, Von Savigny’s 1815 Ge-
schichte des römischen Rechts im Mittelalter (Part I) was provocative in a situa-
tion in which what we now call Germany was a patchwork of smaller entities
with as a result a patchwork of civil law(s).¹² After all, it was not until 1871
that the nation came into being. This makes Von Savigny’s plan to develop
one all-encompassing legal theory for the whole of Germany remarkable and ex-
plains his aversion to, for example, the plan of Anton Friedrich Justus Thibaut
(1772–1840) to construct a general German civil law code against which he
also wrote his Vom Beruf unserer Zeit für Gesetzgebung und Rechtswissenschaft.
Another reason perhaps for the combination by Von Savigny of a historical meth-
od and the legal precision of a highly conceptual level of systematization that
culminated in Begriffsjurisprudenz can be found in the fact that Von Savigny
had no experience whatsoever of legal practice, and no working knowledge of
law in action. He did not incorporate any legal decisions in his theory. His was
the scientific study of law, the law of university professors in their ivory towers.
Its predominant influence resting on the authority of the system and ordering
of concepts, however, was so impressive that as late as 1920 the National-Social-
ist Party in article 19 of their party manifesto demanded the substitution by truly
German law of Roman law because that had too long served the materialistic
 Cf. Klaus Riebschläger, Die Freirechtsbewegung (Berlin: Duncker und Humblot, 1968): chap-
ter 1.
 Paul Koschaker, Europa und das römische Recht [1947] (Munich: G.H. Beck Verlag, 4th
ed. 1966), ch. XV.
 Uwe Wiesel, Geschichte des Rechts in Europa. Von den Griechen bis zum Vertrag von Lissabon
(Munich: G.H. Beck Verlag, 2010), 509.
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world order only. They had failed to notice that Roman law had by then been ob-
solete in most parts of Germany for quite a few decades.¹³
The Historical School met with fierce criticism, from the inside as well as the
outside. To start with the latter, it was the philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel who led the attack. Hegel had great admiration for the idea of national co-
dification projects. In contrast to the Romanists, he also admired Napoleon
whom he had seen riding past after the decisive Battle of Jena in 1806 when Na-
poleon defeated the Prussian army. To Hegel, the emperor was “the world-spirit
on horseback.” Hegel rejected the idea of looking at laws only in their historical
context when it comes to understanding their meaning and significance, because
to him Roman laws “are positive in so far as their significance and appropriate-
ness are circumstantial and their value is therefore entirely historical; they are
accordingly of a transient nature.”¹⁴ In short, it will not do, as Von Savigny
and his followers such as Gustav Ritter Von Hugo (1764– 1844)¹⁵ suggested,
that historical meaning can be transposed to contemporary circumstances. To
Hegel, sticking to such historical meaning is a matter of “supplying a good rea-
son for a bad thing.”
Enter Shakespeare, Enter Shylock. I humbly submit that the example Hegel
then gives of such a bad thing may have been precisely the trigger for the later
criticism by Joseph Kohler of Rudolf von Ihering’s view on The Merchant of Ven-
ice laid down in that famous footnote that I turn to below, namely that of the
debate between the Roman jurists Caecilius and Favorinus on the Twelve Tables’
Tabula III, i.e. that “abominable law which, after a specified interval had
elapsed, gave the creditor the right to kill the debtor or to sell him into slavery,
or even, if there were several creditors, to cut pieces off him and so divide him
between them that, if anyone had cut off too much or too little, he should incur
no consequent legal disadvantage (a clause which would have benefited Shake-
speare’s Shylock in The Merchant of Venice and which he would most gratefully
have accepted).”¹⁶
 Koschaker, Europa, 246–248 and 299.
 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood and trans. H.B. Nisbet
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), paragraph 3 of the Introduction, 31 [italics in the
original]. I also used G.W.F. Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts [1820] (Hamburg: Felix
Meiner, 1967), and the Dutch translation by Willem Visser, G.W.F. Hegel, Hoofdlijnen van de Re-
chtsfilosofie (Amsterdam: Boom, 2014) for purposes of comparison, not least because of the Eng-
lish edition’s somewhat unusual title Philosophy of Right, rather than of Law.
 Hugo wrote a textbook entitled Lehrbuch de Geschichte des Römischen Rechts (1790), that en-
joyed many editions.
 Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 32 [italics in the original].
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The other great theorist of the jurisprudence of concepts, Rudolf von Ihering
(1818– 1892) eventually recognised its dangers. Initially he adhered to the Ro-
manist strand of the Historical School and elaborated upon the ratio scripta of
Roman Law and the Historical School’s principles in the first three volumes of
his Der Geist des Römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stufen seiner Entwick-
lung (i.e. The Spirit of Roman Law in the various stages of its development, Part I
1852–Part III 1865), with the concept of the legal transaction as one of its most
prominent features: it is the intent, the will of the legal actor to reach a desired
result that is leading and that the law should then help carry out. Von Ihering
endorsed the ideal of the jurisprudence of concepts, i.e. of refinement of con-
cepts to such a degree of conceptual clarity that at the end of the day each
and every legal decision could unquestionably and unambiguously be deduced
from the system itself.
The turning point for Von Ihering came with the sequel to the third volume
of Der Geist des Römischen Rechts in 1865 when he wrote: “Life does not exist in
the service of concepts, but concepts are there to serve life. Not what logic de-
mands but what life, social relations, the feeling what law ought to be postulate,
be that logically deducible or not.”¹⁷ From then on Von Ihering began to develop
a more sociological jurisprudence, more specifically in his 3-volume Der Zweck im
Recht (i.e. literally The Purpose of the Law, 1877–1884, although it should be noted
that the English translation of 1913 was Law as a Means to an End).¹⁸ The starting
point for this legal theory was found in the interests of individual persons in soci-
ety, the so-called Interessenjurisprudenz that is comparable to the Benthamite so-
ciological idea of law as a means to an end and is echoed in Oliver Wendell Holmes
jr.’s “The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”¹⁹ What is more,
 As cited in Riebschläger, Freirechtsbewegung, 29, my translation of “Das Leben ist nicht die
Begriffe, sondern die Begriffe sind des Lebens wegen da. Nicht was die Logik, sonders was das
Leben, das Verkehr, das Rechtsgefühl postulieren, hat zu geschehen, mag es logisch deduzierbar
sein oder nicht.”
 Rudolf von Ihering, Law as a Means to an End (Boston: Boston Book Company, 1913), trans.
Isaac Husik.
 Oliver Wendell Holmes jr., The Common Law [1881] (Cambridge (Mass.): Belknap Press,
2009), 3. Cf. G. Edward White, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law and the Inner Self (New
York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 130 note 8, that Holmes took an interest in Ger-
man scholarship on legal history, read Von Savigny’s Das Recht des Besitzes and Puchta’s Cursus
der Institutionen but disagreed with the Romanist notion of the importance of intent of the legal
actor when it comes to matters of interpretation; cf. also Sheldon M. Novick, The Honorable Jus-
tice, The Life of Oliver Wendell Holmes (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1989), 134 note 32 for the
remark that Holmes understood German school of idealist jurisprudence as saying that law is
160 Jeanne Gaakeer
Von Ihering’s criticism also culminated in his satire on the heaven of legal con-
cepts in which he exposes concepts as fictions, i.e. constructs, useful though
they may be, that exist only because of the order that law imposes. This heaven’s
inhabitants, the first being Puchta, but soon followed by Von Savigny who
“based a legal institute purely on the sources or the ideas therein without resort-
ing to any real practical meaning,”²⁰ are taken to task for discussing jurispruden-
tial problems without ever asking after their practical significance, one example
being Von Savigny’s analysis in Das Recht des Besitzes of the problem whether
possession is a question of law or of fact.²¹
In short, Von Ihering’s scholarly development may be viewed as a mirror of
nineteenth-century German legal theory, from a jurisprudence of concepts to so-
ciological views on law and, eventually, to the Free Law Movement. The latter, on
the one hand, shared the jurisprudence of interests’ rejection of the technicality
of the purely conceptual thought, but, on the other hand, took its leave from the
sociological starting point to view law as a whole with its concomitant idea that
the judge should take into consideration the principles of justice as well as law
including the lawgiver’s intention in the sense of the purpose of a specific piece
of legislation, in favour of a discretionary, i.e. free form of judicial interpretation.
That is exactly what the German debate on Portia’s interpretive position turns
on.²²
2 Equitable justice
To reach one’s Zweck in law, one must be prepared to start one’s Kampf ums
Recht, one’s struggle to attain one’s ends, as Von Ihering explains in his book
on the subject. Der Kampf ums Recht is Von Ihering’s elaboration of a speech de-
livered before a Vienna audience of jurists-practitioners. Such was its success
that within two months after its publication in 1872 a second edition was neces-
sary, a year later a third and 1874 did not only see the fourth edition but also
translations in Hungarian, Russian and Dutch. The fifth edition of 1877 was
the expression of the Volksgeist, a view Holmes attacked in The Common Law, but that it is un-
certain whether Holmes had read Von Savigny when he started developing The Common Law.
 Rudolf von Ihering, In the heaven for legal concepts: a fantasy [1884], tr. Charlotte L. Levy,
foreword by John M. Lindsey, Temple Law Quarterly 58 (1985): 799–842, 804. I also used Rudolf
von Ihering, Scherz und Ernst in der Jurisprudenz (Darmstad: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesell-
schaft, 1992).
 Von Ihering, Heaven, 820.
 Riebschlager, Freirechtsbewegung, 17 and 48.
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translated into English. For this outstanding contribution to legal theory Ihering
was also given a decoration, the Cross of the St. Annen Order, by the Russian
emperor.²³
As Von Ihering explains, his aim was not to further the scientific study of law
but “the cultivation of the state of mind from which the law must ultimately de-
rive its strength, viz.: the courageous and constant exercise of the feeling of
right,” an unfortunate translation of the original German term “Rechtsgefühl”
which refers to the idea of law and justice rather than to an individual, subjective
right.²⁴ This can be inferred from Von Ihering’s definition of the struggle for law
as “Der Kampf ums Recht ist eine Pflicht des Berechtigten gegen sich selbst”
which is rather roughly translated as “The struggle for his right is a duty of the
person whose rights have been violated, to himself,”²⁵ because what Von Ihering
means to emphasize, next to any practical result in law because law and rights can
only be said to exist when they are “realized” in the world,²⁶ is the ethical thrust: it
is our existential duty to seek law and justice.²⁷ The English translation is therefore
a bit ambiguous, no doubt given the civil-law setting of the production of Von Iher-
ing’s text as compared to the American translator’s common-law setting.²⁸
 For purposes of citation I use the 4th edition in German and the 5th edition in English: Rudolf
von Ihering, Der Kampf ums Recht, 4th edition, in Rudolf von Jhering Ausgewählte Schriften, ed.
Christian Rusche (Nürnberg: Glock und Lutz Verlag, 1965); Rudolph von Ihering, The Struggle
for Law, trans. from the 5th edition in German by John J. Lalor (Chicago: Callaghan and Co.,
1879); for materials with respect to the speech version, I also consulted Rudolf von Ihering, Der
Kampf um’s Recht, 18th edition 1913, ed. Felix Ermacora (Berlin: Propyläen Verlag, 1992). The
work is also translated as The Battle for Right, trans. Philip Arthur Ashworth (London: Stevens
and Son, 1883). Cf. Kampf um’s Recht, the introduction by Ermacora at 27–28, for the reference
to the decoration.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, vii, Kampf ums Recht, 195 “weniger darauf gericht, die wissen-
schaftliche Erkenntnis des Rechts […] zu fördern […] [als] diejenige Gesinnung[…]: die der mu-
tigen und standhaften Behauptung des Rechtsgefühls.”
 Von Ihering, Kampf ums Recht, 213, Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 29.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 12, Kampf ums Recht, 204, “The idea of law is an eternal Be-
coming”; cf. Benjamin Cardozo’s “Law never is, but is always about to be” (The Nature of the
Judicial Process, New Haven: Yale university Press, 1921), 126.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 129– 130, “It is […] ethics which has to tell us what is in har-
mony with, and what contradicts, the idea of law.” Kampf ums Recht, 272, “Die Ethik hat uns
Aufschluss darüber zu geben, was dem Wesen des Rechts entspricht oder widerspricht.”
 Cf. Kampf um’s Recht, the introduction by Ermacora, 46,which references the original speech
that contains the wonderfully succinct remark on the duty not to be a coward when it comes to
struggling for one’s right: “Das Preisgeben eines verletzten Rechtes ist in meinen Augen ein Act
der Feigheit, der, wenn er nicht durch die Einrichtungen des Staates zur Nothwendigkeit ge-
macht wird, der Person zur Unehre und dem Gemeinwesen zum höchsten Schaden gereicht.
Der Kampf für das Recht ist ein Act der ethischen Selbsterhaltung, ist eine Pflicht gegen sich
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So what matters, also in Shylock’s case, is that one therefore always has to
start the legis actio as it is called in Roman law, in order to invoke the law, “das
Gesetz anrufen,” for “The law itself is called in question; it is the law itself which
is under discussion in a particular case […] There is question not alone of a per-
sonal interest […] but there is a question of the law itself which has been de-
spised, trampled under foot, and which must be defended, if the law itself is
not to become a mockery and a word without meaning. When the legal right
of the individual is sacrificed, the law is sacrificed likewise.”²⁹ This can also
be seen in Shylock’s remark “I stand for judgment” (IV.1.103),³⁰ immediately
after he has said “The pound of flesh which I demand of him Is dearly bought.
‘Tis mine, and I will have it. If you deny me, fie upon your law: there is no force
in the decrees of Venice (IV.1.98– 101).” It is this passage from the play that Von
Ihering first cites, without clear references, however, so that we cannot be abso-
lutely sure whether after this he refers to the “I stand for judgment” or to “I stand
here for law” (IV.1.141) or the line “I crave the law” (IV.1.201) that follows Portia’s
“quality of mercy” speech, which is what the English translator chooses.
Not that it matters much since all citations qualify when it comes to the use
Von Ihering makes of Shylock’s standpoint, namely that
It is hatred and revenge that take Shylock before the court to cut his pound of flesh out of
Antonio’s body; but the words which the poet puts into his mouth are as true in it as in any
other. It is the language which the wounded feeling of legal right will speak, at all times
and in all places; the power, the firmness of the conviction, that law must remain law,
the lofty feeling and pathos of a man who is conscious that, in what he claims, there is
question not only of his person but of the law. […] ‘I crave the law’. In these four words,
the poet has described the relation of law in the subjective to law in the objective sense
of the term and the meaning of the struggle for law, in a manner better than any philoso-
pher of the law could have done it. These four words change Shylock’s claim into a question
und gegen die Gemeinschaft,” my translation “To relinquish a violated right is in my opinion an
act of cowardice, that when not made necessary by the organizations of the state, brings dis-
grace to the individual and harm to the community.” In the book versions, see the comparable
but rhetorically weaker passages Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 127, Kampf ums Recht, 217–271.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 78–79; Kampf ums Recht, 242 “das Gesetz anzurufen […] Das
Gesetz selber ist in Frage gestellt, es is ein Streit ums Gesetz, der in dem einzelnen Fall entscheiden
werden muss […] es handelt sich bei dem Streit nicht bloss um das Interesse des Subjekts […] son-
dern das Gesetz selber is missachtet, mit Füssen getreten; das Gesetz, wenn es nicht eitel Spiel und
Phrase sein soll, muss sich behaupten – dem Recht des Verletzten, stürtzt das Gesetz selbst zusam-
men.”
 References are to William Shakespeare, The Merchant of Venice, in The Norton Shakespeare,
eds. Stephen Greenblatt et al. (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 1997).
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of the law of Venice […] it is the law of Venice itself knocking at the door of Justice; for his
rights and the law of Venice are one and the same; they both stand or fall together.³¹
As a result of Portia’s interpretive strategy, not only Shylock but the law itself is
broken. So when Shylock “finally succumbs under the weight of the judge’s de-
cision, who wipes out his right by a shocking piece of pleasantry,”³² […] “who
can help feeling that in him the law of Venice is humbled; that it is not the
Jew, Shylock, who moves painfully away, but the typical figure of the Jew in
the middle ages, that pariah of society who cried in vain for justice?”³³ The trag-
edy, then, to Von Ihering, is not that Shylock’s rights are denied in “the patho-
logical moment” in which he seeks them,³⁴ but that his faith in the law as a
firm rock is shaken by the judge who dispels the illusion that he has a right
and teaches him that he is only “the despised medieval Jew to whom justice
is done by defrauding him.”³⁵ Onward now to the famous footnote attached to
the passage “a shocking piece of pleasantry” which is a rather weak translation,
I suggest, of Von Ihering’s “schnöden Witz,” “schnöde” being a far more nega-
tive connotation of disgraceful behaviour with the intent to cause harm. It re-
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 80–81. It should be noted that language is one of Von Iher-
ing’s metaphors for law, undoubtedly an influence of the Historical School. Cf. Kampf um’s
Recht, the introduction by Ermacora, 18, referencing the speaker who thanked Von Ihering
after his speech, and specifically noted the Herderian idea that law, like the language of a people
develops organically throughout the ages, “wie die Sprache eines Volkes, ein auch sich organisch
werdendes, ein organisch gewordenes Product der Geschichte sei,” my translation “like the lan-
guage of a people, an organically developing, and organically created product of history.” Cf.
Kampf ums Recht, 243, for the same passage in German.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 81; Kampf ums Recht, 243, “Und wenn er selber dann zusam-
menbricht unter der Wucht des Richterspruches, der durch schnöden Witz sein Recht vereitelt.”
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 82.
 Cf. Kampf um’s Recht, the speech version in the introduction by Ermacora, 41, “pathologi-
schen Momentes.”
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 82–83, “His fate is eminently tragic, not because his rights are
denied him, but because he, a Jew of the middle ages, has faith in the law – we might say as if he
were a Christian – a faith in the law firm as a rock which nothing can shake, and which the
judge himself feeds until the catastrophe breaks upon him like a thunder clap, dispels the illu-
sion and teaches him that he is only the despised medieval Jew to whom justice is done by de-
frauding him”; Kampf ums Recht, 244, “Die gewaltige Tragik seines Schicksals beruht nicht darauf,
dass ihm das Recht versagt wird, sondern darauf, dass er, ein Jude des Mittelalters, den Glauben an
das Recht hat – man möchte sagen, gleich als wäre er ein Christ -, einen felsenfesten Glauben an
das Recht, den nichts beirren kann und den der Richter selber nährt; bis dann wie ein Don-
nerschlag die Katastrophe über ihn hereinbricht, die ihn aus seinem Wahn reisst und ihn belehrt,
dass er nichts ist als der geächtete Jude des Mittelalters, dem man sein Recht gibt, indem man ihn
darum betrügt.”
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turns as “ein elender Winkelzug, ein kläglicher Rabulistenkniff,” rabula being
the Latin for “wrangling advocate, pettifogger,”³⁶
The eminently tragic interest which we feel in Shylock, I find to have its basis precisely in
the fact that justice is not done to him; for this is the conclusion to which the lawyer must
come. The poet is, of course, free to build up his own system of jurisprudence, and we have
no reason to regret that Shakespeare has done so here; or rather that he has changed the
old fable in nothing. But when the jurist submits the question to a critical examination, he
can only say that the bond was in itself null and void because its provisions were contrary
to good morals. The judge should, therefore, have refused to enforce its terms on this
ground from the first. But as he did not do so, as the “wise Daniel” admitted its validity,
it was a wretched subterfuge, a miserable piece of pettifoggery, to deny the man whose
right he had already admitted, to cut a pound of flesh from the living body, the right to
the shedding of blood which necessarily accompanied it. Just as well might the judge
deny to the person whose right to an easement he acknowledged, the right to leave foot-
marks on the land, because this was not expressly stipulated in the grant. One might al-
most believe that the tragedy of Shylock was enacted in the earliest days of Rome; for
the author of the Twelve Tables held it necessary to remark expressly in relation to the lac-
eration of the debtor (in partes secare) by the creditor, that the size of the piece should be
left to his free choice. (Si plus minusve secuerint, sine fraude esto!).³⁷
Von Ihering compares Shylock’s broken resistance after Portia’s decision to the
figure of Michael Kohlhaas in Heinrich von Kleist’s eponymous novel. Kohlhaas
is given a comparable treatment but he stays firm in his insistence on, and de-
votion to the law. In the end he accepts the consequence of his position with dig-
nity: after his rights are honored he accepts the death penalty for his own violent
acts. What matters to me here is that Von Ihering qualifies this decision as “Ju-
dicial murder is the deadly sin of the law”³⁸ and this is, I suggest, also Von Iher-
ing’s verdict of Portia’s act.
How, then, did it come about that Von Ihering was so severely criticized for
his footnote?³⁹ From a point of law it is well-balanced, both as far as the outcome
of the case as authored by Shakespeare is concerned, for Von Ihering respects
Shakespeare’s authorial liberty and from his approving remark that “we have
no reason to regret that Shakespeare has done so here,”⁴⁰ i.e. that the outcome
in the sense of the denial of the validity of the bond is as such correct, and from
 Von Ihering, Kampf ums Recht, 244. Cf. Julius Hirschfeld, “Portia’s Judgment,” 167 n.1.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 81 note 1; Kampf ums Recht, 244 note.*
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 86, Kampf ums Recht, 247, “Justizmord ist die wahre Todsünde
des Rechts.”
 Already after Kampf ums Recht was published in the speech version, Von Ihering was criti-
cized, see Cf. Kampf um’s Recht, the introduction by Ermacora, 28.
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, 81 note 1.
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a point of view of interpretation, i.e. his remark that if one pays careful attention
to the legal aspects, the verdict would have been that the bond was void, is in no
way out of the order with his legal theory. Von Ihering’s view that the bond was
null and void to start with fits with his jurisprudence of interests that takes into
consideration principles of law when ascertaining what the lawgiver intended
with a specific piece of legislation as noted above in paragraph 2. That would
include, I suggest, equity in its original Aristotelian meaning of equitable justice
as found in the Nicomachean Ethics, not least because in Das Zweck im Recht
Von Ihering thinks in terms of mercy as justice in the individual case.⁴¹
In other words, this resembles the Aristotelian argument that “all law is uni-
versal but about some things it is not possible to make a universal statement
which shall be correct.” Thus, the error that arises from the universality of the
law, is an omission to be corrected by saying, “what the legislator himself
would have said had he been present, and would have put into his law if he
had known,” hence Aristotle’s conclusion that, “this is the nature of the equi-
table, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality.”⁴² The
equitable is therefore just not because it is legally correct; it is just because it
is a correction of the justice provided by the system of law itself. It is here
that Portia fails as the judge who interprets the lawgiver’s texts: she has the tech-
nical acuity to understand that according to Venetian law the bond must be hon-
ored if she sticks to the letter of the law, but her solution to save Antonio’s life is
lacking in the practical wisdom necessary to apply the equitable correction of
the law that the bond’s content is contrary to the principle of good morals under-
 See also the twentieth-century editor of Von Ihering’s Der Zweck im Recht, Arthur Kauf-
mann’s view that to Von Ihering mercy was the “Selbstkorrektur der Gerechtigkeit” (as noted
in Der Zweck im Recht, vol.1, 6th and 8th German edition, 1923, 331) in “Recht und Gnade in
der Literatur,” in Arthur Kaufmann, Beiträge zur Juristischen Hermeneutik (Köln: Carl Heymanns
Verlag, 1984), 227–245, 228. But see the different view of Gustav Radbruch, Rechtsphilosophie
[1950] eds Erik Wolf and Hans-Peter Schneider (Stuttgart: K.F. Köhler Verlag, 1973), Besonderer
Teil, par. 24 “Die Gnade,” 275, i.e. “Mercy,” “Die Gnade erschöpft sich also nicht darin, nach Iher-
ings Wort “Sicherheitsventil des Rechtes” zu sein. Sie ist ein Symbol, dass es in der Welt Werte gibt,
die aus tieferen Quellen gespeist werden und zu höheren Höhen aufgipfeln, als das Recht.” To Rad-
bruch, mercy is not the safety valve but a symbol of a universal value that is superior to positive
law. From a point of view of legal theory, however, Von Ihering’s view and Radbruch’s are not es-
sentially different; they differ in degree rather than kind since both agree on the function of mercy
to bring about justice, and both agree that mercy is part and parcel of law as an ordering system,
since as “Selbstkorrektur,” it is self-correction of law. Cf. Gustav Radbruch, Kleines Rechts-Brevier
[1941] (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954), nr. 59, referencing the “quality of mercy”-
speech.
 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and introduction by David Ross, revised by J.L. Ac-
krill and J.O. Urmson (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 132– 133, V.10.
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lying all law, that it is unconscionable. I find support for this view also in Von
Ihering’s remarks in the Preface to the 5th edition where he says that those
who disagree with him have to answer the question, “What should a man do
when his rights are trampled under foot?” and continues by saying that “The per-
son who can give a tenable answer to the question, that is an answer compatible
with the existence of law and order and with the dignity of personality has refuted
me,”⁴³ the inclusion of the principle of human dignity and legal personhood being
indicative of the inclusion of principles in the quidditas or “whatness” of law.⁴⁴
And then he concludes,
One word more, on a point which has been contested even by those with whom I otherwise
agree. I refer to my claim that injustice was done to Shylock. I have not contended that the
judge should have recognized Shylock’s bond to be valid; but that, once he had recognized
its validity he should not, subsequently, have invalidated it by base cunning. The judge had
the choice of deciding the bond valid or invalid. He should have declared the latter, but he
declared it to be the former. Shakespeare represents the matter as if his decision was the
only possible one; no one in Venice doubted the validity of the bond; Antonio’s friends,
Antonio himself, the court, all were agreed that the bond gave the Jew a legal right. And
confiding in his right thus universally acknowledged, Shylock calls for the aid of the
court, and the “wise Daniel,” after he had vainly endeavored to induce the revenge-thirsty
creditor to surrender his right, recognizes it. And now, after the judge’s decision has been
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, xiii.
 Von Ihering’s views were praised by German legal theorist Georg Jellinek in his 1879 speech
“Die Idee des Rechts im Drama in ihrer historischen Entwicklung,” in Georg Jellinek, Ausgewählte
Schriften und Reden, Band I, part II, Zur schönen Literatur, essay nr. 9 (Berlin: O. Häring Verlag,
1911), 208–233. Jellinek is Kantian in his own approach: only the rational wills of human beings
together can form the law, i.e. laws are the boundaries that human beings impose on themselves,
so that law in the objective sense draws the boundaries of human action and law in the subjective
sense of the rights of the individual is the legal freedom to act. It is in the tension between the two
aspects of law that the struggle for law originates. Significantly, Jellinke uses the term “Kampf ums
Recht” when he writes that in ancient Greek drama, Sophocles’ Antigone being the prime example,
the struggle is for the legitimacy and ultimate predominance of the legal norms of the case,where-
as in modernity, the first writer announcing that era being Shakespeare (220), the struggle focuses
on the legitimacy of the legal claim (subjective law) versus the order of the legal system (objective
law).Viewed this way, one would have to denote Portia as belonging to the ancient order or cosmos
because her solution is to bend the law in the direction of the kind of mercy she imposes by in-
troducing another legal norm, the one that helps destroy Shylock. Jellinek does not specifically ad-
dress this issue but he explicitly refers to Von Ihering when he writes, “Da wird durch einen
rabulistischen Kunstgriff, wie ein bedeutender Jurist der Urteil der Porzia treffend nennt das starre
Recht geknickt zugunsten der Forderung der Gnade” (225, note 1), my translation “The strict law is
there bent in favour of mercy, through an artificial act of pettifoggery, as one important jurist aptly
calls it.” Jellinek sees Shakespeare as one of the first playwrights who no longer portray the legal
order as absolute and indisputable, as one who clearly shows that law is the work of men.
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given, after all doubt as to the legal right of the Jew has been removed by the judge himself,
and not a word can be said against it; after the whole assembly, the doge included, have
accommodated themselves to the inevitable decree of the law – now that the victor, entirely
sure of his case, intends to do what the judgment of the court authorized him to do, the
same judge who had solemnly recognized his rights, renders those rights nugatory by an
objection, a stratagem so contemptible, that it is worthy of no serious attention. Is there
any flesh without blood? The judge who accorded Shylock the right to cut a pound of
flesh out of Antonio’s body accorded him, at the same time, the right to Antonio’s blood,
without which flesh cannot be. Both are refused to the Jew. He must take the flesh without
the blood, and cut only an exact pound of flesh, no more and no less. Do I say too much
when I assert that here the Jew is cheated out of his legal right? True it is done in the in-
terest of humanity, but does chicanery cease to be chicanery because practiced in the name
of humanity?⁴⁵
The latter rhetorical question enraged critics even more and the neo-Hegelians
were in the majority to lead the attack.
3 Chicanery in the name of humanity?
3.1 Prioritizing the state
One of them, the sitting judge August Pietscher as early as 1881 devoted a study
to Von Ihering’s view on Portia.While granting that law in its actual appeareance
does not always reflect the underlying idea and ideal of law, the “Rechtsidee,”
Pietscher initially praises Von Ihering for having drawn the attention to the
urge of the human soul to struggle to get his right in Der Kampf um’s Recht
that Pietscher calls “A study equally excellent in content and form.”⁴⁶ However,
Von Ihering’s “appellate review” of the lower-court judge Shakespeare does not
meet with Pietscher’s approval.⁴⁷ Already foreboding Josef Kohler’s attack on
Von Ihering, Pietscher claims that while the essence of law is to have universally
applicable rules and norms, there may come a moment when the development of
societal relations and new demands of human commerce can no longer be sub-
sumed under the existing rules, i.e. when there is an antithesis between law and
 Von Ihering, Struggle for Law, xiv-xvi.
 August Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, Versuch einer Studie über Jhering’s ‘Kampf um’s Recht’
und Shakespeare’s ‘Kaufmann von Venedig’ (Dessau: Emil Barth Verlag, 1881), 5, my translation
of “Eine Schrift gleich vortrefflich nach Inhalt wie nach Form.”
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 6, “einer oberrichtlichen Revision, die ein für den Dichter nicht
eben günstiges Ergebnis liefert,’’my translation “a review by a higher judge that does not lead to
a favourable result for the poet.”
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life.⁴⁸ Unlike Von Ihering whose Historical-School view that law in the objective
sense of the legal norm has developed through the ages in a way comparable to
law in practice, i.e. in the discursive courtroom situation of the struggle for
meaning with a debate on meaning in legal use and a constant tension between
de lege lata (what the law is) and de lege ferenda (what the law should be),
Pietscher favours the idea that if the laws of Venice were of such poor quality
that they suffered the good merchant Antonio to be destroyed by Shylock, the
judge is indeed allowed to use “a chicanery” to respond to such villainy.⁴⁹
In all fairness it should at once be noted that Pietscher has a keen eye for
both the Shakespearean text and the demands of trial practice. He draws the at-
tention to the fact that so far legal theorists have not noticed some crucial as-
pects of Shylock’s character. For example, he refers to Shylock’s remark to
Tubal to bespeak him an officer of the court in a fortnight at the end of scene
3.1, “I will have the heart of him if he forfeit, for were he out of Venice I can
make what merchandise I will”( 3.1.105–107) as the sure indication of Shylock’s
motive of commercial competition; he also questions the validity of Shylock’s re-
mark “An oath, an oath, I have an oath in heaven. Shall I lay perjury on my
soul?” (4.1.223–224) because it has not been mentioned so far; and as a true
legal practitioner he asks why Shylock did not take the precaution of adding a
clause to the contract to justify the spilling of blood, for we all know, don’t we
that what is not laid down in legal documents does not exist, any lawyer
could have told Shylock that.⁵⁰
But “our jurist” Von Ihering, as Pietscher condescendingly calls him, only
has the defense for his client Shylock that the bond was contra bonas mores
to start with and that is an insufficient argument, a turpis causa in Portia’s
legal theory, one that is bound to make Shylock lose the case.⁵¹ While Pietscher
is willing to acknowledge that in interpreting the trial scene we must take for
granted that the laws of Shakespeare’s Venice did not contain the rule that
there can be no unconscionable contract, he contends that even if any legal sys-
tem would contain such a rule, and that could only be a highly sophisticated
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 4, “Widerspruch zwischen Leben und Recht, der Streit des leb-
endigen Menschen mit der abgezogenen Regel,” my translation “Discrepancy between life and
law, the struggle of the living being with the abstract legal rule.”
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 22.
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 19, “Und was nicht in dem Akten isst, isst nicht in der Welt,” my
translation “What is not in the legal documents, does not exist in the world.”
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 19.
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legal system,⁵² this does not guarantee its correct interpretation, for after all
much of what we now consider immoral laws were once generally accepted,
with the acceptance of slavery until recently in the U.S. as a good example. So
Von Ihering’s argument is a failure since poetic justice is the prerogative of
the playwright and while Shakespeare’s Portia may not have been able to give
good reasons for her decision, she intuitively felt that Shylock should be hoist
with his own petard by sticking to the literal words of the bond. In truly neo-He-
gelian vein, Pietscher then contends “Here rises the injured majesty of the idea of
law, able to mete out punishment, destructive against the one who viciously
dares to use the law to bring about injustice. The injured individual disappears
behind the […] state of Venice.”⁵³ That is why to Pietscher Portia’s presumedly
legal ruse, “Tarry, Jew. The law hath yet another hold on you” (4.1.241–242) is
totally acceptable, because while the idea of law may well originate from the
struggle for law as both Von Ihering and Shakespeare understand so admirably,
nevertheless “Law must remain law,”⁵⁴ i.e. positive law prevails because in the
Hegelian view it originates from the state and serves to guarantee its existence.
Pietscher’s view did not augur well for the reception of Von Ihering’s view but
worse was yet to come.
3.2 The judge’s discretionary power: over Shylock’s dead
body?
Significantly, Josef Kohler opens his analysis of The Merchant of Venice, the first
chapter of Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz with the name “Ihering.”
And while in the Foreword to the first edition he claims that he had long wanted
to take up the subject of Shakespeare’s plays in relation to law, it is clear from
the start that Von Ihering’s footnote is the trigger to Kohler who calls Ihering’s
views as internally contradictory as they are forcefully argued.⁵⁵ Although Kohler
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 20, “seine Anerkennung im Rechte gehört immer nur den
höchsten Kulturstufen,” my translation “its acknowledgement in law always goes together
with the highest level of culture.”
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 24, “Da erhebt sich also die verletzte Majestät der Rechtsidee,
selbst strafend, vernichtend gegen den, der sich frech vermass, das Recht zum Unrecht zu ge-
brauchen. Der verletzte Privatmann tritt zurück hinter den […] Staat Venedig.”
 Pietscher, Jurist und Dichter, 23 and 24, “Recht muss doch Recht bleiben.”
 Josef Kohler, Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz (Würzburg: Verlag der Stahel’schen
Universitäts Buch- und Kunsthandlung, 1883), 6 and iii, ‘die ebenso kräftig durchgeführte, als in-
nerlich unrichtige Auffassung Ihering’s.” The copy of Forum 1883 I used for this article is the li-
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claims that he aims to distil the legal thoughts from the plays and that he will
not look at the law in Shakespeare’s days, but contribute to the universal
study of law,⁵⁶ ironically, throughout the book his approach is specifically histor-
ical-comparative and geographically situated,⁵⁷ also in its attack on Von Ihering
and his footnote on Portia’s pettifoggery that bent the law of Venice. Kohler notes
that no performance of the play that he attended was sympathetic to the charac-
ter of Shylock, and that although he is a jurist, he has always watched the scene
in which “the wise Daniel” curbed Shylock’s revenge breathlessly.⁵⁸
To Kohler, the trial scene offers an example of the development of law in all
ages, a deeper form of jurisprudence than the one we find in Pandectist text-
books or the one offered in all the works of Von Savigny and Von Ihering
taken together, an obvious sneer at the Historical School.⁵⁹ After such opening
brary copy of Harvard College dated 1901 which goes to show that Kohler too was widely known in
his days.
 Kohler, Forum 1883, iii-iv, “Mein Zweck, war es, die innern juristischen Gedanken, welche der
grösste Dichter im Gewande der Poesie zum Ausdrucke gebracht hatte, in der Sprache der Jurispru-
denz zu entwicklen und in ihrem universalgeschichtlichen Sein und Werden zu beleuchten,” my
translation “It has been my purpose to develop in the langauge of jurisprudence the intrinsically
legal thoughts, that the greatest poet has expressed in the garb of poetry, and to throw a light
on their universal-historical existence and values.”; Kohler, Forum 1883, v, on the aim of the
book, “Ich wollte einen Beitrag zur Universalgeschichte des Rechts geben,” my translation “I want-
ed to contribute to the universal history of law.”
 Yet Kohler specifically rejects the historical method of John, Lord Campbell in Shakespeare’s
Legal Acquierements considered (London: John Murray, 1859). For a more compact treatment
than Kohler’s, see Uwe Diederichsen, “Das Fleischpfand,” in Literatur und Recht, literarische Re-
chtsfälle von der Antike bis in die Gegenwart, ed. Ulrich Mölk (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag,
1996):138– 149.
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 5, “habe ich, obgleich Jurist, immer und immer mit angehaltenem Athem
dem weisen Daniel gelauscht […] und der Kläger, der die heilge Stätte des Rechts beschmutzen
wollte mit dem Schmutze seiner elenden Seele, der das Recht selbst in die Tiefe gemeiner Rachgier
herunterziehen wollte, mit Schimpf und Schande von den Schranken des Gerichtes weggejagt
wird.”; my translation “have I, although [my italics] I am a jurist, on all occasions while holding
my breath listened to the wise Daniel […] and [how] the complainant, who dared stain the holy
places of the law with the soil of his wretched soul, who himself wanted to pull down the law
in the very depths of his mean revengeful state of mind, is chased away from the courtroom show-
ered with scorn and disgrace.”
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 6, “ein typisches Bild der Rechtswentwicklung aller Zeiten […] sie enthält
die Quintessenz vom Wesen und Werden des Rechtes in ihrem Schoosse, sie enthält eine tiefere
Jurisprudenz, als 10 Pandektenlehrbücher und eröffnet uns einen tiefern Blick in die Gechichte
des Rechts, als alle rechtshistorischen Werke von Savigny bis auf Ihering.” Cf. Ziolkowski, Mirror,
173, “the trial scene […] is a typical image of the legal development of all times: it contains the quin-
tessence of the nature and progress of law; it contains a more profound jurisprudence than ten vol-
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lines, the reader would expect Kohler to delve into the contentious issue without
further ado. However, it takes him some seventy odd pages of legal-historical
and anthropological descriptions and explanations, with incredibly detailed⁶⁰
comparative analyses of the topic of the laceration of a defaulting debtor by
his creditor ranging from the law in Padua to that in Avignon and even that in
the Dutch town of Zutphen, before he arrives at the point he need to make to
save the day for Portia. And that point is that in all legal cultures a development
takes place from the literal taking of flesh to what Kohler later on in the book
calls “a world-historical necessity”⁶¹ to deny creditors like Shylock their rights.
So what matters is to ascertain the level of development in the historical period
in which Shakespeare situates his play, as if that would be a simple task to start
with.⁶² This view is odd to say the least, not least because it presumes a referen-
tial view on literature as the mirror of a specific era, one that finds its counter-
part in the jurisprudence of concepts’ ideal of the referential power of a language
of concepts, i.e. once the system of concepts has reached its zenith, the solution
to each and every legal problem will perfectly follow from it. And it is precisely
the jurisprudence of concepts that Kohler despises. What is more, in hermeneu-
tics viewed as the science of interpretation, the idea of referentiality was also al-
ready in decline, so we may consider this literalness a sign of Kohler’s positivis-
tic world view. It does fit in, however, with John Wigmore’s later idea of reading
literature as an historical source for legal professionals.⁶³
Kohler emphazises that this development is a gradual one, because before a
legal order starts rejecting a contract of the kind that Shylock has had Antonio
sign, i.e. on the ground that such contract needs to be annulled, the legal con-
umes of Pandects and opens up a deeper view into the history of law than all works of legal history
from Savigny down to Ihering.”
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 45, 51.
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 94, “eine welthistorische Nothwendigkeit.”
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 71, “Wie weit diese Entwickelung in der rechtsgeschichtlichen Periode, in
welche der Dicher das Stück verlegt, sich bereits vollendet hat, das ist der juristische Springpunkt
in der Beurtheilung des Kaufmann von Venedig,” my translation “To which degree this develop-
ment has been completed in the periode of legal history in which the poet situates the play, is pre-
cisely the legal point that stands out in our view on The Merchant of Venice.” Cf. Paul Huvelin, “Le
Procès de Shylock dans Le Marchand de Venise de Shakespeare,” Bulletin de la Société des Amis
de l’ Université de Lyon (1902): 173–198, 182 and 186, for the view that we should doubt that Shake-
speare specifically intended the audience to understand that it was sixteenth-century Venetian law
that was applicable, especially since Portia applies common law reasoning. Huvelin is one of the
few critics of the Von Ihering- Kohler controversy who specifically mentions this common law ori-
entation.
 John Henry Wigmore, “A list of legal novels,” Illinois Law Review, 2 (1908): 574–593.
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sciousness of its people will have anticipated the necessity to do so. This, I sug-
gest, already forebodes Kohler’s adherence and contribution to the Free Law
Movement, though differently than he himself later claimed when in the Fore-
word to the second edition he wrote, in a rather self-congratulatory vein,
What are my explanations of Portia’s decision other than the dawn of the Free Law Move-
ment, that is brought to light here and in my essay on the interpretation of the laws? That
through daring interpretations a law already obsolete is pushed back and a judicial custom-
ary law is created, as the as yet unconscious judicial feeling of right […] breaks though […]
and that, next to the laws, the judge’s [own] view comes to the fore as a factor of developing
the law, these are the principles of my thought, that my work has introduced to jurispru-
dence for more than three decades, principles that today have not merely gained solid
ground, but have become the foundations of the whole of our legal science.⁶⁴
What matters to me here is that Kohler prioritizes the legal consciousness of a
people, a society, as the starting point for a judicial decision. To Kohler, then,
because Shylock is devoid of any ethical feeling and deaf to the plea for
mercy, his insistance on his legal right and subsequent downfall is not tragic.
Shylock himself is a pettifogger, a “rabulististic plaintiff”⁶⁵ and therefore his
downfall is a signal that “the malignant bubonic growth is erased.”⁶⁶ It’s good
riddance to bad rubbish, and we are glad to be rid of one who recklessly dam-
aged our law. In other words, Shylock is the pariah that is excluded because he
 Josef Kohler, Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz, (Berlin: Rothschild, 1919), 2nd ed-
ition, iii, my translation of “Was sind meine Ausführungen über den Spruch der Porzia anders als
die Morgenröte der Freirechtsbewegung,welche hier und in meinem Aufsatz über die Interpretation
der Gesetze zuerst zu Tage getreten ist? Dass durch gewagte Auslegungen verlates Recht zurückge-
drängt und ein gerichtliches Gewohnheitsrecht geschaffen wird, indem das unbewusste Rechtsge-
fühl des Richters […] hindurchbricht […], und dass neben dem Gesetze das richterliche Urteil als
Faktor der Rechtsbilding hervortritt, das sind Grundgedanken, welche mein Werk vor mehr als
drei Jahrzehnte in die Jurisprudenz hineingetragen hat, Grundgedanken die heutzutage nicht
nur festen Fuss gefasst haben, sondern zu den Stützen unserer ganzen Wissenschaft geworden
sind.” See also Kohler, Forum 1919, i, for Kohler’s view that the topic of law in literature was
new when he wrote Forum in 1883, but that now it is good to see jurists paying attention to Goethe
and Ibsen, because literature offers a piece of world history that any jurist would do well to rec-
ognize is its depiction of the progress of law, “Ein Stück Weltgeschichte ist es, was der Dichter bie-
tet, und wehe dem Juristen, der in der Weltgeschichte den Rechtsfortschritt nicht zu erkennen ver-
mag,” my translation “It is a piece of world history that the poet offers and woe to the jurist who
fails to recognize in world history the progress of law.”
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 79, my translation of “rabulistischen Kläger.”
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 76–77, my translation of “die wuchernde Pestbeule ausgeätzt ist.” Note
that the German “wucherend” contains the idea of Shylock being a usurer (“Wucherer”) and the
idea that, unless stopped, his point of view will grow rampant.
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prioritizes his own legal and financial interest above the morals and values of
the community. Immoral use of the law cannot be tolerated. The tragic character
of the play is not Shylock but the judge who is the instrument in the hands of this
scoundrel and who on the basis of the laws of Venice that she has to apply, does
not know how to avoid the undesirable, bad solution that the law suggests.
To Kohler, this does not mean that Von Ihering was right when he wrote that
cutting a pound of flesh implies the shedding of blood. On the contrary, this
would mean sticking to the letter of the law, and ignoring, “the legal conscious-
ness of the judge, the legal instinct that lives in him, that has not yet developed
itself into a complete and clear insight and therefore hides itself behind the mock
argument of the wise Daniel.”⁶⁷ It is her legal consciousness that makes the
judge aware of the fact that now is the time to set aside the old law. Obviously,
the lawgiver should be aware of the instincts of the people and preferably change
the law accordingly. But since this is not always possible, the judge should act as
the intermediary between the lawgiver and the people. She should grasp the
straw that she can use to legitimize her decision, i.e. her instinctive legal con-
sciousness as the foundation of her decision, that she then clothes in the
legal garb of interpretation, as Portia does. The judge is allowed to do so once
the word of the law is too rigid. What Kohler does not tell us, however, is how
the judge is at all able to sense that the law is rigid. Criteria for this decision
are lacking so that the risk of arbitrary decisions, nourished by sentiments
other than those of law’s progress, looms large.What is more, Kohler’s argument
contains a shocking, and, I suggest, distinctively discriminatory remark to brush
aside any comments that critics might voice. The answer he gives to his own rhet-
orical question whether or not at the end of the play we should take pity on Shy-
lock whose very existence is threatened, is this: “every great advancement of so-
ciety lets no one or nothing stand in its way, in the same way each healthy walk
causes the death of a great amount of innocent animals.”⁶⁸ The metaphor is as
anti-semitic as it is false – the purpose of the walker, after all, is not to go out to
kill -, with Shylock as an insect to be trampled, which is nothing to be worried
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 83, my translation of “das Rechtsbewusstsein des Richters, der im Richter
lebende Rechtsinstinkt, der sich noch nicht zur vollständig klaren Erkenntnis heraufgearbeitet hat
und sich daher hinter den Scheingründen des weisen Daniels verbirgt”; cf. Forum 1919, 39.
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 95, my translation of “jeder grosse Fortschritt der Gesellschaft schreitet
über Leichen hinweg, ebenso wie jeder heilbringende Spaziergang einer Menge unschuldiger
Thiere den Tod bereitet.” Cf. Kohler, Forum 1883, 74, for a disparaging remark on Heinrich Heine’s
view that Shylock is the most respectable character of the play,which is odd if you read Heine who,
while calling both Portia and Shylock brilliant figures, nevertheless calls Shylock “the terrible, un-
pitying Jew” (Heine, Maidens and Women, 394).
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about, for, as Kohler insists, the devil Shylock, this enemy of law and justice,
“has forfeited life.”⁶⁹
In his Afterword Kohler explicitly points to the two premises of his argu-
ment, once more by way of reaction to Von Ihering who in the seventh edition
of Der Kampf ums Recht had referred to Kohler’s view on Shylock, but, again,
had not understood a thing. The first principle of Kohler’s legal theory indeed
heralds in the Free Law Movement: the decisive importance of judicial legal con-
sciousness; the second is the explicit acceptance of (individual) injustice in the
course of inevitable progress in and of law.⁷⁰ The “Shylock Problem” as Kohler
later calls it remains central stage in his thought, and while in his Afterword
he emphasizes that Von Ihering incorrectly presumed that he invited him to a
debate,⁷¹ his opposition to Von Ihering is what I would call a “pathological mo-
ment” in legal theory. Kohler, while admitting that Portia’s legalistic turn is un-
acceptable from a point of view of the law “as it is,”⁷² claims that it is acceptable
because Portia understands that the law is about to change, and insists that his
historical explanation shows how the judge with her discretionary power has the
duty to annihilate “the bearer of the by now defeated level of civilization” that is
Shylock.⁷³ This idea of the necessary annihilation of a “defeated level of civiliza-
 Kohler, Forum 1883, 95, my translation of “hat das Leben verwirkt.” Kohler also refers to the
Faust legend in which the devil loses, despite of the pact. For Kohler’s interest in literary-legal
connections, see also Josef Kohler and Ernst Landsberg, “Fausts Pakt mit Mephistopheles in ju-
ristischer Beleuchtung,” Goethe Jahrbuch vol. 24, II Abhandlungen, (1903): 113– 131.
 Josef Kohler, Nachwort zu Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz, (Würzburg:Verlag der
Stahel’schen Universitäts Buch- und Kunsthandlung, 1884), 1.
 Kohler, Nachwort, 3.
 Cf. Theodore Niemeyer who disagrees with the interpretations of Von Ihering, Kohler and Hu-
velin. Niemeyer dismisses Kohler’s view that Portia’s decisionwas correct: neither the result nor the
arguments are sound law.While he agrees with Von Ihering about the pettifoggish character of Por-
tia’s ruse to save Antonio, he does not follow Von Ihering’s argument that the contract was void
because contra bonas mores, but calls Shylock’s fate “the tragedy of a man who is made a sacrifice
in a typical conflict, a conflict that lies not only in his own person, not only in the dissentient views
of his own generation, but also in the discordant nature of all law.”What it means that law’s nature
is discordant, Niemeyer does not disclose, and, comparable to Kohler, he loses himself in a descrip-
tion of contemporary German law. Theodore Niemeyer, “The Judgment against Shylock in The Mer-
chant of Venice,” Michigan Law Review, vol.14.nr.1 (1915): 20–36, 36, trans. Wandell Herbruck of
Der Rechtsspruch gegen Shylock im ‘Kaufmann von Venedig’: ein Beitrag zur Würdigung
Shakespeares (Munich and Leipzig: Duncker & Humbolt, 1912).
 Josef Kohler, “Das Shylock-Problem,” Der Zeitgeist, Beiblatt zum Berliner Tageblatt, 8 Sep-
tember 1902, nr. 36, 1, mt translation of “[D]er Träger einer überwundenen Kulturstufe.”
Again Kohler fulminates against Von Ihering whose interpretation was devoid of any historical
insight and who keeps calling the way Shylock is treated as an injustice. To Kohler it is obvious
that “whoever resists the Wheel of Progress, will be crushed by it,” my translation of “Wer sich
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tion” and the role of the judge in bringing this about (apart from the legal social
Darwinism it seems to adhere to) sits uneasily with accepted principles such as
the concept of the separation of powers and the idea(l) of fair trial.What is more,
it augurs ill for the idea that law should be a bulwark to protect citizens against
unjust intrusions by the state in whatever form.
In the second edition of Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz in 1919
Kohler forcefully repeats his view that Shylock’s downfall is anything but tragic.
It cannot be tragic for that would mean that we would take his legal argument
seriously and interpret it in a positive way as a contribution to legal discourse.
This “cannot be; his downfall must itself portray the deliverance from a heavy
epidemic that threatened to torture the world.”⁷⁴ In short, it is “the dreadful
struggle of the repressed Jewry, that wants to use the law.”⁷⁵ And so we must in-
deed wonder what it means to Kohler that Shylock “stands on the boundary be-
tween two worlds,” and that Kohler insists that Shylock knew from the very start
that his case and his cause were unjust, that what he did was an intentional
abuse of law.⁷⁶
4 Gute Juristen, böse Christen?
So where’s the rub? What moved Kohler whose long and distinguished career
spans decades, whose list of publications is one hundred and fifty pages
gegen das Rad der Entwicklung aufbäumt, wird von ihm zermalmt.” Cf. Josef Kohler, “Phantasie
im Recht,” Westermanns illustrierte deutsche Monatshefte, Band 97 (1906): 239–242, 242, that
throughout the ages poets have given legal issues a literary form, the example Kohler gives
is, once more, Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice with its “subtile Rechtsfrage,” its subtle
questio iuris.
 Kohler, Forum 1919, 6, “Das darf nicht sein: sein Untergang muss selbst die Erlösung bilden
von einer schweren Epidemie, welche die Welt zu bedrängen drohte.” It should be noted that
the first and the second edition of Forum are actually two quite different books. The second edition
has an enormous excursion on debtor’s law in a comparative context; the second editon lacks the
Introduction that the first has; Von Ihering who remains the culprit in the second edition, is never-
theless not mentioned in the name register. In the second edition Kohler also takes Julius Hirsch-
feld (“Portia’s Judgement”) and Frederick Pollock (“A Note on Shylock v. Antonio,” The Law
Quarterly Rewiew (1914): 175–177) to task for their views on Portia’s verdict.
 Kohler, Forum 1919, 6, my translation of “der furchtbare Kampf des unterdrückten Judentums,
der sich des Rechts bedienen will.”
 Kohler, Forum 1919, 10, my translation of “steht an der Grenzscheide zweier Welten,” and 45,
my paraphrase and interpretation of “er war sich eben von jeher in seinem Innern bewusst, das
sein Bestreben ein materiell unrechtes war.”
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long,⁷⁷ who co-founded the International Association for the Philosophy of Law
and Social Philosophy, to engage in such an extended discussion on a single foot-
note in an equally distinguished scholar’s work?⁷⁸ Why is his interpretation of The
Merchant of Venice driven by an aversion to the theoretical views of his contem-
poraries or predecessors? Why the many antagonisms? In line with what Richard
Weisberg in his Poethics has ingeniously denoted as the ressentiment of the jurist-
verbalizer,⁷⁹ I suggest that Kohler with his one-sided emphasis on legal history, al-
beit in a geo-comparative context, favours a literal reading⁸⁰ and a scholastic her-
meneutics of referentiality that is informed by professional jealousy of Von Ihering
combined with a not too subtle form of anti-semitism.⁸¹ Kohler’s interpretation of
both Portia’s decisionmaking-process and his treatment of his colleagues is a good
example of Martin Luther’s saying “Gute Juristen, Böse Christen,” good jurists,
bad, i.e. malicious Christians.
To start with the first point, throughout his works Kohler contrasts his suppos-
edly superior neo-Hegelian view with Von Ihering’s legal amateurism.⁸² That is
strange, not only because Von Ihering and Kohler share the view that the study
of law should be practical,⁸³ and they share an aversion to Von Savigny’s emphasis
on a jurisprudence of concepts and both emphasize the purpose of the law so that
 Arthur Kohler, Josef Kohler-Bibliographie (Berlin: Rothschild, 1931). Kohler also wrote poetry,
e.g. “Lebensweisheit,” Westermanns Monatshefte 50 (1905), xlv.
 For an overview of Kohler’s career, see Andreas Gängel and Michael Schaumberg, “Josef Koh-
ler, Rechtsgelehrter und Rechtslehrer an der Berliner Alma mater um die Jahrhundertwende,” Ar-
chiv für Rechts-und Sozialphilosophie (ARSP), (1989): 289–312.
 Richard Weisberg, The Failure of the Word (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1984) and Poethics and Other Strategies of Law and Literature (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1992).
 See also Kohler’s reaction against Paul Huvelin’s view, like Pietscher’s, that Shylock should
have added a clause on the spilling of blood, Kohler, “Shylock Problem,” 1.
 That we also see in other authors, cf. O. Hood Phillips, Shakespeare and the Lawyers, 93,
“Ihering, himself a Jew, ” [my italics].
 Josef Kohler, Philosophy of Law [New York: Augustus M. Kelley, 1914] (New Jersey: Rothman,
1969), 11 and 26, “A phenomenal work like Hegel’s Rechtsphilosophie was followed by amateur-
ish platitudes like Ihering’s Zweck im Recht in which Ihering only stammers a bit about law,”
and “Ihering’s whole attempt came to grief on the rocks of a deplorable dilettantism; only an
unphilosophical mind like that of Ihering himself could find satisfaction in it.”
 Gängel and Schaumberg, “Josef Kohler,” 294, note 20, citing Josef Kohler, “Rechtsgeschichte
und Culturgeschichte,” Grünhuts Zeitschrift 12 (1885), 588, “Die Rechtswissenschaft soll praktisch
sein,weil das praktische Recht das richtige Recht ist, weil ein Recht, das zu ungesunden praktische
Resultaten führt, sich damit von selbst als ein falsches Recht, als ein Hirngespenst erweist,” my
translation “The science of law should be practical, because practical law is the right [form of]
law, because a[n individual] right that leads to unwholesome results proves itself to be incorrect
law, a chimaera.”
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it seems unlikely that Kohler begrudged Von Ihering his “turn” in legal theory,⁸⁴
but also in view of the fact that Von Ihering’s scholarship was impressive and
his interpretation of Roman law renowned. Calling Von Ihering an amateur is
therefore blatantly ridiculous. Yet, while Kohler may have had no reason to com-
plain about scholarly respect during his long career, one thing is obvious, namely
that Von Ihering is still a household-name in legal theory, while Kohler is hardly
ever mentioned, for, other than Von Ihering, Kohler had no pupils in academia, no
successors who helped continue attention to his intellectual legacy.
What is insightful is that Kohler has Nietzsche’s eponymous concept of the
Wille zur Macht as an epigraph to his textbook on legal philosophy. In his more
or less characteristic self-congratulary way, Kohler compares Nietzsche’s views
to his own, “It is striking that Nietzsche is often in agreement here [i.e. in
Wille zur Macht] with the ideas that I have expressed since my Shakespeare
vor der Forum der Jurisprudenz.”⁸⁵ Kohler’s view on the progress of a world-his-
torical consciousness and the progress of nations and their levels of culture lead
him to favouring the Nietzschean idea of the “Übermensch,” a species he already
perceived to exist in the cultured nations of the Occident, specifically if we look
at his view on the figure and the power of the judge who when she discovers in
herself the conviction that the law “as it is” should be discarded in favour of a
law fit for that presumed higher level of civilization, should act accordingly.⁸⁶
Kohler contrasts the great cultured nations, Germany being one of the more
prominent among them, with “Peoples that must be brought down, so that world
 In Űber die Interpretation von Gesetzen, Grünhuts Zeitschrift 13 (1886): 1–60, Kohler explicitly
notes that what matters is not the legislator’s intent, but what the law wants to accomplish as an
organical strife after a purpose, and that does not essentially differ from Von Ihering’s concept of
the purpose of the law.
 Josef Kohler, “Nietzsche und die Rechtsphilosophie,” ARWP (abbreviation of Archiv für
Rechts-und Wirschaftsphilosophie)1 (1908): 355–360, 355, my translation of “Merkwürdig ist,
wie Nietzsche hier [i.e. in Wille zur Macht] manchmal mit den Ideen übereinstimmt, die ich
seit meinem Shakespeare vor der Forum der Jurisprudenz geäussert habe.”
 Josef Kohler, “Auf den Spuren Nietzsches,” in Josef Kohler, Aus Kultur und Leben (Berlin: O.
Elsner, 1904), 3–10 [orig. Berliner Tagesblatt, nr 45, November 10, 1902], 5, “Der Űbermensch ist
ja schon heute da: der Europäer und Angloamerikaner sind Űbermenschen gegenüber den
Wesen niedriger Rasse.” The point is already noted by Girard who contends that while Kohler’s
historical approach is impeccable from a point of description of ancient laws, nevertheless, “M.
Kohler prend, pour un appréciation du personnage de Shylock, un point de vue un peu bien an-
tisémitique […] qui l’a mȇme conduit avec M. Ihering à une polémique fort acerbe, my transla-
tion “ Mr Kohler takes, for an analysis of the character of Shylock, a rather anti-semitic point of
view […] that has even led him to a polemic with Mr Ihering,” Paul Fréderic Girard, “Les travaux
allemands sur l’histoire du droit comparé, le Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz par
Joseph Kohler,” Nouvelle Revue Historique du Droit (1886): 224–238, 235.
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culture does not suffer distress in its very essence.⁸⁷ After World War I, Kohler is
nationalistic and somewhat reactionary in his remark that his second edition of
Shakespeare vor dem Forum der Jurisprudenz is his contribution in hard times to
prove that the Germans “are and will always be the first in science.”⁸⁸
Obviously, the idea of the judge as “Übermensch” is a dangerous concept.
The subjective judicial consciousness as the decisive factor in the judicial con-
struction of the applicable norm sits uneasily with the principles of equality be-
fore the law and legal certainty. And even though Kohler insisted that the judge’s
discretionary power was not absolute in the sense that it could go contra legem,⁸⁹
the Free Law Movement was increasingly criticized in the first decade of the twen-
tieth century. Kohler’s view on the matter has an uncanny resemblance to what
Hermann Kantorowicz wrote in his 1906 work significantly entitled Kampf um
die Rechtswissenschaft. In it, Kantorowicz argued that ultimately the progress
of the law depends on the culture and will of the (individual) judge,
We therefore demand that the judge […] decide a case as much as a case can be decided
according to the clear wording of the code. He may and should abandon this, first, the mo-
ment the code appears to him not to offer an undisputed decision; secondly, if it, according
to his free and conscientious conviction, is not likely that the state authority in power at the
time of the decision would have come to the decision as required by law. In both cases he
ought to arrive at the decision that, according to his conviction, the present state power
would have arrived at had it the individual case in mind. Should he be unable to produce
such conviction, he should then decide according to free law. Finally, in desperately in-
volved or only quantitatively questionable cases such as indemnity for emotional damages,
he should – and he must – decide according to free will.⁹⁰
 Josef Kohler, “Ein letztes Kapitel zum Recht und Persönlichkeit,” ARWP 8 (1915): 170, as cited
in Gängel and Schaumberg, 302, n.66, my translation of “Völkern die niedergedrückt werden
müssen, damit die Weltkultur nicht wesentlich notleidet.”
 Kohler, Forum 1919, iii, my translation of “dass wir in der Wissenschaft die Ersten sind und die
Ersten bleiben werden.”
 Kohler, “Über die Interpretation.” The point is elaborated upon by Hermann Kantorowicz in
“Die Contra-Legem Fabel,” DRiZ (abbr. of Deutsche Richter Zeitung, trans. German Judicial Jour-
nal) (1911): 258–263.
 Published under the pseudonym Gnaeus Flavius, “The Battle for Legal Science,” trans. Cory
Merill, German Law Review 12.11 (2006): 2005–2030, 2025, http://static1.squarespace.com/static/
56330ad3e4b0733dcc0c8495/t/56b71dcc01dbae3ec98a32bb/1454841292956/GLJ_Vol_12_No_11_Fla
vius1.pdf [my italics] (last access September 15, 2016). Cf. Gnaeus Flavius, Der Kampf um die Re-
chtswissenschaft (Heidelberg: Winter, 1906), 34, “Wir fordern deshalb, dass der Richter […], den
Fall so entscheidet, wie nach klarem Worlaut des Gesetzes zu entscheiden ist. Von diesem darf
und soll er aber absehen erstens, sobald das Gesetz ihm eine zweifellose Entscheidung nicht zu
bieten scheint; zweitens, wenn es, seiner freien und gewissenhaften Űberzeugung nach, nicht
wahrscheinlich ist, dass die zur Zeit der Entscheidung bestehende Staatsgewalt die Entscheidung
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The German judges did not agree and reacted accordingly. At the second Confer-
ence of German Judges in 1911, they restricted the freedom that the Free Law
Movement would give to judges. Firstly, they stated that all judicial power is sub-
ject to positive law, and that the judge is not allowed to deviate from positive law;
secondly, that even when the content of the law is uncertain, the judge is not al-
lowed to decide according to his own feeling, but is to solve any doubt by inter-
pretation of the law according to its intended meaning and purpose, when need
be by means of analogy; thirdly that in event that a law can be interpreted in
different ways, the judge must give precedence to the interpretation that best
fits the general legal consciousness and the demands of society.⁹¹ In the latter,
stricter requirement than the Free Law’s unbridled subjectivism, we can see
the turn to the sociological view espoused by Von Ihering. So it may well be
that Kohler’s diatribe kept feeding on the disappointment that Von Ihering’s
view, as had been the case since his turn to the jurisprudence of interests, pre-
vailed. The Free Law Movement subsequently petered out and was discontinued
in 1933.⁹² The year is as significant as it is ominous, because by then what the
Free Law theorists had propagated was trumped by the very instincts of the peo-
ple (healthy as these supposedly are) as the new, formal and sole guideline for
judicial decisionmaking, “das gesundes Empfinden des Volkes” as the National
Socialist creed had it.
There the fuss about the footnote ended. And what a fuss it was if we con-
sider that the Law of the Twelve Tables on the subject of debt enslavement had
already been abolished in 326 BCE.⁹³ So this goes to show that uses and abuses
so getroffen haben würde, wie das Gesetz verlangt. In beiden Fällen soll er die Entscheidung tref-
fen, die seiner Überzeugung nach die gegenwärtige Staatsgewalt, falls der einzelne Fall ihr vor-
geschwebt hätte, getroffen haben würde.Vermag er sich eine solche Überzeugung nich herzustelen,
so soll er nach freiem Recht entscheiden.”
 Kampf ums Recht, the introduction by Ermacora, 55–56, my translation of “1. Die richterliche
Gewalt ist dem Gesetz unterworfen. Der Richter hat deshalb niemals die Befugnis, vom Recht ab-
zuweichen. 2. Die Zweifelhaftigkeit des Gesetzesinhalt berechtigt den Richter nicht, nach seinem
Ermessen zu entscheiden; vielmehr ist der Zweifel durch Auslegung des Gesetzes nach Sinn und
Zweck und zutreffendenfals nach Analogie zu lösen. 3. Ist ein Gesetz verschiedener Auslegung
fähig, so hat der Richter derjenigen Auslegung, welche dem Rechtsbewusstsein und den Verkehr-
bedürfnissen am besten entspricht, den Vorzug zu geben.”
 Riebschläger, Freirechtsbewegung, 89.
 Cf. Mary Beard, S.P.Q.R., A History of Ancient Rome [2015] (London: Profile Books, 2016), 14,
for the sobering view on the Twelve Tables that “later Romans looked on this motley collection
of regulations as the beginning of their distinguished tradition of law,” and 142 for the view that
later on, as a result of paraphrasing the earlier texts, “In some cases, even learned Roman law-
yers misunderstood what they read in the Twelve Tables. The idea that a defaulting debtor who
had several creditors could be put to death and his body divided between them, in appropriately
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of literature in the sense of out-of-context appropriations for purposes of the de-
velopment of (a) legal theory, or for self-aggrandizement should be viewed crit-
ically. Sometimes there is already also something outside the text, pace Derrida.
The example of the Kohler-Von Ihering controversy should also make us pause
and reflect on contemporary interdisciplinary ventures lest we perpetuate an-
cient or new grudges to the detriment of the future development of Law and
the Humanities and end up with a reductionist picture of both Shakespeare
and the law, and our own field(s) of inquiry.
sized pieces, according to the amount owed, looks like one such misunderstanding (or so many
modern critics have hoped),” and 563, the abolition of debt enslavement in 326 BCE.
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François Ost
Measure for Measure: Are Criminal Laws
Made to Be Applied?
1 Text and context
Shakespeare wrote Measure for Measure¹ in 1604, when James VI, King of the
Scots, had just ascended the throne of England as James I.
The plot of this play, which shifts between tragedy and comedy and, as is
often the case with Shakespeare, is overflowing with twists and secondary intri-
gues, is not easy to summarize. The following is an initial overview.
In an imaginary Vienna, a degree of licentiousness has grown roots. The
Duke, who wields power in a somewhat carefree manner, decides to step aside
and temporarily yield the regency to Angelo, a person of severe righteousness.
As soon as he is in charge, Angelo rushes to bring back into application a
law that had been allowed to slumber and which punishes extramarital relations
with death. He also orders that the brothels be closed, and arrests, and then sen-
tences to death, an unfortunate gentleman, Claudio, whose only wrong is to have
impregnated his fiancée, Juliet.
Claudio’s friends spring into action; Lucio, who plays the part of a roguish
clown, solicits the sister of the unfortunate man, Isabella, a novice preparing
to enter the Order of Saint Clare. Lucio begs her to obtain a pardon for Claudio
from the inflexible Angelo. At the same time, and parallel to the main plot, there
is a subplot that unfolds in Vienna’s clubs and brothels, and involves protago-
nists from a carnival of pimps, prostitutes and representatives of order who
will act as the distorting mirror of the main characters facing one another in
the palace.
Of course, Isabella does not succeed in persuading the regent until he, taken
with a sudden, guilty passion for her innocent candour, proposes an “odious
ransom:” her virginity for Claudio’s head. As one might suspect, Isabella bridles,
outraged. Even when her brother begs her, she cannot be brought to sacrifice her
virtue.
 I had the opportunity to work with three French translations of the play: that by René Galland
(Paris: Éditions Les belles lettres, 1930); that by André Markowicz (Besançon: Éditions Les Soli-
taires intempestifs, 2008), with a Preface by Margaret Jones-Davies; and finally that by Jean-Mi-
chel Deprats (Paris: Éditions théâtrales, 2001), with an analysis and substantial notes by Anny
Crunelle-Vanrigh.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-010
At this point in the drama, the Duke, who had only apparently disappeared,
comes back on stage (disguised as a friar) and from then on takes control of the
plot. He remembers that, not long before, Angelo broke his own engagement
with Mariana, considering her dowry insufficient. The rest of the plot, controlled
behind the scenes by the Duke, leads to the thwarting of Angelo’s plans and
soon, in the final conclusion:
– Mariana takes Isabella’s place during a nocturnal rendez-vous proposed by
Angelo (the classical “bed trick”);
– when Angelo, despite the sacrifice of what he thought was Isabella’s virgin-
ity, breaks his word again and demands that he be brought Claudio’s head,
he will be presented with the head of a prisoner who died of natural causes
(the “head trick”).
The time is ripe for the Duke to make a public return. Immediately, he sets up a
huge trial to deal with the complaint of the unfortunate Isabella, who has been
kept in ignorance of the subterfuge that saved her brother’s life. Angelo, whose
moral turpitude is now exposed to the light of day, admits his wrongs and de-
mands that he be sentenced to capital punishment. However, the Duke, faithful
to his jurisprudence, has other designs: after getting Isabella to forgive Angelo,
he also grants him grace, though not without first having forced him to marry
Mariana. Similarly, this time intervening in the subplot, he forces Lucio, the ro-
guish clown, to marry the prostitute he impregnated.
As is the case in many of Shakespeare’s plays, the story is directly related to
the current events of the time. When the play was performed before the King at
Whitehall the day after Christmas 1604, James I (of the Stuart line) had just as-
cended the throne of England, thus ending Elizabeth I’s long reign, and at the
same time the Tudor domination. The situation was difficult, marked by wars
of succession, famine and the ravages of the plague (36,000 dead in London,
out of a population of around 200,000 at the time); there was also great uncer-
tainty concerning the style and intentions of the new king. In London, the man-
ual of political instructions (the Basilikon Doron) that the King had written for his
son, Prince Henry, was circulating secretly, although it would soon be public. In
it one could find in particular the exhortation to ensure that law be strictly ap-
plied for fear that licentiousness would take root and repression would become
impossible or, if repression was nonetheless necessary, it would appear as arbi-
trary and discriminatory.
Another current event: the very recent order to close brothels (September 16,
1603). The measure was probably justified first out of concern to limit the spread
of the plague – a scourge that also led to the postponement by six months of the
coronation celebrations. However, this decision can also be interpreted as an op-
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portunity to strengthen social control and raise the moral standards of a poten-
tially seditious London mob.
Here again, Shakespeare takes control of this controversial question – at the
crossroads of the requirements of social order and the necessities of desire – and
he does not fail to frame it as a problem: is such a measure legitimate? Has it the
slightest chance of being effective? We cannot eradicate the passions, yet can we
regulate them?
2 Title and interpretation
We are gradually moving towards an understanding of the play by taking its title
very seriously. The idea of measure is precisely both the guiding thread and its
moral. This cannot fail to attract the attention of jurists, who know that law is,
in its essence and function, the art of measure.²
The entire play never ceases questioning the idea of exchange: can every-
thing be traded (Isabella’s virtue for Claudio’s life, for example, or Mariana’s
body for that of Isabella? – and this leads to the inevitable slide toward the
theme of prostitution that makes itself felt as a continuous bass vibrato: the
body of a woman for money?) Again, on the penal level this time, must we
say that the punishment has to be equal to the crime? If so, how can that meas-
urement be performed?
The measure referred to here is paradoxical in a drama in which so many
cross the line; in fact, “Excess for Excess” could have just as well been the
title.³ Angelo’s excess of legalistic rigor leads to Isabella’s excessive indignation,
who does not hesitate to sacrifice her brother to save her virtue. The dispropor-
tion of Claudio’s punishment (death for having had carnal relations with his
fiancée, who was perhaps already his wife according to certain interpretations
of the law in effect at that time – cf. infra); the unbridled violence of Isabella,
who calls death down upon her brother’s head, accusing him of a kind of incest
 François Ost, Le temps du droit (Paris: Odile Jacob, 1999), 333–334. The law is measurement in
at least four senses: (1) It consists in a set of “measures” (norms, rules); (2) It is an instrument of
measure, modelled after scales that establish the right proportions in human relations; (3) It ex-
presses the middle way, targets balance and moderation, and is in opposition to excess; (4) In
the ongoing adjustment, the law sets the measurement, this time in the temporal sense: it sets
the appropriate rhythm, the choice of the right moment, the tempo given to the march of the
social.
 Anny Crunelle-Vanrigh, Sur mesure. Documents et notes, in the translation of Measure for
Measure, J. M. Déprats, (Éditions théâtrales, 2001), 134, 144.
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(“Is’t not a kind of incest to take life / From thin own sister’s shame? […] / Die;
perish,” 3.1.138– 140).
The Duke will probably intervene to set things straight and re-establish
measure. But exactly what measure? This is the fundamental question and
also the moral of the story, which will come clear when the Duke subjects Isabel-
la to her final ordeal in the last scene. Either it will be “one for one,” which
evokes the ancient lex talionis, restated in the Old Testament: “And thine eye
shall not pity; but life shall go for life, eye for eye, tooth for tooth, hand for
hand, foot for foot” (Deuteronomy 19:21). In this case, it will be “An Angelo
for Claudio, death for death! / […] Like doth quit like, and Measure still for Meas-
ure” (5.1.407–411).
Or else the Christological interpretation of the New Testament will prevail,
which causes grace and mercy to triumph over the strict logic of the judgement
of equivalence. “Judge not that ye be judged. For with what judgement ye judge,
ye shall be judged: and with what measure ye mete, it shall be measured to you
again. And why beholdest thou the mote that is in thy brother’s eye, but consid-
erest not the beam that is in thine own eye?” (Matthew, 7:1–5).We come closer to
our story when we recall the episode of the adulterous woman pardoned by
Jesus, after he first thwarts the legalism of the Pharisees: “He that is without
sin among you, let him first cast a stone at her” (John 8:3– 11). The point becomes
even clearer when we remember that it was precisely in a commentary on these
passages that Saint Augustine, for the first time it seems, referred to the “odious
ransom” imposed on a young woman forced to choose between her virginity and
her husband’s life. Far from condemning her sacrifice, Saint Augustine saw it on
the contrary as a proof of love. This lesson in tolerance must not have escaped
Shakespeare since Saint Augustine’s texts were known and appreciated by the
contemporaries of Montaigne and Shakespeare. In this case – and this will be
Isabella’s choice – Angelo’s life will be saved; in return for evil, he will receive
good (“Well, Angelo, your evil quits you well,” 5.1.495).
The play is thus divided between measure and excess, seeking the best
“common measure.” Sometimes, passions are unleashed, with all of their de-
structive excesses; sometimes there is strict equivalence, the logic of an eye
for an eye, which still underlies our thought, even though we have the penal
paradigm of retribution of which we will speak below. While it is vulnerable
to the twofold criticism of being archaic and formalistic, the lex talionis has at
least the merit of containing the excesses of punishment (which is all the differ-
ence between socially instituted vengeance and uncontrolled popular scapegoat-
ing); sometimes, lastly, there is the excess of grace and forgiveness that avoids
give and take, but “from above” this time, through a free, gratuitous action.
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With mercy, we come back to a form of “excess” that flows from a logic of “sup-
plement” to which we will come back.⁴
These preliminary discussions concerning the exegesis of the title say
enough about the difficulties involved in interpreting the play as a whole.⁵ In
Shakespeare’s corpus,Measure for Measure is considered unclassifiable: it is nei-
ther a true comedy, nor a true tragedy. In short, it is a problem play, an enigma
fed both by the composite style of the work and by the ambiguity of the charac-
ters, the ambiguity of its moral and the depth of its themes. (It has been argued,
for example, that the true motif of the work is defamation, and that regulating
sexual behaviour is only a screen.)⁶
Under these conditions, the commentators’ perplexity is not surprising, nor
is the fact that it continues to be staged in a wide variety of ways. Thus,while it is
possible to give priority to a relatively positive, edifying interpretation of the play
by drawing from it a lesson in juridical wisdom (“penal laws are not made to be
applied wholesale, at least not systematically”), as we will do, or even a way to
live and forgive in the face of death-dealing forces (which we will call the logic of
“supplement”), there is nothing to prevent one, in contrast, from drawing from
the drama a suspicious, Foucauldian logic that would see, in decadent Vienna,
the theatre of re-establishment of control by a manipulative Duke, renouncing
the ostentation of the show of public punishment for widespread social control,
a prelude to full regulation.⁷
 On the role of equity and mercy in the play, see Daniela Carpi, “Law, Discretion, Equity in The
Merchant of Venice and Measure for Measure,” Cardozo Law Review 5.6 (2005): 2325–2329.
 For an overview of these various interpretations, see Ian Ward, Shakespeare and the Legal
Imagination (London: Butterworths, 1999), 83ff.
 In this sense, see Mariangela Tempera, “Slander and Slanders in Measure for Measure,” in
Shakespeare and the Law, ed. Daniela Carpi (Ravenna: Longo, 2003), 127ff. It is true that
James I seemed obsessed with defamation and meant to punish it severely.
 We find arguments in this sense in the notes, cited above, of Crunelle-Vanrigh, Sur mesure.
Documents et notes, 140. The author refers, in parallel, to the slide of strategies of power, re-
nouncing the theatre of politics in favour of panopticon mechanisms – a thesis supported by
the Duke’s omnipresence in all the shady corners of the city: jails, monks’ cells, dens of iniquity.
Going even further, the author suggests that the Duke encourages misconduct in order to regu-
late it better.
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3 Legal issues: are criminal laws made to be
applied?
As we have said, the repression has fallen upon the unfortunate Claudio, and
now he is displayed, in his chemise, on the public square (“why dost thou
show me thus to th’ world?”, 1.2.116); this was the first stage of the punishment
for those who were guilty of extramarital sexual relations. (Only Juliet’s pregnan-
cy spares her for the moment.) Angelo’s repressive policy is part of the classical
“culture of shame” that Michel Foucault speaks about, a culture that also ap-
pealed to the crowd assembled at the foot of pillories, gallows and other execu-
tion venues.⁸
However, questions remain about the effectiveness of this type of legislation.
On this point, the pimp Pompey does not tire of exercising his flair for mockery:
Mistress Overdone is worried about the order to close the brothels? She should
take comfort! “Though you change your place you need not / change your
trade”, 1.2.98–99). Escalus reminds him about the prohibition against prenuptial
relations? Pompey retorts: “Does your worship mean to geld and spay all the /
youth of the City? […] / Truly, sir, in my poor opinion, they will to it then”,
2.1.229–233).
This leads us to the central argument of the play: Was Angelo well advised –
was he even authorized – to bring this repressive legislation out of relative ob-
solescence?⁹ This question is developed at length: no less than four characters
set out the stakes using a network very rich in images and metaphors.
Thus, the Duke reveals some of his intentions to a friar who is sheltering
him:
We have strict statutes and most biting laws,
The needful bits and curbs to headstrong steeds,
Which for this fourteen years we have let slip;
Even like an o’orgrown lion in a cave,
That goes not out to prey. Now, as fond fathers,
Having bound up the threatening twigs of birch,
Only to stick it in their children’ sight
 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et punir (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), 70.
 On the question in general, see Harry Keushian, “Punishment Theory in the Renaissance: the
Law and the Drama,” in Shakespeare and the Law, eds. Gary Watt and Paul Raffield (Oxford: Hart
publishing, 2008), 175 ff. The author bases his analysis of the difference between strictness and
fairness on the twofold nature of English jurisdictions: common law courts (stricter, fodder for
tragedies) and jurisdictions of equity (more utilitarian, fodder for comedies).
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For terror, not to use, in time the rod
Becomes more mock’d than fear’d; so our decrees,
Dead to infliction, to themselves are dead,
And liberty plucks justice by the nose. (1.3.24–29)
Finally, it is Angelo himself who states this penal philosophy in complete clarity:
We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it
Their perch, and not their terror. (2.1.1–5)
We will soon see, in light of Michel van de Kerchove’s analysis, what “criminal
paradigm” Angelo’s resolution belongs to. However, in order to gain a complete
picture, we still have to identify two motivations that, while more discreet, none-
theless help to explain his attitude. Indeed, the regent does not seem to be con-
tent with re-affirming the law to ensure compliance with it after it has been vio-
lated; his concern is also to prevent future crimes:
The law hath not been dead, though it hath slept
Those many had not dar’d to do that evil
If the first that did th’edict infringe
Had answer’d for his deed. (2.2.115– 118)
Likewise, the concern for a form of restorative justice with respect to victims is
not foreign to him, at least on the rhetorical level (the scene places him in op-
position to Isabella, who corners him):
[…] I pity those I do not know,
Which a dismiss’d offence would after gall […] (2.2.101– 102)
Let us accept, following Angelo’s position, that it is necessary, for various rea-
sons, to ensure the complete and entire strength of criminal law in general.
Yet, could we not – this is Isabella’s argument – make exceptions in certain
cases in which there are duly substantiated reasons? Cannot in-principle penal
rigor ever accommodate minor equity? Can we not “Condemn the fault and
not the actor of it?”– Angelo sweeps the question away with the back of his
hand: “Why, every fault’s condemn’d ere it be done[…]” (2.2.38).
Isabella then has to raise the stakes: the appeal to mercy and forgiveness:
“But you might do’t [pardon him], and do the world no wrong.” Too late, he
has been condemned, replies the rigid Angelo – and so the beautiful novice re-
fers, as a last resort, to the argument of divine justice: If the supreme judge par-
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dons, He who knows all our failings, who are we to judge? (2.2).¹⁰ Angelo’s re-
sponse it to take cover, once again, behind the law: “It is the law, not I condemn
your brother.”
Isabella is not the only one, far from it, to try to calm Angelo’s repressive fer-
vor. The Prevost himself, officer of justice, aware that “[a]ll sects, all ages, smack
of this vice,” tries to avoid rushing into anything; while he delays and Angelo
presses him to take action, he protests: “Lest I might be too rash; / Under
your good correction, I have seen / When, after execution, judgment hath / Re-
pented o’er his doom” (2.2.7– 10). Without succumbing to unwelcome anachron-
isms, we can think that arguments drawn from the procedural guarantees of due
process of law are mainly what inspire the moderation of this professional of jus-
tice. Moreover, Escalus, the wise advisor to the Duke, who has remained at his
post in Angelo’s shadow, says nothing different: “Ay, but yet / Let us be keen,
and rather cut a little / Than fall and bruise to death” (2.1.5–6).
Naturally, all of this prepares the way for the Duke to make his grand re-en-
trance on stage, during the “last judgment” (the term is not inappropriate since
the Duke’s justice is largely inspired by divine mercy) and his deluge of verdicts.
Angelo and Lucio, one in a serious mode, the other with a comical tone, will
suffer comparable fates (5.1. 548–549): each one, after being forced to marry, will
be condemned to capital punishment (in the case of Angelo: “We do condemn
thee to the very block Where Claudio stooped to death”; in Lucio’s case: “The
nuptial finish’d Let him be whipped and hanged”). Next, however, it will be
the pardon and commutation of the sentences (in Angelo’s case: “I find an apt
remission in myself”; in Lucio’s: “Thy slanders I forgive; and therewithal
Remit thy other forfeits”).
Where does this “apt remission” come from? The Duke raises a corner of the
veil, in which could very well be the final appraisal resulting from his experience
as an observer-participant in the political life of his duchy: “I have seen corrup-
tion boil and bubble / Til it o’errun the stew: laws for all faults, / But laws so
countenanced that the strong statutes / Stand like the forfeits in a barber’s
shop, / As much in mock as mark” (5.1.342–345). It is a valuable observation
since it will escape no one that it rings in perfect counterpoint with the reasons
justifying bringing the law back into effect. In the end, the Duke prefers sleeping
law to law applied in a corrupt manner.
 In fact, Isabella uses two other arguments during this confrontation. On one hand, she re-
fers, not without finesse, to the argument of the arbitrariness of a condemnation that comes
after two years of tolerance: “Who is it who has died for this offence? There’s many have com-
mitted it.” On the other hand, and we will come back to this, she invites, prophetically, Angelo to
put himself in the place of the man he is condemning: “If he had been as you, and you as he.”
190 François Ost
Now let us return, in a more theoretical mode, to the central question: Are
criminal laws made to be applied? Despite its apparently provocative nature,
this question relays a concern that applies to law as a whole, as Dean Jean Car-
bonnier subtly points out: “The mundane phrase that the legal norms are made
to be applied, although it seems like a truism, is not a truth. Or at least not a
universal truth.”¹¹ The author recalls the merits of comminatory orders, that “un-
certainty of efficiency” that makes possible an economy of penal means and very
often suffices to ensure the effectiveness of the penal system.
In an important and often cited article,¹² Michel van de Kerchove approaches
the question from the following angle: with regard to the different functions as-
signed to punishment, what criminal model most easily accommodates purely
selective application? Three models are considered. First, the axiological, retrib-
utive model, in which a punitive or repressive philosophy clearly dominates.
Criminal law tends toward the protection of the social order itself and punishes
attacks on goods that are considered essential. Legal vengeance is in question in
this case, and sanctions are measured according to the seriousness of the of-
fence. It is understandable that, of all the models, this is the one that has the
most trouble accommodating partial ineffectiveness of penal law. Second,
there is the preventive model, of utilitarian inspiration. In this case, the gaze
turns from the past of the guilty action to the future, with a view to prevention
in the broad sense (dissuasion, neutralization, rehabilitation). Application of the
penal sanction is no longer considered a good in itself, but as an instrument in
service to an external good: the prevention of the crime in the mind of the guilty
party or any other potential offender. Only truly harmful forms of behaviour are
established as offences and only truly dangerous individuals will have the pun-
ishment applied to them. Criminal law is applied with flexibility and discretion,
in the name of a superior principle of effectiveness. Lastly, a third model flows
from the concern for a symbolic reaffirmation of a prohibition. In this case, what
is sought is a symbolic reaffirmation of values protected by the norm, not in the
mechanical sense of the paradigm of retribution, but rather with a socio-peda-
gogical goal designed to inculcate, spread and reaffirm, on a symbolic level,
the strong values that structure the collective consciousness. In this context, af-
firmation of the law is considered more important than the associated punish-
ment, and we can speak of partial decriminalization.
 Jean Carbonnier, Flexible droit. Textes pour une sociologie du droit sans rigueur, (Paris: LGDJ,
1971), 101. [Our translation.]
 Michel Van de Kerchove, “Les lois pénales sont-elles faites pour être appliquées?,” Journal
des tribunaux, (1985): 239–334; Van de Kerchove, Sens et non-sens de la peine (Brussels: Presses
de l’Université Saint-Louis, 2009).
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What conclusions can be drawn from these observations for the analysis of
Measure for Measure? Clearly, Angelo’s attitude is inspired by the axiological-re-
tributive model, including the anonymous, automatic aspect of the sanction,
which takes the equivalence of the lex talionis as its model. Crime must be pun-
ished because it is crime, and the sanction is to be calculated in proportion to
the seriousness of the offence. Angelo’s point of view is at once legalistic, literal
and backward-looking; his eye is turned to the past and he sees no further than
the letter of the text – for these two reasons, he will not gain the stature of states-
man.
In contrast, the Duke is quite comfortable with the relative material ineffec-
tiveness of criminal law. Can his behaviour be explained through the reference to
a single model? It is probably wiser to explain it using reasons drawn from each
of them, since it is true that in practice the various paradigms are applied in a
cumulative manner.
Thus, the Duke certainly must share some of the procedural scruples ex-
pressed by his lieutenants, the Prevost and Escalus (a self-restraint phenomenon
with a view to the requirements of due process of law). As the statesman he is, he
certainly does not seek a revengeful, mechanical application of criminal law. The
way he applies it is instead flexible and discriminating, with a view to the future
and with a general concern for prevention. Lastly, he is certainly more attached
to the symbolic affirmation of the values underlying the prohibition than to its
systematic application to offenders.We have seen that he is not stingy with par-
dons and that he employs with perseverance all of the resources for differentiat-
ing among punishment, sentencing and execution.
However, while he rather systematically evades penal prohibitions, he re-
frains from repealing them as he would have the power to do. Even better, we
have not forgotten that his partial withdrawal was explained in particular by
the concern to assign to an inflexible regent the unpopular task of recalling
the prohibition at a time when libertinism was spreading dangerously in his
states. This proves the observation that the symbolic effectiveness of the norm
cannot survive over the long term unless it is, at least from time to time, reacti-
vated by truly being applied.
4 Anthropological stakes: pardon and life, the
logic of supplement
As pertinent as they may be, these socio-juridical analyses do not exhaust the
meaning of the play. In order to try to do it justice, we have to take a more en-
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compassing perspective, of an anthropological order. Its ultimate point, in line
with the momentum that flows through the whole plot, is the celebration of
life and pardon, according to a logic of free gift and supplement: a declaration
of life despite the suffering of existence (the stench of the plague that was dec-
imating the population of London at the time), the generosity of forgiveness de-
spite the ravages of vice and corruption.¹³
However, the approach of this logic of supplement (d) implies a series of
prior mediations: it presupposes the ethical capacity of decentring, which con-
sists in placing oneself in another’s shoes or, even better, discovering the
other in oneself ((c) “If he had been as you, and you as he”). In turn, that capaci-
ty supposes that we become aware of the relativity of the separation of desire
and the law – or, to speak more frankly, of the subversion of the law by desire
(b). Lastly, this subversive theme is itself announced and performed in the
work through a whole series of substitutions, subterfuges and confusions that
we must first bring to light (a).
(a) Substitutions
In a fascinating chiaroscuro interplay (palace lights, the shadows of the jail cell
and the brothels, the unreliable light of Lucio, the will-o-the-wisp rogue clown),
coming and going between the high and the low (the summit of power, the dregs
of the slums), and suspicious images (out of sync, doubled) reflected by a wide
variety of distorting mirrors, the play deploys a twisting plot that moves ahead
only through slides and substitutions, two-tongued talk and double games.
First, there is a topographical confusion in that upside down Vienna, with
trap doors and secret passages that, from the convent cell to that of the jail,
from the alcove in the brothel to the backroom of the executioner, and from
those to the antechambers of the palace – not to mention the garden where
the trick is played, to the great dismay of the fallen Angel.
Next, there is the slide in roles from the beginning of the play: the Duke puts
on a friar’s cloak (a prelude to a long series of masquerades) – which will soon
be answered, at the end of the play, with the engagement of the pimp wearing
the executioner’s livery.
 In the play, love itself appears largely corrupted: from the prostitution that dictates life in the
slums to the venal nature of legitimate unions, largely conditional on the size of the dowry (both
Claudio and Angelo explain the postponement or breaking of promises by questions of insuffi-
cient dowry, 2.1).
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Moreover, as is natural, it is first language that is marked by the confusions.
We laugh heartily at the clumsy retorts of the unfortunate Constable Elbow, who
systematically uses one word when he means another. Yet, when we look at it
closely, this clownlike confusion is only the out-of-sync reflection of the shifti-
ness affecting the language of the powerful: the Duke, who gives Angelo’s “dep-
utation all the organs of our own power” (2.1.20), and Angelo who,with complete
ambiguity, discusses with Isabella the question of “to do it” or “not to do it”
(“pleased you to do ‘t at peril of your soul”, 3.4.68–69).
(b) When desire subverts the law
Shakespeare must be convinced of it: sex drive is as natural as it is universal; we
can probably try to channel it, but trying to contain it is pure madness.We have
already recalled the firm opinions of the wise Prevost in this respect (“All sects,
all ages smack of this vice,” 2.2.5) and there are also those of the dubious Pom-
pey (“If you head and hang all that offend that way but for ten year together,
you’ll have to give out a commission for more heads,” 2.1).
Angelo is also well convinced of this; therefore, to combat what he sees as a
manifestation of the devil, he deploys energy proportional to the force of evil.
However, we soon see that this zeal is not as innocent as he would have us be-
lieve, thus anticipating the words of Voltaire and Pascal. Voltaire: “Anyone who
seeks to destroy the passions instead of controlling them is trying to play the
angel” – like Angelo, precisely; but Voltaire must have had in mind Pascal’s
“whoever would play the angel plays the brute.” This is the truth of Angelo: be-
hind the incorruptible saint, the lustful ape. Let us understand this well: it is not
enough to say that Angelo, the austere regent, is troubled by physical passions
from time to time. This would be mundane and simplistic, and yet would make
the man more human. What Shakespeare suggests – the lesson is much more
troubling– is that Angelo is overwhelmed by his desires in the very exercise of
power. This would not be, once again, in the mundane sense in which he uses
his authority to achieve his ends, but in the sense that it is his puritan zeal
that is itself entirely driven by sex. Claudio understands this well when, in
scene 2, he reveals the truth about Angelo’s obscure power with the help of a
network of metaphors with explicit sexual connotations:
Or whether the public body be
A horse whereon the governor doth ride,
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Who, newly in the seat, that it may know
He can command, lets it straight feel the spur; (1.2.156– 160).¹⁴
Moreover, Angelo himself soon admits the disturbing enjoyment that he finds in
exercising his authority over Claudio and thus having the innocent Isabella in his
power. Lucid, the regent himself finds the words to express the turmoil he feels:
not the very natural stirring of emotions at the sight of the young novice in tears,
but instead, directly, the abjection, in other words, very precisely, the confusion
of the most sacred with the most vile.
[…] Having waste ground enough,
Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary,
And pitch our evils there? (2.2.20–22).
Later, when he sees Isabella again, the right words again come to him, perfectly
aligned with the money metaphor that has been flowing throughout the play:
Their saucy sweetness that do coin heaven’s image
In stamps that are forbid[…] (2.4.45–46).
Lastly, when Isabella finally understands his intentions and escapes them in the
most energetic way possible, Angelo gives free reign to his libido, and this re-
veals sadistic aspects: torture, not only death for Claudio, Juliet’s body subjec-
tion to all of his whims, and to crown it all, delectation of the impunity guaran-
teed by his high office. Thus, Angelo’s perversion is brought to light: he is not
content with ordinary corruption obtained through little arrangements with jus-
tice. Instead, under the cover of restoring common statutes, he plans to impose
his own law: the dictatorship of his desire, transforming all of his partners into
objects (Marianna rejected, Isabella raped, Claudio and soon Juliet killed) and
asphyxiating all of his relationships in the rarified air of what Sade called “isol-
ism.”
Facing him, Isabella’s character, while she initially attracts sympathy like
Antigone’s character, proves to be just as complex. Her fragile innocence is a
poor veil for an excess of passion. When she appears in scene 4 of Act 1, are
her first words not to call for “more strict restraint” in the Order of Saint Clare
that she is preparing to enter? She never yields her horror of sexual sin to the
terror Angelo threatens. Indeed, at no point does she contest the legality of
the prohibition that strikes her brother or the seriousness of the crime of
 Sexual connotations: horse and whores are homophones, and ride.
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which he is guilty. When she speaks of flesh, she uses expressions such as
“ahorr’d pollution” and “yield My body up to shame” (2.4.104). Moreover,
while she does not lack courage when pleading for her brother, she does not con-
sider for a second, even when he begs her, sacrificing her chastity for him.
In sum, she appears as the faithful reflection of the regent’s strictness, the
proud vestal virgin sacrificed on the altar of virtue. However, the parallel is trou-
bling and requires us to take a closer look at it also. Is not this attachment to
principles, which would take priority over the very life of a brother, not also sus-
pect? Who will describe Isabella’s dark sides?¹⁵ She herself, perhaps; she reveals
(another point in common with Antigone) a desire for death that is clearly sex-
ually driven when she grasps the unworthy exchange she has been offered:
[…] were I under the terms of death,
Th’impression of keen whips I’d wear as rubies,
And strip myself to death as to a bed
That longing have been sick for, ere I’d yield (2.4.100– 105).
That thing that she nonetheless “abhors to name” (2.1), the sexual desire that she
suppresses so violently, does it not return in the absolutism of her resolutions?
(c) Moving away from self-centredness. And if it were you?
The aesthetics of substitutions (a) and the theme of subversion of the law by de-
sire (b) produce a critical view and disclose, in short, a suspicious, passably dis-
enchanted anthropology. However, we are also permitted (and our hypothesis is
that Shakespeare actually invites us to do so) to draw from this the resources of
an ethics of shared humanity that could very well soon lead to mercy and for-
giveness.
What have we found so far? A horde of more or less carnavalesque metamor-
phoses, substitutions of roles, two-tongued discourses and double-dealing,
dodgy principles, the duplicity of many characters. Beings who are masked,
twisted, corrupted, disguised.
So be it. Yet, Shakespeare seems to suggest that we might be able to simply
acknowledge this disturbing truth rather than suppress it.We would then discov-
er the other in oneself, for better or for worse. We would know we are fragile,
vulnerable, criss-crossed with many cracks, but also complex, human, probably
 Erika Rackley, “Judging Isabelle: Justice, Care and Relationships in Measure for Measure,” in
Shakespeare and the Law, eds. Watt and Raffield, 65.
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better able to listen, understand and interact. The poet said, “I is Somebody
Else”; the philosopher went one further: “Oneself as Another.”
We can make the hypothesis that this is the point of departure for any ethics
worthy of the name (we are speaking of ethics, which is a question of values and
standards; and not morals, which concern principles and prohibitions). It is
based on a simple two-letter word: “if,” a word that has the tremendous
power of introducing a wedge into dogmatic certainties and contains the formi-
dable potential to unleash the possibilities slumbering in reasons and minds.
“If he had been as you, and you as he.” The proud subject is invited to look
deep within his conscience: “He that is without sin among you, let him first cast
a stone at her” and the Pharisee legalists disperse. In a word, the prophet man-
aged to make them feel their sameness with the prostitute. Do not do unto others,
continues the prophet, and suddenly the subject, who believed he was invulner-
able is projected in his imagination into the possible situation of the other, vul-
nerable and dependant.
It is possible to argue – without risk of being contradicted – that the “if”
strategy – “If he had been as you, and you as he?” – creates a rhythm in the
play, like a leitmotiv, and is, from the beginning to the end, the instrument
that both thwarts Angelo and finally saves him. This theme occurs innumerable
times throughout the plot.
For example, Escalus to Angelo:
Whether you had not sometime in your life
Err’d in this point which you now censure him. (2.1.20–21)
(d) Logic of supplement. Excess of forgiveness. Stubbornness of life.
Let us repeat: forgiving is a very special social institution: nothing should make
it compulsory. As such, it is the manifestation par excellence of sovereign justice.
Its essence is divine, as Isabella, who has run out of arguments, does not fail to
remind Angelo: In your place, God would have pardoned (2.2).
Moreover, the play shows how narrow the path of forgiveness is, between
laxity and corruption, two figures that are very present in the plot. Laxity produ-
ces a sort of slackening of the rule or obliteration of values that then encourages
other transgressions. In support of Angelo’s new policy, the wise Escalus recalls
a time when his sinister consequences had not yet shown themselves:
[Angelo’s severity] is but needful:
Mercy is not itself that oft looks so:
Pardon is still the nurse of second woe. (2.1.269–271).
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Corruption leads to forgiveness through complicity with the forgiven evil. Far
from transcending the crime, it spreads it; far from strengthening the law by
showing it capable of humanity, it waters it down by making it private, hijacks
it by subordinating it to special interests. This is precisely the meaning that Isa-
bella and the Duke give to the mercy (temporary and false, moreover) that Ange-
lo pretends to accord to Claudio in exchange for the odious exchange that he im-
poses on Isabella.
This is therefore the narrow way of forgiveness, between laxity and corrup-
tion. This is also the ordeal that the Duke imposes on Isabella at the point when
she is still unaware that Claudio has been spared.We know the outcome: not an
Angelo for a Claudio, “Like doth quit like, and Measure still for Measure,” but
“Well, Angelo, your evil quits you well.”
An edifying happy ending? The ultimate ruse of a Machiavellian Duke em-
ploying forgiveness as a recipe for power? And what if it were simply a salient
mark of life? Life that stubbornly persists and that, despite debauchery and
the plague, stronger than the silence of the monastic cells and the racket of cap-
ital punishment, claims the last word.
Such forgiveness, like life and love, seems to spare no one: from the unwor-
thy regent to the pious novice, from the grotesque pimp to the gentle Mariana.
Torrents of warm humanity, all classes together: this is what Shakespeare oppos-
es to the cold reason of death. In a deafening pandemonium that shakes up both
styles and conventions, he celebrates the hymn of life that triumphs over all.
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Filippo Sgubbi
Measure in Penal Law
1 “O, it is excellent / To have a giant’s strength;
but it is tyrannous / To use it like a giant.”
(Isabella in Measure for Measure, 2.2.107–
108)
Out of the many reflections triggered by Shakespeare’s comedy, Measure for
Measure, anyone such as myself who deals with criminal law will see in this
phrase an effective conception of the power of the state vis-à-vis the governed –
and one that is still valid today. The power of the State is ambiguous and often
hypocritical, is not based on certain rules, and is often left to the arbitrary deci-
sion of one single person: and the criminal law is the main instrument for the
specific exercise of sovereign power over citizens/subjects. This is the case
today as it was 400 years ago, and may indeed remain so forever.
Obviously, a person who causes an unmarried woman to become pregnant
will not today risk the death penalty; however, no such law existed even at
the time as it was Angelo that re-exhumed an ancient law (Claudio, Act 1,
Scene 2), perhaps entirely on an ad personam basis. The contemporary context
is less gruesome; honour and virginity are not primary values, and social rela-
tions are structured in a more open and less hierarchical manner. However,
the dynamics of power and authority remain similar. In fact, the great Enlighten-
ment narrative that man must be governed by law and not by men is being pro-
gressively abandoned. Similarly, the distribution of powers has changed.
The Constitution in books is still rooted in the central role of Parliament as
the sovereign lawmaker, along with the Government and the Judiciary as bodies
that are subject to the law. The Constitution in action offers a different distribu-
tion of power: true, effective power lies in bodies not elected by the people. The
judiciary first and foremost, the European institutions, the various agencies that
carry out inspections, controls and checks in relation to private individuals and
businesses in various areas (financial, tax, labour law, etc.) along with independ-
ent administrative authorities such as the CONSOB (the Italian Securities and Ex-
change Commission), the Bank of Italy and – of fundamental importance within
the current climate in Italy – the National Anticorruption Authority, which is
vested with practically unlimited powers over the economic and political life
of the nation.
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But in particular, power is vested in the judiciary, which is in the body charg-
ed with administering the criminal law. Political and social power lies with the
body that can decide at its discretion to punish other individuals and to confis-
cate assets. The latter should limit these powers, but “the strong statutes stand
like forfeits in a barber shop” (Duke Vincenzo, Act 5). We have slipped from the
political to the criminal, moving from a democracy characterised by debate and
representation to a democracy of inculpation. The widespread and arbitrary use
of criminal law destroys people, businesses and political careers. Such tyranny is
inherent within the role (Claudio, Act 1, Scene 2) and power acquired by the
criminal courts.
Means of mass communication magnify these perverse effects: accusations
proliferate and a simple indictment turns into a definitive judgment, fuelling
the judge’s vanity by promoting his fame and career, even in politics (Claudio,
[Angelo revives and applies laws that had fallen into desuetude] – “surely for
a name” – Act 1, Scene 2).
2 Second reflection
Power seeks consent, attributing unpopular political choices to someone else:
“My nature never in the fight to do in slander” (Duke, Act 1, Scene 3).
This is a widely known way of yielding power. There is no doubt that, within
the current world, unpopular decisions are pinned on others obviously by very
different methods, which are in any case more sophisticated than the delegation
to Angelo and the disguising of the Duke. Nowadays, there is a myriad of centres
of sovereignty through which political decisions and rules are adopted. Consider
the growing influence of unelected officials requiring a high level of technical
expertise, the growing influence of court rulings or the political and social
power of medicine, science and national and multinational finance. These con-
stitute alternative and auxiliary governments, which influence the construction
of society, both today and tomorrow. It is thus easier to hide within this forest
of decision making powers and to govern from behind the scenes. And it is in-
creasingly difficult to know who is responsible for a political decision.
At the same time, the decisions made within contemporary political life are
becoming increasingly complex: it is often necessary to choose between different
positive values, sacrificing one of them (a very topical example: taking in refu-
gees as against avoiding disruption for citizens). At the same time, the social
bodies with a blocking or veto power are increasing (consider for example the
dissemination of the NIMBY attitude). Bodies vested with institutional sovereign-
ty are increasingly unable to make decisions, amongst other things to avoid los-
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ing votes. This is especially the case if – as in Shakespeare’s comedy – it is nec-
essary to depart from a consolidated political stance of indulgence towards ille-
gality in order to restore rigorous respect for the law: “We have strict statutes and
most biting laws […] which for 19 years we have let slip” (Duke, Act 1, Scene 3).
And the Duke is right: tolerance of illegality over the long term morphs into the
right to break the law.
The paralysis of decision making power that is characteristic of political au-
thority results in a shift (or delegation) towards the judiciary, which for all in-
tents and purposes becomes a deputy power. Citizens expect judicial procedures
to lead to the specific results that cannot be obtained through elections.
3 Third reflection. Absolute power vested in an
individual favours corruption
Angelo proposes to Isabella that they engage in sexual relations in exchange for
her brother’s life. This request was made possible by the absolute criminal power
vested in Angelo: a jus vitae ac necis that is not limited by law or balanced by
external powers capable of exercising effective control. This is an extreme exam-
ple of criminal government by men.
Unfortunately, similar situations continue to occur to this day, even if it is
not life that is at stake. In a large number of cases, the law vests individuals
with far-reaching powers of inspection and control over private and financial ac-
tivities. This, coupled with the legal uncertainty characteristic of the world of
today, gives certain individuals complete discretion over individual rights. And
this offers fertile ground for the development of corruption.
4 Conclusion
“Death for Death; Like doth quite like” (Measure for Measure, Duke, Act 5). The
Duke’s vision appears to draw inspiration from the law of an eye for an eye, typ-
ical of the ancient criminal law, which is however still today present within the
irrational instinct and within the common sense of each of us. But this is not the
real philosophy inspiring the Duke, as is shown by the clemency ultimately
granted to Angelo.
A valid moral lesson can also be drawn for the modern political climate. The
authorities, the bodies holding political power and above all those administering
criminal law have the task of overseeing compliance with the law: but they must
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have the right measure when performing this highly difficult task. Criminal
power is a matter for giants and it is an excellent thing; however, to use it as
a giant amounts to tyranny. “O, it is excellent / To have a giant’s strength; but
it is tyrannous / To use it like a giant” (Isabella, Act 2, Scene 2).
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Carlo Pelloso
Are the Conspirators Purgers or Murderers?
Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and Roman Ius
Sacrum
1 Introduction
“Let us be sacrificers, but not butchers, Caius […] And, gentle friends, let’s kill
him boldly, but not wrathfully; let’s carve him as a dish fit for the gods, not
hew him as a carcass fit for hounds […] This shall make our purpose necessary,
and not envious; which so appearing to the common eyes, we shall be called
purgers, not murderers.”¹ In the tragedy Julius Caesar, Shakespeare depicts Bru-
tus – the dictator’s friend and protégé – as deeply anguished and, at the same
time, firmly fascinated by the prospect of killing an extraordinary and noble
Roman that, in his opinion, appears like a to-be king and ultimately deserves
to die.² It is in Act II that Brutus pronounces such solemn, powerful, and vision-
ary words.
In a recent analysis of the play, Garry Wills has interpreted these lines –
alongside the so-called orchard soliloquies, as well as further speeches held
by the conspirator – as proof of an intensive use of rhetorical strategies exclu-
sively concerned with “how to present the action to others.” According to this
scholar, Brutus would be “performing a kind of transubstantiation, turning
blood back into sacrificial wine;” he would just try “to cover up the ugly reality
 William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar, ed. David Daniell (London: Arden Shakespeare, 1998),
2.1.166, 172– 175, 180: the sole textual source of the tragedy (first performed in 1599) is the Shake-
speare First Folio (London, 1623). See, moreover, the astonishing scene where the conspirators
ritually wash their hands in Caesar’s wounds: “Stoop, Romans, stoop, // And let us bathe our
hands in Caesar’s blood // Up to the elbows and besmear our swords. // Then walk we forth
even to the market place, // And waving our red weapons o’er our heads, // Let’s all cry,
Peace! Freedom! and Liberty!,” 3.1.105– 110.
 See Julia Griffin, “Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and the Dramatic Tradition,” in A Companion to
Julius Caesar, ed. Miriam Griffin (MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 371–398, 383 (follow-
ing the communis opinio): “At the beginning of Act II, he reveals his uncertainty in a long solil-
oquy about the killing, and how to justify it: the argument he reaches is that Caesar, though no
tyrant at present, might later become one. However unsatisfactory this argument might appear
[…] Shakespeare’s concept of a brooding, hesitant Brutus was a dramatic innovation.”
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with ritual pieties,” as well as, in order to contradict “the ugly realities of the
plot,” he would also refuse to treat it “as a contract.”³
Although rhetorical artifices, tricks, and figures of speech are undeniable de-
vices used in Elizabethan poetry in general, and in the work at issue in particu-
lar,⁴ the above-mentioned interpretation completely disregards the historical, re-
ligious, and legal grounds of this Shakespearean play (strongly embedded in the
Roman culture), and appears to be excessively simplistic. Differently from such
one-dimensional approaches, Roman law may contribute to develop the studies
of English literature and, specifically, to deepen our understanding of Shake-
speare’s dramas.
2 Murder: substance and procedure in Roman
law
On the Ides of March, 44 BC, a group of conspirators, all members of the sena-
torial élite, cut down Julius Caesar in the Senate.⁵ On the one hand, this dramatic
episode was “the final main effort on the part of a still vital aristocratic tradition
to turn the tide of events.”⁶ On the other hand, it can suggest that Caesar had
become rather isolated, more than in the past, during his final months in office:⁷
 Garry Wills, Rome and Rhetoric: Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar (New Haven, London: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2011), 71–72.
 See Wolfgang G. Müller, “Ars Rhetorica und Ars Poetica: Zum Verhältnis von Rhetorik und Lit-
eratur in der englischen Renaissance,” in Renaissance-Rhetorik, ed. Heinrich F. Plett (Berlin: De
Gruyter, 1993), 225–243, 230; Brian Vickers, Classical Rhetoric in English Poetry (Carbondale:
Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), 44; Wills, Rome and Rhetoric, 37–78.
 App. bell. civ. 2.106– 147, and, particularly, 2.114, 119–124; Plut. Caes. 60–68 and Brut. 1–20;
Cass. Dio 44.21.2, 44.34.2–7; Nic. Dam. Caes. 25.91–94, 58– 106; Suet. Iul. 76–85.
 Luigi Capogrossi Colognesi, Law and Power in the Making of the Roman Commonwealth (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 229.
 Andrew Lintott, “The Assassination,” in A Companion to Julius Caesar, ed. Miriam Griffin (Mal-
den, MA and Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 72–81, 72: “Among the immediate causes of the
conspiracy listed were fears that his eastern expedition would lead to a relocation of Rome’s
capital to the East, his excessive honours, his manipulation of the elections, his failure to rise
to meet a deputation of senators, his deposition of the two tribunes who imprisoned the man
who crowned his statue with a diadem, the incident of the diadem offered by Mark Antony at
the Lupercalia, and the rumour that it would be proposed in the senate that he should have
the title of king on his Parthian expedition. Thus the story is one of an arrogant claim to suprem-
acy, leading to the tragic fall of an otherwise good man.”
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even Antony and Lepidus, bound by oath to avenge Caesar’s death, ended up ob-
serving any consultum passed by the Senate.⁸
The following notes deal with some challenging aspects concerning the legal
qualification of the killing of Caesar, in order to appreciate the solemn words
pronounced by Brutus. They are precise and clear: indeed, Shakespeare high-
lights that the ‘assassination’ of Caesar is a lawful act. What is the reason why
such killing might not be considered – from a legal perspective – a murder?
In Rome, murder is an offence primarily governed by the ancient lex Numae,
a royal provision stipulating that “if a person with wrongful intent and knowing-
ly causes the death of a homo liber, he or she will be a paricidas”⁹ (that is, ac-
cording to the most persuasive interpretation of the sign paricidas, he or she
will be put to death by the victim’s relatives).¹⁰
 See Stephen Weinstock, Divus Julius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 221–225.
 Paul.-Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Parrici<di> quaestores (Lindsay 247): […] ita fuisse indicat lex Numae
Pompili regis his composita verbis: Si qui hominem liberum dolo sciens morti duit, paricidas esto
(see FIRA, ed. Salvatore Riccobono [Florence 1941], 13). There is a large modern literature on the
original nature of homicide and on its penalty; on the text, see – among others – Duncan Cloud,
“Parricidium: from the Lex Numae to the Lex Pompeia de Parricidiis,” Zeitschrift der Savigny Stif-
tung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 88 (1971): 2–18; Geoffrey MacCormack, “A
Note on a Recent Interpretation of Paricidas Esto,” Labeo 28 (1982): 43–50; Roberto Fiori,
Homo sacer. Dinamica politico-costituzionale di una sanzione giuridico-religiosa (Neaples: Jovene,
1996), 62; Giorgio Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1998), 81; Leonard Johanter Beek, Dolus. Een semantisch-juridische studie (Nijme-
gen: Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen, 1999), 322–331; Luigi Garofalo, “Homo liber et homo
sacer: deux archétypes de l’appartenance,” Revue historique de droit français et étranger 87
(2009): 317–337; Leon ter Beek, “Divine Law and the Penalty of sacer esto in Early Rome,” in
Law and Religion in Roman Republic, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leiden: Brill, 2012): 11–29;
Marco Falcon, “Paricidas esto. Alle origini della persecuzione dell’omicidio,” in Sacertà e repres-
sione criminale in Roma arcaica, ed. Luigi Garofalo (Neaples: Jovene, 2013): 191–274.
 Pace the communis opinio (see Bernardo Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale nell’antica
Roma [Milano: Giuffré, 1998], 15– 19), Marco Falcon has recently demonstrated that, during
the archaic era, the negative consequences prescribed by Numa in case of homicide – either
murder (dare aliquem morti dolo sciens) or manslaughter (occidere aliquem imprudentia) – did
not restore the harmony and the state of peace between the community of the Romans, on
the one side, and the community of the gods, on the other side (i.e. they did not reconstitute
the so-called pax deorum). Indeed, homicide was not, at its beginnings, a scelus (crime), that
is a wrong implying the state of collective ‘impurity’ and, as a consequence, the infringement
of a public interest. The commission of this offence, according to the original legal-religious sys-
tem of Rome, deserved neither ‘atonement’ (by means of an animal sacrifice: Serv. Verg. ecl. 4.43
in Numae legibus cautum est, ut, siquis inprudens occidisset hominem, pro capite occisi agnatis
eius in cautione offerret arietem; see, moreover, XII tab. 8.24a), nor ‘execution of the offender’
(in terms of a human sacrifice: Paul.-Fest. verb. sign. [Lindsay 247]), depending on the mens
rea of the offender. In other words, the penalties prescribed in the two leges Numae at issue
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In early Roman law, this offence (as many other acts that in modern legal
systems are treated as wrongs against the state and prosecuted by public author-
ities) was regarded as a private tort. The family of the dead was given a rightful
claim and at the same time a religious duty to execute the wrongdoer, after the
quaestores (so-called parricidi) had carried out the due inquiry.¹¹ Yet, such situa-
tion changed in the following centuries.¹² During the proto-republican period,
were not directed to eliminate the public impurity due to the unlawful killing of a human being.
The legal term paricidas designated, for the murderer, a status of dependence under the victim’s
relatives. The former, as such being caught in the grip of the latter, lost his previous status and
the consequent rights and prerogatives; the relatives were religiously compelled to ‘avenge’ the
deceased or, rather, to ‘restrain the anger of his ghost’. Likewise, the subactio of the aries, if the
killer did commit the offence unknowingly (imprudentia), aimed at avoiding the return of the
dead to haunt the living (see Marco Falcon, “Paricidas esto,” 230–236, 237–272). These concepts
were so deeply rooted in Roman culture, that long after homicide was labelled as a crime against
the State, and religion played a less influent role in this area (see Plin. nat. hist. 18.12; Cic.
top. 64, Tull. 51, de orat. 3.158, rep. 2.61; Liv. 33.9– 10; on the topic, see Santalucia, Diritto e proc-
esso penale, 56, and ntt. 33–35), a kinsman was bound to initiate the public prosecution against
the killer and, if he failed to do so, he could not obtain any of the deceased’s inheritance.
 As far as the primitive regnum is concerned, the quaestores (parricidii) were established to
inquire into killings (above all on the mens rea of the killer) and, probably, even to give a
final judgment on the behalf of the king (explicitly, see Tac. ann. 11.22.4; D. 1.13.1 pr.; Lyd.
mag. 1.24; implicitly, Zon. 7.13; Varr. l.L. 5.81; Paul.-Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Parrici<di> quaestores
[Lindsay 247]; contra, see Plut. Publ. 12.3 and D. 1.2.2.22–23, where the quaestores are considered
only a republican institution); on a possible harmonization of the two views, see Luigi Garofalo,
Appunti sul diritto criminale nella Roma monarchica e repubblicana (Padova: Cedam, 1997),
71–86; see, moreover, Roberto Fiori, Homo sacer, 387–388; Vera Dementyeva, “The Functions
of the Quaestors of Archaic Rome in Criminal Justice,” Diritto@Storia 8 (2009), available at
http://www.dirittoestoria.it/8/Tradizione-Romana/Dementieva-Quaestors-Archaic-Rome.htm
(last access May 20, 2017); Piotr Kołodko, “The Genesis of the Quaestorship in the Ancient Rome.
Some Remarks,” Legal Roots 3 (2014): 269–280.
 See, amplius, Carlo Pelloso, “Sul diritto del cittadino al processo popolare dalla caduta del
regno al decemvirato legislativo,” Revue Internationale des Droits de l’Antiquité 62 (2015): 323–
344; Carlo Pelloso, “Ai primordi del giudizio popolare: poena capitis e garanzie del civis nella
prima età repubblicana,” in Regole e garanzie nel processo criminale romano, ed. Laura Solidoro
(Turin: Giappichelli, 2016): 83–120; Carlo Pelloso, “Provocatio ad populum e poteri magistratuali
dal processo all’Orazio superstite alla morte di Appio Claudio Decemviro,” Studia et Documenta
Historiae Iuris 82 (2016): 219–264. Originally, criminal proceedings were totally inquisitorial.
Once the magistrate was aware of a crime, he was entitled to initiate the investigation of the
case, to file the charge against the suspected wrongdoer, to produce the necessary evidence,
to give a judgment. The magistrate acted as a public prosecutor (either personally or by
means of auxiliaries) and as a judge (very probably just personally): see Plut. Publ. 3–7,
Zon. 7.12; Dion. Hal. 5.57.2–4; Cassiod. var. 6; Cic. rep. 2.53, 1.62, acad. pr. 2.5.13; Val.
Max. 4.1.1; Dion. Hal. 5.19.4, 5.70.2, 6.58.2, 7.41.1; Plut. Publ. 11.2; D. 1.2.2.16, 23; Dion.
Hal. 5.72.1–2; Liv. 2.8.2; Flor. 1.9.4; vir. ill. 15. Yet, according to the Roman tradition, the lex Vale-
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the still existing capital trials by magistrates (which started embracing the cases
of homicide, now labelled as authentic crimes) were gradually replaced by the
so-called popular iudicia where, on the one hand, the supreme magistrates or
the quaestores, as their representatives, initiated the legal proceedings and
acted as mere public prosecutors, summoning the accused, holding the trial in
contione, eventually presenting a motion in the form of a rogatio where he pro-
posed the penalty (that is they were responsible just for iudicare alicui).¹³ On the
other hand, either according to the magisterial discretional choice, or on the
grounds of a provocatio submitted by the Roman citizen affected by the magis-
terial proposal, the people as a whole gave final judgments (that is the populus
Romanus operated as a court of justice whose officium was iudicare aliquem).
It is clear that such a system, based on adjudication of crimes by the Roman
people, as a whole, could have been successful just in the context of a “face-to-
face” civitas. As political, economic and social conditions got more complex, the
so-called iudicia populi became gradually inadequate in dealing with criminal
prosecutions: the questions implied were excessively hard; moreover, the esca-
lating number of cases made comitial trials very problematic, as the procedure
was too complicated, cumbersome and time-consuming.¹⁴ A decisive moment
ria, that is the first centuriate statute passed in the 509 BC, stipulated that, had a Roman citizen
submitted a provocatio ad populum, the magistrate, either as a judge, or as a police authority,
was not allowed to put him to death. In other words, after the establishment of the Republic
(or better in the first year of the libera res publica Romanorum), jurisdiction over the major
crimes was still vested in the consuls, even if the provocatio ad populum was conceived of as
a civic right and not as an act of grace. The Law of the Twelve Tables went even further: as
of 451 BC, no magistrate had the power to pass a capital sentence (Cic. Sest. 30.65, 34.73,
rep. 2.54, rep. 2.61, leg. 3.44; leg. 3.11; Salv. gub. 8.5; see, moreover, Plaut. aul. 200, truc. 819,
pseud. 1232; Aug. civ. Dei 1.19; Pol. 6.14.6; Dion. Hal. 3.22.3).
 The activities implied by this Latin phrase are well known: see Santalucia, Diritto e processo
penale, 69–97. The magistrate, after summoning the citizen accused, held a trial in (at least)
three successive contiones (that is public informal meetings). During this phase, he carried
out investigations on the case; he determined matters of fact and law based on the evidence;
had the accused been found guilty, an order summoning the popular assembly to meet on
the expiry of the trinundinum was issued. During this period (corresponding to 24 days) the
Roman citizens discussed the case. When the assembly took place on the appointed day, the
magistrate presented a rogatio for condemnation. Without any preliminary debate, the citizens
in favour of the magisterial rogatio (bill, proposal) voted ‘condemno’, while those against it
voted ‘absolvo’. Thus, if the majority voted in favour of condemnation, the magistrate, as pres-
ident of the assembly, pronounced the final judgment.
 In the early second century BC a gradual evolution took place: see, among others, for a sum-
mary, Richard A. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (London and New York: Rout-
ledge, 1996), 21–22. The people voted the creation of special jury-courts or commissions of in-
quiry (quaestiones extraordinariae) for the investigation of some offences characterized by a
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in the history of Roman criminal procedure (iudicia publica) was the creation of a
system of permanent courts (quaestiones perpetuae) entitled, by statute, to adju-
dicate crimes of a specific nature.¹⁵ Thus, in the second half of the first century
BC, trials for simple and aggravated homicide, as well as for parricide¹⁶ – besides
other crimes¹⁷ – were held before a permanent court and not before the comitia.
political nature (such as abuse of power or dereliction of duty by magistrates and provincial of-
ficials, and conspiracies against public order and the security of the state). Moreover, the Senate,
on occasions of emergency, started setting up, by its own authority and without the Roman peo-
ple’s authorization, special courts whose judgements were final. In the transformed background
of the later Republic, such quaestiones extraordinariae provided more efficient instruments of
prosecuting crimes than the archaic iudicia populi (see Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale,
97–102).
 The first quaestio perpetua was instituted in 149 BC to deal with the ‘abuse of power’ (mainly
in terms of extortion: repetundae), a crime perpetrated by magistrates charged with provincial
administration and tax collection (see Cic. Brut. 106). The establishment of such quaestio later
inspired the creation of other jury-courts. Thus, by the end of the second century BC, three fur-
ther permanent quaestiones, aside the quaestio de repetundis, had been established for high
treason (de maiestate), electoral corruption (de ambitu), and embezzlement of public money
(de peculatu). Under Sulla’s dictatorship (82–81 BC), the ‘court system’ was revised, renewed
and improved. For the first time a very criminal legal system (the ordo iudiciorum publicorum)
posed the administration of criminal justice on more consistent grounds. The jury-courts were
in permanent session. Each statute defined a crime (or a group of crimes), and consequently
laid down procedures and penalties. Any adult male citizen in good standing to bring a charge,
if he became aware of a crime, could start the prosecution by making an accusation. If a relevant
accusation was made, the magistrate in charge of a particular court for the year (a quaesitor-
magistrate, usually a praetor, but sometimes an ex-aedilis, allotted by the Senate) was entitled
to proceed to the enrolment of a quaestio, whose members were chosen from a yearly album.
Condemnation required a majority verdict. See, for a concise overview, Duncan Cloud, “The
Constitution and Public Criminal Law,” in Cambridge Ancient History 9.2 (1994): 491–530, 530;
Olivia F. Robinson, The Criminal Law of Ancient Rome (London: John Hopkins University
Press, 1995), 2–3; see, for an exhaustive survey, Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale, 103–188.
 As far as the pre-Sullan period is concerned, see Sen. clem. 1.23.1; Quint. decl. min. 377.1; Plut.
Rom. 22.5; Val. Max. 1.1.13; Zon. 7.11; Cic. Rosc. Am. 11, 64–65, inv. 2.58–59. Even if Pomponius
commits a mistake, his words testify that the Sullan quaestio also embraced this crime: see D.
1.2.2.32; CTh. 9.19.4.1, with Bernardo Santalucia, “Cicerone e la nominis delatio,” Labeo 43
(1997): 404–417, 415–417.
 According to the sources (see, for instance, D. 48.8.1; C. 9. 16), the first caput of the lex at
issue gave the court capital jurisdiction over those who carried weapons (ambulare cum telo)
with the wrongful intent of killing or stealing (occidendi furtive faciendi causa), and over the si-
carii who killed (hominem occidere). The fifth chapter dealt with poisoning, that is the making up
(facere), the selling (vendere), the buying (emere), and the keeping (habere) of a venenum, as
well as its fatal administration (dare). This court also had jurisdiction over common and simple
homicides (see Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale, 145–149, especially 148, nt. 137), urban
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More precisely, by Sulla’s time the quaestio perpetua based on the lex Cornelia de
sicariis et veneficis (i.e. a “legge di circostanza” primarily directed to protect and
to restore social peace)¹⁸ had become a general unified murder court, by bringing
together two older courts.¹⁹
Those who were found guilty by such quaestio – for instance the perpetra-
tors of the crime already punished by Numa in his lex, by means of the imper-
ative phrase paricidas esto (hominem liberum morti dare dolo sciens)²⁰ – were
sentenced to death. Nevertheless, they were granted the potestas effugiendi, un-
less the accused was found guilty of parricidium and, accordingly, the penalty
was the atrocious poena cullei.²¹
arson (D. 48.8.1 pr.), and in some cases the corrupt procuring of the condemnation of an inno-
cent person on a capital charge (D. 48.8.1 pr.–1).
 Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale, 147.
 Cic. nat. deor. 4.74, Cluent. 148; D. 48.8; I. 4.18.5; Paul Sent. 5.23; Coll. 1.2–3, 8.41; see, on the
statute, Jean Louis Ferrary, “Lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis,” Athenaeum 69 (1991): 417–434;
on the Sulla’s unification of the two courts, see Erich S. Gruen, Roman Politics and the Criminal
Courts 149–78 BC, 1968 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968): 268;Wolfgang Kunkel,
Kleine Schriften. Zum römischen Strafverfahren und zur römischen Verfassungsgeschichte (Wei-
mar: Böhlaus, 1974), 58. Before Sulla’s government, a court for hearing cases of poisoning
(quaestio de veneficis) was established and this is confirmed for the year 98 BC (CIL VI 1283;
see Cic. inv. 2.58–59). However, it probably was at least as old as the century if it did not
date back even to the 120s BC. A court dealing with cases of assassination (quaestio de sicariis)
had been created as early as 142 BC, but it is unclear if it operated only as a quaestio extraordi-
naria (Cic. fin. 2.54; see, moreover, for some cases of homicide in 127 BC, Asc. 45.22–26); the first
attestation of a quaestio perpetua de sicariis is found in Cic. Rosc. Am. 11, 64–65 (concerning a
case predating the Sullan reforms). Under Sulla’s lex Cornelia de sicariis et veneficis of 81 BC,
both forms of homicide (as well as other species of this crime and other crimes breaching the
common peace) were dealt with by the same quaestio.
 Indeed, the wording of the lex Cornelia did not exactly overlap Numa’s provision, since the
new statutory phrase was just hominem occidere. However, this expression did not embrace the
killing of a slave (perpetrated by anyone) or of a filius familias (perpetrated by the pater); more-
over, it did not punish only a mere actus reus (i.e. killing), but the killing perpetrated dolo (afore-
thought, with intent, knowing the effects of the conduct): see Santalucia, Diritto e processo pe-
nale, 145– 148.
 Cic. Rosc. Am. 30, 71–72, inv. 2.149, Cluent. 148; Coll. 1.3.1. According to Pol. 6.14.7, by the mid-
second century BC, it had become customary to allow those condemned before the Roman peo-
ple to go into exile, as long as even one centuria had not voted. Such a mos seems not aban-
doned in the quaestiones perpetuae: see Olivia Robinson, “Polybius on exile,” IVRA. Rivista in-
ternazionale di diritto romano e antico 55 (2004): 19–27. See, moreover, Sal. Cat. 51.21–22 and
51.40: in these passages Sallust, through Caesar, maintains that exile is allowed for those con-
demned of a crime, while Polybius clearly assumes that exile is granted only before (and not
after) formal condemnation. However, the former perhaps deals only with the system of the
quaestiones, and with the short delay between the judgment and the execution of the sentence
Are the Conspirators Purgers or Murderers? 209
3 Lawful homicide and “sacertas”
A possible answer to the riddle put forward in the previous paragraph is the fol-
lowing: Caesar was no longer a free man (homo liber) covered by the protections
settled by the Roman civitas, at the procedural and substantive level. Had the
dictator become a homo sacer (that is a sacred human being), the aforemen-
tioned lex Numae – as well as, a fortiori, the more recent lex Cornelia – could
not have applied to the case at issue.
What does homo sacer mean? The adjective sacer, -a, -um belongs to the ear-
liest level of the Latin language and it probably derives from the Indo-European
root *sak-,²² even if the precise determination of the features involved in the
Latin adjective is still under debate. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that its original
meaning (firmly connected to the legal-religious sphere), in archaic Rome, ap-
plied to anything – real property, animals, chattels, human beings – perceived
as divine, or rather perceived as pertinent to the divine sphere and, consequent-
ly, separated from the human world.²³ The sacrum, in the most exact meaning, is
given to the condemned. The latter is without a doubt concerned with the iudicia populi, where
such an interval pro condemnato was not allowed at all: see Gordon P. Kelly, A History of Exile in
the Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 21–23.
 See Fiori, Homo sacer, 66–72 (for a useful and complete overview); see, moreover, Giovanni
Semerano, Le origini della cultura europea, II.2, Dizionari etimologici. Basi semitiche delle lingue
indoeuropee. Dizionario della lingua latina e di voci moderne (Firenze: Olschki, rist. 2002), 454.
 On the one side, Huguette Fugier, Recherches sur l’expression du sacré dans la langue latine
(Paris: Belles Lettres, 1963): 109– 125, has attempted to demonstrate that the original meaning of
the root *sak– was “exister, être réel;” on the other side, Emile Benveniste, Le vocabulaire des
institutions indo-européennes, 2, Pouvoir, droit, religion (Paris: Les Éditions de Minuit, 1974), 188–
191, maintains that “c’est aussi en latin qu’on découvre le caractère ambigu du sacré: consacré
aux dieux et chargé d’une souillure ineffaçable, auguste et maudit, digne de vénération et sus-
citant l’horreur. Cette double valeur est propre de sacer.” Moreover in the scholar’s opinion: “la
différence entre sacer et sanctus se voit en plusieurs circonstances. Il n’y a pas seulement la dif-
férence entre sacer, état naturel, et sanctus, résultat d’une opération;” […] on dirait que le sanc-
tum, c’est ce qui se trouve a la périphérie du sacrum, qui sert a l’isoler de tout contact; […] Mais
cette différence s’abolit peu à peu à mesure que la valeur ancienne du sacer se transfère à la
sanction: sanctus n’est plus seulement le murus, mais l’ensemble du champ et tout ce qui est
en contact avec le monde du divin. […] Là s’achève l’évolution: sanctus qualifie alors une
vertu surhumaine.” Next, by emphasising that sacer is anything characterized by the quality
*sak–, while sanctus is anything that has been made *sak–, James Rives, “Control of the Sacred
in Roman law,” in Law and Religion in Roman Republic, ed. Olga Tellegen-Couperus (Leiden:
Brill, 2012), 165–180, 177, suggests that “in archaic Rome the word sacer (or sakros) was applied
to anything spontaneously perceived as having some inherent connection with the divine.” From
a legal point of view, these three reconstructions fail to keep to the point. First, any etymological
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anything in proprietate deorum, as the jurist Trebatius Testa clearly maintains.²⁴
Therefore, this concept, per se, bears no biased connotation, being just a neutral
description of a legal-religious status, without any intrinsic ambivalence of
meaning.
More specifically, the legal-religious imperative clause “sacer esto” designa-
tes a penalty to be applied if a person commits a wrong prohibited by the Roman
system and perceived by the Roman community as an offense to a god or to a
group of gods (even if the actus reus concretely harmed a human victim).²⁵ As
and primeval meaning remains a mere supposition (so that no communis opinio does exist: in-
deed, one must underline that the root *sak– is linked either to the verbs “to cut” and “to es-
tablish,” or to the nouns “cause,” “accusation,” “dispute.”) Second, the sources clearly attest
that the adjective sacer is not constantly used to denote a natural status only. Third, the sup-
posed ambivalence of the concept at issue is not an original feature at all. In short, the adjective
sacer, from a legal and religious perspective, neutrally designates human beings, animals and
things belonging to a god: see, amplius, Carlo Pelloso, “Sacertà e garanzie processuali in età
regia e proto-repubblicana,” in Sacertà e repressione criminale in Roma arcaica, ed. Luigi Garo-
falo (Neaples: Jovene, 2013), 64–66.
 For an explanation of the so-called sacertas in terms of divine ownership (as clearly emerges
from Macr. Sat. 3.7.3, that cites the jurist Trebatius Testa), see Bernardo Albanese, “Sacer esto,”
Bullettino dell’Istituto di Diritto Romano ‘Vittorio Scialoja’ 30 (1988): 155– 177; Luigi Garofalo,
Studi sulla sacertà (Padova: Cedam, 2005), passim; John Scheid, An Introduction to Roman Re-
ligion (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 23; amplius, see Pelloso, “Sacertà,” 57–
144.
 Several testimonia link the phrase sacer esto to the leges regiae, where – in the majority of
cases – the wrong prohibited by statute is committed against a human being, but the punish-
ment (or, rather, the legal consequence) is described in terms of forfeiting to the gods (that is
the wrongdoer is marked as divine property). Festus informs us of a law enacted by Romulus
and Titus Tatius providing that “if a nurus had maltreated her parens, she was sacer to the
gods of her parents.” Dionysius of Halicarnassus assumes that Romulus enacted a law (also re-
peated in the Twelve Tables) which forbade a patronus to break the fides-bond existing with his
cliens. The phrase sacer esto is also linked to the second king of Rome: Festus points out that the
guarding of the fields was under Terminus’s patronage. Thus, Numa provided that a person who
had removed a boundary stone by ploughing was sacer (rather: both he himself and his oxen).
Likewise, Dionysius of Halicarnassus maintains that this king decreed “if a person has removed
or changed the position of the boundary stones, be the offender hieros to the god.” Next, one
finds a direct quotation from the laws of Numa in Festus: “if a person shall act otherwise (aliu-
ta), he himself shall be sacer to Jupiter.” Finally, Festus quotes a law enacted by king Servius
Tullius: “if a puer shall have maltreated his parens, and this parens shall have uttered an endo-
ploratio, the puer shall be sacer to the gods of his parentes.” Also in the early Roman Republic
one finds the phrase sacer esto. It is mainly connected with the leges sacratae prescribing that
those who have done something contrary to the plebeian sworn provisions shall be sacer togeth-
er with their slaves and property. See Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Plorare (Lindsay 260: si parentem puer
verberit ast olle plorassit paren<s>, puer divis parentum sacer esto; si parentem nurus verberit ast
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a result, the perpetrator, while and by committing such offence, would become
the very object of divine ownership and ipso iure, that is to say automatically,
would lose any human protection.²⁶
In other words, as the offended god becomes the owner of the offender, the
latter, as homo sacer, is neither a liber civis (that is a human being belonging to
the community of the freemen and of the Romans), nor a peregrinus (that is
olle plorassit paren<s>, nurus divis parentum sacer esto); Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Termino (Lindsay
456: Numa Pompilius statuit eum qui terminum exarasset et ipsum et boves sacros esset; see
Dion. Hal. 2.74.3), Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Aliuta (Lindsay 98: si quis aliuta faxit, ipsos Iovi sacer
esto); Serv. in Verg. Aen. 6.609 (ex lege XII Tabularum venit, in quibus scriptum est patronus si
clienti fraudem fecerit, sacer esto; see Dion. Hal. 2.10.3); Cic. Tull. 20.47 (iubeat impune occidi),
concerning the plebeian lex sacrata that, enacted in 494 BC, introduced the Tribunes’ inviolabil-
ity (see Dion. Hal. 6.89.3, 10.35.2; Zon. 7.15); Liv. 3.55.6–7 (eius caput Iovi sacrum esset), concern-
ing the lex Valeria Horatia of 449 BC, in the part where the Tribuns’ sacrosanctitas was recog-
nised by the whole civitas (see Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Sacratae leges [Lindsay 422]); Liv. 3.55.4–5
(ius fasque esset occcidi), concerning the above-mentioned lex Valeria Horatia, in the part
where the creation of magistrates sine provocatione was prohibited (see Cic. rep. 2.54). For fur-
ther (but controversial) cases, see Cic. dom. 17.43, Sest. 30.65; Dion. Hal. 5.70.2; Liv. 2.8.2 (with
Plut. Publ. 12.1; Liv. 2.1.9, 2.2.5); Dion. Hal. 5.19.4 and Plut. Publ. 11.
 Such an automatism represented a constant trait of the Roman regime concerning the homo
sacer. Not only during the primitive regnum and in the early Republic, but even after the enact-
ment of the Twelve Tables, neither a legal process against the supposed sacer was necessary, nor
a judgment proclaiming the status of sacer and, implicitly, allowing anyone to kill the wrongdo-
er, once found guilty. Indeed, the decemviral provision de capite civis did cover the cives Romani
only and who infringed a “sacer esto-statute” automatically lost the status civitatis, as well the
status libertatis (Cic. Sest. 30.65: cum […] XII Tabulis sanctum esset ut neque […] liceret, neque de
capite nisi comitiis centuriatis rogari; Sest. 34.73: de capite […] iudicari […] nisi comitiis centuriatis;
rep. 2.61: de capite civis Romani nisi comitiis centuriatis statui vetaret; rep. 2.54: ab omni iudicio
poenaque provocari licere indicant XII Tabulae conpluribus legibus; leg. 3.44: tum leges praeclar-
issimae de duodecim Tabulis tralatae duae, quarum altera […] altera de capite civis rogari nisi
maximo comitiatu vetat; ferri de singulis nisi centuriatis comitiis noluerunt; leg. 3.11: de capite
civis nisi per maximum comitiatum […] ne ferunto; Salv. gub. 8.5: interfici […] indemnatum quem-
cunque hominem etiam duodecim Tabularum decreta vetuerunt; see Aug. civ. Dei 1.19; Dion.
Hal. 3.22.3). See Pelloso, “Sacertà,” 110– 144: on the one side, Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Sacer mons
(Lindsay 424: at homo sacer is est, quem populus iudicavit ob maleficium; neque fas est eum im-
molari, sed, qui occidit, parricidi non damnatur; nam lege tribunicia prima cavetur, ‘si quis eum,
qui eo plebei scito sacer sit, occiderit, parricida ne sit’) is read as a confuse and imprecise men-
tion of the lex Valeria Horatia enacted in 449 BC, and, on the other side, the existence of iudicia
populi directed to declare the status of homo sacer is ruled out. See, moreover, Leon ter Beek,
“Divine Law,” 28: “Being sacer means that all forms of protection enjoyed by all other people
are lifted; in fact, a homo sacer is excommunicated from society and anyone may kill such a per-
son without being punished. Moreover, the consequence of being sacer comes about immediate-
ly, without any kind of trial or judicial sentence. It is up to the gods to decide what will happen
to the sacer person.”
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stranger, belonging to a non-Roman civitas), nor a servus (that is a slave, and as
such, property of a human being). It is clear that the homo sacer, as such, does
not belong to any human community, as he or she enters into the super-natural
world. This way, the sacertas-mechanism reconstitutes the pax deorum (i.e. the
situation of harmony and agreement existing between the divine and the
human communities), thus granting life and prosperity to the civitas Roma.²⁷
Since any owner, on the grounds of private law, can do whatever he or she
wants with his or her properties, and since the god or the goddess, offended by
the perpetration of the wrong, becomes the ‘owner of the homo sacer, the former,
on the grounds of sacred law, can do whatever he or she wants with the latter.
The superhuman being can let the homo sacer live; it can make him or her crazy;
it can make him or her die of disease or of other natural causes; it can even kill
him or her by means of a human agent, that is an executor of the divine deter-
mination. Accordingly, from the human and legal point of view, no one who kills
a homo sacer is punishable, since such killing is not prohibited and no crime is
perpetrated.
So, keeping to the point, it is clear that Brutus seems totally aware that the
plotters’ actus does not fall into the limits established by the lex Numae and by
the lex Cornelia; he is aware that killing Caesar, from the legal-religious perspec-
tive, is not an actus reus. Accordingly, he emphatically presents himself and the
others as a very longa manus of the gods to avoid any suspicion of murder.
4 Caesar and the Republican order
How might Caesar have become a homo sacer?Why, therefore, could anyone law-
fully kill him? The last steps along the path of his extraordinary career, if inter-
preted as a gradual, albeit implicit, subversion of the republican order, reveal a
plausible answer.
In the years immediately before the civil war,²⁸ the optimates, on the one
hand, were inclined to destabilize Caesar (whose popularity and wealth had in-
creased after the conquest of Transalpine Gaul, and to whom the troops were
more and more devoted). On the other hand, they intended to support and to im-
 Francesco Sini, “Diritto e pax deorum in Roma antica,” Diritto@Storia 5 (2006), available at
http://www.dirittoestoria.it/5/Memorie/Sini-Diritto-pax-deorum.htm (last access May 20, 2017).
 For the sources, see T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 2 (New
York and Atlanta: American Philological Association, 1951–1952): 233–271.
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prove Pompey’s standing (above all when the latter started siding with the sen-
atorial oligarchy).²⁹
Caesar, still in Gaul, was in an extremely problematic position.³⁰ He wanted
to remain at the head of his army and to stand for his second consulship by
proxy. His plan was to return to Rome only after he had entered the honos:
this way, his person would not be vulnerable anymore. If he had respected Pom-
pey’s law and, therefore, he had come back as an ordinary citizen, he would
have put himself at the mercy of his opponents. All this would have likely led
him either to an inexorable political defeat (if prosecuted and condemned), or
even to an immediate death (since assassinations were a normal de facto device
to resolve disputes).
It was necessary to change the rules and to do so with all the rationality and
firmness that had always inspired Caesar’s political and military actions. The
imperator crossed the Rubicon and, so, the pomerium itself. By placing himself
 In 52 BC, Pompey entered the office of consul without a colleague. Therefore, he was in pos-
session of an unprecedented honos. Moreover, it was more and more apparent that Caesar’s po-
sition entirely depended on Pompey’s authority, political friendship, and discretional choices. In
51 BC, Pompey did not contrast a motion that the Gallic provinces should be discussed in the
Senate on March 1, 50 BC. In February, 50 BC, the tribune C. Scribonius Curio brought in the
proposal that both Caesar and Pompey stepped down, surrendering their extraordinary com-
mands. Consequently, Pompey shifted toward the position held by the senatorial oligarchy, en-
dorsing the opinion that Caesar should leave Gaul on the Ides of November. In December, 50 BC,
the Senate passed the proposal that Caesar should surrender his command, while the consultum
on Pompey’s resignation failed to pass. Curio’s original proposal passed by a margin of 370 to 22.
Anyway, no practical consequence took place. Finally, through a symbolic and powerful act, the
consul Marcellus, together with the consuls-elect for the year 49, placed a sword in Pompey’s
hands, praying him to defend the Republic against Caesar. On January 7, 49 BC, the Senate
passed a consultum ultimum. To Caesar, civil war was the only option.
 If Pompey was supported by the optimates, Caesar enjoyed great influence amongst the trib-
unes. The plebeian magistrates of the year 52 proposed that he should be recalled to Rome as
Pompey’s colleague. Notwithstanding that, Caesar both refused this position and persuaded
the tribunes themselves to present a bill that would allow him to stand in absentia for the con-
sulship (that is an office he could legally hold only in 49 BC), once his command in Gaul had
expired. Obviously, so long as Caesar possessed imperium, he could remain immune from any
criminal prosecution and he could preserve his bodily safety. Thus, Caesar required either a fur-
ther extension or a new proconsular command. However, campaigning for his second consul-
ship in the normal way would have left him defenceless before entering the office. On the
one hand, Pompey had proposed a law that required all candidates to stand for the office in per-
son; on the other hand, after the law was passed and published, he added a codicil of exemp-
tion stipulating that Caesar was not deprived of his privilege. However, since this provision pos-
sessed no legal force, Caesar’s safety depended on Pompey’s alliance. However, the harmony
between the two would not last too long.
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outside the law, he intended to reshape the traditional notion of legality.With the
repudiation of the traditional order, the rise to a tragic and incomparable power
ineluctably starts.
The antiquissimum pomerium was, in fact, a legal-religious border around
the city of Rome. Accordingly, Rome existed, in legal terms, only within its pom-
erium:³¹ everything beyond it was merely territory belonging to Rome. What is
more, inside the pomerium, that is domi, the republican magistrates who held
imperium did not have full powers (as the provocatio and the tribunician interces-
sio worked as tools limiting consules’ initiatives).³² On the contrary, beyond the
 See Gell. 13.14.1; Varr. l.L. 5.143; Gran. Lic. 28; Cic. div. 1.3, 1.95 and 2.77; Liv. 1.36.6, 6.41.4,
10.8.9; Fest. verb. sign. s.v. Prohibere comitia (Lindsay 268). The line of the pomerium, supposedly
traced by Romulus himself, corresponding to the boundaries of the magisterial auspicia urbana
(finis urbani auspicii) surrounded the urban space inaugurated by the founding auspices and,
consequently, it delimited the area of the so-called imperium domi. Beyond the urban space,
the magistrates were given the imperium militiae (that is a power that was either absolute or lim-
ited depending on the target pursued and on the measure carried out by the magistrate). During
the republican period the most important popular assembly was convened outside the pomeri-
um:Varro, indeed, did equate convening the people’s comitium with commanding the centuriate
army, and called the centuriate assembly itself the urban army (Varr. l.L. 6.88, 93). As a matter of
fact, it was not possible to command the army within Rome’s augural precincts (see Gell. 12.27.5).
However, this boundary did not overlap the territorial limits imposed, during the Republic, to the
ius provocationis ad populum (whose visive sign was the absence of the secures, that is the axes
that in 509 BC Publicola removed from the magisterial fasces: Plut. Publ. 10.7; Val. Max. 4.1.1; vir.
ill. 15.4; Cass. Dio 3.13.2) and to the auxilium tribunicium. As of fifth century, inside the Urbs as
well as outside Rome till the primum miliarum from the walls (Liv. 3.20.6–7), any magisterial
measure de capite (implying the verberare fascibus and the necare securibus) could be blocked
by the Roman citizen affected by it; see Bernardo Santalucia, “Longius ab urbe mille passum:
cittadini e provocatio in Italia prima delle leges Porciae” in Praesidia libertatis. Garantismo e sis-
temi processuali nell’esperienza di Roma repubblicana. Atti Copanello 1992 (Neaples: Edizioni Sci-
entifiche Italiane, 1994), 63–84. This spatial distinction is well explained by Roberto Fiori, “La
convocazione dei comizi centuriati: diritto costituzionale e diritto augurale,” Zeitschrift der Sa-
vigny Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 131 (2014): 60– 176, 171: if the provo-
catio ad populum was not in force, both intra pomerium and extra pomerium the magistrate
would be allowed to prohibit any free discussion in the preparatory meetings, to force the citi-
zens to approve his proposals, to put to death or to flog any opponent.
 See, on the first lex Valeria de provocatione enacted in the 509 BC (Cic. rep. 2.53, 1.62, and
acad. pr. 2.5.13; Val. Max. 4.1.1; Dion. Hal. 5.19.4 e 5.70.2; D. 1.2.2.16), Elena Tassi Scandone,
Leges Valeriae de provocatione. Repressione criminale e garanzie costituzionali nella Roma repub-
blicana (Neaples: Jovene, 2008), passim. For the tribunician intercessio, susceptible to be used
inside and even outside Rome, but not longius ab Urbe mille passuum, see Liv. 3.20.7 (the plebe-
ian tribunes were allowed to exercise their negative power against any magisterial initiative con-
ceived of as a damage to plebeians); in general, see Renzo Lambertini, “Aspetti positivo e neg-
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pomerium, that is militiae, their military command was originally without any re-
striction (unless the acts carried out by the magistrates were civilian and not
military in character).³³ Crossing the pomerium, in other words, represented a
first serious infringement of the republican constitution. Better, it could even
be understood as the actual subversion of the republican order as a whole.
In addition, the further grounds on which Caesar’s supremacy rested implied
an undeniable departure from the republican traditions and provisions. First, he
concentrated on his person an extraordinary convergence of offices and powers
never held by the same person at the same time. For instance, he combined the
office of dictator with a ten-year term of consulship; he even took over some sen-
atorial prerogatives, such as the ius to assign provinces, to start new wars, and to
control the treasury. Second, he reunified civil and military powers. For instance,
he acted as consul, although – through his proconsular imperium – he retained
ativo della sacrosancta potestas dei Tribuni della plebe,” Diritto@Storia 7 (2008), available at
http://www.dirittoestoria.it/7/Memorie/Sini-Diritto-pax-deorum.htm (last access May 20, 2017).
 However, the high magistrates, empowered to convene and preside over the comitia centur-
iata by means of the ius agendi cum populo, could also carry out acts directed to achieve civilian
targets, even though militiae. Thus, when a consul summoned the Roman people and submitted
bills either to seek approval for new leges, or to propose a penalty, or to elect supreme magis-
trates for the following year, his power was not absolute. On the problems concerning nature
and limits of the magisterial imperium in the space included between the original pomerium
and the first mile from the Roman walls, see Theodor Mommsen, Römisches Staatsrecht, 13 (Leip-
zig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1887), 61–71, 98– 105; André Magdelain, Recherches sur l’imperium, la
loi curiate et les auspices d’investiture (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 45–68;
Fiori, “La convocazione dei comizi centuriati,” 60– 176. On the gradual extension of the guaran-
tees against the military and civic imperium to curb the consuls’ authority over soldiers and citi-
zens even outside the pomerium, see Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale, 52–53, 71–72. In
short, one can assume that, until the second century BC, the imperium carried out militiae
(that is outside Rome, both beyond and before the primum miliarum) authorized the magistrate –
through a very summary procedure – to flog and put to death the Romanmilites.On the contrary,
between the original pomerium and the primum miliarum (as well as inside Rome), as far as the
civilian sphere was concerned, any magisterial initiative implying either capital punishment or
severe pecuniary fines (and, from the second century on, even corporal punishment by means of
fasces) could be blocked. In the first century BC, not only did Sulla intend to sharpen the divide
existing between civilian and military offices, as well as to reaffirm the rule banning the exercise
of the imperium militiae within the pomerium. He also replaced the original line at the northern
boundaries of the Italian Peninsula, making it illegal to conduct any kind of military command
within its confines. This way, he practically deprived the consuls of their imperium militiae (since
they had to reside in Italy) and gave the pro-magistrates the command of the army: see Capo-
grossi Colognesi, Law and Power, 203–204. Obviously, after these reforms, the above-mentioned
problems, depending on the divide between augural boundaries and primum miliarum, were an-
nihilated.
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command of the army; moreover, he was granted the life title imperator, i.e. a
title bestowed by the troops on magistrates who led them to victory. Third, he
gradually and de facto acquired other republican powers. For instance, he was
vested with the potestas censoria, even if de iure he did not hold any correspond-
ent office.³⁴
However, the singular nature of Caesar’s personal status became even more
obvious as a result of the absolute and plenipotentiary position he acquired by
appointing himself as dictator.³⁵ To be more precise, in 49 BC, he took his first
dictatorship under the guise of comitiorum habendorum causa et feriarum Latina-
rum causa (i.e. the office was held in order to convene the popular assemblies
and to conduct the Latin festivals).³⁶ Next, he held five consecutive annual dic-
tatorships rei publicae constituendae causa,³⁷ that is he was dictator for the pur-
pose of establishing the res publica: the office was still temporary, although far
exceeding the old republican six-month term. Finally, in 45 BC Caesar assumed
the title of dictator perpetuus,³⁸ that is to say, he became dictator with no fixed
terminal date. This, being an unprecedented figure in the republican tradition,
turned out to be an apparent misjudgement, as it is likely to have accelerated
his killing.
 See, amplius, Capogrossi Colognesi, Law and Power, 221–225, underlying (at page 223) the
following: “On the symbolic level as well, a number of innovations worked to exalt his person
beyond the limits prescribed by tradition: from the purple toga that magistrates wore only on the
day of a triumph but which was eventually granted him without restriction, to the laurel wreath,
also originally a symbol of military triumph but which he had the right to wear at all times, to
his personal retinue of bodyguards made up of senators and equestrians.”
 Mathias Gelzer, Caesar: Politician and Statesman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1968), 320–321; Ronald Syme, The Roman Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960),
50–56; Elizabeth Rawson, “Caesar: Civil War and Dictatorship,’’ eds. John Anthony Crook, An-
drew Lintott, Elizabeth Rawson, The Cambridge Ancient History 8 (1994): 424–467; Heinrich
Siber, “Caesars Diktatur und das Prinzipat des Augustus,” Zeitschrift der Savigny Stiftung für Re-
chtsgeschichte. Romanistische Abteilung 55 (1935): 99–58, 103; Jane Gardner, “The Dictator,” in A
Companion to Julius Caesar, ed. Miriam Griffin (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009), 57–71.
 In mid-49 BC the praetor M. Lepidus was allowed, by statute, to nominate a dictator (Cic.
Att. 9.9.3, 9.15.2; Caes. bell. civ. 2.21.5). He nominated Caesar, while the latter was still at Massilia.
 T. Robert S. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 3 (New York and Atlanta
1952), 107– 108. According to Plutarch Caes. 51.1 and Dio 42.20.3, Caesar held his second dictator-
ship for a full year: he returned to Rome from the East in September, 47 BC, for a short period,
before leaving for Africa. There is a gap between the end of the second dictatorship, and the start
of the third. The latter was supposed to last ten years, initially renewed annually (Bell. Hisp. 2.1;
Cass. Dio 43.14.3), then held continuously. This seems to be a step taken to assure continuity of
authority: Roman government was in danger under the demands of a general civil war.
 App. bell. civ. 2.442; Plut. Caes. 57; Cass. Dio 44.8.4; 46.17.5; Suet. Iul. 76.1; Flor. 2.13.91; vir.
ill. 78; Liv. perioch. 116; Zon. 10.11.
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Caesar, employing, strengthening and even overcoming Sulla’s model,³⁹ em-
bodied the concept of ‘dictator with supreme power’. This new office represented
the very paradigm for any commentator, even though it was inconsistent with the
way in which dictatorship had thus far been employed and understood as a pol-
yvalent feature.⁴⁰ In short, his role did not simply look like an anomaly or an
exception with respect to the republican system whose negation was embodied
by Caesar since the conspicuous monopoly on powers and honours gave him the
appearance of a tyrant or a de facto monarch.⁴¹
All this was an intolerable hyperbole, above all to the men who felt right in
deeming themselves to be his peers and thought that there seemed no limit to his
hybris. Finally, in the last months of his life Caesar himself impressed a fatal ac-
celeration on a process that seemed to be inevitable per se.⁴²
 See Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic, 2, 66–67; Broughton, The Magis-
trates of the Roman Republic, 3, 74–75; Arthur Keaveney, Sulla: The Last Republican [1983] (Lon-
don: Routledge, 2005), 148–203; Ronald T. Ridley, “The dictator’s mistake: Caesar’s escape from
Sulla,” Historia 49 (2000): 211–229; Florian Ingrisch, Sullas ‘dictatura rei publicae constituendae’
und Caesars ‘dictatura rei gerendae’. Ein Vergleich (Berlin: WVB, 2007). Late in 82, special legis-
lation authorized the interrex L. Flaccus to name Sulla dictator – the first in 120 years, since the
last dictatorship before Sulla occurred in 202 – with extraordinary powers to make laws and re-
organize the constitution. He was completely free to settle the Roman polity (and without time
limit, though he abdicated after about a year). His position was genuinely unrestricted: he was,
in practice a king or a tyrant: see Plut. Sull. 32; App. bell. civ. 1.97– 103; Dion. Hal. 5.77.4. Mostly in
81, he enacted a coherent, if questionable, program to stabilize the nobles’ traditional system.
 See Pol. 3.87–89, 6.12.5, 6.12.9; Dion. Hal. 5.73.1–2; Liv. 2.18.4–8. Indeed, the canonized view
of the Roman dictatorship (grounded on the examples given by Sulla and, above all, by Caesar)
maintains – seemingly without nuances and distinctions – that such an extraordinary office was
granted unrestricted imperium and plenipotentiary jurisdiction. It moreover states that dictators
administered the Roman polity autonomously and with supremacy over the consuls. On the one
hand, in the period between the beginning of the fifth century and the end of the fourth century
BC, the office at issue, in its original form, was given a power that resembled the consular im-
perium militiae, since the dictators served above all for consular military functions (dictator rei
gerundae causa: literally, dictator for conducting military affairs). On the other hand, from the
beginning of the third century BC up to the end of the third century BC, the office was used
far less abundantly than in the previous centuries. Moreover, the causae attested in the sources
reveal a deep change: in most cases, the dictatores performed just civic and religious tasks (such
as the dictator for driving the nail into the temple of Jupiter; such as the dictator for holding
elections, supervising sacrifices, handling the enactment of laws). See Andrew Lintott, The Con-
stitution of the Roman Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109–113.
 See Francesco De Martino, Storia della costituzione romana, 3 (Neaples: Jovene, 1972): 273.
 See, amplius, Lintott, “The Assassination,” 76, 78, 80. Caesar planned an Eastern campaign
against the Parthians and, if some believed that Caesar’s strategy entailed shifting the political
balance of the Empire in an Eastern direction, others even suspected that he intended to conquer
what was left of the world. What is more, his love affair with Cleopatra, whom Caesar himself
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5 Caesar and the “lex Valeria de adfectatione
regni”
The above-described conducts carried out by Caesar are susceptible to be quali-
fied in terms of adfectatio regni, that is to say the crime of attempted tyranny. The
details regarding the prosecution of such a crime is highly controversial. On the
one hand, those who attempt to re-establish the primitive regnum are regularly
charged with perduellio (that is treason) and brought to trial before the compe-
tent criminal courts.⁴³ On the other hand, Plutarch and Livy seem to attest the
existence of a lex Valeria enacted in 509 B.C. that provides the status of homines
sacri for the perpetrators of a crime statutorily labelled as adfectatio regni.⁴⁴
had restored to Egypt’s throne, was an open secret. Cleopatra’s presence in Rome together with
Caesarion, the son born of their relationship, and the dissolution of Caesar’s previous marriage
were aspects that, together with the exaggerated public exaltation of his person, made him re-
semble a king. Actually, many senatorial decrees heaped quasi-religious and quasi-regal hon-
ours on Caesar, before his death. Such honours did not give any real political power; however –
as Dio points out (Cass. Dio 43.44–46, 44.3–8) – Caesar, whether he accepted or rejected them,
was put in an invidious position: and this may have been the actual intention of the proposers.
 See, on the prosecution of this crime, Santalucia, Diritto e processo penale, 47, 80, 152, 169.
 Liv. 2.8.2: Latae deinde leges, non solum quae regni suspicione consulem absoluerent, sed quae
adeo in contrarium verterent ut popularem etiam facerent; inde cognomen factum Publicolae est.
Ante omnes de provocatione adversus magistratus ad populum sacrandoque cum bonis capite eius
qui regni occupandi consilia inisset gratae in volgus leges fuere; Liv. 2.8.5: ibi omnium primum ius
iurandum populi recitat neminem regnare passuros nec esse Romae unde periculum libertati foret;
Plut. Publ. 12.2: ἔγραψε γὰρ νόμον ἄνευ κρίσεως κτεῖνια διδόντα τὸν βουλόμενον τυραννεῖν κτεί-
ναντα δὲ φόνου καθαρὸν ἐποίησεν, εἰ παράσχοιτο τοῦ ἀδικήματος τοὺς ἐλέγχους. See, on the lex
Valeria de adfectatione regni, Fiori, Homo sacer, 325, and Tassi Scandone, Leges Valeriae de pro-
vocatione, 269, endorsing the view that the perpetrator of the crime became automatically a
homo sacer and as such susceptible to be killed lawfully by anyone; contra, see Roberto Scevola,
“L’adfectatio regni di M. Capitolino: eliminazione sine iudicio o persecuzione criminale?,” in Sa-
certà e repressione criminale in Roma arcaica, ed. Luigi Garofalo (Neaples: Jovene, 2013), 275–
344. See, moreover, Claire Lovisi, Contribution à l’étude de la peine de mort sous la république
romaine [509– 149 av. J.–C.] (Paris: De Boccard, 2000), 55, who maintains that the trial takes
place a posteriori if the crime is attempted tyranny, while if the adfectator regni establishes a tyr-
anny, “dans ce cas, on pouvait tuer le coupable sans attendre le jugement.” See, on the repub-
lican right to put to death, sine iudicio, anyone who attempted to a establish a tyranny, Luis Ro-
dríguez-Ennes, Realidad historica y elementos legendarios en la seditio Manliana, in ‘Sodalitas’.
Scritti in onore di A. Guarino, 1 (Neaples: Jovene, 1984): 55–74; André Magdelain, Remarques sur
la ‘perduellio’, Historia 22 (1973): 405–422, 410. On the shadowy line dividing the perduellio
(roughly translatable with ‘treason’, that is a crime usually tackled by the tribuni plebis since
the middle of the third century BC,while the appointment of the ancient duoviri became virtually
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Did Caesar really intend to subvert, as a tyrant, the republican order? Did he
really attempt to re-establish the reign, and thus to enslave the Roman people?⁴⁵
On the one side, it is undeniable that Caesar formally refused the royal crown
(even though someone suspected him as the planner of the solemn and subver-
sive gesture carried out by the consul M. Antony on behalf of the Roman people
during the festival of the Luperci, i.e. offering the diadem).⁴⁶ He also declined the
title of king (even though the tribuni plebis who accused the citizens who had
addressed him as rex were condemned and deprived of their office, notwith-
standing their sacrosanctitas).⁴⁷ On the other side, despite the absence of any ac-
tual intention on his part to restore, de iure, the primitive regnum,⁴⁸ it is plausible
that his outrageous and untraditional conducts led both the plebeian magis-
trates and the optimates⁴⁹ to consider him as a real adfectator regni.⁵⁰
Indeed, the title of king and the royal crown are just exterior signs of a power
that, in its substance, is conceived of as annihilation of the republican order (at
least according to the optimates’ view).⁵¹ As a matter of fact, the crime of adfec-
obsolete) and the adfectatio regni repressed by the above-mentioned lex Valeria (through the re-
ligious-legal mechanism of the sacertas), see Pelloso, “Sacertà,” 116– 118, nt. 90.
 As for Brutus’s and Cassius’s ideas (focused, first, on the violation by Caesar of the plebeian
sacrosanctitas, and, secondly, on the early republican oath against the adfectatores regni), see
App. bell. civ. 2.137– 139, 144, 4.90–98. Cicero depicts Caesar’s consulship of 59 BC as an actual
regnum and maintains that Caesar had already had this in mind as early as his aedileship (Suet.
Iul. 9.2). Finally he describes him in terms of rex in correspondence of 45 BC (Cic. Att. 13.37.2,
fam. 6.19.2).
 Cic. Phil. 2.84–7, 3.12, 5.38, 13.17, 13.31, 13.40, 13.31; Liv. perioch. 116; App. bell. civ. 2.108,
2.456–458; Cass. Dio 44.10.1–3, 44.11.2–3, 45.31.3; 46.49.2; Vell. 2.56.4; Suet. Iul. 79; Plut. Caes.
61; Flor. 2.13.91. It must be highlighted that Caesar used the episode pro se, ordering Antony’s
offer, and his refusal, to be recorded in the Fasti.
 Cic. Phil. 13.31; Nic. Dam. Caes. 20.69–70; Liv. perioch. 116; Vell. 2.68.4–5; Val. Max. 5.7.2;
Suet. Iul. 79–80; Plut. Caes. 61 and Ant. 12; Cass. Dio 44.9.3–44.10.4; 46.49.2; App. bell.
civ. 2.108, 109, 122, 138; Iul. Obseq. 70; Zon. 10.11. Actually, the two tribunes, Caesetius and Mar-
ullus, were deposed from office not directly by the dictator himself, but on the proposal of a fel-
low tribune, that is C. Helvius Cinna.
 De Martino, Storia della costituzione romana 3, 271–273.
 App. bell. civ. 2.107; Liv. perioch. 116; Suet. Iul. 78; Nic. Dam. Caes. 22.76–79; Cass. Dio 44.8.6.
 Liv. perioch. 116: […] quod Epidio Marullo et Caesetio Flavio tr. pl. invidiam et tamquam re-
gnum adfectanti; Val. Max. 5.7.2: is tribunus plebis cum Marullo collega invidiam ei tamquam re-
gnum affectanti iecerat; Vell. 2.68.4: immodica et intempestiva libertate usos adversus C. Caesar-
em Marullum Epidium Flavumque Caesetium tribunos plebis, dum arguunt in eo regni voluntatem
(see, moreover, App. bell. civ. 2.108; Nic. Dam. Caes. 20.69); Suet. Iul. 80: Brutus, quia reges eiecit,
consul primus factus est: // hic, quia consules eiecit, rex postremo factus est.
 Isabelle Cogitore, Le doux nom de liberté. Histoire d’une idée politique dans la Rome antique
(Bordeaux: Ausonius Éditions, 2011), 108; Valentina Arena, ‘Libertas’ and the Practice of Politics
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tatio regni encompasses any wrong perpetrated against the republican libertas.
This is a syncretic concept implying, at the constitutional level, that all the pow-
ers (potestates) come, directly or indirectly, from the populus Romanus: this, as
an electoral assembly, votes the magistrates; as a lawgiver, passes the laws; as
a judge, is allowed to sentence to death.⁵² If during the (Etruscan) regnum the
res had belonged to a single plenipotentiary, if not even capricious, ‘magistrate’
(res regis), during the Republic the res belonged to the people as a whole (res
populi).⁵³ Accordingly, the magistrates, in potestate populi, were representatives
of the Roman people (that was, on the contrary, in sua potestate)⁵⁴ and the sen-
ators, who were ex-magistrates, embodied the ruling oligarchy invested with
powers and functions of coordination, supervision, and advise (by means of
their consultum and auctoritas).⁵⁵
From the beginning of the Republic, therefore, those who stepped outside
the boundaries of the new constitutional order (that is the system replacing
the primitive kingdom where there was no res publica, but a res regis) were label-
led as adfectatores regni.When someone’s power threatened to disrupt the bal-
ance in the new free order (as establishing the regnum, by statute, was not nec-
essary), an accusation of perduellio (in terms of attempted subversion of the
popular power) could be brought against him.
Notwithstanding that, according to the lex Vaeleria and under particular
(and so far unknown) conditions, such criminals could even be put to death
sine iudicio.⁵⁶
Accordingly, out of his de facto tyrannical behaviour, Caesar could be quali-
fied as a homo sacer, whether he had intended to modify formally the shape of
the res publica, or not. The penalty “sacer esto,” as we already know, removed
the wrongdoer from any human community and consigned him to the sphere
in the Late Roman Republic (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 6, 26, 81, 116; Carlo
Venturini, Studi di diritto delle persone e di vita sociale in Roma antica (Neaples: Satura Editrice,
2014), 483.
 See, amplius, Giovanni Lobrano, Res publica res populi. La legge e la limitazione del potere
(Torino: Giappichelli, 1996), passim.
 Cic. rep. 1.39, 2.23; Liv. 2.1.1; Tac. ann. 1.1.1. See Francesco De Martino, Storia della costituzione
romana, 3, 138: the predominant idea lying behind the noun libertas was not the so-called ‘dem-
ocratic freedom’; indeed, libertas (i.e., etymologically, ‘belonging to the people’) meant denial of
regnum and, thence, absence of any tyrannical domination. See, moreover, Giuseppe Valditara,
Saggi sulla libertà dei romani, dei cristiani e dei moderni (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino, 2007), 27.
 D. 49.15.7.1; Varr. l.L. 9.6; Cic. off. 1.124, de orat. 2.167; Sen. ep. 14.7.
 Cic. rep. 2.56, rep. 3.37, leg. 3.28, dom. 130, Sest. 137.
 On tyrannicide, in general, see Andrew Lintott, Violence in Republican Rome (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999), 53–58.
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of the gods. As such, Caesar would have lost any protection afforded by member-
ship in the Roman civitas; he would have become property of the gods of Free-
dom and anyone, as a divine longa manus, could have killed him with impunity.
His killers would not have been prosecuted.⁵⁷ His body would not have been bur-
ied, his goods would have been sold, his provisions, acts, and measures would
have been considered void.⁵⁸
This reconstruction⁵⁹ seems to be less sound in regard to the events occur-
ring after Caesar’s death. Since protecting the conspirators represented an ulti-
mate need, qualifying Caesar’s conducts in terms of tyranny turned out to be
the easiest way to achieve this goal. A different way was taken, and what actual-
ly happened after Caesar’s death is certainly remarkable, both from a political
and a legal perspective.
First, in the Senate meeting of March 17, after a troubled session of the as-
sembly,⁶⁰ an amnesty, supported by Antony, was voted: the consultum pro-
claimed that the plotters had committed murder (this implying that the Senate
assumed that lex Numae and the lex Cornelia applied to the case), but, at the
same time, it stipulated that they were not punishable. Second, it did not formal-
ly qualify Caesar as a tyrant (this implying that the Senate assumed that the lex
Valeria did not apply to the case): thus, even against the opinion endorsed by
some, in the same session the Senate voted to ratify Caesar’s appointments to
office and all his other measures (whether enacted or merely planned).⁶¹
Third, after Piso’s speech, the Senate authorised solemn funeral and burial for
Caesar, as well as the public reading of his will.⁶²
The senators did not rule out, from a legal perspective, the grounds for the
sacertas-mechanism; they just decided, from a political perspective, to follow an-
 App. bell. civ. 4.94: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐγένετο, αὐτίκα ἡ βουλὴ τὴν κοινὴν γνώμην ἐξέφηνε, σαφῶς μὲν
ὅτε καὶ γέρα τυραννοκτονικὰ ἐψηφίζοντο εἶναι: ἐπισχόντος δὲ αὐτοὺς A̓ντωνίου καθ᾽ ὑπόκρισιν
ἀταξίας καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἡμῶν ἀξιούντων διὰ γέρα τῇ πόλει μᾶλλον ἢ δι᾽ αὐτὴν τὴν πατρίδα βοηθεῖν,
τοῦδε μὲν ἀπέσχοντο, οὐκ ἐθέλοντες ἐφυβρίζειν τῷ Καίσαρι, ἀλλὰ μόνης τῆς τυραννίδος ἀπηλ-
λάχθαι, ἀμνηστίαν δὲ ἁπάντων ἐψηφίσαντο εἶναι καὶ σαφέστερον ἔτι, φόνου μὴ εἶναι δίκας.
 Suet. Iul. 82: corpus occisi in Tiberim trahere, bona publicare, acta rescindere (see App. bell.
civ. 2.128, 133– 136, 3.18; Cass. Dio, 44.35.1; Plut. Brut. 20).
 See Fiori, Homo sacer, 458, on the basis of App. bell. civ. 3.18.
 App. bell. civ. 2.127– 134.
 App. bell. civ. 2.135: τοιαῦτα εἰπόντος τοῦ A̓ντωνίου σὺν ἀνατάσει τε καὶ ὁρμῇ βαρυτέρᾳ,
γίγνεται δόγμα, ἡσυχαζόντων ἤδη καὶ ἀγαπώντων ἁπάντων, φόνου μὲν οὐκ εἶναι δίκας ἐπὶ τῷ
Καίσαρι, κύρια δὲ εἶναι τὰ πεπραγμένα αὐτῷ πάντα καὶ ἐγνωσμένα, ἐπεὶ τῇ πόλει συμφέρει.
 App. bell. civ. 2.136: θορύβου δὲ καὶ ἀγανακτήσεως γενομένης παρὰ πάντων, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν
τι καὶ ἐλπιζόντων ἐκ τῶν διαθηκῶν αὑτοῖς ἔσεσθαι, τάς τε διαθήκας ἐς τὸ μέσον ἔδοξε προφέρειν
καὶ θάπτειν τὸν ἄνδρα δημοσίᾳ.
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other way. Nevertheless, it is apparent that this was a solution of mere conven-
ience, rather than a legally and religiously grounded answer. Before the Senate,
Antony pragmatically emphasizes that, if the killing of Caesar was to be consid-
ered as a ‘tyrannicide’, all the legal acts concluded by Caesar in the last five
years should have been considered void and each public office should have
been dismissed. This utilitarian approach gains the support of the majority.
Hence, the Senate again annihilates the republican order: the same order that,
first, Caesar had allegedly breached and, then, the conspirators had intended
to re-establish. Paradoxically, the senatorial pardon – notwithstanding its inter-
nal and external coherence de iure – is, de facto, both a denial of the republican
values and an acknowledgement of the order infringed by Caesar. Indeed, in ac-
cordance with the views of the Senate’s majority, on the one hand, the regime
shaped in the lex Valeria is not enforced; on the other hand, the killing is quali-
fied in terms of murder, even though it is firm belief that the perpetrators do not
deserve any punishment.
6 Some conclusions
During Caesar’s funeral, Shakespeare presents all the ambiguity of the situation,
reconfiguring Caesar’s assassination as “the foundational violence of the Roman
empire.”⁶³ This is a dramatic event presented as unlawful (in contrast with the
view supporting the enforcement of the traditional sacral law), but historically
necessary (in order to found a new order that will turn out to look as formally
homogeneous and practically heterogeneous with the republican tradition).
Shakespeare celebrates the contingency of the codes of conduct, as well as
the dialectics existing between antagonistic forces: and he does so, by emphasiz-
ing the ambivalence implied in the main character of the tragedy, Caesar, his life
and his death.⁶⁴ He presents the inescapable run of history, and conceives of the
historical processus in the path toward the future as recognition, inclusion, and
 Richard Wilson, Shakespeare in French Theory: King of Shadows (London, New York: Rout-
ledge, 2007), 180, quoting from René Girard, A Theatre of Envy: William Shakespeare (New
York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).
 As Julia Griffin, “Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar and the Dramatic Tradition,” 371, underlines:
“every major event in which he was involved might be regarded in two ways: was he merciful or
corrupt in his attitude to Catiline? Were his conquests in Gaul and Britain to be admired or ab-
horred? How far was he responsible for the Civil War? Was his assassination a murder or a tyr-
annicide?”
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transfiguration of the past: the republican thesis, symbolized by Brutus and Cas-
sius, and the Caesarean antithesis will merge into the Augustan synthesis.
Antony, in line with the targets achieved by means of the senatus consultum
of March 17, openly ratifies the order represented by the dictator. Caesar is depict-
ed as a man who loved his people and hated any royal power; the crowd is even
inclined to revenge Caesar’s death, overcoming the senatorial settlement. Caesar
is not a criminal who, by attempting to dissolve the republican libertas, becomes
property of the gods (sacer); he is a noble hero, a god.⁶⁵ Accordingly, Brutus is
not a divine agent; he is, formally, a murderer. Nevertheless, Antony himself
has no hesitation in praising the enemy, Brutus, as one of the noblest Romans
and as a man aiming at the common good and worthy of the rites of burial.
This is a subtle and implicit recognition: the words pronounced by Brutus, in
Act II, are not vain rhetorical devices. The latter had addressed the conspirators
as real purgers (not as butchers and murderers), had urged them to kill Caesar
with no wrath and envy, and had qualified the project as necessary.
Through this powerful picture, Shakespeare does not treat Brutus simply as
a rhetorician who tries to deny the dreadful realities of the plot and to idealize a
cruel assassination by describing it in religious terms. Through this powerful pic-
ture, Shakespeare describes – and, according to Roman law, quite correctly
so⁶⁶ – the republican regime, entailing the so-called sacertas for those who at-
tempted to dissolve the Roman libertas.
 Antony had even called him “the noblest man // That ever lived in the tide of times,”
3.1.256–57. Stephen Weinstock, Divus Julius, 411, points out, Caesar was “as an imaginative
and daring religious reformer, who planned and created new cults, accepted extraordinary hon-
ours and died when he was about to become a divine ruler – a reformer who did not want to
appear as an innovator […] but to be guided by tradition; and yet one who in the end radically
broke with it.”
 From a legal-religious perspective, the conspirators are not sacrificers, as Brutus erroneously
maintains. Festus clearly attests that the immolatio of the homo sacer is nefas: Fest. verb. sign.
s.v. Sacer mons (Lindsay 424): at homo sacer is est, quem populus iudicavit ob maleficium; neque
fas est eum immolari, sed, qui occidit, parricidi non damnatur; nam lege tribunicia prima cavetur,
‘si quis eum, qui eo plebei scito sacer sit, occiderit, parricida ne sit’. In other words, since such a
homo, being sacer, already belongs to a god and since the sacrifice is a ritual implying the trans-
fer of the victima “du domaine humain à celui des dieux” (Francesca Prescendi, Décrire et com-
prendre le sacrifice, [Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 2007], 35), it is not fas (i.e. it is impossible from a
religious and legal point of view) that who kills a homo sacer performs a sacrifice: “Was sacer ist
bildet schon den Besitz der Götter, wird nicht erst gemacht”, as Karol Kerényi, Die antike Reli-
gion. Ein Entwurf von Grundlinien (Düsseldorf and Körf: E. Diederichs, 1953), 84, remarks (see





Notes on A Strange Eventful History
“Shakespeare didn’t write this stuff to be read. It’s like sheet music.You don’t just look at it;
it’s just a bunch of notes on a page. This was meant to be played.”
The actor Kevin Kline speaking on John Barton’s The Shakespeare Sessions (Storyville Films,
Dir: Jacoby, 2003)¹
This paper retells the story of a strange event. In the summer of 2016, I joined
The Song Company of Australia (described on its website as “the continent’s
leading vocal ensemble”)² in rehearsing and performing a Shakespeare-themed
show that I had co-written with their Artistic Director, the composer Antony
Pitts.³ The idea behind A Strange Eventful History (‘ASEH’) was to mark the
four-hundredth anniversary of Shakespeare’s death with a symphony of famous
Shakespearean speeches and musical pieces connected by a playful narrative.
The narrative, which was loosely structured according to the “seven ages of
man” as presented by Jaques in Shakespeare’s As You Like It (2.7.140–67),⁴
was threaded throughout by the conceit that The Song Company had assisted
scientists in recovering snippets from the original soundscape of Shakespeare’s
London. Thus the narrator introduces the show as “a journey back to Shake-
speare’s London and the journey of a lifetime from birth to the last scene of
all” (ASEH, prologue). Another idea, at least for my part, was to experiment
with some of the performance theories and practical techniques that I had writ-
ten about in a book – Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law Testament and Properties of
Performance – that was published around the time of the show.⁵
 Kevin Kline might have been recalling Harley Granville-Barker’s words in the Introduction to
his Prefaces to Shakespeare: “The text of a play is a score waiting performance” (London: Bats-
ford, 1930), 5.
 See http://song.company (last access September 6, 2017).
 I am grateful to Antony Pitts, Marc Stauch and Sean Mulcahy for their helpful comments on a
draft of this paper. I am to blame for duff notes that remain. My thanks also to Daniela Carpi,
Chiara Battisti and Sidia Fiorato for the invitation to present these reflections at the conference
As You Law It: Negotiating Shakespeare (Verona, 2016). I also want to take this opportunity to
record my thanks to all members of The Song Company, those on stage and off, who did so
much to entertain me and organise me and make me welcome.
 William Shakespeare, As You Like It, The Arden Shakespeare, 3rd series, ed. Juliet Dusinberre
(London: Bloomsbury, 2006). All references to Shakespeare are to the most recent editions in
The Arden Shakespeare unless otherwise stated.
 Gary Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law, Testament and Properties of Performance (London:
Bloomsbury Arden Shakespeare, 2016). See, further, Sidia Fiorato, “Gary Watt’s Acts of Will: A
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-013
One of those techniques is a poetic method that is subtly at work in much of
Shakespeare’s dramatic writing. I call it “fractional inference.” In essence, it is a
method of scattering fragments of sound throughout a passage of a text and then
combining the fragments to produce a recognizable word. The fragments provoke
the subconscious to seek a resolution that at first eludes the ear (and eye, if the
text is being read) until it finally finds completion in some word or phrase that
combines an audible sense with the intended literal (dictionary) sense of the tar-
get word. I call this target word the “tenor” word. The term “tenor,” with its ob-
vious musical overtones, is actually borrowed from the vernacular of literary cri-
tique in which it describes the meaning or sense carried by the “vehicle” of a
metaphor (in the phrase “love is like a red, red rose,” love is the tenor and
rose is the vehicle). In a case of “fractional inference,” the tenor word combines
the scattered sound fragments into a pleasing whole. The satisfaction of the res-
olution can be heightened by postponing the express presentation of the tenor
word by using homonymic or homophonic forms of the word. Homophones
tease the subconscious to within tantalizing proximity of the tenor word so
that the final presentation of the true tenor becomes all the more pleasing. Occa-
sionally the tenor word never appears, but is left to the imagination to create.
By way of illustration, I will repeat, in brief, an example of the phenomenon
that I discuss in Shakespeare’s Acts of Will. (A further, new, example is presented
later on in this paper). Set out next are four lines from Shakespeare’s Julius Cae-
sar which feature in Antony’s rhetorical effort in the funeral scene to stir the mob
against Brutus. I have curtailed the passage for present purposes at the word
“stir.” “Stir” is the tenor word, and the reader will note how sound fragments
of the word are scattered through the four lines and on two occasions the
sound sense (but not the dictionary sense) of the word appears homophonically
in “ye-ster-day” and “ma-ster-s,” thus the culminating appearance of the word
“stir” is the rhetorically satisfying third iteration in the tricolon “ster” –
“ster” – “stir.” I have underlined and bracketed the relevant sound fragments
to show how Shakespeare sometimes encloses one fractional version of the
word within another to produce a layering or amplification of sound effect:
But yesterday the word of Caesar might
Have [stood again{st the wor}rld. Now lies he there],
And none [so poor to do him rever]ence.
O masters! If I were disposed to stir (Julius Caesar 3.2.119– 123)
Consummate Performance,” Cardozo Electronic Law Bulletin (2016): 1– 19; and Daniela Carpi,
“Review of Shakespeare’s Acts of Will: Law Testament and Properties of Performance,” Pólemos
10.2 (2016): 453–457.
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The reader will note that within the tricolon “ster” – “ster” – “stir” three fraction-
al versions of the “stir” sound are sandwiched between the homophonic pair
“ster” and “ster.” The fact that one of these homophonic versions is enclosed
within another means that there is a three-fold layering: a fractional “stir”
sound inside a fractional “stir” sound inside the pair “ster” and “ster.” We
have then a tricolon of tricolons – the first is “ster” – “ster” – “stir,” the second
is the three fractional versions of the “stir” sound, the third is the three layers in
which the sound is enclosed within the sound. As with the musical tricolon of
melody, harmony and rhythm, the overall effect is rhetorically stirring stuff in-
deed.
The technique of “fractional inference” – by which the audience is prompted
to infer a whole from fractional parts – is a sound effect which has equivalents or
close comparators in musical theory. One such is so-called “thematic transfor-
mation” or “thematic metamorphosis.” It is a common technique of musical
composition whereby the composer produces a pleasing resolution or reiteration
of a theme by scattering its component motifs and other elements throughout the
work. The musical theme may be stated in complete form early in the piece so
that it becomes the subject of subsequent fragmentation and variation; or the
fragments may come first, to be combined later in a climactic statement of the
theme; or the two sequences (“whole followed by fractions” and “fractions fol-
lowed by whole”) may be employed together in the same work. It may seem
strange to commence these notes with reference to a single technical point of
comparison between music and literary text, but the broader point is that the
techniques in both arts are united by their pleasing effect upon the ear. It is
my argument that such pleasing sound effects are the most direct point of con-
nection between the arts of music and dramatic text and the arts of law, for they
share a rhetorical concern to persuade through pleasing sensual, including au-
ditory, effects. As the classical rhetorician Quintilian wrote:
Composition, therefore, as it seems to me, plays the part of a sort of…bowstring in giving
direction and force to our thoughts. This is why the best scholars are all convinced of its
great value, not only for pleasure but also for its emotional impact, first because nothing
can penetrate to the emotions if it stumbles at the ear – at the threshold, as you might say;
and, secondly, because we are naturally attracted by harmony.
The best judge of Composition is the ear, which senses completeness, feels the lack when
something is incomplete, is offended by unevenness, soothed by smoothness. (Quintilian,
Institutio Oratoria, 4.9– 10, 116)⁶
 Donald A Russell (trans.), The Orator’s Education, Volume IV, Loeb Classical Library (Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014).
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Rhetoric is the most substantial justification for the inclusion of these perform-
ance notes in the present set of essays, concerned as they are with Shakespeare
and the law. A less substantial, more circumstantial, link between A Strange
Eventful History and the law is the fact that the fifth age in Jaques’ seven ages
of man is the age of “the justice.” I want to suggest that Jaques’ seven ages of
man can be appreciated in a new acoustic sense as a series of seven notes on
sound and silence. In ASEH, each of the six singers was allocated one of the
first six ages. We have the “mewling” infant;⁷ the “whining schoolboy”;⁸ the
“sighing” lover;⁹ the swearing soldier (“full of strange oaths”) whose fiery in-
stinct is to “quarrel” even in the cannon’s mouth;¹⁰ the justice “full of wise
saws and common instances”¹¹ (“common instances” alludes to rhetorical com-
monplace sayings, such as Justice Shallow’s “death is certain to all, all shall die”
(2 Hen IV, 3.2.27)); and, the pantaloon whose “big manly voice” has turned again
“to childish treble, pipes / And whistles in his sound” (2.7.163–4).¹² The seventh
age is the age of oblivion, with its deathly decline into silent nothingness. His is
the scene “[t]hat ends this strange eventful history” (2.7.165). The seventh age was
allocated to the musical director Antony Pitts who throughout the entire show
accompanied the singers on a Fender Rhodes electric piano on which he also in-
termittently played dances including the charming Mal Sims by Giles Farnaby (c.
1560– 1640). The Fender Rhodes wonderfully evoked the tripping, daintiness of a
Shakespearean virginal whilst simultaneously playing up to the conceit that the
performers were sharing a soundscape revealed by space-age scientific instru-
mentation. The seventh age of man is a dance of death. His voice is silent.
Jaques’ justice represents the life of man at its zenith before things start to go
downhill. He is in all respects a full figure. Physically he has his “fair round belly
with good capon lin’d”; intellectually he is “[f]ull of wise saws and modern in-
stances” (2.7.157). After the age of the justice, Jaques informs us that the “sixth
age shifts.” The man wanes thin. The trousers have to be tightened at the
waist (“His youthful hose well sav’d, a world too wide / For his shrunk
shank” (2.7.161–2)); and eventually he wastes away to nothing. Jaques’ depiction
of the justice is a de-piction indeed; it is highly visual – we have his “eyes severe
and beard of formal cut” in addition to the sight of his “fair round belly.” The
mouth is framed by the beard, and although both mind and mouth are full of
 Played by Anna Fraser (soprano).
 Played by Andrew O’Connor (bass baritone).
 Played by Hannah Fraser (mezzo soprano).
 Played by Mark Donnelly (baritone).
 Played by Richard Black (tenor).
 Played by Susannah Lawergren (soprano).
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sayings, our imagined sense of sound is arguably drowned out by the overpow-
ering sense of sight. I hear a warning here about the overpowering influence of
the visual in law – a theme on which many law and humanities scholars have
reflected.¹³ It is said that justice must be seen to be done. Is it not equally true
that justice must be heard?
The sense of sound – even the lack of sound and the strain to achieve a fair
hearing – takes us back to rhetoric. Shakespeare’s playhouse dramas and the
performance of law are deeply connected to each other by their shared origins
in the classical arts of rhetoric. The word “rhetoric” ultimately derives from
Proto-Indo-European for the spoken word (*wretor), and related to it is the
Greek rhetra, which came to denote a ceremonial or authoritative utterance.
Today we think of the “writ” – the written word – as an epitome of stated
legal power, but a different and deeper authority emanates from the word spo-
ken. Audible speech adds an appealing sense of sound to the silent rhetorical
qualities of script, notwithstanding that silent script may acquire an imagined
auditory quality by means of the mind’s inner voice. Rhetoric of the spoken
sort may be called the art of persuading through the music of sweet sound.
For Shakespeare, music is the food of love, but lover’s words also have a “sil-
ver-sweet sound” that is “like softest music to attending ears” (2.2.165–6). An
appreciation of the audible quality of Shakespeare and law in performance
will bring us closer to a sense of sound justice than can be achieved by a silent
appreciation of the logic – the logos – of the written word alone. As David Levin
put it, the “development of our capacity for listening exercises and develops our
(bodily felt) sense of justice. The primary sense of justice is not seeing, but hear-
ing.”¹⁴
There is a difference between the word on the page and the word spoken.
When I teach my student advocates how to speak well, I never focus exclusively
upon the logical sense of the words used or even upon formal stylistic features of
the script. I emphasize the musicality of pleasing speech and the moderation –
 See Leif Dahlberg, ed., Visualizing Law and Authority: Essays on Legal Aesthetics (Berlin: de
Gruyter, 2012); Peter Goodrich, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law: Obiter Depicta as the Vision of
Governance (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Ruth Herz, The Art of Justice: The
Judge’s Perspective (Oxford: Hart, 2012); Paul Raffield, Images and Cultures of Law in Early Mod-
ern England: Justice and Political Power, 1558– 1660 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2004); Richard K. Sherwin, Visualizing Law in the Age of the Digital Baroque: Arabesques & En-
tanglements (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011); Anne Wagner and Richard K. Sherwin, eds., Law, Cul-
ture and Visual Studies (Heidelberg; New York; London: Springer, 2014).
 David Levin, The Listening Self: Personal Growth, Social Change and the Closure of Metaphy-
sics (Abingdon: Routledge, 1989), 184; cited in Richard Dawson, “Listening,” in Justice as Attune-
ment (Abingdon: Routledge, 2014), 163– 169.
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indeed, the musical modulation – of the voice, which should be tuned to pro-
duce ease of speech and hearing so as to bring out with fidelity the sound quality
of the script. Equally important is to learn to listen well and not merely to rely
upon what is written down. There are, as has been said, “difficulties […] in
the tendency to reduce […] sensory knowledge to visual terms[…] A word is
more than a sign of something […] It is a cry, a voice.”¹⁵ The appeal to human
well-being and the human psyche in pleasing sound is so deep that justice si-
lenced must surely amount to justice lost. We might have our day in court, but
unless we are free to speak and to voice our concerns audibly we will not
have had our hearing. Might it be that the sounding out of arguments and the
hearing of voice are together absolutely essential to our sense that justice has
been done? Richard Dawson and James Parker, legal scholars from New Zealand
and Australia respectively, have recently and separately called for greater atten-
tion to the acoustic quality of justice.¹⁶ It may be that the aural sense figures
more prominently as a concern in common law jurisdictions due to the adversa-
rial mode of trial procedure, but even in countries with a more documentary or
inquisitorial system the call should not fall on deaf ears. One of the pillars of due
process and of a fair trial – the hearing of both sides to an argument – has been
telling us, since it was first rendered in the Latin audi alterem partem, that audi-
tion is the key sense in a judicial hearing. To an Anglophone ear the auditory
connection between forensic rhetoric and other species of performative rhetoric
is pronounced in the French word “audience,” which the French lawyer hears as
a legal hearing and an English speaker hears as the body of theatrical playgoers.
In Anglophone jurisdictions we sometimes talk of judicial “hearings,” but even
the more usual word “trial” has a strained, perhaps strange, connection to audi-
tion. The verb “to try” seems to have its origins in ideas of sieving or separating,
which ideas equally underlie such judicial words as “discern” and “discrimi-
nate.” (Shakespeare uses “sift” in a judicial sense in All’s Well That Ends Well
where the king, having put material, written and oral evidence to the proof,
states “We’ll sift this matter further” (5.3.124)). Thus trial and audition can, at
a strain, be understood to be connected by a sense of straining – the sense
that a judge is called upon to discern the sweet voice of justice from the general
noise of the debate or, to put it another way (and to make another etymological
connection), to sift the true note from the general “clamour” of the claims. The
 Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art
of Reason (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), 109– 110; cited in Richard Dawson,
“Rhetoric,” in Justice as Attunement, 220–226.
 Dawson, Justice as Attunement; see especially the chapters on “Listening” and “Rhetoric”;
James Parker, Acoustic Jurisprudence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).
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judge’s task of hearing or attunement becomes, therefore, the task of being able
to tell which account rings true, and, in response to what is heard, to sound a
new note in their judicial speech. Juris-diction is, after all, the necessary start
and conclusion to any fair hearing that claims to give sound judgment.
These linguistic correspondences between sound and law are something
more than puns. The metaphor of the legal hearing may be a dead metaphor
but when it is disinterred a sound can be heard in it. Let me pause on that pair-
ing “dis-in-terred” and “heard-in-it.” As is the case with so many rhetorical and
poetical devices, that pairing seduces our ear and our sense of sound before it
seeks to reason with our sense of logic. In the pairing “dis-in-terred” and
“heard-in-it” assonance is amplified by a structural palindromic technique
that may be considered a species of chiasmus. Paired sounds move one way
and then the other, as if echoing off a wall. “Dis-in-terred” bounces back as
“heard-in-it” so that, through the assonance of paired sounds, the paired
words become in the most literal sense resonant of each other. This echo-effect
captures our attention and makes us attend to other reverberations created in the
mind through sound. For example, we become aware, albeit subconsciously, that
the echoing pair has produced a pleasing structural sense of balance. This sound
sense of balance has numerous musical equivalents – for example juxtaposed
crescendo and diminuendo or the use of ascending and descending scales.
The idea of scales and balance can be playfully productive in our appreciation
of the musical sweetness of sound justice. In A Strange Eventful History, each
of the seven ages of man is introduced by a stanza written as a variation on
Shakespeare’s (Jaques’) version and delivered by the narrator. For the age of
the justice, we have the following iambic pentameter lines:
See the justice keep score with scales and notes
Ignoring weighty planks while sawing motes
When sharp indentures the innocent bite
The judge’s jaw should set all things aright
With evident eyes and fair-hearing ears
Speaking sound judgment and drowning down tears (ASEH, the justice)
When the forms of law bite, the jaw of the law should speak substantial justice.
Indenture is an old form of legal document that was typically cut down the mid-
dle to produce corresponding part and counterpart containing identical script, so
that the two parties each had a portion of the original whole and a complete
copy of the document’s terms. The line of the cut was deliberately jagged like
the intersecting teeth of a jaw, so that the original part was a true and perfect
fit for none other than its original counterpart. It was an early technological
method of fraud-prevention.
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Let us dwell a little longer and more deeply upon the musical metaphor.
Music is made up of melody, harmony and rhythm. It is most pleasing and per-
suasive to human sense when it is rhetorically constituted by the trinity of these
elements, but each of the three can be played with; indeed the highest art – the
discretionary and equitable aspect – consists in the judicious bending of the for-
mal rules. Regular scales played in metronomic strict time are no more pleasing
or humane than formal rules strictly and unwaveringly applied in law. A series of
scale exercises is hardly more musical than a strict law is just. Justice, in music
as in law, requires art as well as technical skill. The rhythmic metre of Shake-
speare’s verse, especially his iambic pentameter, is no doubt a large part of
what makes it pleasing. The pairing of unstressed and stressed beats in the iam-
bic foot (“dee-DUM”) is said to be resonant of the “lub-DUB” of a human heart-
beat. Commenting on iambic pentameter, Peter Groves observes that “Shake-
speare’s meter informs the actor’s production of emotional meaning through
rhythm… the rhythm can seem an echo to the sense.”¹⁷
In addition to melody, harmony and rhythm, there is a fourth or master el-
ement – one that constitutes and combines and transcends all other elements. In
a sense it is an anti-element. In both music and law it goes by the name of “si-
lence.” It is telling that justice systems based on juris-diction nearly always en-
shrine a right to silence. In English law, a criminal accused’s right to silence is
now exercised with this official caution: “You do not have to say anything, but it
may harm your defence if you do not mention, when questioned, something
which you later rely on in court. Anything you do say may be given in evi-
dence.”¹⁸ Silence is very often more eloquent than words.¹⁹ To take a musical ex-
ample, each section of Pärt’s setting of the Latin translation of the St John Pas-
sion in the Vulgate is “allocated a certain constant set of notes and durations
throughout” and “Even the silences between sections have a precise duration
specified by the number of syllables in the final word of the preceding sen-
 Peter L. Groves, “‘My heart dances’: Performing Emotion through Shakespeare’s Rhythms,”
in Shakespeare and Emotions: Inheritances, Enactments, Legacies, eds. R. S.White, Mark Houla-
han and Katrina O’Loughlin (Palgrave Shakespeare Studies: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 84.
 The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 ss.34–37 deals with “Inferences from accu-
sed’s silence” including the effect of the accused’s “failure to mention facts when questioned or
charged” (s.34); “silence at trial” (s.35); “failure or refusal to account for objects, substances or
marks” (s.36); failure or refusal to account for presence at a particular place (s.37). The right to
silence is discussed in Annabelle Mooney, Language and Law (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan,
2014), 68–73.
 See, generally, Deborah Tannen and Muriel Saville-Troike, eds., Perspectives on Silence (Nor-
wood, NJ: Ablex, 1985); Michal Ephratt, “The functions of silence,” Journal of Pragmatics 40
(2008): 1909– 1938. Ephratt adopts the term “Eloquent Silence.”
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tence.”²⁰ Pärt’s formula provides that “if the final word in a section (with a full
stop) has one or two syllables, then the following silent bar should be of the
same duration (as in the printed score); if the final word has three or four sylla-
bles, then the silent bar should be exactly half as long.”²¹Actors know that si-
lence fills the theatre in a way that can hardly be attained even by shouting.
When one shouts, the sound immediately dies away, whereas silence gets louder
and louder and louder the longer it lingers.²² It is not emptiness, but a solid thing
that demands our attention. It is not for nothing that we speak of a pregnant
pause. The silent pause may be an anti-element to sound and it may be consid-
ered an absence, but it is by no means an emptiness or a vacancy. It is a full
thing that seems to strike the ear physically almost as sound does.
To attend and to be attentive one must first be called to attention. In Shake-
speare’s London, church bells summoned congregations to hear sermons and
trumpet and drum summoned playgoers to the theatre. The ear must be excited,
incited, invited to hear. A clamour awakens the ear as a prelude to attentive hear-
ing. Rhetorician’s have long appreciated this need to excite auditory engage-
ment, thus the rhetorician Thomas Wilson lauded the “plaine beginning” where-
in “the hearer is made apt to giue good eare out of hande.”²³ Shakespeare was
highly likely to have been familiar with Wilson’s work and it might even have in-
spired Mark Antony’s famous plain beginning to his speech in Caesar’s funeral
where he expressly invites the “Friends, Romans, countrymen” to lend their ears
(3.2.74). That said, the call to give or lend the ear had long been a staple of the-
atrical practice just as it had long been a staple of the rhetorical tradition. In
fact, the earliest surviving play script in the canon of English theatrical drama
– The Castle of Perseverance (c. 1420) – begins with a similar call to friends to
lend their hearing: “Farewel, fayre frendys, / That lofly wyl lystyn and lendys.”²⁴
In another example of the tradition, Shakespeare has the Vice figure, Rumour,
 Arvo Pärt Passio (Passio Domini Nostri Jesu Christi Secundum Joannem), The Song Company;
St Mary’s Cathedral Choir; Omega Ensemble St Mary’s Cathedral, Sydney, Friday 10 March 2017
(Programme Notes).
 Antony Pitts, “A Brief Introduction to Pärt-writing: Arvo Pärt and his unique musical formu-
la,” Church Music Quarterly (March 2004): 1–7, 7.
 See, further, Sean Mulcahy, “Acting Law | Law Acting: A Conversation with Dr Felix Nobis
and Professor Gary Watt,” Exchanges: The Warwick Research Journal 4.2 (2017): 189–200. Avail-
able at http://exchanges.warwick.ac.uk/index.php/exchanges/article/view/146/276 (last access
September 6, 2017).
 Thomas Wilson, Arte of Rhetorique [1560], ed. George H. Mair (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1909), 99.
 Frederick J. Furnivall and Alfred W. Pollard, eds., The Macro Plays (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1904), 75–188, lines 153– 1544.
Notes on A Strange Eventful History 235
call upon the audience to engage their acoustic sense at the start of Henry IV,
Part II: “Open your ears; for which of you will stop / The vent of hearing
when loud Rumour speaks?” (The Induction). Similarly, Coriolanus opens with
these words of a citizen speaking in the streets of Rome “Before we proceed
any further, hear me speak” (1.1.1).²⁵
The impressive quality of such lines, by which I mean that aspect of these
lines that makes the fullest impression on the mind, is the fact that spoken
words strike the ear and make an initial demand to be heard. Thus the call to
hear operates in a curiously oxymoronic way by calling a listener to listen.
The effect of this, I would suggest, is to make the audience reflexively self-
aware of its own auditory engagement with the words of the script. It therefore
invites a more acute and critical engagement with the sense of the words – hear-
ing becomes a hearing. Shakespeare indicates elsewhere that the same effect can
be achieved in combination with music. At the beginning of Twelfth Night, for
example, the opening line (“If music be the food of love, play on…”) makes ex-
press reference to music that we can presume was being played by musicians on
stage or in one of the adjoining spaces. (ASEH included Antony Pitts’ own setting
of “If music be the food of love.”) In Shakespeare’s play the on-stage music,
combined with the express textual overture to “music,” would have excited
the ear of the audience, and perhaps, by focusing their attention on stage
sounds, would have prompted playgoers to hush their own chatter at the outset
of the play. Henry V through its prologue invitation to the audience “gently to
hear, kindly to judge our play” (1.prologue.34) more expressly and directly
than any other of Shakespeare’s plays invites the audience to engage in a critical
hearing of the ensuing drama, but it also contains within it a more subtle and
primordially effective appeal to the audience’s sense of hearing. The opening
line of that prologue – “O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend” – contains at
least two significant auditory notes. The reference to “muse” is one, for it
might awake a musical sense of hearing in readiness for the ensuing verse,
but more potent is the very first word of the play – the exclamation “O.” This
is the shape of an open mouth and the sound that an open mouth makes,
and it is also the shape of the open ear against which the sound strikes. It is
in every sense a portal through which the play is presented, and this is quite
apart from its resonance with the “wooden O” of the theatre structure.²⁶ That
 I am grateful to Sean Mulcahy for directing me to the intensity of sound references in the
opening and closing scenes of Coriolanus.
 In A Strange Eventful History, I liken Shakespeare’s Globe theatre to the instrument of the
human voice: “But how did the scientists find the thread of a single voice strung out somewhere
between the earth and the moon? Here Shakespeare helped us in ways he could not have fore-
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opening “O” is not so much a word as an attention-grabbing alarm. Beowulf, the
earliest surviving poem in the Anglo-Saxon language, begins with another exam-
ple of an ear-seizing monosyllable, which Dr Felix Nobis describes as “the classic
Anglo Saxon call” – “Hwæt.”²⁷ It is frequently translated “listen!” or “lo!,” al-
though recent scholarship suggests that it should perhaps be read (in the context
of the line) as “what we have learned.”²⁸ The first line in full is “Hwæt. We Gar-
dena in geardagum,” which Seamus Heaney translates “So. The Spear-Danes in
days gone by.” In a note on his own translation he makes an interesting obser-
vation connecting Anglo-Saxon speech to legal speech: “when the men of the
family spoke, the words they uttered came across with a weighty distinctness,
phonetic units as separate and defined as delph platters displayed on a dresser
shelf […]. They had a kind of Native American solemnity of utterance, as if they
were announcing verdicts rather than making small talk.”²⁹
Techniques for acquiring an attentive ear, whether in express or more subtle
forms, create a sense of acoustic anticipation whose combined effect is some-
thing similar to that produced by the biblical injunction – “those who have
ears, let them hear.”³⁰ In the context of a musical concert a similar effect is ach-
ieved by the tuning of the instruments. It is not just that the musical instruments
are being tuned, but also that the auditory instruments of the audience – their
ears – are being attuned to the acoustic context of the musicians’ instruments
in this place. It was with such techniques and considerations in mind that the
advance publicity for A Strange Eventful History sought to strike a playful note
calculated to invoke a critically engaged mode of hearing. The hope was the stan-
dard one of enticing through intrigue, but at the same time it sought to encour-
age acoustic appreciation of the resonance between the musicality of Shake-
speare’s words and the musical compositions that inspired him and which his
works in turn inspired. The paragraph of advance publicity – the teaser – read
as follows:
seen. His Globe theatre was a huge wooden model of the human vocal tract – a vast wooden
cylinder for a throat and the sounding board of a hollow wooden stage thrust like a voice
box into its very centre […] and Shakespeare kindly left the lid off for us, so the great mouth
of the playhouse could shout out into thin air […] into the thin air of space, and of time”
(ASEH, narrative).
 See https://vimeo.com/108538344, at 8.38–46. See, further, http://artsonline.monash.edu.
au/performance/beowulf-dr-felix-nobis (last access September 6, 2017)
 See http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/news/listen-beowulf-opening-
line-misinterpreted-for-200-years-8921027.html (last access September 6, 2017).
 See http://www.wwnorton.com/college/english/nael/beowulf/introbeowulf.htm (last access
September 6, 2017).
 Matthew 13:9.
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For decades, scientists have been straining to hear alien voices in outer space. Now traces
of speech have been found. Are they extra-terrestrial, or could they be human voices trap-
ped in time? The rumour is that scientists have found the sounds of Elizabethan London
and have recovered the voices of actors in the original Globe theatre. Twenty-score years
since the death of William Shakespeare (1564– 1616), A Strange Eventful History marks
time with a journey through a sweet soundscape of Shakespeare’s words and the music
he has inspired… Lend us your ears, and hear that strain again…
Bridging this preamble to each evening’s performance, I opened the show by
welcoming the audience whilst wearing a lab coat. This gave time for the six
singers to warm up back stage and at the same time gave the playful illusion
of scientific veracity and thereby continued the framing conceit – introduced
by the advance publicity – that scientists had discovered or recovered actual
sounds from Shakespeare’s original Globe Theatre (from 1599 when it opened
to 1613 when it was destroyed by fire).
The performance proper began with a prologue that in the printed paper pro-
gramme was subtitled “roll-call.” This was a playful reference to the fact that the
paper programme was itself in the form of a large single-sheet designed to be
rolled and therefore to evoke the paper scrolls on which the early modern player
received his section of the playscript – his roll, it will be recalled, was the prac-
tical (and etymological) origin of the actor’s “role.” The word “call” was also in-
tended to evoke the auditory cues, discussed earlier in this paper, by which au-
diences have historically been summoned to congregate as witnesses to a
performance. Even such homonyms as roll and role were placed in the script
not just for punning, but with a desire to engage and excite the ear. The prologue
or roll-call of A Strange Eventful History comprises four elements – a song, a sec-
tion of narration, a Shakespearean speech and another song. The first song,
which served as an overture to the entire work, was “The isle is full of noises”
(Paul Ayres b.1970) which was sung by the six singers as they gradually entered
the scene from various points off-stage. The express reference to “noises” in the
title of this song alerts the listener to the overall theme of the show, which is to
connect speech and music and sounds of all sorts at the primal level of noise.
The fact that the phrase “isle is full” is full of the lulling sound of the letter
“l” fits with the lulling quality of the tune, which, like a lullaby, lulls the listener
into a dreamlike state. Shakespeare’s text promises that noises will be audible in
the isle, but the busy, buzzing “s” and “z” sounds in the word “noises” are in
fact inaudible when the word “isle” is pronounced – the same was probably
true of pronunciation in Shakespeare’s day, so his “isle” turns out to be curiously
empty of noises.We are left, instead, with an isle (pronounced “I’ll”) that enhan-
ces the lulling, dream-like quality of the soundscape and in which the feeling
that the isle is alien and unreal may be heightened because the “s” of the written
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word is not present. Shakespeare’s line “the isle is full of noises” is taken from
Shakespeare’s play about a colonized island The Tempest (3.2.135), and this
serves to open up a suggestive and intriguing set of acoustic allusions to the con-
tinental island of Australia in which the performances of A Strange Eventful His-
tory were taking place. Even in the suburbs of modern Sydney one is wonderfully
assailed by a clamour of cockatoos, mynahs, parakeets and occasionally the lyri-
cism of the elusive Lyre bird. One can easily imagine how raucous must have
been the African and American islands on which early modern explorers first
set foot in Shakespeare’s day. The beautiful music of the opening song, coupled
with Shakespeare’s beautiful words, awakens the ears of the audience and stirs
their attention even as it induces a somewhat soporific, dreamlike state. It is into
this that the narrator’s opening speech intrudes:
The isle is full of noises and tonight we will be full of play. Welcome to A Strange Eventful
History – a journey back to Shakespeare’s London and the journey of a lifetime from birth
to the last scene of all.
At this point the pseudo-scientific framing narrative is picked up, as it is
throughout all of the narrator’s speeches:
Scientists have found strange sounds in space: historical remnants of human voices. They
call them “Light Amplified Radio Cords” – L.A.R.C.s for short; and they have asked the
Song Company to help turn these LARCs into human voices. Tonight we share our findings.
You’ve heard the speculation….
Shh…shh…Shakespeare’s voice has been found!
It’s just a rumour, but who can “stop the vent of hearing when loud Rumour speaks?”
The narrative sections serve to articulate the songs and the speeches by connect-
ing them whilst keeping them distinct from one another. The first of Shake-
speare’s speeches to be introduced is the famous prologue to the first Act of
Henry V, spoken (as befits a strange form of choral concert) by the character
called “Chorus.” It begins with a couplet that brings in the musical and extra-ter-
restrial themes of the show: “O for a Muse of fire, that would ascend / The bright-
est heaven of invention” (1.prologue.1–2). One highly pertinent couplet later in
the prologue directly urges the audience to visualise horses: “Think when we
talk of horses, that you see them / Printing their proud hoofs i’ the receiving
earth” (1.prologue.1.26–7). These lines expressly urge the audience to see horses,
but they also encourage the horses to be heard in the imagination’s ear. The per-
cussive “pr” sound that is rapidly repeated in the phrase “printing their proud”
has an onomatopoeic quality that is calculated to make an impression on the ear
of the mind even as the mind’s eye is called upon to witness horses snorting and
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hooves impressing the soil. The narrator interrupts the speech immediately after
the phrase “receiving earth” to amplify the playful conceit that scientists have
detected signals of Shakespearean sounds that centuries ago had emanated
into space. The interruption – which required me as narrator to interrupt myself
in the middle of my own delivery of the prologue to Act One of Henry V – was
deliberately designed to alienate and to create a sense of the alien. An instance,
perhaps, of what Brecht called the Verfremdungseffekt (“alienation effect”).³¹ The
interruption took the form of a question addressed to the singers and, obliquely,
addressed to the audience: “Are you receiving earth?” The hope was that the au-
dience might enter more fully as participants in the play and that their ears,
alerted and alienated, would be more acutely attuned to the sound play connect-
ing the songs and the script.
The prologue to the first Act of Henry V acquires the ear of the audience by
means of another poetic technique that Shakespeare was profoundly adept in.
The technique I am referring to is a playfulness with related vowel sounds. In
particular, the vowel sound of “or.” It should be noted that in the following pas-
sage the “hour” in hour-glass would also have been pronounced with an “or”
sound in the Elizabethan pronunciation and the possessive pronounce “our”
would have been closer to “or” than to our modern bisyllabic pronunciation.³²
I have underlined in bold the “or” sound and underlined related sounds to
show how loudly the passage is loaded with this audible refrain:
For ‘tis your thoughts that now must deck our kings
Carry them here and there; jumping o’er times,
Turning the accomplishment of many years
Into an hour-glass: for the which supply,
Admit me Chorus to this history;
Who prologue-like your humble patience pray,
Gently to hear, kindly to judge, our play (1.prologue.28–34).
 John Willett, trans., Brecht on Theatre (London: Methuen, 1964), 144.
 See David Crystal, The Oxford Dictionary of Original Shakespearean Pronunciation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2016). The ‘or’ sound ɔː would have generally sounded ɔ˞ː In his English
Grammar, Ben Jonson likens it to the growl of a dog: “R is the dog’s letter, and hurreth in the
sound.” Compare Romeo and Juliet, 2.4.190. In the original Elizabethan pronunciation, Hamlet’s
“words, words, words” (2.2.189) would have been filled with the sound of “or”, as in modern
Received Pronunciation of “swords, swords, swords.” I have engaged elsewhere in an extended
appreciation of the sound of “or” in Hamlet (Watt, Shakespeare’s Acts of Will, Chapter 5, “‘His
will is not his own’: Hamlet downcast and the problem of performance,” 191– 198).
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Shakespeare is not the only great rhetorician to employ the sound of “ore” poeti-
cally to acquire the ear of his audience. The most famous example from politics
is surely the opening clause of Abraham Lincoln’s Gettysburg Address: “Four
score and seven years ago our fathers brought forth.” There are four “ores” in
that one clause, and the rich “r” sound resonates further as it echoes around
full vowel sounds in such words as “years,” “our” and “Father.” The “ore”
sound fills the mouth and fills the ear. Repeated and amplified with further
vowel and “r” sounds it has a roaring quality. In A Strange Eventful History,
the prologue speech from Henry V is followed by The Cries of London by Orlando
Gibbons (1583– 1625) that was written around the time of the original Globe play-
house. The choral quality of the “or” sound features in the opening line of the
song (as indeed it features in the composer’s Christian name): “God give you
good morrow, my masters, past three o’clock and a fair morning.” In the original
early modern pronunciation the repeated “r” sounds would have awakened the
ear like a drum roll. (“God give you good morrrrrow, my ma[r]sters, past thrrree
o’clock and a fairrr morrrrning”). The song celebrates the musicality of the streets
especially in the cries of street vendors who would have crowded the lanes out-
side the playhouse and mingled with the crowd inside.
For ASEH, it was hoped that the down-to-earth music of street voices would
join with the hooves printing the earth to produce a concrete sense so that, de-
spite the intangible quality of time and imagined time-travel, the listener would
be located in a present felt experience. These are, of course, precisely the same
effects that Shakespeare aimed at and so successfully achieved in the time-trav-
eller prologues to the Acts of Henry V delivered by the Chorus. For example, in
the prologue to the third Act we have the tangible call to ‘Grapple your minds to
sternage of this navy’ (3.prologue.18) and in the prologue to the fifth Act the au-
dience is invited (in reference to the king) to ‘Heave him away upon your winged
thoughts’ and ‘fetch’ him in (5.prologue.8, 28), and, most tangibly of all, to ‘be-
hold / In the quick forge and working-house of thought’ (5.prologue.22–3).
After the prologue part of ASEH, the show proceeds to the seven ages of man
as Jaques describes them, starting with the age of the infant. To begin with, Ja-
ques’ entire speech was spoken to allow each singer to introduce themselves to
the audience. All parts having been introduced in the overture, the show then
proceeded to journey through the seven ages one-by-one. The format for each
age contained, with occasional slight variation, the same structural elements.
First, the narrator introduced the age with a poetic stanza newly written for
this production. In writing these stanzas, I took Jacques’ words as a starting
point for a playful riff designed to emulate some of the techniques of sound
play discovered in Shakespeare’s writing. The new stanza for each age therefore
operated as an amplification, and maybe an exaggeration, of Shakespeare’s own
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poetic methods. For example, the stanza written to introduce the first age, began
with the couplet “In expectation here begin fantastic / scenes and phantom
sounds of ages past.” This couplet makes straightforward sense as an introduc-
tion of the show’s pseudo-scientific conceit concerning the recovery of an Eliza-
bethan soundscape. Less obvious is the fractional arrangement of the word “in-
fant” within the couplet; not just once, but twice. Here I copied Shakespeare’s
technique of bracketing or echoing a sound within a repetition of the same
sound, as follows: “[In expectation here beg{in fant}astic / scenes and
phant]om sounds of ages past.” The effect of the closely concentrated {in
fant} at the centre of the more sparsely spaced [In … phant] seems to produce
concentric waves of sound sense, akin to the waves produced by dropping a peb-
ble in a pond. There is a large ripple in the middle that fades out to a more gentle
ripple as the ring widens. Perhaps the concentric sense causes sound waves to
ripple through the mind. The stanza for the age of the lover was a playful take
on the “sigh” sound which Shakespeare’s Jaques associates with this age.
Thus the first couplet of the lover’s stanza contains four homophonic repetitions
of the “sigh” sound: “The lover’s eyes for signs shoot swift to sight / As high in
hope as cupid’s darts in flight.” The word “sigh” itself is never in its dictionary
sense expressly stated in the couplet or the stanza as whole, but its absence
might foster a lovesick sense of longing, and the quick repetition hopefully en-
genders a bodily sense of lovesick lament – as sighing does. Each stanza was
merely the first feature in the performance of each age. Second, as I spoke the
words of the stanza for each age, I handed a prop to the singer playing that par-
ticular age. In return each singer handed me the labcoat that they had been
wearing up until that point, and which, removed, revealed clothes in some col-
our on the rainbow spectrum – one for each of the seven ages, starting with red
for the infant and ending with violet. Third, having introduced the individual
performer, he or she sang a solo piece (usually with other performers accompa-
nying in the role of chorus). The prop was in each case appropriate to the age
being represented and was in each case capable of being played as an instru-
ment – a rattle for the infant, a hoop and stick for the schoolboy, a (violin)
bow for the lover, a drum for the soldier, a pair of brass scales (miniature cym-
bals) for the justice, and a spectacles case for the pantaloon. Antony Pitts, rep-
resenting the seventh age, the age of oblivion, had his instrument and prop
throughout in the form of the Fender Rhodes electric piano. With its cover re-
moved the audience saw a skeletal array of metal ribs and electric sinews
which simultaneously evoked musical instrument, scientific instrument and
something like an emaciated corpse in a lid-less coffin or sarcophagus. It was
present throughout the entire performance, like a memento mori.
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On that note, this might be the appropriate point to elucidate a further in-
stance of “fractional inference” in Shakespeare’s dramatic works. This example,
like the earlier one, is taken from Julius Caesar. The following lines appear in a
longer passage of speech that was spoken to exemplify the age of the soldier in A
Strange Eventful History:
O, pardon me, thou bleeding piece of earth,
That I am meek and gentle with these butchers!
Thou art the ruins of the noblest man
That ever lived in the tide of times (3.1.254–57)
As before, I have highlighted the relevant sound fractions to bring out the tenor
more clearly, even though there might be some slight variation between Elizabe-
than pronunciation and modern. The subject of the passage – he who is the
“bleeding piece of earth” – is none other than Julius Caesar himself, and the
tenor word that may be inferred from the constituent sound fragments is “Cae-
sar,” perhaps (more tenuously) “Julius” also. Caesar’s name appears towards
the end of the full speech, but in this case the word “Caesar” is sufficiently in-
ferred without needing to state it expressly. It is, after all, the title of the play and
everyone knows to whom Antony is referring as he addresses the corpse. In fact,
the inference is arguably all the more powerful through the absence of any ex-
press reference to the name, for this has the effect of confirming Caesar’s ab-
sence in the listener’s mind.Without the resolving satisfaction of an express ref-
erence to “Caesar,” the audience will also be encouraged to hold in mind Caesar
in his broken form. The fractional representation of “Caesar” in scattered sounds
fits perfectly with an idea that is expressly stated in these lines, namely that the
statuesque colossus that was Caesar is now a “ruin,” fragmented into a rubble of
parts (a few lines later Antony even muses in connected vein that Caesar’s blood
shall “cumber all the parts of Italy”). Note that the salient lines start with the
declaratory “O,” one effect of which is, as we have already observed, to engage
the playgoers’ auditory attention. The sound of Caesar is palpable, echoed espe-
cially in the endings of the first two lines “piece of earth” and “these butchers.”
These lines present the bleeding ruins of Caesar. Caesar chopped up.
This might seem to be pushing the point. Surely Shakespeare did not intend
the audience to hear or sense Caesar’s name in these lines. Perhaps not.Who can
know what Shakespeare intended, and how much of his craft was instinctive.
What is clear is that earlier in the play, Shakespeare makes great play of Caesar’s
name and expressly engages the audience’s ear to hear the sound quality of
“Caesar.” Cassius asks:
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“Brutus” and “Caesar”: what should be in that “Caesar”?
Why should that name be sounded more than yours?
Write them together: yours is as fair a name;
Sound them, it doth become the mouth as well. (1.2.141– 144)
Caesar himself speaks of his own name at the start and end of a seventeen-line
passage that mentions hearing, music, the ear and deafness and in which we
find in two adjacent lines two instances of fractional inference of the name “Cae-
sar” (highlighted in the following abridgement):
Yet if my name were liable to fear,
I do not know the man I should avoid
So soon as that spare Cassius. He reads much,
[…]
[…] he hears no music;
[…]
Such men as he be never at heart’s ease
Whiles they behold a greater than themselves,
[…]
[…] for always I am Caesar.
Come on my right hand, for this ear is deaf. (1.2.198–200, 203, 207–208, 211–212)
Shakespeare was fond of the set-piece eulogy spoken over the body of a Great
One fallen. Julius Caesar is not the only one of his titular characters to receive
the honour. Coriolanus is another, whose “eulogist” Aufidius cues the play’s
closing music with his words: “Take him up. / Help, three o’ the chiefest soldiers;
I’ll be one. / Beat thou the drum, that it speak mournfully: / Trail your steel
pikes” (5.5.147–50). This, of course, is an echo of Hamlet. In Hamlet’s case the
general Fortinbras, like the martial Antony, speaks formal honours for the fallen
prince while Horatio takes Antony’s part in speaking of his friend. The interven-
tion of Fortinbras brings the play to a close with a crescendo of sound and audi-
tory elements. When Horatio promises an oration on the sad events, Fortinbras
commands “Let us haste to hear it, / And call the noblest to the audience”
(5.2.370–71). His next passage of speech, the very last lines of the play, contains
a cue, surely, for gunpowder effects (of the sort that would later cause the fire
that destroyed the Globe playhouse) and a concluding fanfare of martial trum-
pet:³³
 See http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/sound-the-trumpet-1249715.html (last
access September 6, 2017).
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Let four captains
Bear Hamlet, like a soldier, to the stage;
For he was likely, had he been put on,
To have proved most royally: and, for his passage,
The soldiers’ music and the rites of war
Speak loudly for him.
Take up the bodies: such a sight as this
Becomes the field, but here shows much amiss.
Go, bid the soldiers shoot. (5.2.395–403)
The cacophonous climax brought in by Fortinbras is in marked contrast to the
hush of Hamlet’s passing. In his dying words, Hamlet had alluded to the audi-
ence (on-stage or playhouse, perhaps both). However noisy and distracted the
playgoers might have been upon entering the playhouse they were surely silent
for his last words; with which he resigned himself to the inevitable law of death.
Hamlet did not live long enough to play the justice, for the sergeant Death has
come:
You that look pale and tremble at this chance,
That are but mutes or audience to this act,
Had I but time (as this fell sergeant, Death,
Is strict in his arrest), O, I could tell you—
But let it be. (5.2.339–43)
Hamlet’s final speech is a study in the sound of “o” that echoes until it dies away
into a silence that fills the wooden “o’ of the playhouse:
O, I die, Horatio.
The potent poison quite o’ercrows my spirit.
I cannot live to hear the news from England.
But I do prophesy the election lights
On Fortinbras. He has my dying voice.
So tell him, with th’occurrents, more and less,
Which have solicited. The rest is silence.
O, O, O, O. (dies) (5.2.306–313)
Hamlet’s silence inspired the closing words of A Strange Eventful History. Per-
haps those closing words provide a just and fitting note to finish on:
The rest is silence? No. The rest is sound.
The rest is peace? Yes. But not quiet.
True rest is the song of birds, the company of sweet words, the soothing chorus of friends.
And when we think that the light is fading and the colours are dying away…we are mistook.
The light is merely sleeping beneath the layers of a life laid down: it lies within a blanket of
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enfolding dreams. The colours of life do not die, but dye…and deeply too. Ever deeper.
For mixed with the shades of me are the memories of you.
All hue. No cry…but a tone.
The end is not darkness, but beautiful black. Not silence, but a full forever sound.
Life ends in perfect pitch. (ASEH, epilogue)³⁴
 The words “a tone” were the cue for Antony Pitts to play 52 keys descending the length of the
keyboard – one key for each completed year of Shakespeare’s probable lifespan (he is known to
have died on 23rd April 1616 and is romantically reputed to have been born on the same day in
1564, based on his baptismal date of 26th April that year). 23rd April was, even then, the Saint’s
Day of England’s patron St George. The standard modern grand piano has 52 white keys and a
total of 88 keys, as do some models of Fender Rhodes, although in this case the Fender Rhodes
was of the smaller 73 key variety.
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Marett Leiboff
“Stir Up the Australian Youth to
Merriment”: A Midsummer Night’s Dream,
Summer 1989– 1990 (Sydney, Australia)
and the Theatrical Transmutability of Law’s
Texts
1 Transmuting law and the theatrical
As You Law It. A pun that plays on and invokes a title that is so well known it
almost goes without saying: As You Like It.¹ There are jokes aplenty in the cata-
chresis and pun – law and like – can law be liked, what is law like, what is like
law? This play of words takes us to the play of law, and plays on law. This play of
words transmutes – from one thing into another, a conversion into something
different, an alteration, a transformation.² Transmutation also conceives of the
concept of exchange,³ in an obsolete or archaic meaning of the word. It is also
alchemical, literally and figuratively. The OED tells us that trasmutabilità or
“transmutability” first surfaced in English in 1611,⁴ in J. Florio’s Queen Anna’s
New World of Words,⁵ just a few years after As You Like It, and A Midsummer
Night’s Dream,⁶ were first reputed to have been staged.⁷ The advent of this active,
adverbial form of the word carries with it an imposition of liveness, and liveli-
ness. For although each play was thought to have been written during the last
decade of the sixteenth century (Elizabethan and Jacobean performance meth-
 William Shakespeare, As You Like It: Updated Edition, ed. Michael Hattaway (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2009): further references in the text.
 “transmutation, n.” “b. Law. Transfer: usually transmutation of possession, transfer or change
of ownership.” OED Online (Oxford University Press, March 2017).
 OED, “transmutation”: The Merchant of Venice “exchange” denoted transmutation.
 “transmutability, n.” OED Online (Oxford University Press, March 2017).
 This source derives from an English/Italian Dictionary, dedicated to the wife of James I, Anne
of Denmark, by John or Giovanni Florio, also touted as a possible Shakespeare. John Florio,
available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Florio (last access March 20, 2017).
 William Shakespeare, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, ed. Burton Raffel (New Haven: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2005): further references in the text, abbreviated as Dream.
 As You Like It, in 1603, the year Elizabeth I died; A Midsummer Night’s Dream in the second
year of James’ reign, in 1605.
https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110591514-014
ods aside),⁸ it is only at a point of exchange, when words on the page are trans-
formed through the liveness of the theatrical encounter, that their transmutation
is made truly manifest, in the same way that law, too, is only made manifest,
through the act of reading, interpreting and living law.
To begin thinking about how this exchange of transmutation, through the
play of law, is made manifest, I will stay with As You Like It, for it is through
one of the most famous of Shakespearean lines that we can find an exemplary
instance of transmutation as exchange at play. After an encounter with the out-
law lords in the forest, the hapless Duke Senior remarks:
Thou seest we are not all alone unhappy:
This wide and universal theatre
Presents more woeful pageants than the scene
Wherein we play in. (As You Like It, 2.7.142– 145)
to which Jaques most famously responds: “All the world’s a stage And all the
men and women merely players” (As You Like It, 2.7.145– 146). Puns aplenty per-
meate Duke Senior’s quip, an hilarious jape as sight gag for an audience who
heard these words within the walls of The Globe theatre, that “wide and univer-
sal theatre,” as identified through name and motto.⁹ And of course, the puns ran
deeper and longer, into the thick allusion of the theatrum mundi, the remnant
classical and medieval concept of the Divine as author, director and spectator
of the lives of humans on an earthly stage.¹⁰ A commonplace divorced from its
religious connotations by the sixteenth century, and so too a reference to a the-
atre building and a literary trope,¹¹ the world as stage, and stage as world, takes
on a new significance for the early modern self, seeking to understand their
place in the word.¹² Thus, as Quiring observes, Jaques’ remark functions at a
“purely immanent level of existence, without any reference to transcendent au-
 Farah Karim Cooper and Tiffany Stern eds., Shakespeare’s Theatres and the Effects of Perform-
ance (Bloomsbury: The Arden Shakespeare, 2013); David Bevington, This Wide and Universal
Theater: Shakespeare in Performance, Then and Now (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2007).
 The Globe’s motto was Totus mundus agit histrionem.
 Lynda Gregorian Christian, Theatrum Mundi: The History of an Idea (New York: Garland,
1987), 7, 89, cited in Björn Quiring, “Introduction” to “If Then the World a Theatre Present …”:
Revisions of the Theatrum Mundi Metaphor in Early Modern England, ed. Björn Quiring (Berlin:
de Gruyter, 2014), 1–23, 4, 5.
 Quiring, “Introduction,” 5.
 Quiring, “Introduction,” 5.
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thorities,”¹³ and one that is deeply mired in the problems of existence in a chang-
ing world.
We lose this reading, however, when Jaques’ response to Duke Senior is cut
loose from its surrounding text. This untethering of the call from the response
reads as lofty sentiment, rather than a mordant moan about the progress of
being through the seven ages Jaques identifies. But cut adrift, a very particular
complaint of and about law and lawyers, judge and judging, loses its sting en-
tirely:
And then the justice,
In fair round belly with good capon lined,
With eyes severe and beard of formal cut,
Full of wise saws and modern instances;
And so he plays his part. (As You Like It, 2.7.160– 164)
Of course, this is a literal and figurative judge (the middle-aged as prosperous
and reproving), but read with Duke Senior’s opening gambit, presents a more
synchronous saw of its own.¹⁴ This is a far from flattering portrait of law and
the judge,which echoes the far from flattering literal and figurative device of the-
atre to demonstrate the impediments that would intrude upon clear reason and
analysis by a legal figure – the lawyer philosopher Francis Bacon.¹⁵ 1603 is a very
particular year in this respect. It is more than a small coincidence that Bacon
was knighted by James I in 1603, the same year that the first staging of As You
Like It can be traced,¹⁶ and it was the same year that Bacon’s unpublished Valer-
ius Terminus: Of the Interpretation of Nature first circulated, originally to a closed
circle, though it quickly became known more widely.¹⁷
 Quiring, “Introduction,” 6.
 Richard J. Ross, “The Memorial Culture of Early Modern English Lawyers: Memory as Key-
word, Shelter, and Identity, 1560– 1640,” Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities 10:2 (1998):
229–326.
 1561– 1626; Contra the postulation of the Baconian cipher, the hypothesis that Francis Bacon
wrote the works of Shakespeare.
 As You Like It was one of the few plays included in the First Folio of 1623 that had not been
already been published in some other form. The text was possibly written between 1598– 1600:
Hattaway, in As You Like It: Updated: 49–53. Textual changes could come at any of seven stages
up until publication: Hattaway, in As You Like It: Updated, 215, 216.
 There are clues that the manuscript was finished in1603: Richard Serjeantson, “Communica-
tion: The Philosophy of Francis Bacon in Early Jacobean Oxford,With an Edition of an Unknown
Manuscript of the Valerius Terminus,” The Historical Journal 56 (2013): 1087– 1106, 1090– 1092.
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Valerius Terminus inaugurates some of the ideas that Bacon would later de-
velop, albeit in amended form, but for now he specifically identified his concern
about “the internal and profound errors and superstitions in the nature of the
mind,” created through four “idols or fictions which offer themselves to the un-
derstanding in the inquisition of knowledge”:¹⁸
Of the inherent and profound errors and superstitions in the nature of the mind, and of the
four sorts of Idols or false appearances that offer themselves to the understanding in the
inquisition of knowledge; that is to say, the Idols of the Tribe, the Idols of the Palace,
the Idols of the Cave, and the Idols of the Theatre. That these four, added to the incapacity
of the mind and the vanity and malignity of the affections, leave nothing but impotency
and confusion. A recital of the particular kinds of these four Idols, with some chosen exam-
ples of the opinions they have begot, such of them as have supplanted the state of knowl-
edge most. ¹⁹
As Rossi makes plain, the Idol of the Theatre was, at this stage of Bacon’s think-
ing, an internal impediment to proper forms of judgment and reason.²⁰ Later, it
would be reshaped as an external impediment to proper thought.With these two
concepts in mind, the quip about “wise saws and modern instances” takes on a
potentially potent meaning – by speaking to Bacon’s emerging philosophy,
coded deep in this exchange between Jaques and Duke Senior. Contemporary fig-
ures made their way into As You Like It, in the form of Jaques himself,²¹ so this
nudge and wink targeting this lawyer and politician, and Bencher of Gray’s
Inn,²² who was now in early middle-age – could be easily decoded, a small
barb as a perfect riposte in the hands of those whose profession was derided
by Bacon’s device.
There was more to come. In 1605, the same year that A Midsummer Night’s
Dream was first presented, Bacon published Of the Proficience and Advancement
of Learning, Divine and Human, or The Advancement of Learning. The Idol of the
Theatre was omitted from this publication, though he maintained the other idols,
 Francis Bacon, Valerius Terminus: of the interpretation of Nature (eBooks@Adelaide, 2014),
Ch. 11, available at: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis/valerius/#chapter11 (last
access March 20, 2017).
 Bacon, Valerius, Ch. 16.
 Paolo Rossi, Francis Bacon: From Magic to Science [1957], trans. Sacha Rabinovitch (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 157– 158.
 Jaques was identified, for instance, as a satire of the godson of the Queen (Elizabeth), Har-
ington, mooted as one potential reason for its non-publication: Hattaway, As You Like It: Updat-
ed, 215.
 Jayne Archer, Elizabeth Goldring and Sarah Knight eds., The Intellectual and Cultural World
of the Early Modern Inns of Court (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2013).
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albeit in modified form.²³ However, theatre did not escape his attention; if any-
thing, he added further barbs to his views of theatre, on a properly formed and
functioning mind, now extended, too, to the practices of theatre-going. The liter-
ary device of poetry might be acceptable up to a point, but theatre is another
thing entirely to a properly functioning mind:
In this third part of learning, which is poesy, I can report no deficience […] But to ascribe
unto it that which is due, for the expressing of affections, passions, corruptions, and cus-
toms, we are beholding to poets more than to the philosophers’ works; and for wit and elo-
quence, not much less than to orators’ harangues. But it is not good to stay too long in the
theatre. Let us now pass on to the judicial place or palace of the mind, which we are to ap-
proach and view with more reverence and attention.²⁴
Thus properly formed judgment is corrupted by theatre, to wit, Jaques’ sardonic
remarks about the justice’s saws is enlivened – in concert with Duke Senior’s
quip, for Bacon, too, is ill-disposed towards the place as communal.²⁵ Moreover,
Bacon’s conception of judgment is law’s method, as Shapiro has revealed,²⁶
meaning the quips in As You Like It are more than a little apt as a play on
law. And even if not directed towards Bacon, it is not had to see, given the op-
probrium theatre received at the hands of justices of the peace,²⁷ how this ex-
change between Jaques and Duke Senior spoke to a world of law at play beyond,
as well as within, the place of theatre, and a more than little disdain for law, and
that which is proper.
But there is one more small point. In the Novum Organon of 1620, published
just three years before Shakespeare’s First Folio, Bacon expands on his com-
plaints about the Idols, with the Idol of the Theatre now reinstated. Truth and
reality, as literal accounts of being are acceptable, but not, it seems, fancy and
fantasy.Asserting now that this Idol is one of philosophy and inherited systems
of knowledge, the adoption of theatre – or stage plays – as a trope is far from
accidental:
 Rossi, Bacon, 161.
 Francis Bacon, The Advancement of Learning [1893], ed. Henry Morley (The Project Guten-
berg ebook), Book 2, Aphorism V, [my emphasis].
 Allison P. Hobgood, Passionate Playgoing in Early Modern England (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2014), 188– 189.
 Barbara J. Shapiro, A Culture of Fact England, 1550– 1720 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
2000); compare Barbara J. Shapiro, “Law and Science in Seventeenth-Century England,” Stan-
ford Law Review 4 (1969): 727–766.
 Hattaway, As You Like It: Updated, 52–53.
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Lastly, there are Idols which have immigrated into men’s minds from the various dogmas of
philosophies, and also from wrong laws of demonstration. These I call Idols of the Theater,
because in my judgment all the received systems are but so many stage plays, representing
worlds of their own creation after an unreal and scenic fashion. […] which by tradition, cred-
ulity, and negligence have come to be received.²⁸ […] And in the plays of this philosophical
theater you may observe the same thing which is found in the theater of the poets, that sto-
ries invented for the stage are more compact and elegant, and more as one would wish them
to be, than true stories out of history.²⁹
Theatre, then, represents error and mistake, as laziness, prejudice and a desire
for a lack of complication and complexity. Yet what is instantiated here is a mis-
trust of the imagination, and the possibility of asking how reality is observed and
processed – that is, Bacon’s confidence in the possibility of the rational and sci-
entific, “the true stories out of history” and how they are shaped and under-
stood, are assumed to be perfectible. For he also remarks, of knowledge (sci-
ence): “The human understanding is no dry light, but receives an infusion
from the will and affections; whence proceed sciences which may be called “sci-
ences as one would.” For what a man had rather were true he more readily be-
lieves… [my emphasis].³⁰ When applied to law, rather than signalling an intellec-
tual emancipation, Bacon’s formula turns inwards, the condemnation of
imagination becomes a means by which injustice could be made manifest, for
a literal reading of Bacon takes us into analytically closed interpretative meth-
ods. Law closed its eyes to the narrowing of its interpretative universe, relying
on this logic; law as play and the play of law and the possibilities that derive
from exchange, as a mark of transmutation, as “sciences as one would,” repre-
sent an unacceptable break into law and rational, even in the face of injustice.
“Sciences as one would”? Bacon is complaining about selfish or self-oriented
assumptions in the place of clear, rational judgment, but this is not Bacon’s turn
of phrase. He wrote, as all scholars of the time did, in Latin. Translation (itself an
exchange and transmutation) is far from clear-cut. Two other scholars, Derham
and Stewart each translates Bacon’s Latin into – “as-you-like-it” science.³¹ The
 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, or True Directions Concerning the interpretation of Nature
[1863], trans. James Spedding, Robert Leslie Ellis, and Douglas Denon Heath (eBooks@Adelaide,
2014), Book 1, Aphorism XLIV, available at: https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/bacon/francis/or
ganon/chapter1.html (last access March 20, 2017).
 Bacon, New Organon, Book 1, Aphorism LXII.
 Bacon, New Organon, Book 1, Aphorism XLIX.
 Stanley Stewart, Shakespeare and Philosophy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 132; Daniel Der-
rin, Rhetoric and the Familiar in Francis Bacon and John Donne (New Jersey: Fairleigh Dickinson
University Press, 2013), 120.
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then-contemporaneous “saws” of As You Like It now read as a retort of Bacon’s
complaints of theatre and imagination. Jaques’ justice could well be any judge,
or any self-satisfied judgmental middle-aged man, but this now starts to take on
the attributes of a specific individual. This takes the text into an entirely different
direction. So too law inherited into the twenty-first century, for what had been
inherited into law through Bacon’s influence on its interpretative practices,
loses precisely the complaint of theatre and the play of imagination within
law. Law thus becomes a self-referential system, and one that instructed itself
to disregard the world beyond its black letter rules and case precedents. Reason
and judgment operated by closing itself off from the world for centuries to pro-
tect itself from “as you like it law.” I now turn to Australia, to the 1980s, where
law as a practice began after critical agitations through legal scholarship and
politics, to turn its gaze beyond the books, and back into the world, into the the-
atre of the world, as a theatrum mundi, seemingly rupturing the Baconian logics
in law by taking on a scintilla of “as-you-like-it” thinking that turned to imagina-
tion as a condition precedent of justice.
2 From Bacon to 1980s Australia – from cultural
cringe to a new assertiveness
Common lawyers, including Australian lawyers, are the inheritors of the Baconi-
an approach towards legal reasoning, method and concepts, through the later
seventeenth-century judge and legal scholar, Sir Matthew Hale and the eight-
eenth-century codifier of legal concepts, Blackstone.³² Legal doctrine was inher-
ited through case law, containing precedents themselves sourced from the judg-
es. Legislation was a rarity, though in the latter part of the twentieth-century, it
burgeoned, including in Australia. Though law is now understood to mean legis-
lation, law inherited through the cases remains foundational. Courts would
“read down” socially progressive law in the name of doctrine and existing
legal principle. Critical scholarship, particularly that which took shape in the
1960s and 1970s, charted the outdated logics and historical verities that were
maintained by the courts, in entirely inappropriate circumstances, such as re-
taining doctrines created in England in the eighteenth-century that had been
overturned in the 1930s, only to be revived in Australia in the 1970s, in entirely
different social, geographic and temporal circumstances, some instances of
 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book II: Of the Rights of Things,
ed. Simon Stern (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).
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which were documented by the renowned Australian lawyer Geoffrey Robertson
QC in his book The Justice Game.³³ Law, as a discipline and profession, was con-
sidered to be captive to a conservative political agenda, aided by the logics, rea-
soning and methods of analysis inherited through Bacon. Of course, there had
been individuals and groups within the field whose politics and social attitudes
were far from conservative, but the practices, procedures and methods of law
cannot function as sites of political engagement. Challenges to conventional
legal approaches required the creative redeployment of doctrine and legal prin-
ciple – something that could only happen by looking outside the confines of law
itself, drawing on imagination, that unacceptable “as-you-like-it” science – in
part triggered by social changes themselves.
If anything typified the Australia of the 1960s and earlier, it was a concept,
now largely lost, of a “cultural cringe.” This infamous Australian state of mind
could be summed up in one idea – that nothing in Australia was good enough,
and the rest of the world, the United Kingdom in particular as the so-called
mother country, was the source of proper and appropriate culture and law.Voices
and accents were to mimic, as best they could, the “received pronunciation” of
BBC English. Though it had its own superior court, the High Court, the final court
of appeal was located in London, largely comprised of members of the Judicial
Committee of the House of Lords, though some members of the Australian courts
might sit from time to time. Local culture was considered inferior, by and large.
Pressure started to be exerted, however, by the late 1960s and early 1970s, where
this obeisance to an external presence started to be resisted, and a reiteration of
an Australian identity was actively pursued. The election of a left-wing national
government in 1972, led by the Prime Minister Gough Whitlam, kick-started or
instantiated change, some of which had to wait until after that government
was dismissed in 1975.
By the 1980s, small symbols of change took effect, such as changing the na-
tional anthem from God Save the Queen to the present Advance Australia Fair,
cutting a symbolic tie to the “mother country,” and the move to end legal
links with the UK, through the eventual passing of the Australia Acts 1986
throughout the country, removing the final appellate function of the Privy Coun-
cil for Australia, and inaugurating Australia as a sovereign independent nation,
85 years after it had been created. In 1988, the 200th year after Britain invaded the
land that indigenous Australians had inhabited for at least 40,000 years, was a
 Geoffrey Robertson, The Justice Game (London: Chatto & Windus, 1998).
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Bicentennial celebration or a mark of shame as a result of the consequences of
invasion.³⁴
Though there had been some small shifts in the 1970s, by the 1980s, argu-
ments that sought to overcome social and political injustice started to be accept-
ed by the courts, using law’s methods. Some judges and courts slowly began to
adapt and change their positions – some, but not all. Those that did looked be-
yond the limits of law on the page, and to read those words within time and
place, as Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh have recently charted, of two key
decisions of the Australian superior court, the High Court, in the 1980s, when
it started to shift its focus and look beyond the law in its narrowest sense.³⁵
As the description of Genovese’s collection, Australian Critical Decisions, notes:
The 1980s was a time of significant social, political and cultural change. In Australia, the
law was pivotal to these changes. The two High Court cases that this book explores – Koo-
warta v Bjelke-Petersen (1982) and the Tasmanian Dams case (1983) – are famous legally […]
Yet these cases also offer a significant marker of Australia in the 1980s: a shift to a different
form of political engagement, nationally and internationally […] to reflect on how Austral-
ians experience their law in time and place, and why those experiences might require more
than the usual legal records.³⁶
These decisions reveal that the courts were now willing to shake off the Baconi-
an yoke, to look beyond the limits of the law. A High Court decision of 1989 con-
firmed that 200 years of legal, political and social obeisance to the United King-
dom had ended with the passage of the 1986 Australia Acts,³⁷ regardless of the
emotional or other ties Australia had to Britain. But there were changes afoot
too, for Australia’s indigenous people. Though it had started to take shape
since 1982, and was subjected to numerous legal setbacks, in December 1988,
right at the end of the Bicentennial year, in the case of Mabo v Queensland
No. 1.,³⁸ the High Court of Australia laid the groundwork for the decision in
1992 that removed the doctrine of terra nullius from Australian law, the famous
 Frank Bongiorno, The Eighties – The Decade that Transformed Australia (Carlton: Black Inc.
Books, 2015).
 Ann Genovese and Shaun McVeigh, “ Nineteen eighty three: A jurisographic report on Com-
monwealth v Tasmania,” Griffith Law Review 24 (2015) 68–88; Ann Genovese ed., Australian Crit-
ical Decisions: Remembering Koowarta and Tasmanian Dams (Abingdon: Routledge, 2017)
 Australian Critical Decisions available at: https://www.routledge.com/Australian-Critical-
Decisions-Remembering-Koowarta-and-Tasmanian-Dams/Genovese/p/book/9781138692053 (last
access March 20, 2017), [my emphasis].
 Sue v Hill [1999] HCA 30.
 Mabo v Queensland (No. 1) [1988] HCA 69.
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Mabo decision, or Mabo v Queensland No. 2.³⁹ This decision looked beyond doc-
trines that had grounded the idea that, in law, Australia had simply been settled
and not conquered. The case overturned law that had supposedly been inviola-
ble doctrine – by applying imagination to that doctrine, and looking beyond the
pages of the books. Starting from the position of “as-you-like-it science,” the
court looked into the world beyond the internalised assumptions of doctrine,
and into the historical, social, political injustices that law had imposed upon in-
digenous Australians – and by looking at the evidence of their ownership and
relationship to land. The decision in Mabo only went so far and not far enough
to rectify 200 years of dispossession and harm, but to think beyond limits in this
way takes law into the realm of theatre, looking beyond the interiority of inher-
ited dogma and doctrine to consider the operation of law in time and place – to
notice injustice and to reshape doctrine and principle.
Australian law was ripe for change at the end of the 1980s, but some of the
most profound changes like Mabo had to wait a few more years. Australia, in the
1980s, had transformed itself, its understanding of its position in the world, and
its sense of self-awareness. And as the clock ticked on the end of the 1980s, that
most transmutable of Shakespearean plays, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, was
about to transmute again in Sydney, reminding us that theatre is there to insist
that times and places matter, and that reason, without love, is an altogether dan-
gerous thing. That most amusing of plays, perhaps poking a Puckean pole at
Bacon (for it is to be remembered that the Advancement of Learning was pub-
lished in 1605, the year A Midsummer Night’s Dream was reputed to have been
first staged), where Bacon warned that it “is not good to stay too long in the the-
atre,” preferring to “now pass on to the judicial place,” reminds us that law with-
out justice is a dangerous thing. For as we know, the judicial place is overborne
by real justice – “Egeus, I will overbear your will” (Dream, 4.1.179). Theseus ad-
monishes, a position he came to belatedly, through the most theatrical of devi-
ces – that which is lived and experienced, in his case through that which Hippo-
lyta experienced.⁴⁰ For A Midsummer Night’s Dream has much more to tell us
about justice than its historical frothy exterior might have led us to believe.⁴¹
 Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) [1992] HCA 23.
 A conventional legal analysis tells a fundamentally different story, taking eyes back into law
and missing the consequences of action: “Theseus and Hippolyta are Royals, and they open the
play; yet they are perhaps the least important figures we shall consider, and they present the
least challenging legal questions. For they are basically bystanders. It is Theseus’s job as
Duke to apply the law to resolve the dispute between the young lovers”: David P. Currie, “A Mid-
summer Night’s Dream – The Legal Issues,” Green Bag 2 (2003): 381–387.
Compare an interdisciplinary panel held in 2010 at Texas Law School, which takes a far more
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3 Transmuting A Midsummer Night’s Dream
Of all of Shakespeare’s plays, A Midsummer Night’s Dream has a most curious
history of disappearance and transformation across time, as the visuals con-
tained in an exhibition mounted by the British Library reveals.⁴² The Dream
has been constantly changed and transformed according to taste and social at-
titudes – even its words have changed from time to time, but how the play be-
comes theatre is another thing entirely. Whatever and however we see this
play, we can take it for granted that it alters according to time and tide. Plays
are meant to be seen and experienced. It needs to be remembered, too, that
there is no authentic production of Shakespeare, unless we were to reincarnate
his players and were prepared to have boys play the role of women characters,
with bare stage and musical interlude. Even the text, now considered sacrosanct,
has been subjected to variation and change, as the rule, rather than the excep-
tion. Bottom and the mechanicals have spawned offshoot productions, including
the 1661 piece, The Merry conceited Humors of Bottom the Weaver,⁴³ (like the 1987
Australian The Popular Mechanicals “By Keith Robinson, William Shakespeare
and Tony Taylor”).⁴⁴ Indeed, A Midsummer Night’s Dream, in its entirety, was
out of fashion less than 60 years after it was first staged. In 1662, Pepys famously
remarked that he had “never seen before, nor shall ever again, for it is the most
insipid ridiculous play that ever I saw in my life. I saw, I confess, some good
nuanced view of the conduct of law at the outset of the play: “‘According to our Law,’ is taken
from the play’s first scene, when the harsh patriarch Egeus demands that his daughter marry the
man of his choice or be executed ‘according to our law.’ The play’s actions find a way to recon-
cile ‘harsh Athenian law’ and the erotic desires of the young lovers.” Shakespeare and the Law:
Scenes and a Panel on Legal Issues from A Midsummer Night’s Dream (September 22, 2010), avail-
able at: https://law.utexas.edu/news/2010/09/20/shakespeare-and-the-law-scenes-and-a-panel-
on-legal-issues-from-a-midsummer-night%E2%80%99s-dream/ (last access March 3, 2017).
 Peter C. Herman, “Equity and the Problem of Theseus in A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Or, the
Ancient Constitution in Ancient Athens,” Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies 14.1 (2014):
4–31, holds to a narrow legal interpretation that asserts that the Duke reached his ultimate de-
cision contrary to law.
 Emma Smith, Dream, Illusion and Doubling in A Midsummer Night’s Dream, (British Library,
undated), available at: https://www.bl.uk/shakespeare/articles/dream-illusion-and-doubling-in-
a-midsummer-nights-dream (last access March 3, 2017).
 Published in 1661, London, Robert Cox [adaptor], available at: https://www.bl.uk/collection-
items/the-merry-conceited-humors-of-bottom-the-weaver-1661#sthash.VuX9JCIC.dpuf (last ac-
cess March 3, 2017).
 Keith Robinson, William Shakespeare, Tony Taylor, The Popular Mechanicals: a Funny Old
(New) Play (Paddington, N.S.W. : Currency Press in association with Belvoir Street Theatre, Syd-
ney, 1992).
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dancing and some handsome women, which was all my pleasure.”⁴⁵ The play
then took an altogether different shape in the form of an opera, The Fairy
Queen, written as a series of masques in 1692 by the English composer Henry
Purcell – though it was then lost until the early twentieth-century. The actor-
manager, David Garrick, created his own operatic version, The Fairies, in 1755,
effectively an entirely different creation made up of a pastiche of material,
based in and around the lovers and the fairies.
By the early nineteenth-century A Midsummer Night’s Dream had become a
burlesque, subject to fashion and whims of staging, until, at mid-century the
play itself was restored, and the formula of the play in production, inherited
even into the twenty-first century, took shape. Now laden with musical inter-
ludes, formularised through Mendelssohn’s score, this now “standard” Dream
was a pastiche of lush spectacle and cute fairies, of balletic interludes featuring
large corps de ballet, and reimagined as a romantic fantasy. Attempts by the the-
atrical avant-garde to unpick the layers of tulle and forest glen began in the early
twentieth century, with Harley Granville-Barker’s 1914 production that attempted
to return the play back to facets of Shakespearean performance styles, including
the use of English folk music; and forty years later, in 1954 a production by the
RSC attempted to work with the image of the production Granville-Barker began,
in a production that worked with the abstract, including features such as stylised
metal trees to denote the forest. Despite this, the pantomimic Dream remained as
the expected form.
But all that changed in 1970, when Peter Brook utterly transformed A Mid-
summer Night’s Dream,⁴⁶ for good. Brook’s Dream was profoundly influenced
by the work of Polish scholar, Jan Kott, whose seminal book Shakespeare Our
Contemporary,⁴⁷ first published in Polish in 1961, and then in English in
1966,⁴⁸ stripped the play back to its text and the deep coding of the unconscious
within it. Kott’s return to the texts provided the insight that Brook, through the
Royal Shakespeare Company, would take to the stage. It had been fundamentally
 Samuel Pepys, Diary: Monday 29 September 1662, available at: http://www.pepysdiary.com/
diary/1662/09/29/(last access March 3, 2017).
 Royal Shakespeare Company, A Midsummer Night’s Dream: Some of our Past Productions of A
Midsummer Night’s Dream available at: https://www.rsc.org.uk/a-midsummer-nights-dream/
past-productions (last access March 3, 2017); Alan W. Bellringer, “The act of change in A Mid-
summer Night’s Dream,” English Studies 64.3 (1983): 201–217.
 Jan Kott, Shakespeare our Contemporary, 2nd ed., trans. Boleslaw Taborski (London: Rout-
ledge, 1988).
 That is not to say that Kott was completely comfortable with all aspects of Brook’s produc-
tion: Jan Kott, “The Bottom Translation,” Theater 18.1 (1986): 74–90.
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and profoundly reorientated through a theatrical reimagining that shifted the
play from its imagined exterior world of fairies and revel to one grounded in
the interior, the sub-conscious, and in doing so profoundly changed the play’s
grammar and coding. Theseus and Oberon, Hippolyta and Titania were one
and the same, the woods and forest the locale of the sub-conscious, the text
no longer read literally but through its time and place and encounter between
actor and spectator. With nods to the conventions of the Elizabethan and Jaco-
bean stage, the production was utterly grounded in its time and place, at the
same time triggering a renewed sense of how this play ought to appear in pro-
duction.
The text was now unmoored from the staging conventions that had been os-
sified across time, and now an explosion of Dreams appeared throughout the
world, taking its cue from this profound shift. Dreams appeared in public gar-
dens and in parks, as the Women’s Institute, as punk, as the Dream appeared
in an entirely new vernacular, literally and figuratively, stripping itself of the lay-
ers of expected theatrical presence, and doing something new and having some-
thing to say, even productions that claim to return to “Renaissance” staging.⁴⁹
That wasn’t to say that the other romantic Dream had run its course – it is
still hankered for, and produced.
But like law’s interpretative limitations using the logics of Baconian reason
and judgment, combined with a disdain of the imaginative ability needed to turn
to justice, this play reminds us how injustice can occur – through its text. If As
You Like It criticised the logics and economy of an antitheatrical reason, then this
play put it into effect, from the blackest of black letter legal logic at the begin-
ning of the play (Dream, 1.1.21–90) to the shift at the end, where Egeus’ demands
for the exercise of his rights are quashed, allowing rightness and fairness to take
its course (Dream, 4.1.135– 179).
But this literal black letter logic also results in nonsense, where the law real-
ly is an ass – as revealed in one of the most intensely disturbing scenes of the
play. It might be imagined that this denotes the opening scene of the play,
when law is dispensed harshly, resulting in the flight from Athens by the lovers.
But instead it is the situation where the incredulous Bottom responds to Titania’s
abject declaration of love, itself perversely engineered by Oberon. The hapless
 Shakespeare’s Globe, A Midsummer Night’s Dream [2014], (undated), available at: http://
www.shakespearesglobe.com/discovery-space/previous-productions/a-midsummer-night-s-
dream-7 (last access March 20, 2017): “This production employed Renaissance costumes and
staging.” The cast list includes women. The Titania/Hippolyta, Oberon/Theseus doubling was
deployed. There are significant clues to indicate that this doubling was the practice at the
time, however.
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Bottom, the captive dupe, responds to this extraordinary declaration, along the
way congratulating himself on his cleverness:
Methinks, mistress, you should have little reason
for that: and yet, to say the truth, reason and
love keep little company together now-a-days; the
more the pity that some honest neighbours will not
make them friends. Nay, I can gleek upon occasion. (Dream, 3.1.126– 130, [my emphasis])
This ordinary man reminds us that reason and love should keep company and not
function in different arenas, that reason on its own results in harshness. He, of
course, is making sense of what seems to be Titania’s nonsense and her abusive
demands on him. But by the end of the play, Titania’s alter ego, Hippolyta, seems
to have learnt from him, acknowledging that reason, on its own, might lead to
wrong conclusions. In speaking to Theseus of the strange experiences the lovers
recount, she remarks: “Tis strange my Theseus, that these lovers speak of”
(Dream, 5.1.1).
But this is not “strange” as in unbelievable; it is an account worthy of notice
because of its singularity. Theseus, on the other hand, dismisses their story,
speaking as a Baconian – and as a perpetrator (as Oberon), who, if the story
of the night were to be attended to, would implicate him in its debasement. Bet-
ter to blame Puck for this error than admit responsibility (Dream, 3.2. 88– 101)
and it is easy to turn attention towards a surplus of fantasy and imagination
and a lack of reason (and thus judgment) on the part of the lovers:
More strange than true: I never may believe
These antique fables, nor these fairy toys.
Lovers and madmen have such seething brains,
Such shaping fantasies, that apprehend
More than cool reason ever comprehends.
The lunatic, the lover and the poet
Are of imagination all compact:
One sees more devils than vast hell can hold,
That is, the madman: the lover, all as frantic
[…]
Such tricks hath strong imagination,
[…]
Or in the night, imagining some fear,
How easy is a bush supposed a bear! (Dream, 5.1.2–22, [my emphasis])
This speech functions as a warning against the Idol of the Theatre and the dan-
ger of “as-you-like-it” science – but is self-serving in the extreme. It reveals, too,
the danger of “cool reason” and “judgment” for justice. It is not, as Theseus,
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Bacon, and generations of lawyers assumed, an unimaginative endeavour. Rath-
er, “cool reason” that sits upon a mind grounded in prejudice or bias or self-pro-
tection, is the epitome of “as-you-like-it” law that then becomes embedded with-
in doctrine and dogma. But if the Baconian promise of rationality and reason is
to mean anything, then it might be expected that a fair judge will overcome their
own prejudice through open eyes and minds – that can only come from looking
out from within, from the books into action, as the American Legal Realists of
the 1930s had it, and from experience. So when Hippolyta responds with logic
and rational thinking, observing and analysing what the lovers say and do
that niggles with her because of her own experience, she ever so cleverly coun-
termands what his eyes presume, because, as she observes, their stories are con-
firmed by each other. There is corroborative evidence:
But all the story of the night told over,
And all their minds transfigured so together,
More witnesseth than fancy’s images
And grows to something of great constancy;
But, howsoever, strange and admirable. (Dream, 5.1.23–27)
Her arguments must have had some effect, because Theseus, as we already
know, overturns his earlier edict of marriage or death, overbearing Egeus.
True, he might just have been in a good mood, but Hippolyta/Titania, belatedly,
was able to see and respond to their story, as advocate for truth and justice. The
play, in this register, speaks to justice based in experience, and encourages chal-
lenges to convention and the forms in which law takes and how it operates.
Productions of A Midsummer Night’s Dream, too, have challenged conven-
tion at least since Brook’s seminal production of 1970, now to speak better to
time and place, and to respond to joys and fears, criticisms and celebrations,
and to define a sense of identity – or challenge it, asking audiences to pay atten-
tion to the world around them.⁵⁰ The play, regularly in production, seems to now
take the temperature of the social and political world about it, and for it to do
something, not just entertain. Of a new 2016 production by the Sydney Theatre
Company, the artistic director of the company remarked: “For us to do the ump-
teenth production of it in Sydney, we had to have something new to say.”⁵¹ And
that production had lots to say about justice and fairness, and the harshness of
law, reflecting the tenor of the times.
 Rob Conkie, Writing Performative Shakespeares: New Forms for Performance Criticism (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016).
 Andrew Upton, “‘A Message from Andrew Upton’ Program: A Midsummer Night’s Dream,”
(Sydney: Sydney Theatre Company, 2016).
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It might have been thought that a production of the play in Australia in the
late 1980s would also have been politically aware. Now self-confident, aware of
its history and its mainstream obtaining some idea of injustices affecting indig-
enous Australians through popular music, such as through the politically aware
band, Midnight Oil, fronted by lawyer and soon to be politician Peter Garrett,
who made even the most unaware Australian familiar with injustices accorded
to Aboriginal people in their 1987 hit Beds Are Burning, demanding land rights
and justice at a time that it looked like Mabo might not come to fruition. And
by 1991, Australians were soon humming along to a song, called Treaty, by
the band Yothu Yindi. In 1988, its Yolngu members,⁵² had famously handed
the then prime minister of Australia a document created out of bark called the
Barunga Statement, seeking a treaty between indigenous and non-indigenous
Australians. The then prime minister set a date of 1990 for a treaty – which at
2018, is still unfulfilled. The song, however, had a huge success, and in 1992,
a dance version became a global hit.⁵³ Yothu Yindi had people around the
world dancing to a claim for indigenous rights – by a band comprised mostly
of indigenous people and mostly sung in language,⁵⁴ that is the language of
the Yolngu people who made up Yothu Yindi and embedding law and culture
within it– but including parts in English that people could sing along to “Treaty
yeah, treaty now,” without any awareness of this unrealised promise and contin-
ued injustice “back in 1988.”
Sitting between these two immensely powerful instances of popular culture,
the still relatively new Sydney Theatre Company,⁵⁵ began work on a production
of A Midsummer Night’s Dream. It would form part of the annual summer Sydney
Festival, from December 1989 until January 1990.⁵⁶ Yet this Dream did not take its
audience into a politics of reconciliation, or challenge convention. In its own
way, it chose to celebrate an Australian vernacular and place in the world, but
 Dhimurru Aboriginal Corporation, Yolngu Culture, available at: http://www.dhimurru.com.
au/yolngu-culture.html (last access March 20, 2017).
 Treaty (song), available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Treaty (song), (last access March
20, 2017), reaching a position of No. 6 on the Billboard Hot Dance Club Play singles charts.
 Trevor Marshallsea, “Why doesn’t Australia have an indigenous treaty?” (London) BBC News
(Online) (May 24, 2017), available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-40024622 (last
access March 20, 2017).
 It was formed in 1979 out of antecedent organisations. The Company is funded as the flag-
ship state theatre of the Australian state of New South Wales. There are numerous smaller com-
panies throughout the state, and the other Australian states.
 Sydney Theatre Company, “Archive: STC Productions of A Midsummer Night’s Dream” (Syd-
ney) Magazine (July 28, 2016), available at: https://www.sydneytheatre.com.au/magazine/posts/
2016/july/archive-a-midsummer-night-dream (last access March 20, 2017).
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through a new version of a Victorian Romantic expectation of the play, dressed
differently and with different music, some local and some from the rest of the
world, but now spoken as Australians in an Australian accent – and vernacular,
that tried to keep up with the kids,with too many “modern instances” that ignor-
ed its text – at its peril.
4 A Midsummer Night’s Dream, Sydney 1989–
1990
It is mid-summer in Sydney in 1989, and a hugely controversial production of A
Midsummer Night’s Dream opens, directed by the supreme figure of Australian
and Sydney theatre, Richard Wherrett. If anyone had been paying close atten-
tion, they might have noticed that the advertisement for the new production
that would run from 7 December 1989 to 20 January 1990 was a little anomalous.
“Stir up the Australian Youth to Merriment,” the newspaper advertising said.⁵⁷
Purists would have realised that this might have been a play on the original
text “Stir up the Athenian youth to merriments” (Dream, 1.1.12) and perhaps con-
ceived as an advertising gimmick.
Wherrett’s new production turned “Shakespeare’s fairy festooned forest be-
comes a 1980s style dance club called The Wood; the funny, fond and foolish
“mechanicals” performing Pyramus and Thisbe become a rather gritty group
of kids.”⁵⁸ With dramaturg and “translator,” May-Brit Akerholt, Wherrett’s
Dream not only reimagined the place, locale and shape of the production of
the Dream, but rewrote it: “So what we’ve done amounts, in fact, to a major
change in the text. But I don’t think the audience will even realise. The language
just rolls off the tongue more easily than the original.”⁵⁹ But the audience – and
critics – did notice, and though the production was wildly successful, it went
down in Australian theatre history as a fundamentally controversial and not en-
tirely successful production. And his hope “If I’m right in this decision, I think it
will be a pointer to where Shakespeare may go in the future,”⁶⁰ was not entirely
unfounded, because textual changes to this and other Shakespearean plays have
 “Sydney Theatre Co. presents A Midsummer Night’s Dream,” (Sydney) The Sydney Morning
Herald (November 29, 1989), 34.
 STC, “Archive.”
 Pamela Payne, “Dream of the Future,” (Sydney) The Sydney Morning Herald (December 8,
1989): Metro.
 Payne, “Dream Future.”
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become common, but as we have seen, there was nothing new in this kind of
transmutation. What was missing was the exchange – between text and time
and place, as Annette Fraser of Oxford Street, Newtown said in her letter of 4
January 1990, published in Sydney’s main newspaper:
SIR: Recently, I saw the Sydney Theatre Company’s production of A Midsummer Night’s
Dream. I sat through the performance dazzled by the set, fascinated with the concept, dis-
appointed with the acting (except for the brilliant Helen Buday) and strangely unsatisfied
with the text.
As I read through the program after the performance, I saw that the director, Richard Wher-
rett, had seen fit to alter many of Shakespeare’s expressions to clarify meaning and to re-
move ambiguous, archaic terms. The examples provided confirmed my fears. In my opin-
ion, the changes were ugly, clumsy and completely unnecessary.
Much of the beauty and poetry of Shakespeare’s language had been removed for nothing.
Richard Wherrett must assume that his audience has all the intelligence of a deranged tar-
antula. Shakespeare is like music – it should not have to be translated. If the actors are
competent and the direction clear, then the meaning will be obvious.
When I pay $29 to see a Shakespeare play, I expect to see a Shakespeare play, not an abridg-
ed version.⁶¹
She was perhaps too kind. It was tedious, but maybe a few weeks into the pro-
duction, things had improved. I had seen the production in “preview” just before
it opened and it was big on style and short on substance. Richard Wherrett
watched anxiously just behind where I sat with my friends, right at the back
of the theatre, and couldn’t help but have noticed our irritation and impatience.
He might have been a little unhappy with us, but we were all part of that party
scene at the time and some of us, me included, had theatre backgrounds. We
would always be harsh critics.
But there was one really exciting feature of the production which was trans-
fixing – and memorable. The set by Brian Thompson featured a globe on a vast
blue geodesic dome (playing of course on Shakespeare’s theatre), featured a
world sat upside down, with Australia on top of the world, albeit inverted. It
spoke to a new antipodean self-confidence, with Australia subverting its place
in the world at the bottom of the globe, right on top. But along with that Austral-
ian sense of identity was an image of the play that sat firmly in New York City, at
a nightclub called Nell’s, owned by an expatriate Australian, Little Nell.⁶² This
was Wherrett’s vision, a celebration of a sexual politics that challenged conven-
 Annette Fraser, “Bastardised Bard,” (Sydney) Letter to The Sydney Morning Herald (January
6, 1990): 16.
 Payne, “Dream Future.”
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tions of conduct that released the unbuttoned self, to be revealed in its real sense
at night time.⁶³ It was a Dream that spoke to Sydney’s famed Oxford Street, via
New York, drag queens included, relocated to a pub owned by Theseus, who
commissions a party to celebrate this wedding. This was familiar territory for
Wherrett, who also staged drag acts. He was an accomplished director who
was about to turn 50, who succumbed to an HIV illness 10 years later. It was
this politics, not the broader political agenda swirling around at the time, that
imbued this Dream.
One of Sydney’s prominent critics was kind, but firmly insisted that this was
an adaption – and the much vaunted discussion of the “translation” an irrele-
vancy:⁶⁴
THIS is video-clip Shakespeare. It has every indication of being designed and executed –
quite brilliantly – for a generation for whom sound, image, colour and movement mean
virtually everything, while the text is of little account.
The result is diverting, amusing, inventive and above all energetic, but it is not Shake-
speare, any more than the Nimrod’s extremely successful The Venetian Twins a decade
ago was Goldoni.
That will reassure many people. There is nothing in it to be afraid of; it does not matter in
the least if the audience does not understand the text because that text is only the trigger,
the springboard – even the excuse – for the action.
It is curious, therefore, that Richard Wherrett’s interesting program essay concerns itself so
diligently with the question of what he cleverly calls“translating” the text for our times, yet
the text is of such nugatory importance in this extravaganza.
There really was very little that was new, technology and time apart, and he also
quietly remarked on its association with Wherrett’s other interests – and scolded
him for his lack of historical awareness of the transmutative character of the
play. Adaptation, yes, Shakespeare, a firm no:
It is part-pantomime, part drag-show, part rock-opera, in other words, part of a long English
tradition of flamboyant Shakespearean adaptation. The composer Henry Purcell did it in
collaboration with Dryden, with Shadwell (The Tempest) and also with Elkanah Settle in
The Fairy Queen, a florid adaptation of A Midsummer-night’s Dream.⁶⁵
But it was one of the best and most scholarly of theatre critics in Sydney who
picked it for what it was. Also noting its antecedents as a critical backdrop,
 Payne, “Dream Future.”
 John Carmody, “Dream Night for a Midsummer Sydney,” (Sydney) Sun Herald (December 10,
1989): 122.
 Carmody, “Dream Night.”
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Bob Evans remarked that “Perhaps because of its emphasis on magic in an in-
creasingly rational world, Dream has borne so many of the changes wrought
in the theory and practice of theatre this century.”⁶⁶ This prescient remark
spoke to future Dreams, but for now, in noting some of the key productions of
that century, he tied this production to the excess of Beerbohm Tree’s extrava-
ganza of the turn of the twentieth century (rabbits included), and then turns
the screw:
There is more of Tree’s conspicuous consumption and tricksy populism than Brook’s or
Granville-Barker’s [noted earlier] radical sensitivity in the Sydney Theatre Company’s pro-
duction […] Wherrett’s 21st-century production echoes the excesses of a century ago.Where
Tree and Irving had lashings of Mendelssohn’s Sommernachtstraum music, corps de ballets
and children as fairies,Wherrett substitutes Malcolm McLaren’s vogueish Waltzing Darling
and Phillip Glass with hot dance club numbers.⁶⁷
And here’s the rub. Though focussing on the Kottian elements of the play – sex,
the unconscious:
What’s missing from the performances and the production is heart and soul and a sense of
what’s at stake. The cast do not always manage the text, even in translation (which passes
for the real thing and still may offend the purists) […] It is the substance of the play which
has been glossed over⁶⁸.
This inability to manage the text, missing what’s at stake. This was no transmu-
tation, despite the attempt to find the play in place. But as theatre history goes,
this wasn’t the end. Dream has now had four Sydney Theatre Company outings,
and the one following Wherrett’s was altogether different. In 1997, a Dream that
celebrated Indigenous Dreaming, “understood by their diverse Aboriginal adher-
ents to be reality, religion, and the Law,”⁶⁹ took to the stage. Directed by Aborigi-




 Christine Judith Nicolls, “‘Dreamtime’ and ‘The Dreaming’: who dreamed up these terms?”
The Conversation (January 29, 2014), available at: https://theconversation.com/dreamtime-and-
the-dreaming-who-dreamed-up-these-terms-20835 (last access March 20, 2017). See also Chris-
tine Black, “Maturing Australia through Australian Aboriginal Narrative Law,” South Atlantic
Quarterly 110.2 (2011): 347–362; Christine F. Black, The Land is the Source of the Law: A Dialogic
Encounter with Indigenous Jurisprudence (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010).
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nal actor and director Noel Tovey and a stellar cast of Indigenous actors,⁷⁰ it
changed the language of the Dream forever. It made small changes to the
text,⁷¹ to remind non-Indigenous Australians of harms caused to them, but
Tovey intended that the production not be political.⁷² Regardless, the transmuta-
tion of the production that mattered, and that is how it was read.⁷³ This new ex-
change, however, reminded that in the Dream and Dreaming law imbues life and
justice matters, and law comes from land and place, the perfect manifestation of
law grounded in life, place and justice.
However, injustice for indigenous Australians remained, in all facets of life.
And the protection of law was also about to be radically confined. The last of the
key judicial changes to land rights, the Wik case,⁷⁴ was decided just before
Christmas 1996. Political disapproval followed, even though the legal principles
on which the case was decided were sound.⁷⁵In 1998, a so-called conservative
judge was appointed to the High Court, and slowly the court would soon be pre-
dominantly populated by justices who would be less likely to “look beyond” the
books and more likely to narrowly interpret law, as true Baconians. The promise
of the 1980s seemed extinguished, but now, the court is made up, in part of judg-
es who were only learning law in the 1970s and 1980s, and even now in the
1990s. What had changed then is now part of law. Turning back into the books
now looks different, and the court is very different too. Even if eyes do not
look up and out too often, it is harder now to ignore the world around.
And so too, A Midsummer Night’s Dream. In the 2016 production mounted by
the Sydney Theatre Company, the Tiwi Island actor, Rob Collins, was cast as
Lysander.⁷⁶ Discussing his place as the only indigenous actor in the production
he remarked:
 Emma Cox, “‘What’s past is prologue’: Performing Shakespeare and Aboriginality in Austral-
ia,” Multicultural Shakespeare: Translation, Appropriation and Performance 8.23 (2011): 71–92,
80–85.
 Emma Cox, “Negotiating Cultural Narratives: All-Aboriginal Shakespearean Dreaming,”
Southerly 64.3 (2004–2005): 15–27.
 Cox, “Negotiating Cultural Narratives,” 18.
 Cox, “Negotiating Cultural Narratives”; Cox, “What’s past is prologue.”
 Wik Peoples v Queensland [1996] HCA 40.
 Maureen Tehan, “A Hope Disillusioned, an Opportunity Lost? Reflections on Common Law
Native Title and Ten Years of the Native Title Act,” Melbourne University Law Review 27.2 (2003):
523–571.
 Tiwi Islands available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tiwi_Islands (last access March 20,
2017).
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The ideal scenario is to have an actor, regardless of race, creed or colour, picked for his abil-
ity […] Mr Collins said he is drawing on his background to interpret A Midsummer Night’s
dream, comparing Shakespeare’s fairies to similar mythologies in his own culture. “We
have a wealth of stories of little men who steal children into the bushes. ⁷⁷
This exchange, the transmutation of Shakespeare as part of a modern Australia,
in its own way reflects the position of law now. We were left knowing that law,
and the challenges to law in the absence of looking and seeing and being aware
of justice was not just a problem, but a danger to a properly functioning polity. A
few weeks later, Donald Trump was elected President of the United States of
America.
 David Spicer, “Indigenous artists taking centre-stage at Sydney Opera House,” (Australia)
Australian Broadcasting Corporation (September 9, 2016), available at: http://www.abc.net.au/
news/2016-09-09/indigenous-artists-taking-centre-stage-at-sydney-opera-house/7832542 (last ac-
cess March 20, 2017).
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